Djakarta, 22 July 1969
1960. Secret Priority
Reference my telegram 1953.1
Visit to West Irian
This telegram describes the pattern of relationships and co-operation which, if we want it, could develop between Indonesia and Australia in respect of New Guinea. If I go back to Biak and Djajapura I should be glad to have any reactions, however preliminary, that you can give me in the next week.
2. Liaison offices or consulates in Djajapura and Port Moresby
This is still premature. There is not enough work to be done. Easy and flexible contacts can be developed without these offices. We cannot be sure that individual Indonesian officers permanently stationed in Port Moresby would not be meddlesome. An Australian office in Djajapura might become a focus for discontented Papuans including those wanting to go to T.P.N.G.
3. Border controls
This is developing adequately.2 A framework for getting the border observed and for communications has been established. (Incidentally, our action in sending West Irianese weapons back to the Indonesian border posts has made quite an impression.) There is perhaps a tendency now in Canberra and Port Moresby to think of tidying up and strengthening border procedures against illegal border crossings. My own view is that we should not rush quickly towards sealing off the two territories. There will still be genuine political escapes3 and some of the more vigorous, articulate Papuans who are now mainly economic refugees could turn into anti-Indonesian activists in the future. There could be a case for being a little more permissive in the aftermath of the Act of Free Choice. We should see how things go for a few months, also taking into account the feelings of our own Papuans.
4. Contacts, exchanges and technical assistance
Malik has talked to me about contacts between the universities. I have warned him about risks of exposing West Irianese students to the atmosphere likely to be found among the staff and students on our side. I said it would be unwise to encourage student fraternization, seminars on broad political subjects etc. Boediardjo4 also spoke to me about cultural and sporting exchanges and I told him too that this could expose the West Irianese to questionable contacts.
5. There is much scope for practical contacts between officials and professional people along the following lines:
(a) The better type of Indonesian could come over at our expense and move among his counterparts. There are some good types now who could mix easily including English-speaking Catholics and Protestants. For instance the present judge in Djajapura might be interested to study how we handle the problems of formal law and native custom. Indonesian doctors would be interested in discussing the sort of health problems existing in New Guinea.
(b) We could make our special New Guinea skills available to the Indonesian administration by offering access to our research institutions on soils, plants etc. Also we could permit our experts to make short-term visits to have a look around and give practical advice.
(c) A novel and formidable problem for Indonesia is contact and development in the highlands. Our pattern of intensive patrolling and the rapid opening up of the country to commercial life is simply not possible. The problem for the Indonesians is how to hold the situation in a fairly static way but with some impact of change. There may be cheap means of furnishing medical help and cheap means of improving the people’s livelihood. For example, there are virtually no animals in the highlands and there is a scarcity of salt. Some of our veterans might have practical knowledge which could be applied in these circumstances.
(d) Technical assistance, perhaps mixed with the furnishing of supplies and equipment, could be given in fields where T.P.N.G. has a clear interest in improved standards on the other side of the border, e.g. health control measures, veterinary and plant control, disease control measures, etc.
6. At this stage these things could develop piecemeal without too much bureaucracy and without a formal agreement on co-operation. The main requirements are that a few intelligent people give their minds to what can be done and that the T.P.N.G. administration have the funds.
7. Economic development and stability
The dimensions of the problem may not be as big as perhaps we think. The situation is in no way comparable to our side where we are laying foundations which could support an independent state and where there are great problems associated with rapid social change, the presence of a wealthy expatriate community, etc. On the other hand, West Irian has to be integrated into a low-level but viable South East Asian social and economic system. This is not to minimise the problems of comparison but rather to bring in other perspectives.
[ matter omitted ]5
11. We should need to kill from the outset any great expectation. A senior member of the P.N.I.6 said to me in West Irian that it would be necessary for the two areas of New Guinea to keep in balance in their development in the future. I explained that this was impossible to which the reply was ‘then you must help us’. This attitude of mind can be modified through intelligent discussion, but only provided we are prepared to do something. This could be a contribution of five million dollars a year to FUNDWI.7 It would be difficult to explain that we contribute well over one hundred million dollars to bring T.P.N.G. to independence but [are] not prepared to make a special effort to assist Indonesia in the orderly integration of West Irian. The other risk is that West Irian might go sour and the more we were involved the more ill-will will be generated. The pattern of activity sketched above however is designed to avoid over-involvement.
12. A special contribution to West Irian could no doubt be counted for I.G.G.l.8 purposes. The pattern of association is a mixture of good will, transfer of special New Guinea skills, and some economic assistance. The policy considerations are obvious. We now have a big opportunity of putting substance into a good neighbour policy in New Guinea. We can work to create an atmosphere of co-operation and mutual interest between Canberra and Djakarta which will be important as political tension and problems grow in T.P.N.G. We want to avoid West Irian becoming a chronic internal security problem for Indonesia and add to Indonesia’s burdens as well as having an unsettling effect on our side. The spending of a few million dollars on West Irian should be looked at in the context of the level of expenditure we are now incurring in our defence and security policies in other parts of South East Asia, and, also, in the context of the valuable role that Indonesia is now performing with its neighbours. If we are now fully stretched this question is important enough for an examination of priorities. We would gain considerable good-will if in the course of the proceedings of the General Assembly this year we were able to announce a programme of practical and positive support for the Indonesian government’s efforts for the development of West Irian.
[ matter omitted ]9
[NAA: A452, 1969/3330]
1 21 July. It reported Jockel’s impressions of a visit to West Irian (NAA: A452, 1969/3009).
2 Following the Webb visit of 10–13 June (see Document 285), a second visit was made to Djajapura on 8 and 9 July. The meeting was devoted largely to a review of administrative arrangements made at the first meeting, though notably the Indonesians asked if officials at border posts could visit each other without requesting permission from headquarters. On the Australian side, Webb requested that the Indonesians ‘ensure that officers at their border posts were instructed not to discuss the return of West Irianese who had crossed the border. Treatment of refugees was an internal matter and solely the responsibility of the T.P.N.G. authorities’ (submission, Galvin to Barnes, 1 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3330). (Commenting on the meetings, J.M.C. Watson told DOET that the Indonesians were ‘motivated by security , first and foremost, and are only thinking from week to week’ (minute, C.M. Goode (Senior Research Officer, International Relations Section, DOET) to Warwick Smith, 16 July 1969, ibid.).) Liaison had also occurred at lower levels, including a meeting on 2 July at Sotar in the south, where weapons taken by Irianese from Indonesian patrols were returned. At the same meeting, Indonesian officials had asked to accompany patrols in Papua which were searching for Irianese. This was denied (submission, Besley to Barnes, 25 July 1969, ibid.).
3 This should perhaps read ‘escapees’.
4 Indonesian Minister of Information.
5 Matter omitted is a discussion of the economic challenges facing West Irian. Jockel believed other countries needed to assist in meeting them.
6 Partai Nasional Indonesia—Indonesian National Party.
7 The United Nations Fund for the Development of West Irian, established in 1963 by UN Secretary-General U Thant for the purpose of Irian’s social and economic development. The fund was managed by the Secretary General and had the Netherlands as its first important contributor, though it was open to donations from other members of the UN ( Yearbook of the United Nations 1963 , New York, 1965, pp. 44–5).
8 The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, a ‘loose and flexible’ consortium of lndonesia’s non-communist creditors established in 1967 and ‘designed to examine at regular intervals Indonesia’s aid requirements, to try to meet these requirements, and co-ordinate aid’. Australia was a member of IGGI ( Current notes , vol. 40, 1969, p. 485; see also Current notes , vol. 38, 1967, p. 78).
9 Territories used Jockel’s cable as an opportunity to again press the idea of four-cornered talks. Galvin spoke to Osborn, telling him DOET ‘found much of interest in Jockel’s suggestions and thought that they were the sort of thing which we envisaged being discussed’ at the proposed talks. Osborn said DEA would soon respond to Warwick Smith’s idea (minute, Galvin to Besley, 25 July 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3330). Galvin’s reminder was part of a DOET campaign that had continued since Warwick Smith had originally raised the matter with Plimsoll (Document 278). On 20 June, when conveying a friendly letter sent by Sarwo Edhie to Hay following the first Webb visit, Warwick Smith had written to Plimsoll that ‘I still believe however that the four cornered talks … will be necessary if we are to make any real progress’ (NAA: A452, 1969/2608). A fortnight later, Warwick Smith had mentioned to Ballard that the four-sided talks were ‘at present a dead duck’ but he had suggested that DOET raise immediately with other departments the question of having ‘plans laid out under which we know the circumstances in which the P.I.R. will become available in the border areas and the use to which they can be put’. The Secretary thought that ‘If we take up the substantive issue the four-sided discussion with the Indonesians may well come good again’ (minute, Ballard to Galvin and Legge, 4 July 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3050).