Canberra, 21 July 1969
Secret
PNG border contingency planning
[ matter omitted ]1
Administration’s Border Contingency Plan
5. Basis of the plan …2
- based on existing channels of control from Administrator’s Department to district headquarters and sub-districts;
- assumes a context of a border shared by two friendly powers between whom satisfactory liaison arrangements would be made;
- responsibility for planning and decisions in the event of emergency to rest with Secretary, Department of the Administrator, within approved Administration policy and instructions, referring to Administrator as necessary;
- small-scale local situations to be handled by officers in charge of border posts; larger-scale emergencies to be the responsibility of district commissioners; Secretary, Administrator’s Department to arrange additional resources (including, where necessary, logistic resources from other Commonwealth authorities) where, in an emergency, district resources are inadequate;
- continuous liaison with armed services at all stages, but, in the event of use of armed services being authorised, executive action within prescribed limits to be determined by Administrator in conjunction with senior officers of the Services.
6. Emergencies envisaged …
Types of border crossers …
Likely areas to be affected …
- These sections indicate the various types of situation that could arise from crossing by different-sized groups and varying combinations of West Irianese nationalists (armed or unarmed); village supporters and villagers, in some cases associated withcrossings by Indonesian troops or armed police.
- Areas most likely to be affected considered to be Wutung, Pagei, lmonda and Weam, Kiunga and Lake Murray—maximum crossings in West Sepik District estimated at 2,000; and in Western District, 1,000.
7. Objectives of plan …
In summary, the objectives are:
(i) to protect the lives and property of the people of the Territory;
(ii) to succour unarmed border crossers and facilitate their return to West Irian or process permissive residents applications if sought;
(iii) to disarm armed border crossers;
(iv) to persuade police and military border crossers to return to West Irian immediately.
8. Mode of obtaining objectives …
This section outlines ways of handling different types of border crossers. Significant points are:
- West Irianese Nationalists And Village Supporters …
If armed, to be disarmed and weapons to be returned at border—if they agree to go back to West Irian; contact to be maintained pending arrival of reinforcements if strength beyond capacity of local force to cope; those seeking permissive residence to be dealt with in accordance with existing policy directives.
- Incursions By Villagers …
To be succoured and returned to West Irian as soon as practicable.
- Armed Indonesian Police And/Or Troops …
To be informed they are on Australian Territory and must immediately return to West Irian; except for protection of Territory residents not normally to be engaged with fire or disarmed by force, but contact to be kept pending liaison with Djajapura and police reinforcements, if necessary.
9. Alert situation action plan …
- This section describes the system of coloured alerts rising from ‘Yellow’ (a situation which could normally be handled by border station resources) through ‘Amber’ and ‘Red’ to ‘Red Plus’ (a situation requiring Commonwealth assistance to the Administration, possibly including military assistance). The alerts are thus phased to correspond with situations of increasing degrees of seriousness, either at individual posts or in a district as a whole or over the whole border area. Alerts may be declared by station commanders, district commissioners or the Secretary, Department of the Administrator, or, in the case of a ‘Red Plus’, by the Administrator, and may be based either on the actual situation in the area concerned or on probable developments as assessed from intelligence information.
10. Phased action plan …
- This section describes the kinds of situation that would be associated with different types of colour alert, the Command position in each case and the action that should be taken at the various administrative levels.
- Particular attention is drawn to … the action to be taken by the Administrator and designated officers (in accordance with your approval dated 29.{5}.69) in informing the Department of an emergency situation beyond the Administration’s capacity to handle and requesting Commonwealth assistance.
- Provision is made for liaison with PNG Command at all stages and for this Department and the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Canberra, to be kept continuously informed of developments.
11. Remaining sections of plan …
[ matter omitted ]3
Plan PAXTON
13. …. Plan PAXTON is an outline plan only, to provide a formal basis for further planning by the Commander, PNG Command (who is designated ‘Commander, Joint Forces (Designate)’ under the Plan) for the provision of military assistance to the Administration, should such assistance be authorised by the Government, in connection with emergencies arising from the Act of Free Choice in West Irian. (It is understood that planning by the Commander, PNG Command, has been proceeding simultaneously with the production of Plan PAXTON.)4
14. Pages 2 to 7 of Plan PAXTON summarise or reproduce various sections of the Administration plan which are outlined at paragraphs 5 to 10 above. Pages 7 and 8 summarise the ‘friendly forces’—D.D.A. and police reserves, Navy, Army and Air Force—which are available in the Territory. Page 8 (para. 3) to page 13 relate to the execution of the Plan and provide that, apart from such logistic and communications assistance as can be provided under existing single service command arrangements, no military assistance is to be given until a request from the Administration has been received by this Department and a governmental decision to use Service resources has been made, upon which the Chiefs of Staffwould authorise implementation of the Plan …
15. Sub-paragraph (e.), pages 10 to 12, lays down the action to be taken in dealing with border crossers, in which Commanders of such PIR patrols as may be deployed are to be guided by the terms set out in the Administration’s plan regarding action to be taken by its own patrols. Other points to be noted are—
• need for close military/civil liaison
• border crossers to be handed over, as soon as possible, to the Administration for processing
• if practicable, an Administration official to accompany each PIR patrol and to be embarked in each patrol boat
• minimum force principle to be observed at all times
• military commander on-the-spot is responsible for action by his forces which must be limited to such action as he reasonably believes necessary to achieve his immediate aim. If he must reply to fire, no more ammunition to be used than is necessary to stabilise the position
• patrols not to move out of Australian territory and aircraft not to violate West Irian air-space
• naval officers commanding H.M.A.5 ships to request Indonesian or West Irian vessels found in Australian territorial waters to depart unless permissive residence is sought by a West Irianese vessel, in which case it is to be escorted to nearest TPNG port. Boarding party may be employed but as little force as necessary used so as to avoid loss of life or damage to vessel
• not envisaged that military commanders (either Army or Navy) will initiate any exchange of fire
Chiefs Of Staff Minute
16. Apart from endorsing Plan PAXTON and other preparatory action flowing from the Plan, the Chiefs of Staff minute—
• proposed that, should military assistance to the Administration be authorised by the Government, civil/military coordination should be effected through the PNG Security Executive Committee …
• underlines … the importance of timely and accurate intelligence to the Chiefs of Staff themselves, to Joint Force and to Service Commanders both prior to and during implementation of Plan PAXTON; and recommends that Chairman, J.I.C. consult with Chairman, T.I.C. to ensure that arrangements for the provision of intelligence are adequate .. .
• corrects … a reference … [in] Administration plan to elements of the armed forces being placed on six hours’ notice by the Secretary, Department of the Administrator (who would not, of course, have authority to do this)
PNG Security Executive Committee
[ matter omitted ]6
19. Organization of the PNG Security Executive Committee was modelled on the committee which it was planned to bring into operation in 1964 if civil/military operations had become necessary to deal with covert Indonesian aggression.
Border Intelligence Arrangements
20. Following discussion in Canberra last week between the Chairman (J.I.C.),7 the Chairman (T.I.C.)8 (who is an Assistant Secretary in the Department of the Administrator) and an officer of this Department, it was agreed that until approximately the end of the third week in August a daily border situation report would be sent by signal by the Chairman (T.I.C.) to the Chairman (J.l.C.) and this Department summarising all relevant information available from all sources. These reports would be disseminated within the defence community by the Joint Intelligence Committee. In the event of any serious developments on the border such as further armed Indonesian intrusions, the daily SITREP would be supplemented by emergency ad hoc reports and assessments from the Territory Intelligence Committee.
Return Of Arms To West Irianese Nationalists
21. At para. 8 above, it is pointed out that … the Administration’s plan provides for weapons confiscated from West Irianese nationalists and their village supporters to be handed back at the border if they agree to return to West Irian. This provision has been repeated in Plan PAXTON and has since been commented on by the Department of External Affairs in the following terms in a letter to the Department of Defence copied to this Department:
‘We appreciate the importance of border crossers being disarmed. However, we have reservations about arms being returned to individual West Irianese because of the possibility of their being used against the Administration of West Irian. We would not like to see the situation develop where West lrianese engaged in guerilla-type activity against the Indonesians use TPNG both as a haven and as a base from which to return to the attack.
The same objection does not apply, of course, to the return of arms to regular military or police personnel.
We would be pleased to learn whether the plan could be amended to take account of this point ’
This aspect has been referred back to the Administrator for further consideration and will be the subject of a separate submission to you when his reply has been received.
Recommendation
22. It is recommended that:
(a) you approve the Administration’s Border Contingency Plan … in principle subject to a separate submission being made to you regarding the provision for the return of arms to West Irianese border crossers …
(b) that you note Plan PAXTON and covering Chiefs of Staff Minute …
(c) that you approve the Chiefs of Staff Committee’s proposal that, in the event of armed services assistance to the Administration being approved by the Government, civil/military coordination be effected through the PNG Security Executive Committee …9
[NAA: A452, 1969/3433]
1 Matter omitted outlines action taken following the interdepartmental meeting of August 1968 (Document 219). An Administration border contingency plan was made with the assistance of Territories and Defence. Defence thereafter provided a support plan, Plan Paxton—and comments on both Paxton and the Administration’s plan were made by the Chiefs of Staff. The Minister for Defence endorsed Plan Paxton ‘as a basis for further detailed planning by the Commander, PNG Command for military assistance to the Administration should this be required’.
2 Ellipses in headings omit references to paragraphs in the two plans.
3 The remaining sections of the plan covered Administration manpower availability; reserve police; communications; stores, supplies, accommodation and transport; health; interpretation; security containers and ciphers; reporting; district plans; and liaison with the armed services.
4 On Warwick Smith’s request, Legge asked Defence what would be required to bring Plan Paxton into operation. Poyser said ‘there would be no need for [a] call-out as it would be a case of incursions by foreign nationals and not of “domestic violence”’. However, ‘a collective Ministerial decision would be necessary. It would be for the Prime Minister to decide whether or not the decision should be made by a committee of ministers, for example, Prime Minister, Defence, External Affairs and External Territories, instead of by Cabinet’ (minute, Legge to Warwick Smith, 22 July 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3433). In a marginal note of25 July, Warwick Smith responded: ‘I don’t accept this. PIs discuss’.
5 Her Majesty’s Australian.
6 Matter omitted outlines the membership of the committee, which was established in 1968 as the body which would deal with internal security situations that might involve requests for military aid to the civil power. The committee consisted of the Administrator, Assistant Administrator (Services), Commissioner of Police, Director DDA, Chairman of the TIC and the Force Commander or his deputy. An Internal Security Committee, whose chairman was also on the Executive Committee, was responsible to the latter for ‘research, advice and executive action’.
7 N.F. Parkinson.
8 B.B. Hayes.
9 Besley discussed the submission with Barnes and recorded that ‘[1] The Minister approved the plan and in doing so endorsed the view taken by External Affairs that arms should not be returned to West lrianese when they have been escorted back to the border. In connection with this the Administration’s view was fairly evenly divided with only a slight balance of opinion in favour of a return of arms—the plan could well have been framed the other way. [2] The Minister considered the pros and cons of referring the question of the return of arms to the A.E.C. but finally decided it would not be prudent to do so since in his view the Council would be likely to make a rather emotional decision. In any case he considers this properly a matter concerning external relations which constitutionally belongs to the Australian Government. [3] The Minister did however see some merit in the A.E.C. being informed in a general way of the concept of the plan but was conscious of the fact that to do so might raise security questions in which event he would not want to press the issue. He left it on the basis that the Department and the Administration would take a look at the possibility and see what if anything might be explained to the A.E.C: [4] My own view is that a general descriptive run down of the Administration’s plan but not Plan Paxton should be given to the Council and subject to any views which you may have I consider it would be appropriate to suggest this to the Administration leaving to them the final decision of what they actually tell the Council’ (minute, Besley to Warwick Smith, 21 July 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3433).