Kuala Lumpur, 28 July 1963
Top Secret Personal
Top Secret Personal
Many thanks for your letter of the 16th July on future Australian defence arrangements with Malaysia.1 As I am leaving for Borneo in the morning I shall not be able to give you considered opinions but the following are my first reactions to your paper. While on reflection I might want to modify some of them, I am fairly confident that my interpretation of present Malayan opinion is accurate.
2. First in general terms I agree with your feelings that we should ride along quietly much along the present lines. But as you already know I favour more precision about our commitment and I would agree with the opinion in the paper that this could best be done in our Letter of Association.
3. I must confess that I did not like paragraph 3 of the paper. Basically the issue is whether we want to defend Australia at our borders or north of them. If the latter the defence of Malaysia is vital. In this case we cannot afford to let Malaysia fail if it is within our capacity to prevent it. Malaysia is the area outside of Australia where we have defence bases, where our influence and goodwill are greatest and where there is by far the best opportunity for understanding and co-operative development.
4. In practice I believe that the stationing of Australian Forces with the Strategic Reserve is a commitment to defend Malaysia, and I see little purpose in attempting to disguise the fact. Even if we withdraw our Forces the use of Butterworth could remain a vital part of our strategy.2 I cannot see that the British have a greater responsibility or interest in the defence of Malaysia than we have. Their interest is peripheral and ours could be vital. Accordingly I am not impressed by paragraph 11 of the paper.
5. I do not believe that an agreement should derive only from our wish to station forces within Malaysian Territory (paragraph 4 of the paper) but primarily from our strategic interest in the security of the area including Malaysia.
6. I would also query whether the British would want to obstruct our acquiring separate rights to what have been historically their bases. And I do not understand why the point of acquiring these rights would be to engage in operations to which they were not a party.
7. The Federation Government would like to develop closer defence ties with us and for this reason would probably respond favourably to the suggestion that we negotiate a separate defence agreement. The Federation would also probably assume that we would prefer this as publicly reflecting less subservience to the United Kingdom.
8. When it came to the point of negotiation, however, the Malayans would certainly prefer to avoid a precise definition of rights to deploy our forces freely for operational purposes etc. This problem need not be insurmountable but I am convinced it is better avoided. Not least because of Indonesia this would be a bad time for the Malayans to have substantial defence questions debated in public or parliament. As you say some vagueness will have to be accepted as necessary for the Malayan Government.
9. In the circumstances something along the lines of your paragraph 16 seems to be the best answer. Although not pertinent to your paper I would suggest that it might also be associated with our taking a more active and realistic interest in joint planning and defence consultations generally with Malaysia as well as in aid (equipment, training and secondments) to the Federation Armed Services. We have a unique opportunity to develop the Federation Armed Services in our interests and it would be deplorable if we failed to take it.
10. At first glance, I like the idea of exploring the possibilities along the lines of the suggestions in your paragraph 19 but I think we should move slowly and the present prospects for the Summit and for Indonesia are not propitious.
11. Then there is the question of SEATO exercises. I recommend that we continue to play this quietly and seek no binding understandings. I agree with Tory (our memorandum 716 of the 24th July)3 and for the same reasons, that it would be unwise to raise this matter formally. In practice any quarantine restrictions will at worst be irksome and that on the basis of private arrangements any inconvenience can be minimised and any real difficulties overcome.4 If we do not make them an issue I expect the Malayans to agree to their being quietly dropped before long.
12. I also agree with you that use of our Forces in support of the civil power against subversion should be a separate matter and that we should certainly not attempt to provide for this a public exchange of letters.
13. I have not attempted to discuss the problem of our relations with Indonesia. I believe the Indonesians accept that we are committed to defend Malaysia but we should not flaunt this before them and we should avoid if we can publicity that would provoke them. In other words we should continue to express our commitments as far as possible in a way that is consistent with our policy of friendship towards Indonesia. On the other hand I believe it would be a mistake to refrain from measures that are in our interests simply because we fear Indonesian reactions. I would also suggest that we go to some trouble to explain to the Indonesians through diplomatic channels any steps that we expect them to resent.
[NAA: A1838, TS 682/21/1 part 13]
1 Not published. Waller had enclosed a copy of Jockel’s paper (Document 84) for Critchley’s comment. He told Critchley that ‘our own feelings are that we should ride quietly, much along the present lines, but if we could introduce more precision and clarity into the statement of rights and obligations it would be desirable to do so’.
2 Butterworth, located on the northwest coast of Malaya, officially became a RAAF base on 1 July 1958. It could house three front-line squadrons (sabre fighters and Canberra bombers), substantial numbers of transient aircraft (including transports and helicopters), and supporting units. Butterworth was the most forward Commonwealth air base in Southeast Asia and a key element in Australia’s forward defence strategy.
3 Not published.
4 As a non-member of SEATO, Malaya opposed the direct deployment of CSR forces for SEATO purposes from Commonwealth bases in Malaya. The practice for Commonwealth forces leaving Malaya to take part in SEATO exercises was for them to be stationed first in Singapore for a few days’ ‘quarantine’. The question as to whether the continuance of this practice should be raised with the Malayan Government, or whether the procedure should be dispensed with, had been discussed informally between the UK, New Zealand and Australian High Commissions in Kuala Lumpur.