Port Moresby, 31 August 1969
Since my letter of {LH2996 July 10th}1 I have sent a number of messages on the situation in Rabaul expressing my view that it remains most insecure and that it could be necessary for me, at very short notice, to request authority to use army units in aid of the civil power.2
I have now had a full-scale review of the present situation and the likely future developments. I attach a secret report and attachment prepared by the Special Branch.
I also attach an assessment prepared within the Administrator’s Department in consultation with the District Commissioner and his staff.3
As I see it, the main elements in the situation are:
(a) The present Council is weak, with a small electoral base (in … 4 wards the vote was less than 5%). The decision to enlarge the Council area to include previously anti-Council groups and also Europeans and Chinese, arose from recommendations from the previous Council, but these were not entirely spontaneous, nor were they clearly understood by Councillors and electors.
(b) The opposition to the Council is, by contrast, well-organised and well, if not rationally, led. Tammur has fewer followers overall—perhaps one third of the total, but his leadership group appears to be determined, and emotionally inclined towards violence.
(c) There are many complex and often contradictory streams of opinion. There is a contest between young and old for leadership. There is, on the part of many younger men, a vigorous anti-European and anti-white sentiment. There are widespread frustrations about land. There are many idle young men, very slightly educated, discontented and ready to follow a strong lead—a kind of urban proletariat except that it lives outside the town area. There is a basically pro-establishment older group, but they have not succeeded in solving the pressing problem of land shortage. There is a mainly oblivious and separated European and Chinese community.
(d) In these circumstances, the Council has been heavily dependent on the Administration for its effectiveness since the elections in June. While the Administration has committed itself to the maintenance of law and order and has put some positive things in the Council’s way (such as the Kerevat Forest land), it has tended to restrain the Council from engaging in tests of strength such as tax prosecutions. And the Mataungan Association has so far stopped short of overt breaches of the law such as physical assaults and trespass on the Council offices and Chamber (though it has threatened all these things). The result has been a diminution of confidence on the part of the Council. Tax collections, now at $38,000, have slowed. They are less than twice the ‘contributions’ collected by the Association. Stall holders in the market are refusing to pay their entry fees. More important, deliveries are not being made to the Tolai cocoa fermentary.
Clearly the present situation cannot go on indefinitely. Either the Council will have to be advised to show more fight (and this means committing substantial Administration resources, including police and possibly Army) or else some sort of a compromise has to be reached, which brings the two opposing groups together.
One such compromise is now under discussion. It involves the enlargement of the number of wards from 38 to 52. It does not, as I understand it, involve any reduction in the Council area (either by eliminating areas in which European and Chinese reside or by eliminating the so-called anti-Council villages). The increase would, however, involve a re-arrangement of ward boundaries, a new proclamation, and a new election as a result of which it can be taken for granted that no Europeans will be elected.
This compromise could be accepted by the Council. Before it comes to the A.E.C. we need to assess the consequences. It may be that for the immediate future the heat will go out of the situation, and the problems of the tax and the support of the Tolai cocoa fermentary will be solved. On the other hand, we must assume that the Mataungan Association will exploit the situation to the full and will contest the elections as a party and try to win a majority of Council seats. If they do this, they may use the Council as a political base from which to seek radical solutions to land problems and probably some form of Tolai autonomy from the rest of the Territory. A new kind of political leader will have emerged, radical, articulate, partially educated, anti-white, tribally motivated and separatist, by no means wedded to western democratic methods—in short, the kind of leader so frequently thrown up in Africa. Such leadership is likely to be intolerant, after some generations when the boot was on the other foot, of the planter and not too interested in economic development. His eyes will be turned elsewhere than to Australia. Though Mission educated, they are not likely to be sympathetic to the Missions. This is a sombre prospect. It is one which could be mitigated by active work on the part of Administration officers of all Departments.
The alternative is, one way or another, to break the Mataungan Association. This will require aggressive action by the Administration, and a preparedness to risk violence. Strong police reinforcements would be necessary and they will have to be trained for a more sophisticated role than in the past. The inevitable use of police in Rabaul will attract the same kind of attention as did the use of police at Rorovana.5
[NAA: A452, 1969/4331]
1 Not printed.
2 Since elections for the MRC (see footnote 4, Document 277), the Gazelle had continued to be a focus of concern for Territories and the Administration. A lengthy explanation of Administration action was made by Ellis in the House on 18 June (see NAA: A452, 1969/2889) followed by another on the 25th. But the Mataungans persisted. In early July, when Hay travelled to Rabaul for a meeting of the AEC, he was surprised to find that DC West had organised for the AEC to attend the inaugural session of the MRC. Moreover, the MA had scheduled a demonstration for the same time. Thus, Tammur stood ‘virtually on the corner of the Council House’ and addressed a large crowd as, inside, a nervous attempt was made to conduct an opening ceremony (Hay interview, 1973–4, NLA: TRC 121/65, 4:2/38–9). There followed a tense situation when Hay went to lunch. Ten councillors remained in the chambers while the crowd outside became aggravated and ‘a few punches were thrown’. The councillors, who were ‘very frightened’, requested a police escort and ‘they left amid a lot of abuse after which Tammur and his followers literally took over the council chambers’. Because of this unrest, the AEC was forced to meet in the District Commissioner’s conference room rather than the council house (see telexes 5028 and 5038, Hay to DOET, 1 July 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2889). Various responses were given to these expressions of dissent. Attempts were made to ease the land problem: 5,600 acres of land at Kerevat and 2,900 acres at Vunapaladig were earmarked for resettlement—and investigations were instituted regarding the purchase of other land that might be made available to Tolais (minute, Hay to unidentified officer (chairman, Land Development Board), 8 July 1969, NAA: M1866, 4. Barnes was also anxious to expedite the process of land appeals in the courts; see memorandum, DOET (Warwick Smith) to Administration, 8 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1966/3928). A ‘communication exercise’ was also ordered. Hay wrote that Radio Rabaul and ‘other means’ needed to be used to propagate a number of themes, including that the MRC had been elected and ‘must be permitted to go about its lawful business without interruption’; that those opposing the council had chosen not to participate in the democratic process by putting up candidates who supported their views; and that ‘reasonable publicity’ should be given the council in its efforts to deal positively with problems like land shortage. Hay also advised that ‘We need to pay particular attention to the feelings of the younger generation … [to] how best to keep a dialogue going with them’ (minute, Hay to Johnson (in his capacity as Chairman, Public Relations Advisory Committee), 7 July 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2889). In Canberra, Ballard established a Gazelle working group charged with looking at the feasibility of ‘an enquiry into the “causes of discontent” in the Gazelle Peninsula’ and with pressing for facilities in Rabaul for faster processing of land appeals. The group was also to stay in touch with Besley and Legge over the possibility—raised by Hay—‘of calling out Defence Forces’ (minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 22 August 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4146).
3 Attachments not printed.
4 Ellipsis in the original.
5 As he explained later, Hay had intended to give his letter to Barnes as the Minister passed through Port Moresby en route to Canberra but ‘on 1st September the situation changed’. Instead, a discussion was held with the Minister on the new situation (letter, Hay to Warwick Smith, 26 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4331).