Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 1963
445. Secret Immediate
Malaysia
Your telegrams 511 and 512.1
1. Baldwin saw Tunku today. Baldwin did not refer to invitation to both Malaysia celebrations. We both feel that it would have been far more damaging to have failed to send Indonesia an invitation when others were sent. In any case an invitation is consistent with position that Malayans have maintained on all occasions that Malaysia cannot be delayed.
2. Baldwin’s main purpose was to persuade Tunku to issue another public statement. Tunku at first resisted saying he had already sent Sukarno innumerable messages. These had all emphasised that he (Tunku)—
(a) was a man of his word and intended to abide by letter and spirit of agreements at Tokyo and Manila.
(b) would be prepared to meet Sukarno at any time and place to discuss any misunderstandings.
(c) would do this because of his determination to live up to the treaty of friendship with Indonesia.
However Tunku eventually agreed to issue further statement and telegraph it to his Embassy in Djakarta for passing to Indonesians. (Text in my immediately preceding telegram.)2
3. Tunku indicated to Baldwin that his preferred position at Summit would be to stand by Manila agreement and leave it to U Thant to decide procedure for ascertaining people’s wishes. As fall-back position he would be agreeable to detailed instructions for ‘auditing’ the recent elections in North Borneo and Sarawak.
4. As seen from here key issues are internal situation in Indonesia and the date of Malaysia rather than self-determination which by any reasonable standard has already been exercised. I would prefer not to press Tunku to change his proposed tactics especially as there could be disadvantage for the Federation going beyond Manila agreement and making positive proposals at an early stage of Summit. Sukarno might feel bound to oppose them whereas he might accept ‘audit’ type compromise if it appeared to be result of his own intervention.
5. It seems to me Malayans must have scope for manoeuvre of3 Summit. I agree that they should not rely merely on some simple policy of ‘leaving it to U Thant’. But as first position it would have two advantages. First it is the logical position following the Manila agreement and secondly it can be assumed that Sukarno will want to take some initiative himself. Tunku’s acceptance of fall back position gives me an opportunity to continue to emphasise the importance of going to Manila armed with detailed proposals along lines you have been discussing with State Department.4 These could provide for United Nations Secretariat checking the recent elections in North Borneo and Sarawak to ensure that—
(a) Malaysia was a major issue.
(b) Majority of elected representatives support Malaysia.
(c) Elections were fairly held without coercion.
(d) Results were correct and votes were correctly counted.
6. Foregoing seems in line with your own thinking and unless I receive instructions to the contrary I shall put these ideas to Tunku during weekend.
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 9]
1 26 July 1963, They related to American efforts to ensure that Sukarno attended the summit meeting, and the State Department’s hope that Critchley could join the US Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, Charles Baldwin, in ensuring that the Malayans could provide ‘positive proposals on the issue of self-determination’ for this meeting. The summit was again under threat because Sukarno had been enraged that formal invitations were now being extended to attend the Malaysia inauguration ceremonies beginning on 31 August, which seemingly ignored the proposed ascertainment in the Borneo territories.
2 Not published.
3 Possibly, ‘at’.
4 See footnote 2, Document 87.