Canberra, 24 July 1969
2397. Secret Priority
[ matter omitted ]
4. On the points made in your 1960,1 we agree that it is premature to consider the question of establishing liaison offices or consulates in Djajapura and Port Moresby. We also agree that the border liaison arrangements are developing satisfactorily. There is no move from our side towards sealing off the boundary between the two territories although some of your messages have indicated that this would not be unwelcome to the Indonesians.
5. We see merit in your proposal for the gradual development of cultural, including sporting contacts: they might best begin at relatively unsophisticated levels, for example, by the exchange of visits across the border between sporting teams and perhaps school children from nearby areas. We see this as evolving in the first place out of the border liaison meetings.
6. We also agree that there is much scope for contact on practical matters between administrative and professional persons in both territories on lines which you suggest. In your telegram 1960, paragraph 6(a), you speak of Indonesians but it might be useful if West Irianese were eventually to be included among the visitors to TPNG although we recognise that there might be some possibility of defections occurring. We also agree that matters of this kind should be allowed to develop naturally and without too much formality. We feel, however, that any general initiatives for development of such exchanges in either the cultural or ‘practical’ fields should be deferred until after the West Irianese question has been disposed of in the General Assembly.
7. Nevertheless ad hoc arrangements could be made for visits of a technical or professional kind to take place if they became necessary for some immediate purpose.
Economic development
8. Question of any special Australian aid to West Irian for economic development purposes would need careful consideration. You will be aware, however, that Cabinet is this week considering the budget and that it would not be possible, even if we felt it desirable, to introduce new proposals, such as a sizeable Australian contribution to FUNDWI at this stage. Our preliminary reaction, in any case, is that for reasons both of principle and of administrative practicability, we should limit ourselves, at least at this stage, to encouraging the Indonesians to apply to West Irian a proportion of the aid from Australia available under our present programme.2
[NAA: A452, 1969/3330]
1 Document 297.
2 In a minute of 28 July, Besley commented to Warwick Smith that the last sentence of both paragraph 5 and 6 were added on DOET’s suggestion. He also remarked that before informing the Administration of Jockel’s views ‘it would be wise in [the] first instance to sort out a more definitive attitude between ourselves and E.A.’s than is at present contained in the reply which has been given to Jockel. This seems to me to be principally a matter for the Government here at least to start with but when any agreed proposals get into the operational area such as inter-Territory visits we would need to consult with the Administration to shape up the details. Suggest then that steps are—(i) consultations with E.A.’s; and (ii) then seek Administrator’s comments on line agreed with E. A.’s. All of this suggests to me that four cornered talks could be very useful and [I] therefore suggest you send [another] letter … to Sir James’ (NAA: A452, 1969/3330). In a marginal note of 29 July, Warwick Smith replied: ‘What is the Minister’s attitude in general! I don’t enthuse about inter-Territory activity sporting or otherwise—it will achieve little positive. I prefer the line of Jockel’s comments on consulates!’ Jockel gave further views on the lrian-PNG relationship after a second visit to West Irian: ‘[The Indonesians] are committed to attempting to bring about some political and economic improvements and to convince the Papuans that there is no practicable alternative for them. In this process they will increasingly take an interest in developments on the Australian side of the border. Physical control of the line of the border is only one aspect of the matter. They will also be concerned about social and political developments and the growth of Papuan consciousness. They are likely to be worried about the activities of communists and radical nationalist disruptionists who could promote both anti-European and anti-Indonesian feeling among the Papuans of the whole area. At the same time we must understand that while the thinking of the Indonesian Government will revolve around clear and rational considerations of power and the management of potentially unstable situations there will also be present in some degree those elements of confused ideology and nationalism and even petulant childishness which are part of the collective Indonesian psychology … My second trip does not lead to any modification of the views already expressed about future Australian policy. We don’t have to rush into specific undertakings but we should show ourselves to be thinking seriously and positively about future relations. We should move ahead in our relations with Indonesia in this area smoothly and blandly on an assumption of mutual common interests’ (cablegram 2098, Jockel to DEA, 7 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/3009). In September, Anak Agung of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry approached Jockel requesting aid for West Irian. In the course of the discussion, Agung remarked: ‘the Indonesian Government attached value to cooperation with Australia in particular. Australia had interests in New Guinea and had special resources and skills and a record of development in the Territory of Papua New Guinea. I said I took it from this statement that the Indonesian Government was not concerned about left wing nationalist or anti-colonial criticism about cooperation with Australia on behalf of West Irian. Anak Agung repeated that cooperation with Australia would have value because of Australia’s interests and performance in New Guinea. Anak Agung said that the present Indonesian Government understood Australia’s trustee position in New Guinea and “accepted and believed” our stated intentions to prepare the people for independence in the future. He then added that any lingering suspicion of Australian motives in New Guinea would certainly be dispelled if Australia was willing to cooperate with Indonesia in the development of West Irian. But this would not be so if Australia abstained. (This last observation was made objectively and in the natural run of the conversation. As you know, it is a judgment which I share)’ (cablegram 2306, Jockel to DEA, 2 September 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/20 part 6).