Port Moresby, 1 September 1969
Unnumbered. Confidential Immediate
Rabaul sitrep no. 6
… Reported 0810 hours today—Damien Kereku, a leader of the Mataungan Association, took possession of Council house keys. Council staff locked out this morning. Keys at present in possession of Melchior, another Mataungan leader who also took possession of keys of three Council vehicles. Keys of cars returned to Council president. Mataungan Association in discussions with Council President stated they want a meeting this Wednesday to be attended by councillors and Tolai Members of the House and twenty two members of Association. President told by Association that Council offices and chambers are to remain closed at least until after meeting. They want only market and essential services to continue. Condition is that all other activities cease. Emphasis placed on fact that keys will only be returned on condition of nil activity as requested. At market this morning several concrete survey pegs were thrown out of a truck with remark ‘that is what we think of the Australian Government’. These pegs allegedly taken from Rabaul Vocational School. At this stage gathered crowd of approx four hundred definitely unfriendly. At Council house as regional Local Government officer was leaving a voice from inside chambers shouted ‘go back to Australia’. Superintendent Parry of police1 considers situation at 1315 hours was a state of near lawlessness. Both Tomot and Kamaina2 were actively exciting crowd to pull out markers. DDA officer Emanuel3 stated situation at 1430 hours market area was quiet. Melchior Tomot has sent messages to MHAs ‘Mataungan closed Council house today please come over as soon as possible’. Melchior told crowd this morning that if Wednesday meeting not satisfactory will destroy Council house. Also told crowd not to worry about a hundred or so extra police for the Tolais still outnumber them. Warrants prepared this morning for offences alleged to have been committed by Melchior and Damien over keys incidents have not been executed. Local staff are looking into situation to see what charges could be laid with view to later proceeding by summons. Assessment. Possibility of serious incident before meeting Wednesday decreasing but serious violence could erupt Wednesday.4
[NAA: A452, 1969/4001]
1 Superintendent, C.A. Parry, exact position unidentified.
2 This should probably read ‘Kumaina’.
3 E.J Emanuel, Deputy District Commissioner, Rabaul.
4 Hay telexed Besley late that evening: ‘Latest sitrep indicates some quietening of situation but probable that proposed meeting Wednesday … will be in effect occasion to deliver ultimatum to Council (and indirectly to Administration) to declare itself out of existence and hand over to Mataungan leaders. Meeting likely to be backed by large and angry crowds of up to 5000 in mood openly to defy Administration. Lawlessness could erupt involving danger to Council house and surrounding areas and assaults on police. Police reinforcements are being sent … In meantime Defence should be warned of possibility that situation could after Wednesday get beyond Territory resources to cope with. We hope that at least [a] company of P.I.R. could be put on notice for quick move with primary role of guarding key points’ (telex 7040, NAA: A1838, 936/4/16 part 1). An associated TIC assessment of 2100 hours read: ‘1. The situation has deteriorated suddenly and is now tense. 2. There is every indication of serious disturbance in the next day or two with the resultant likelihood of public disorder. 3. The anti-Council campaign shows every indication of being well-planned, well organised and capably led with definite objects in mind. 4. There are positive indications that the peoples’ resentment goes deeper than the Multi-Racial Council issue and has its roots in the land question. 5. It is unlikely at the meeting on Wednesday that the anti-group will seek compromise, and every likelihood that it will deliver a series of ultimatums. 6. There are indications that the leaders are confident of overwhelming the police. 7. There are indications that the defiance of the anti-Council group is now directed more at the Administration than the Council, and if this defiance is not countered quickly and effectively, it may well spread to other areas’ (telex 7039, Hay to DOET, 1 September 1969, NAA: A1838, 936/3/21 part 1). Hay’s predilection for a call-out of the PIR was heavily influenced by the idea that deployment should not be left until the situation ‘had really deteriorated and there had been bloodshed’. Similarly, he believed police ‘should be used in the mass’ so that ‘it was quite evident [to those in opposition] that they couldn’t tackle a force that was so heavily outnumbering them, then there wouldn’t be violent resistance and you would avoid the necessity for the police to use extreme measures’. As to the specific Mataungan action, Hay’s attitude was that ‘here was a deliberate act of defiance of the law and … a challenge to authority taking place against a background of a good deal of tension … this had to be treated as an extremely serious incident’. The Administrator was strongly supported by the AEC because its members ‘didn’t want to have problems of this kind in their own areas where they had local government. They were all connected or associated with local government and relied very heavily on people paying their taxes. They also relied very heavily on the authority of the central government and anything which upset [its] authority was very worrying to them’ (Hay interview, 1973–4, NLA: TRC 121/65, 5:1/13–5, 5: 1/19–20).