Port Moresby, 2 June 1969
SECRET
Reaction to the proposal to form the Gazelle Peninsula Local Government Council
(multi-racial)
Recently I had the Territory Intelligence Committee prepare an assessment for me on the above-mentioned subject and I attach a copy for your information.
2. In regard to paragraph 4, I personally have the impression that many of the young and educated Tolais would be in favour of some change in land matters and I have asked the Chairman to check this out further for me.
Attachment1
- 1. TAMMUR can be expected to continue to ‘protest’ Tolai land interests.
- 2. Although substantial opposition to a Multi-Racial Council exists, it is assessed to be still in the minority. lndications are that despite intimidation, a multi-racial council will be restored.
- 3. Publicising the attitudes expressed in the resolutions presented on the 16th May2 will serve to exacerbate racial animosities which are already apparent. The tone of the resolutions and the speeches surrounding the demonstrations suggest an increasing awareness of a Tolai identity.
- 4. The young and educated Tolai feels frustrated by both decisions of Village Elders and his general disagreement with all Territory land laws because they do not accord with the traditions of land usage of the Tolai people. While the rate of economic growth for some Tolais has been rapid, others including a lot of younger men, feel there is little future for them. It is within this area that criticism is most vehement against the Administration.
- 5. Although it is certain that the Multi-Racial Council will come into being, this in itself will not end the matter. Anti-council agitation will continue and may obtain support from elements of the M.I.F. Disputes over land will continue to be the major cause of dissension.3 Although the protest demonstration was conducted in an orderly manner, a possible threat to public order may well arise when the collection of taxes is opposed by anti-council elements.4
[NAA: A452, 1969/2889]
The border situation, May–June 1969: Government reaction and public opinion
During May there continued to be problems with Indonesian forces crossing the PNG – West Irian border. Repeated violations were reported from the Imonda area, near Wutung, and seven Irianese were reported to have been captured in the Territory on 13 May and taken back to Irian.1 These incidents were raised with the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, which gave assurances that orders had been given to patrols to ‘go easy’ in the border area and not to cross the boundary on any account. DEA believed ‘the Indonesian Government is sincere in its stated wish to prevent border infringements by its patrols and that continuing Indonesian activity on the border is merely a reflection of the country’s poor internal communications and uncertain lines of command’. The situation on the ground remained unchanged in early June. Police Commissioner R. W Whitrod2 complained to Ballard that Territory police ‘who are not allowed to fire back at Indonesians are taunted as “women”’ and that ‘Indonesian patrols well over [the PNG] side of border are quite common’. 3 He said there was ‘a real loss of morale because Indonesian patrols are allowed to operate in Australian territory without interference’.
The Australians were also disturbed by evidence that a group of Irianese had used Kwari, in the Territory, as a refuge after attacking and killing four members of an Indonesian patrol.4 Moreover, there was uncertainty as to whether the group had launched its attack from PNG. And making matters more complex, the incident coincided with a comment by Malik that Irianese were apparently being trained on the Territory side of the border. Although Barnes appears to have doubted Malik’s knowledge of the Kwari incident, it was decided to raise the episode with the Indonesians. 5 Malik proved unaware of the event, and made no particular comment when told, being ‘intent on explaining that he had been mis-reported in terms of what was appearing in the Australian press’. 6 He also said that ‘he had no problem with the established Australian procedures and the understandings between Australia and Indonesia over the handling of the border crossing problem’. Nonetheless, Jockel made strong representations to Canberra about ‘the fact that we have allowed known leaders of dissident camps to infiltrate back into West Irian … The question in my mind is whether in terms of our relations with Indonesia or in terms of accepted international practice we should allow persons so heavily involved to return to West Irian or whether instead we should hold on to them by some means or another, in the next few months’.
Since late April,7 DEA and Territories had become more restive about permissive residents. In early May, an Indonesian official was reported as saying a rebellion in the Western Highlands of Irian was being master-minded by Irianese in PNG, 8 and while DOET and the Administration were confident that the claim was misguided,9 they decided more had to be done. Warwick Smith and Besley agreed on the ‘need to take a tough line with any permissive residents who do not abide by their obligation i.e. Mr Whitrod’s people will need to say that they either do this or out they go’. 10 Across town, External Affairs was alarmed by a TIC report which suggested that a Papuan government-in-exile might be proclaimed in PNG and there was a call to ‘study urgently what more we can do to prevent embarrassing activity by the exiles’. 11 A Territories-DEA meeting was therefore planned. 12
In the lead-up to the meeting, Jockel’s proposal was discussed in DEA. Bourchier minuted Osborn:
Jockel … asks if we can bottle such people, apparently irrespective of whether they wish to stay or not. My firm impression, based on talks with Alf Body [Acting Senior Assistant Secretary, AG ’s] + P Brazil [Legal Adviser, DEA] +Tim Besley is that we cannot do so if they demand to be sent home. If they do want to stay, then the Administrator has power to attach conditions to the permission given to stay. Thus he can, theoretically at any rate, keep them very restricted (and does so in some cases). His only sanction however is deportation. If faced with the case of a fanatical ‘freedom fighter’ whom we cannot deport (for fear of political repercussions) and who gets able legal advice, the Administrator cannot be confident of controlling him. For this reason Ex. Terr. are examining urgently the possibility of amending the relevant ordinances … Jockel’s idea before he left for Dj. was that we should have some way of taking WI troublemakers ‘out of the game’ and be able to demonstrate to the lndons that we had done so. This is a good idea but I do not see that we could exercise power to (in effect) imprison a West Irianese who, having been willing to be out of the game, later demands the right to get back into it i.e. to return to WI where he came from. The most we could do would be to tell him that we were prepared to send him back, but on the understanding that we would arrange for him to be met at the border by Indonesian officials. It seems to me that this would be publicly defensible if the men could be represented as sufficiently ferocious.13
The public aspects of the Irian situation had continued to stimulate opinion in the Territory. In late May, a group of 14 independent MHAs expressed concerns about the way Indonesia planned to manage the Act of Free Choice.14 One of the Members said ‘We want to see a really free choice, not a vote that is the result of power or force’. These comments were reflected a few hours later by Ministerial Members Kapena and Toliman, who were shortly to join the Australian delegation in New York for work experience and who said they would raise the Irian matter if the MHAs wished. Territories responded publicly with the assertion that the ‘international relations of the Territory’ were, under present constitutional arrangements, not for the House of Assembly and the Administration. 15
Protests were not confined to MHAs. On 24 May, 400 students marched to Konedobu where they presented to Hay a petition which denounced the Act of Free Choice as ‘not … in fact free’ and called on the Australian Government to ‘either condemn or cease from publicly approving the actions of the Indonesian Government’.16 The leader of the march, Leo Hannett, asked Hay to convey the petition to Barnes, who might then pass it to Gorton and the United Nations. Hay said he would convey the request to the Minister.
1 The assessment was signed by Ellis in his capacity as Acting Chairman, TIC.
2 See Document 274.
3 In a letter to Warwick Smith of 5 June, Hay wrote that the multi-racial council ‘has merely become a focus for the expression of dissatisfaction on many grounds, including land and general feelings of frustration and unhappiness in relations with other races in the Gazelle. The current agitation in the Gazelle also illustrates the fact that the first loyalty of many persons in the Territory is to their clan or tribe, rather than to the country as a whole’ (NAA: A452, 1969/2889).
4 Elections for the new council were held between 20 May and 12 June. The response was poor. Of 33,688 people enrolled, 6, 720 voted (both enrolment and voting were voluntary). In eight wards candidates were returned unopposed. Of 38 councillors elected, 34 were Tolais and the remainder Europeans (3) and Chinese (1). Meanwhile, according to DOET, the group opposed to the formation of the Council had become known as the Mataungan Association (MA)—the first word being loosely translated as ‘Tolais wake up’—with Tammur as President and Tomot as Secretary (see background paper, dated ‘Sept 1969’, attached to draft letter, Ballard to P.D. Connolly (President, Australian Law Council), undated, NAA: A452, 1969/4167). The TIC claimed that the Mataungan Association was formed at a meeting of 29 June (MIS no. 6/69, 8 August 1969, NAA: Al838,. 936/3/15 part 5). Hay provided Warwick Smith an interpretation of events in a personal letter of the same date: ‘In spite of all the talk about multi-racial Councils, the issue is really that of the inclusion in the Council area of the so-called dissident Tolai villagers (mainly Raluana). It is really a domestic issue to the Tolais and I think we should try to get it accepted as such. The A.E.C. acted [see Document 245] because it had good reason to suppose that majority opinion favoured inclusion of the dissidents. I hope we can establish that the election has confirmed this. But here we are up against a brick wall because people like Oscar cannot politically afford to accept this and in any event cannot be shaken from their conviction that because only 25% of the electors voted, the other 75% must be their supporters. It is a delicate communications exercise and I hope we can measure up to it’ (NAA: NA 1983/239, 49/8).
1 Submission, Rowland to Acting Minister for External Affairs (possibly Fairhall), undated, NAA: A1838, 3034110/1/4 part 5.
2 Whitrod replaced Cole on 20 April.
3 Minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 2 June 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2608.
4 Submission, Rowland to Freeth, 29 May 1969, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 6.
5 Barnes told Freeth that he was worried Malik might use information provided by Australia to publicly justify his previous comments to the press (see marginal note by Freeth, 29 May 1969, on loc. cit.).
6 Cablegram 1458, Jockel to DEA, 30 May 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2604.
7 See Document 265.
8 Minute, Besley to Warwick Smith, 8 May 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/1766.
9 See minute, Besley to Galvin and Legge, 8 May 1969, ibid., and telex 3528, Hay to DOET, 16 May 1969, ibid.
10 Minute, Besley to Galvin and Legge, 8 May 1969, ibid.
11 Minute, Rowland to Osborn and Bourchier, 13 May 1969, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 5.
12 See undated annotation by Rowland on loc. cit.
13 Minute, Bourchier to Osborn, 31 May 1969, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 6. In connection with DOET’s desire to change Territory ordinances, Bourchier had added: ‘I understand that ExTerr have an ulterior motive. They are not really worried about their ability to control W.I. exiles but under cover of an apparent concern to do so they want to assume powers for use in the Bougainville context. In particular they want the power to restrict the movement of individual persons to specified areas’.
14 South Pacific Post , 23 May 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2743.
15 loc. cit.
16 Telex 3776, Hay to DOET, 24 May 1969, ibid.