Canberra, 13 June 1963
Secret
Defence and Malaysia
In March this year our Cabinet decided to defer a decision as to Australia’s defence relationship with Malaysia until Malaysia comes into being or, in other words, until the issue comes up in a more concrete way.3
Bunting has told me that there was a strongly held view that Australia should be prepared to undertake a more direct responsibility for the defence of Malaya, than is set out in the present exchange of letters between the British and ourselves. But the feeling was that this more direct responsibility should in no sense be the major responsibility. Other partners would be expected to play their full part.
Although this was not said directly, the thinking seemed to be in terms of our becoming a party to a Malaysian Defence Agreement with specific responsibilities, rather than in terms of merely associating ourselves with a British–Malaysian Agreement. If not that, then in terms of having some arrangement of a firm and committing sort. It was felt that if we were a partner in a more definite arrangement this would have some inhibiting implications in respect of Indonesia.
There is no reason why we need to determine this issue at this time, but the British should be left with a sense that we intend to fulfil our obligations. Our objective should be to stiffen the British in the defence of Malaysia. In stressing this we might exhibit a readiness on our part to recognize our own interest in the defence of Malaysia and therefore our willingness to assume some responsibility.
Tange has stressed to me that the threat from China is increasing. The maximum British commitment in Malaysia is vital to the security of Australia. With the increase in the potential threat to the area, there would be no improvement in our security if we were to do a little more merely to enable the British to do a little less.
Moreover United States policy in the South-East Asian area would seem to be based on the understanding that the defence of Malaysia will be a Commonwealth responsibility in which the British will be expected to play a full part.
Moreover the British should appreciate that their prestige in Asia is largely in proportion to their commitments in Malaya.
The objective is to stress British interest and commitment and our expectation that they will meet their defence responsibilities in the area in full.
[NAA: A1209, 1963/6651]
1 James Nimmo, Deputy Secretary, PMD.
2 Menzies was due to visit London, Washington and Ottawa for talks.
3 Not published. See Cabinet Decision No. 706 (FAD), 28 March 1963.