Canberra, 2 September 1969
Secret
Papua/New Guinea—possible domestic violence at Rabaul
The Committee considered a letter dated 2nd September, 1969, from the Department of External Territories indicating that the Administrator considers that there is a possibility that a situation will develop at Rabaul beyond the control of Administration resources to handle, and has therefore requested that a PIR company be placed on notice to move to Rabaul with the primary objective of guarding key points. It was indicated that the Minister for Territories, who is currently in TPNG, supports this proposal and had asked that his view be made known to other Ministers concerned.1
2. The Defence Committee observed that intelligence information available is quite inadequate to enable proper assessments to be made. It is not known just how serious the problem is, what the objectives of the prospective trouble-makers are, how far they might go, what weapons might be used and so on. Furthermore, there is no assessment of how the trouble-makers may react or whether their actions may involve attacks on Europeans.
3. Any intervention on our part would involve us in a series of risks. There would be a risk in relation to the United Nations and also with the domestic Australian body politic. There would also be the risk in Papua/New Guinea itself. If we moved too soon that could prove provocative and attract undesirable interest and publicity. If we move too late we would be criticised in Australia, in the Territory and internationally for failing to take steps which could have averted possible violence.
4. It is to be recognized that any movement of any troops to Rabaul carries with it implications of long term consequences. It is impossible to regard the guarding of key points as separate, distinct and inseparable2 from involvement in civil disturbances. The moment we make a move we are on the road to involvement in situations of civil order. Things could even develop to the point where we would have to commit Australian troops to retrieve the situation. To be noted is that an SAS Unit will shortly be exercising in P.N.G.
5. It would be most unwise to move troops to Rabaul without a clear indication from the House of Assembly that the move is desired. It should be much more than merely acquiescence. The fact that the House is currently meeting adds special significance. As it is a Trust territory, our only defence ultimately could be that we had acted on a positive expression of the will of the House. It was right and proper that the House in a country being led to self-government should begin to learn the responsibilities of Government.
6. The procedure for invoking military assistance for use in the aid of the civil power requires the backing of the legal instrument of an Order in Council. No deployment of forces to Rabaul should be contemplated without this. They should not be deployed for guard duties without this. There can be no question of an Order in Council without firm decisions by responsible Ministers and the Prime Minister.
7. It was important to emphasise to the Administration that for all the reasons mentioned they should be doing everything in their power to avoid a situation leading to involvement of troops. This would include steps such as parleying, considering the postponement or adjournment of the proposed meeting in Rabaul, encouraging local members of the House of Assembly to attempt to quieten tempers, and so on—in short taking all reasonable steps to avoid a confrontation situation with its incalculable consequences. We should also emphasise that the Administration should weigh the risks of denuding Police strengths temporarily in other areas so that more can be provided in Rabaul over the critical period. The Administration should also examine the use of special constables.
8. On the information available, the provision of one Company of PIR would be submitting it to an unacceptable risk if it is to guard five key points. The military assessment, again on the information available, is that at least two Companies would be required. It should be pointed out to the Administration that none of the PIR are trained, or psychologically prepared, for the purpose of controlling civilian disturbances, and this in itself carried risks of the greatest importance to the future of the PIR and to the Territory as a whole.
9. The conclusion of the Defence Committee is that, as at present advised, it is overwhelmingly against the committing of troops to Rabaul at this stage.
10. Certain measures should be put in hand as a precaution and to advance readiness should the situation deteriorate:
(i) a Hercules aircraft should be positioned at Port Moresby by mid-day on the 3rd September. If needs be, this move could be accounted for as a positioning to facilitate police movements.
(ii) the Commander, Papua/New Guinea Command, should be directed immediately to take precautionary measures which would enable two Companies of PIR to move at short notice. It was understood that any advices should be on a need to know basis and that there would be no formal warning orders. The Companies are currently at a high state of readiness in connection with the forthcoming exercises with the SAS.
(iii) a naval patrol vessel should move towards Rabaul.
11. The Committee saw the need to strengthen quickly Papua/New Guinea intelligence arrangements. It was told that the Defence Department was already moving on this. It seemed essential that special efforts should be made to build up a Special Branch of the Police Force. Meantime, arrangements would be made to send an Army Intelligence Officer to Rabaul.
[NAA: A1209, 1969/9031 part 1]
1 Besley sent two memoranda to Defence on 2 September, both of which forwarded the views of the Administrator. Defence was also given a copy of the TIC assessment of late on the previous day and of Hay’s telex 7040 (see footnote 4, Document 310) and was told the current assessment was unchanged. In specific terms, DOET tabled a two-stage plan requiring two separate decisions: first, that a company be placed on standby and, second, that if necessary it move to Rabaul to guard key points. It was added that Warwick Smith supported Hay’s request and believed that ‘it is not only prudent to make it but indeed irresponsible not to’ (NAA: A1838, 936/3/21 part 1). Meanwhile, with the concurrence of Defence and Attorney-General’s, DEA told Territories that ‘if there is a real possibility that the Territory police will be unable to prevent serious disorder leading to bloodshed his department should ask the Commonwealth for police assistance. Although a police group could not be sent to Rabaul by Sept 3, a contingent could perhaps be quickly sent to help with any continuing disorders’ (note for file by Booker, 2 September 1969, ibid.).
2 Presumably, this should read ‘separable’.