Canberra, 23 August 1968
Secret
TPNG border contingency planning
Threat Assessment
The consensus of opinion in discussion that took place in the light of oral assessments given by Mr Starey and Commander Black was as follows:—
• it was unlikely that disturbances would take place on the arrival of the United Nations Mission at Sukarnapura as West lrianese nationalist leaders would probably not want to show their hand at that stage. Latest intelligence reports supported this view;
• in the event of disturbances in the immediate future or later it was possible that there would be a selective movement of key personnel pursued by Indonesian police or troops, but the notion of large bands followed closely by Indonesian troops was somewhat unreal;
• Indonesia was unlikely to deliberately send armed forces into TPNG and any crossings by patrols would probably be due to misunderstanding because of lack of clear border demarcation. If troops did cross they would probably withdraw on request;
• as crossings for political reasons would be related to events in Sukarnapura and Merauke (in both of which centres the Indonesian authorities might take repressive measures before the end of the year) movements of political refugees would tend to be mainly to Administration posts closest to those centres (Wutung in the north and Weam in the south) and it would be wise to make provision for up to 2,000 refugees in the north and about 500 in the south;
• the road between Merauke and Weam made Weam the most likely centre to receive refugees in large groups; in the north, because of the difficulties of the country, they would be more likely to come through in dribs and drabs although total crossings might be higher than in the south;
• as the Indonesian authorities’ intelligence collection was well organised and as they had had some success in combatting nationalist activities, it was possible that the nationalists would be less active in the future than in the past. Nevertheless the possibility remained that at some point of time West Irianese dissidents might decide that the act of self-determination was a mockery and that they had no alternative but to give up the struggle and get out.
Contingency Planning
2. It was agreed that, although an immediate increase in the flow of refugees was unlikely, lack of certainty about future developments made it desirable to plan courses of action related to the possibility of large–scale movements, and to obtain any necessary Ministerial approval for action proposed.
3. Mr Holt pointed out that the role of the armed forces in any situation that might develop would primarily depend on what the Administration itself could achieve with its own resources. It was therefore necessary to know what the Administration’s plans were and what kind of help it might need.
Administration plans
4. It was agreed that, as it was uncertain how and in precisely what area or areas a situation might develop, what was needed was not so much a detailed physical plan for setting up refugee camps or establishing stocks of food and equipment at particular points, but rather a plan for the administrative control of a developing situation. This would involve drawing up a set of directions and procedures which would ensure speedy action to—
• handle requests from field staff for assistance;
• reinforce particular posts with DDA field staff, police and Public Health Department staff;
• transport additional food, medical stores etc. to the areas where they were needed;
• establish refugee camps where existing accommodation proved inadequate.
• It was also considered that the plan—
• should include instructions to field staff and police (along the lines of PNG Command Operational Instruction No. 1/67)2 for action in the event of contact with armed groups of refugees or Indonesian Army or police patrols;
• should give a general indication of the size of influx the Administration would need help to deal with.
5. Brigadier Hopton said that if it were thought that Army could assist the Administration to formulate its plans it would be happy to do so.
6. Brigadier Hopton pointed out that there were two ways in which Service assistance might be required to supplement the Administration’s plans—
(a) logistic and administrative assistance in handling a large influx of unarmed refugees; and
(b) operational action within the limits of PNG Command Operational Instruction No. 1/67 in the event of Indonesian troops crossing into Australian territory.
7. As regards (b) action might involve taking charge of any refugees who were being pursued and informing the pursuing forces that they were now in Australian territory and must withdraw. Such action might be taken by Army patrols operating either separately or in support of Administration patrols but in either case the limits imposed by Operational Instruction No. 1/67 would apply.
8. It was agreed that it would be desirable to take all possible steps on the diplomatic side to prevent situation (b) from occurring.
9. Defence would need to have information on theAdministration’s plans and requirements under both (a) and (b) as a basis for the further development of a Joint Service plan.
Diplomatic action
10. Mr Jockel stated that External Affairs had so far found it difficult to get to grips with the Indonesian authorities on the question of dissident West lrianese wanting to take refuge in TPNG. A start could now be made however on the basis of the Indonesian charge that West lrianese permissive residents in TPNG were carrying on anti-Indonesian activity. If the Indonesians could be assured that steps were being taken to hold these persons to their undertaking not to engage in such activity, it might be possible to give further assurances that any West Irianese whom we allowed into TPNG would be ‘taken out of the game’ so far as the nationalist movement was concerned.
11. It could also probably be pointed out at this stage that because of lack of clear definition of the border, troops of either side might inadvertently cross it, and to obtain agreement that in such an event the proper thing would be to withdraw immediately. Djakarta might even be prepared to instruct its forces that they were not to cross the border. 1t was important to try to get directives on both sides which would prevent incidents on the ground from taking place.
Identification Of Indonesian Armed Forces
12. On the question of briefing Administration officers and police on the identification of members of the Indonesian armed forces Brigadier Hopton thought that Papua and New Guinea Command would have all the necessary information for this purpose.
Summary Of Action To Be Taken
13. It was agreed that action should proceed on the following lines:—
External Territories
•To obtain from the Administration and pass to Defence particulars of the Administration’s plans and requirements. (In this connection Army’s offer of assistance to the Administration in formulating its plans was acknowledged.)
•To consult the Administration about the enforcement of undertakings by West Irianese permissive residents not to engage in political activity. ( Mr Besley undertook to consult Mr Jockel further on this.)
•To obtain from the Administration a thorough assessment of probable Papuan and New Guinean attitudes to future West Irianese refugees.
Defence and Army
• When particulars of the Administration’s plans and requirements were received by Defence they will be used as a basis for the further development of a Joint Service contingency plan.
External Affairs
• Once the necessary assurance regarding control of West Irianese permissive residents in Papua and New Guinea has been obtained from External Territories, External Affairs to take up with the Indonesian authorities the matters outlined at paragraphs 10 and 11 above.
[NAA: A1838,3034/10/1/4 part 2]
1 The meeting was attended by representatives from DOET (Besley, Galvin and Legge), DEA (Jockel, Starey and J.S. Holloway (Third Secretary, Australian Embassy, Djakarta)), Defence (Commander A.D. Black (Naval Member, Joint Intelligence Staff) and Holt (initials and position unidentified)) and Army (Brigadier L.I. Hopton (Director, Military Operations and Plans, JPC) and Major (presumably, K. W. Major, Assistant Secretary, Planning Branch)).
2 See footnote 9, Document 213.