Kuala Lumpur, 16 July 1963
415. Secret
415. Secret
Indonesia and Malaysia
Your 477.1
Washington telegram 18072 has not yet been received.
2. Tunku is unlikely to be back in Kuala Lumpur until towards end of next week but I have spokn with Razak and Tunku Ngah.3 Malayans are aware of importance of exercising restraint. Tunku has reiterated in London his intention to stand by Manila agreement and last night Razak emphasised the same thing (our telegram 414).4
3. In addition Tunku and Ghazali in London and Razak in Kuala Lumpur have explained to respective Indonesian Ambassadors precise constitutional significance of the London agreement. However suspect Soekamo’s outburst was mainly motivated by realisation that contrary to his hopes even after Tokyo and Manila, he is unlikely to be able to prevent Malaysia on 31 st August. I agree with Selkirk (my memorandum 642)5 that Indonesians are likely to argue that unless Malaysia is based on ‘proper self-determination’ (e.g. plebiscite under United Nations) Indonesia will be obliged to support the insurrections that must be expected. I think it significant that Subandrio was stung to sharp reaction yesterday when Prime Minister drew attention to odd contrast between Indonesia’s approach to Malaysia and its objections to plebiscite in West Irian.6
4. Djatik Sumo7 told Razak on July 12th that Soekamo was especially angry about a statement attributed by Indonesian press to Tunku when he arrived in London to the effect that because of importance of trade with Malaya, Indonesian rejection of Malaysia would bring the Indonesian economy to ruins. Razak countered by pointing out that this press report was old, unsubstantiated and had no bearing on London agreement. He added that if Indonesians had been concerned about report they had had ample opportunity to seek explanation through diplomatic channels.
5. In London Indonesian Ambassador has also sought clarification from the Tunku whether his reported statement could be considered a ‘threat’ to Indonesian economy. The Tunku explained that he had answered a pointed question by saying that Indonesian recognition of Malaysia was a matter for Indonesia but that in his private opinion it was not in interests of Indonesia not to recognise Malaysia because of the volume of trade involved. Tunku emphasised that he had spoken factually and in no manner or intention of slighting Indonesia. Nothing he had said would justify Indonesian concern or the reports in Indonesian papers that he had threatened economic sanctions.
6. Chester Bowles8 who had just come from Djakarta told me yesterday that although he had met Soekamo on very many occasions he had never found him in such an unreasoning and difficult mood as he was in now about Malaysia. Bowles believes however that Soekamo will attend summit meeting and draws hope from the fact that Soekamo is surrounded by people notably Djuanda9 and Nasution who are urging moderation.
7. I would also guess that Soekamo might not have relished going to summit meeting merely to confirm Manila Agreement and in effect the success of the Tunku in London. The summit may be more attractive to him now that he has leading role in crises.10
8. Malayans believe that much now depends on U Thant’s attitude. Razak has cabled Ong Yoke Lin11 instructing him to seek to convince U Thant that elections in Sarawak and North Borneo are convincing evidence of popular support for Malaysia. Brunei will also be cited as evidence that Borneo States are not being pushed into Federation against their wishes.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 8]
1 13 July 1963, suggesting that Critchley urge the Tunku to exercise restraint and perhaps send a personal explanation of the London Agreements to Sukarno. Canberra’s reaction was perhaps in response to press reports that the Tunku had said that he did not care what Sukarno thought about the agreement, and that any refusal by Indonesia to recognise Malaysia would have serious repercussions on Indonesia’s economy. By this time, however, the Tunku had called on the Indonesian Ambassador in London, Burhanudin Mohamad Diah, and asked him to assure Sukarno that the London Agreement was not contrary to the Manila Agreement, which he continued to support, and that he was ‘available at any time, at any place’ to discuss any aspect of the formation of Malaysia ‘in a friendly spirit’.
2 12 July, reporting talks with State Department officials on American efforts in Jakarta to mollify Sukarno’s reaction to events in London, and their view that the Tunku needed to be more conciliatory in dealing with Indonesia over Malaysia.
3 Tunku Mohamed Ngah, Malayan Deputy Secretary of External Affairs.
4 Cablegram reported a statement to the press by Razak the previous evening, 15 July, in which he outlined the procedural aspects of the London Agreement, and reaffirmed the government’s intention ‘to adhere to the spirit of the accord in Tokyo and also to the spirit and the letter of understanding in Manila’. The statement was made after Razak’s discussions on these matters with the Malayan Ambassador to Indonesia, who had returned from Jakarta for consultations, and the Indonesian Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur.
5 5 July 1963. It reported on current Maiayan–Indonesian relations, and on Selkirk’s claims that there was evidence of a stepping-up of the Indonesians’ propaganda and subversive efforts in the Borneo territories, and of continuing raids across the Sarawak border. Selkirk also said these were signs that they had not given up the idea of insisting on an Indonesian-approved plebiscite in the territories before Malaysia could be established.
6 Indonesia was attempting to negotiate the form of the act of self-determination in West Irian which the 1962 handover agreement determined should take place in 1969.
7 Lieutentant General Djatikasumo, Indonesian Ambassador to Malaya.
8 US Special Representative and Adviser to the President for African, Asian and Latin American Affairs.
9 Raden Djuanda Kartawidjaja, Indonesian First Minister.
10 Probably, ‘crisis’.
11 Malayan Ambassador to the US and Permanent Representative at the UN.