Canberra, 3 December 1968 .
Confidential
Following their return from the Territory Dr Sinclair and Brigadier Campbell prepared some notes on the Bougainville situation. A copy of the paper is attached.
The paper raises a number of points which require consideration for further action and these are listed in a separate attachment 1 The Minister is particularly interested in this and has enquired what steps are being taken to give effect to the suggestions made. I would be glad to have your views on the specific recommendations which might be submitted to the Minister for consideration. 2
[matter omitted]
Attachment
Notes On The Bougainville Situation
Separation movements generally
1. Independence movements like the ‘Bougainville Referendum’ and the ‘Melanesian Independence Party’3 should not be regarded as wilful rebellion against the Administration. They are normal and predictable results of political education and growing sophistication of the people. If they did not occur the Administration would have failed in its efforts to make the people politically aware.
2. The assumed probable causes of these movements are:
a. political awareness already mentioned;
b. frustrations generated as a result of conflict between the political and economic aspirations of the sophisticated minority and the restraints imposed by paternalistic control exercised by the Administration;
c. conflict between the customary dispersion of native power systems into local units and the western practice of centralisation of control;
d. individual motivations: e.g., there is little doubt that Paul LAPUN’s political ambitions influenced his support of the referendum proposals. Similarly, there are grounds for suspicion that the economic goals of some expatriates influenced the Melanesian Independence move.
Causes specific to Bougainville
3. In addition to those causes common to independence listed in para 2 above, those specific to Bougainville appear to fall under the following headings:
a. Historical
b. Psychological
c. Social
4. Historical
Many Bougainville people harbour a lasting and deep rooted resentment at the treatment they have received at the hands of white men. This has been contributed by—
a. ‘Black birding’ of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There is evidence that stories are still passed from father to son.
b. Periodic changes of titular ‘ownership’ of the island—British, German, Australian, Japanese, Australian—have produced on the people a belief that they are regarded as ‘chattels’.
c. The phrase ‘Black Buka Bastard’ has been, and still is, used by some Europeans and red skins. The fact that Bougainville males were used as bodyguards to the Germans in New Britain does little to foster mutual affection between them and the Tolais.
5. Psychological
a. The people hold strong opinions about their ‘superiority’ over both ‘white skins’ and ‘red skins’. These opinions are believed to be a compensatory mechanism stemming from basic feelings of inferiority over the marked difference of their skin colour.
b. The historical forces stated above have led to a denigration of their own ‘self image’ which in turn has fostered strong and generalised feelings of resentment.
6. Social
a. Whether it is justified or not, the people have a strongly held opinion that the Administration has ‘neglected’ Bougainville in favour of other parts of the Territory. They tend to perceive the Missions as the source of all the benefits they have received.
b. They have growing feelings of disenchantment with the Missions—in particular with the Roman Catholic sector. This is not based necessarily on religious grounds but on
(1) the equivocal political attitudes shown by different Mission priests;
(2) the slowness with which the Missions have delivered the ‘cargo’ i.e. produced material progress and personal gains.
c. Education of younger people has
(1) created feelings of inferiority and indecision amongst the older and more conservative leaders;
(2) has enabled the younger men to read widely and to become aware of the relevant contemporary situations in Nauru and newly independent African states. These they compare with Bougainville conditions. It might be noted that some of their views are more superficial and emotional than insightful and reasoned.
d. The advent of CRA has been a precipitating and not a causal factor. It has had two opposing effects:
(1) the rapid cultural change it will enforce generates fear and resentment;
(2) knowledge of the presence of copper reinforces feelings of superiority over other parts of the Territory and induces the fantasy that the people can exploit this source of wealth.
The Administration
7. Its Dilemma
a. In an earlier report (1964 Follow Up Study on Mental Health of the Indigenes of TPNG)4 we commented
‘Any administrative authority attempting to implement a process of cultural change in an immature preliterate social group is in the unenviable position of a parent attempting to guide a family of not very co-operative adolescents towards adulthood.
Any parental figure, real or substitute can exercise his authority at three levels of maturity. Firstly, at the lowest level, he may be authoritarian, “directing” the adolescent to behave to a set pattern. Secondly, he may be “paternalistic”, inviting the adolescent to accept one, or several, alternative modes of behaviour which he, the father, thinks appropriate. Thirdly, at the most mature level, he may set definite limits to areas of behaviour, and within these limits, allow the adolescent complete freedom. The first form of control invites outright rejection except from the submissive and the anxious; the second elicits limited co-operation and the third gains maximum co-operation.’
b. This is the precise situation in which the Administration finds itself in BOUGAINVILLE. It faces the dilemma of deciding to what degree it can relax its paternalistic control and encourage permissive risk taking. If it remains paternalistic it will be resented. If it is permissive, its new attitude may be perceived as weakness.
c. The only solution to this problem appears to be the application of a masked and subtle form of directiveness which will give the native people greater control and responsibility.
8. Its Image
a. The Administration’s past policy of permitting the Missions, under subsidy, to provide the vital social services of Education and Health has had two unfortunate effects:
(1) it has created for itself the image of a ‘neglecting parent’ and consequently has become the object of paranoid projective thinking expressed in the frequently repeated accusation that ‘BOUGAINVILLE has been neglected’;
(2) it has placed itself in a position of weakness vis-a-vis the Missions, a situation which the people are actively exploiting.
b. The Administration image has not been enhanced, by the ‘go-stop’ nature of the projects its officers have undertaken, e.g.
(1) its failure to proceed with the construction of the JABA–LAMBALAM road after purchase of land for road alignment and after definite assurances that the road would be built;
(2) the failure of the successive agricultural efforts attempted in the south of the island.
c. The task of creating a new image must be undertaken without delay. Steps which can be taken towards this end are
(1) better and more direct communication with the people;
(2) publicising the Administration’s contributions to the Missions in the fields of education and medicine;
(3) publicising the Administration’s direct contributions to the improvement of the island;
(4) recognising that BOUGAINVILLE is, and will continue to be, basically an agricultural economy and therefore making a massive contribution in the form of more and better experienced agricultural advisers and better communication facilities;
(5) having in mind that the education of children will affect the policies of the next two decades, provide increased Administration educational facilities;
(6) recognising that the quickest way to the hearts of Bougainville women, who exert no mean influence, is through the health of their children, provide increased Administration medical facilities.
9. Communication With The People
a. Improved communication between Administration and people is vital. Continuing the simile of parent and adolescents outlined above, the adolescents (the people) expect two kinds of communication:
(1) emotional—in the form of understanding and ACCEPTING their rebellious attitudes;
(2) operational—in the form of guiding them to make constructive use of their drives.
b. The Administration is strong in the latter and lamentably weak in the former. In discussing this question with a number of native persons apropos key figures in the Administration, the common response was—
‘Yes, they understand us and talk to us from here (indicating the head) but they don’t understand us and talk to us’ from here (indicating the heart)’.
c. Some DNA5 officers are skilled in both kinds of communication, vide the dramatic change that has occurred in the attitudes of the BUKA people over the past 4 years. The Administration would be well advised to identify such officers and ensure they fill key posts in BOUGAINVILLE.
d. One further point on communication must be made. Native people are literal and pragmatic in their interpretation of the spoken word. They are incapable of understanding the fine shades of ‘implication’ used by Europeans. They do understand a firm ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Diplomatic statements the Secretary makes, like ‘The referendum proposal will be given favourable consideration’ are interpreted as an agreement the referendum will be carried out. An audible speculation about ‘liking to build a road’ is interpreted to mean the road will be commenced immediately … It is vital that no person in authority—Minister, Secretary, Administrator or Administration officer makes these kinds of statements.
10. Control
a. Mention has been made of the native’s resistance to centralised control because it runs counter to their traditional concept of dispersion of power. They suspect and fear the demands of the ‘Government in Port Moresby’. Their attitude was summarised by Mr. PITA LUS in the royalties debate, ‘If the money comes here it will only be used in Port Moresby. All these things are done in Port Moresby and not in other places.’
b. We believe that this attitude can be countered only by permitting the senior Administration official in BOUGAINVILLE a degree of autonomy and by conferring on him the power to implement decisions and authorise expenditure of money on urgent projects without reference to KONEDOBU. This approach may appear impossible within the present Bureaucratic framework of the Administration, but the possibility of giving the local DC even limited local financial resources should be investigated.
c. As an extension of the need for dispersed control the Government would do well to realise that the permissive benign, yet authoritative control required by the Territory as a whole can NOT be exercised from CANBERRA.
The Missions?
11. The paper ‘The Bougainville Situation ’6 prepared by Ashton7 et al sets out adequately the position relating to the Missions. It is sufficient to comment that although the Missions still exert a powerful influence, the growing disenchantment of the people, the denominational differences between Missions and the internal disagreement in political attitudes within the Marist Mission all create lines of fission which can be exploited.
C.R.A.
12. Role In Current Unrest
a. The presence of CRA is not a major cause of BOUGAINVILLE dissension. It is best regarded as a current and a precipitating event but not a crucial one.
b. The local adverse reaction to CRA’s exploratory operations was logical and inevitable because those operations:
(1) violated customary land rights;
(2) threatened to force on the people sudden and unwanted cultural change;
(3) created fear.
c. The objections raised by people in the PANGUNA area were used by vocal anti-Administration, anti-white agitators as propaganda themes to spread anti-CRA attitudes throughout the island.
d. The success of this propaganda was aided by the attitudes of some Marist priests who undoubtedly saw CRA as a threat to their own material and political control.
13. Current Native Attitudes Towards Cra
a. The BOUGAINVILLE people are NOT unanimous in their attitudes towards CRA. Their reactions vary widely according to location, status, age and education.
b. Reasons for pro-CRA attitudes range from specific benefits—more roads, earn more money—to the generalised statement that CRA is ‘gut pela samting’ .8
c. Stated reasons for opposition to CRA are:—
(1) ‘If CRA had explained themselves to us prior to operations, and had asked our permission, we would have granted it; but they did not do so, so we are against them.’
(2) ‘CRA is taking all our good land and leaving us with no places to live or to plant crops on.’
(3) ‘CRA is looting our Island of all its treasure and giving us little or nothing in return. When “Independence” comes our land will be “skin nothing!”’.
(4) ’The money paid by CRAin “taxes” will all go to Port Moresby, with few or no benefits going to Bougainville in general, or to the dispossessed land owners in particular.’ (A variant on this theme is that the ‘tax’ is going into building skyscrapers, etc., in Port Moresby, and that when ‘Independence’ arrives Papua (as distinct from New Guinea) will be incorporated into Australia.)
(5) ‘CRA people (whites and redskins) are after our women—as evidenced by the “women wanted” sign that was posted, by the visits of (excursioning) men to our villages, and by many actual (i.e. rumoured) cases of rape and of attempted rape.’
(6) ‘CRA will have a bad effect on our young people. They go there, earn lots of money and many evil ways and when they come home they will not do as we tell them any more.’
(7) ’CRA is digging holes 600 miles deep thereby endangering the Island, since the water will come up through these holes and flood the whole Island.’
(8) ’CRA is lying to us about “exploration”; it is already mining copper and selling it.’
d. A brief summary of area reactions are
(1) GUAVA Area. Generally not pro-CRA, but being replaced by an unwilling acceptance of the inevitable. All above anti-CRA reasons except (7).
(2) ROVOVANA. Anti-CRA reasons (3), (4) and (8) balanced by pro-CRA attitudes.
(3) NORTH & SOUTH NASOR. Same anti-CRA reactions as GUAVA. Some pro-CRA sentiments.
(4) BUIN & SIVAI. Anti-CRA attitudes (3, 4 and 6) outweighed by CRA support and disinterest.
(5) NAGOVISI. Strong anti-CRA attitudes.
(6) WAKUNAI. Evenly divided pro and anti-CRA.
(7) BUKA PASSAGE & BUKA. Generally pro-CRA.
14. Cra Attitude Towards Native People
a. CRA is taking [an] enlightened course in its relations with the people. It wishes to proceed with the project as quickly as possible, but in doing so is anxious that it disturbs the native situation as little as possible.
b. It has sought expert advice from two anthropologists (OLIVER9 and NAYACAKALOU),10 is employing a psychologist from 1st January 1969, and cooperates with the Administration.
c. The CRA submissions attached to the paper ‘BOUGAINVILLE Situation’ sets out the situation much as we saw it.
15. He Future
a. CRA officers are non-committal about the future, [and] although current indications are that the company will proceed with operations, there is always the possibility that in an adverse political climate it would be prepared to write off the project. If it took the latter course, its departure would NOT solve the BOUGAINVILLE problem.
b. However, if it proceeds to exploit the copper deposits, its operations will exacerbate the total situation.
c. It may be accepted that CRA’s interests are not altruistic.
Lines of fission in BOUGAINVILLE
16. The greatest asset the Administration has in the manipulation of the BOUGAINVILLE situation is that the people are NOT united on practically every major issue. The most obvious lines of fission are—
A Political
(1) Current old and more conservative leaders v. younger educated and impatient men aspiring to leadership. This was obvious at the conference of Local Government Councils held in KIETA.
(2) Local Government Councillors v. sitting members of the House of Assembly. Paul LAP UN and Josep LUE did NOT attend the KIETA conference.
This did NOT please the delegates who sent LAPUN a message to come by the next plane. He did NOT show up
(3) Sitting MHA’s v. some of their electors. Donatus MOLA has already been warned by his electors that he is in the House of Assembly to REPRESENT THEM and not to exploit his own personal ideas.
(4) MOLA v. LAPUN and LUE. There is some evidence that they are NOT united in their attitudes to the referendum or to CRA.
B Religious
(1) Roman Catholic Missions v. Methodists & SDA.11 These differences exist on political as well as religious grounds. SDA support the Administration, Methodists are more or less neutral, Marist priests while divided are generally anti-Administration, anti-CRA.
(2) Internal Marist differences. Fr. O’SULLIVAN12 et al pro-Administration v. Fr. FINGLETON13 et al anti-Administration.
(3) Younger educated people (and probably others) v. the Church. Members of the former group expressed opinions that people were becoming disillusioned with the Church both as a political force and as a spiritual comfort. This thinking tends to be supported by Bishop LEMAY’ s stated opinion that the Church would be out of BOUGAINVILLE within the next 10 years.
C. Social
(1) People by areas pro-con Administration.
(2) People by areas pro-con CRA.
(3) People by areas pro-con referendum.
Action by the Administration
17. It is our opinion that the whole BOUGAINVILLE situation is ready-made for the application of a psychological operation aimed at manipulating public attitudes in the Administration’ s favour. If undertaken this operation should include:
a. Implementation of the action suggested earlier in the paper under the heading ‘The Administration’.
b. The mounting of a full scale propaganda campaign having
(1) the OVERT aim of advancing the peoples’ political education and so enabling them to make a more reasoned decision on their future;
(2) the COVERT aims of exploiting the lines of fission mentioned above and providing factual information which the supporters of the Administration can use in argument.
18. If such a campaign were mounted, it would need to observe the following principles of the manipulation of attitudes.
a. Identify specific target populations and direct specific themes to each (the section on lines of fission indicate possible target populations).
b. Provide factual information, slanted if necessary in the Administration’s favour.
c. Provide ample opportunity for the people to discuss the issue. It is by discussion and argument that they clarify their positions.
d. Encourage the people to participate in decision making. This aspect is vital. Whether it is in the direction the Administration wishes will depend on:
(1) the quality and relevance of the factual information it gives its supporters.
(2) the skill in argument and the influence of its supporters.
e. Obtain ‘feed back’ of argument and opinion as a guide for future communication policy.
19. The Media which could be used are:
a. Radio BOUGAINVILLE
(1) Place an emphasis on information relevant to the contentious issues.
(2) Suggest discussion groups and encourage feed-back through letters.
(3) Make full and regular use of the programme ‘The DC Speaks’.
(4) Make a feature of ‘Replies to Letters’ with pertinent, if slanted, comment.
b. District Staff Activities
(1) Identify Administration supporters.
(2) Discuss with them the contentious issues.
(3) Encourage them to discuss the issues widely and to give ‘feed back’.
c. CRA Activities
(1) A wider distribution of their ‘Bougainville Copper Magazine’,
(2) An extension of ‘Slide and Talk’ programme already given to delegates at the Local Government Council conference.
d. Radio Recording Teams
(1) Wide coverage;
(2) invite views of contentious issues;
(3) record discussion;
(4) broadcast edited discussion with comments.
Some suggested topics might be—
a. Factual Information
(1) Administration’s past support of Mission effort.
(2) Administration’s own activities.
(3) What is involved in independence—organisational, financial, technical competence.
(4) What is involved in extracting copper, technical competence, finance, organisation, marketing, etc.
(5) Importance of agriculture.
b. Topics to raise doubts
(1) Real aims of LAPUN et al—personal aggrandizement v. good of the people.
(2) 14
(3) Competence and clear thinking of LAPUN et al—conflicting motions, common name for Territory v. Referendum for secession.15
(4) Real aims of RC Church—welfare of people v their political manipulation.
Warning
21. The statements made in these notes do NOT have the oracular quality as those which emanated from DELPHI. They are merely the results of a bi-disciplinary analysis of the information available.16
[NAA: A452, 1969/1157]
1 Not printed.
2 Reacting to calls for a referendum in Bougainville (see footnote 1, Document 223), the Administration had, by December, despatched to the island ‘Bougainville information teams’ as part of an ongoing ‘political education programme’. The teams were described by Hay as ‘one of several fronts designed to facilitate communication between the Administration and the Bougainville people and to try to {gain} an acceptance of Administration policies, especially with regard to a unified Papua and New Guinea’ (record of Public Relations Advisory Committee meeting, 12 December 1968, NAA: A452, 1968/5563). Another element of the program attempted to place the Administration’s practical activity in a more positive light, as Hay explained to Newby: ‘I have gained the impression that some people in the Territory and probably many people on Bougainville think that the Administration is acting on behalf of the C.R.A. or, indeed, as a stooge of the C.R.A. in and around Kieta. This impression can easily arise from the need for the Administration to protect reconnaissance and other parties which go about their lawful business and have occasion to use the Police for this purpose. We need to take what steps we can to remove this impression. I have discussed with the Minister and he has agreed that we could give more emphasis to the role of the Administration in protecting the interests of the people of Bougainville, as well as the interests of the House of Assembly and the Territory as a whole. Where, as frequently happens, the Administration steps in to ensure that the interests of the people are taken into account, then that could be emphasized. However, the Minister has directed that we are not to give the impression that the Company is not co-operating with us in these tasks. The task is, therefore, somewhat a delicate one and its carrying out needs to be done carefully’ (minute, Hay to Newby, 18 October 1968, NAA: M1866, 3).
3 See Documents 234, 236 and 240.
4 Not printed.
5 Department of Native Affairs, a predecessor of DDA.
6 Not found.
7 D.N. Ashton.
8 That is, CRA is ‘a good thing’.
9 Professor D.L. Oliver.
10 Dr R.R. Nayacakalou.
11 Seventh Day Adventist.
12 Father Richard O’Sullivan, Roman Catholic priest, Koromira mission.
13 Father Walter Fingleton, Roman Catholic priest, Tabago mission.
14 One sentence has been expunged.
15 See footnote 1, Document 223.
16 In a reply to Warwick Smith of 20 December, Hay wrote: ‘The first thing to be said is that Bougainville has to be seen as part of the total problem of the Territory picture and not as an isolated problem. While the people of Bougainville claim they have been neglected, the same claim has been made to me by leaders in many other districts … For the Administration to react too strongly to the present situation in Bougainville, particularly by giving “massive aid” to the agriculture, education and health services there as suggested by Brigadier Campbell, could well create difficulties in other areas. This would be the more likely if resources applied to Bougainville came from allocations to other Districts’ (NAA: A452, 1969/1157). With this qualification in mind, Hay remarked that the Administration was: ‘(a) taking action through radio and field staff to “get over” what the Administration is doing (b) studying the possibility of increased efforts in agriculture, education and health … this should be within the framework of the 1969/70 budget, if at all (c) taking steps within existing approvals regarding roads and transports (d) investigating the possibility of establishing a national institution in Bougainville (e) reviewing DDA staff postings in the District and arranging for teams of field staff to be sent there for discussions with key opinion formers (f) encouraging Ministerial Members and Assistant Ministerial Members to visit the area (g) working towards the establishment of a reserve for Bougainville of $10,000 for minor new works and rural development at the District Commissioner’s discretion (h) investigating refinement, expansion and probably allocation of extra resources for the psychological campaign’ (DOET summary of Hay’s letter in submission, Besley to Barnes, 12 February 1969, ibid.). In early 1969, Barnes was told that the ‘Department’s view on the general issue is that a concentrated effort to dampen the unfavourable effect resulting from the Bougainville situation would in the long run cause less trouble. The argument that Bougainville will be contributing to a considerable extent to the national economy can be used with justification. Requests by sectional interests for additional allocation of resources are not uncommon and such requests can it is considered be coped with far more satisfactorily than Bougainville type situations … It is considered that the Administrator should be informed that while his general position is appreciated it is thought that every effort should be made to follow the Campbell/Sinclair line of action. With this in mind the Administrator should be requested to submit a report in six months time on progress made in implementing the suggestions in the report’. Barnes agreed with the last proposal. He also endorsed both the action being taken by the Administration and the Department’s recommendation that ‘the opportunity should not be lost sight of to inject as much resources into the District as possible’. In connection with DOET’s position on resources, he wrote in marginalia of 12 February that ‘This is a valid point, but I believe that greater emphasis could be given to the idea … that the establishment of a valuable resource, such as the copper operation, brings with it many great advantages to the local area as well as the Territory as a whole’ (loc. cit.).