Port Moresby, 13 November 1969
[ matter omitted ]
Chapter II—matters being examined by Committee
4. At its proposed meeting in December 1969, your Committee will consider submissions and invite persons to address the Committee in relation to the present system of ministerial members and assistant ministerial members and the functioning of the Administrator’s Executive Council as at present constituted. The Committee hopes to make to the House recommendations concerning these matters at the sittings in February 1970.
5. At its proposed meeting in January 1970, your Committee intends to consider submissions and to hear evidence from witnesses in relation to a wide range of matters included in the provisional programme.
Chapter III—name, flag and national symbol
[ matter omitted ]
6. … Your Committee has considered the reports of the sub-committees.
7. Subject to the overall control of your Committee, these sub-committees will conduct campaigns—
(a) to determine whether the people wish the country’s name—the Territory of Papua and New Guinea—to be changed and, if so, what suitable name is the most popular;
(b) to select the best design for a suitable flag for the country; and
(c) to select a suitable song to be the national song for the country.
8. In carrying out these campaigns, your Committee and the sub-committees will make it clear to the people that choosing a new name, a flag and a national song are separate matters from the question of independence or self-government for the country.
Chapter IV—visits by Committee
9. Early in 1970, your Committee proposes to interview the Minister for External Territories in Canberra. It is hoped that this visit will take place early in February 1970. The purpose of the visit will be to discuss with the Minister the work of the Committee and a number of particular topics upon which your Committee would wish to ascertain the views and policies of the Commonwealth.
10. Later on (probably commencing in mid-March 1970), your Committee proposes to undertake a visit throughout the Territory to ascertain the views of the people on various aspects of its work.
11. The Chairman of your Committee (Mr. Paulus Arek) has written to all Local Government Councils and District Headquarters, concerning this proposed visit of your Committee. The Councils and District Headquarters have been invited to make suggestions as to places at which parties of members of the Committee could meet representatives of the councils from the surrounding areas. The Committee is considering the replies that have been received.2
[NAA: A452, 1969/3605]
Gazelle Peninsula: Government responses to the Connolly commission, the Mataungan court case and the land issue
The Connolly commission of inquiry began its work in late September.1 Early reports indicated that hearings were ‘quiet and orderly’2 but it was not until Connolly visited Canberra on 10 October that Territories was given a clear indication of his thinking. He told Warwick Smith and Ballard that land problems were ‘very real—[there was] a lot of basic resentment’.3 He indicated that ‘some viable gesture of resumption is needed’ though people would ‘have to learn to be urban dwellers’. On the local government issue, he outlined two possibilities—reversion to a native council or a compromise whereby the number of council wards would be increased and there would be fresh elections. Reviewing the conversation, Kerr wrote, ‘it seems that the Commission will come down in favour of the Administration; its recommendation will possibly be the compromise solution … and apart from observations on land matters it is unlikely that it will comment in depth on any other issues’. As to the Mataungans, Connolly said they had ‘established a considerable degree of discipline’ over their own witnesses as ‘they all use the same simple story—[the] multi racial council [was] not explained [and] even one European will dominate [the] council’.4 Nevertheless, he expressed confidence that generally the Association was ‘losing its sting’.
The concluding phases of the commission’s work were troubled. A major disagreement developed between Connolly and Epstein. On 13 October, Connolly contacted Hay and asked him whether he ‘could do anything to get her out of Rabaul quickly … [he] thought the Department might send a telegram asking her to return immediately’.5 Connolly’s ostensible reason was that, while being aware that she had “‘involved herself” very considerably in the Tolai attitude’,6 he was now ‘quite alarmed’ to hear that she had attended a large Mataungan meeting, ‘largely organised for her benefit’ and at which Administration representatives were ‘forcibly excluded’.7 He was also worried about information that she wanted to have a ‘dissenting opinion’ published in the report and about a comment by Emanuel that she was ‘stirring’.
_Epstein left the inquiry a day early after a request from Hay that they meet in Port Moresby.8 Hay made clear to Territories that he would reject any question of a minority report, saying that she was recruited as a consultant to the commission but ‘not employed by the Administration to give views to us’.9 For her part, Epstein said Connolly had ‘shown distrust by cautioning her not to disclose to Mataungan leaders what had been discussed privately in the commission’ and had ‘made an untrue statement about her publicly’.10 Epstein had also commented earlier that Connolly was ‘not with it’ and was ‘clearly ignorant of [the] ways of extracting evidence from Tolais’.11 In a letter to Warwick Smith, Hay summed up the incident:
She has clearly come out on the Mataungan side. Her public statement to this effect today which the A.B.C. reported seems a bit like a pay back to Connolly, and also to myself for, in her view, restricting her role as a consultant. Clearly she has been troublesome, but we have to face the fact that amongst the younger group the Mataungans probably have a good deal of support and our use of Dr. Epstein can be justified (if necessary) as ensuring that the Mataungan view would be put before the Commission.
_
_On the substance of the Tolai problem, Epstein suggested that a new election be set for 12 months time—an idea similar to Tolai calls during the commission for a referendum12 — and that a Tolai commission consisting of MRC and Mataungan members be formed to determine the type of local government for the Gazelle.13 She later told Warwick Smith that ‘it was quite wrong to believe that [the Mataungan Association] represented a revolt of the youth against the traditional leaders’ and that, while there was ‘some correlation between land shortage and areas of Mataungan … strength’, the Association was ‘principally concerned with self-government’.14 ‘The Mataungan Asssociation’, she warned, ‘had ingredients of Mau Mau’:
The Tolai have a history of secret societies which were stamped out by the Germans. These could revive in conjunction with the present programme of mass meetings …
_
The report of the Commission was tabled in the House on 11 November.15 As Connolly confided to Warwick Smith, ‘no really new considerations emerged’.16 The report argued that the proposal for a change to the council had been clearly publicised, contrary to Mataungan claims, and that Tammur had obscured the changes by reference to land alienation and European domination.17 The report maintained that the current form of local government in the Gazelle was the most appropriate and it recommended that the referendum desired by the Mataungans should not be held but that the new council should be given a fair trial’. The Administration was advised to take further measures on the land problem such as compulsory acquisition of European land and resettlement beyond the bounds of the Peninsula.
Hay was disappointed with Connolly’s report because ‘It came 100 per cent down behind the Administration’; he had hoped for a change of course that ‘would get us out of this painted-in position’ while maintaining a strong stand on the rule of law.18 In fact, he now thought the Administration was forced ‘more firmly into a fixed position’,19 as was evident when he forwarded to Canberra a draft plan of action by Ellis. Ellis declared that ‘Any solution to the problem of the Gazelle Peninsula should be one which will not encourage dissident minorities elsewhere … Firm action by the Administration would … have the general support of most of the Territory … All evidence indicates that the Mataungan Association has respect for firm action taken by the Central Government’.20 He therefore put that ‘there be no retreat by the Administration from support for the existing Gazelle Peninsula Council . .. while keeping in mind the possible option of negotiating an agreement based on increased Tolai membership in the present Council’. Weighing ‘the three alternative basic positions’—the Administration approach, the Epstein proposals, and an ‘interim Commission of three’—Territories wrote on 10 November that its favoured course was:
(a) A request by Council and MA for appointment of three Commissioners
(b) Parallel investigation into scope and powers of Gazelle Local Government—more powers but short of regional self-government; Council takes over many of the functions of D.D.A ….
(c) MA. is to make its contribution by handing back tax funds to individuals; vigorous tax collection action to follow above steps, with legislation … at current meeting of House of Assembly to ensure non-Council groups pay equivalent tax to Administration.21
The result of the trial was equally uncomfortable for the Government. The prosecution had added to charges of stealing and unlawful possession of the council keys by alleging that the Matuangan leaders had obstructed the council’s operation. Yet it soon became clear that the stealing charge against Kereku would probably fail—and there were fears that an error in the proclamation of the MRC, which had induced a re-proclamation, might mean that the ‘prosecution could fail altogether and this become a major victory for the Mataungan Association’.22 Territories suggested that it would be best to pursue the obstruction charge but ‘withdraw the other charges as gracefully as possible so that the prosecution does not appear vindictive’.23 At the same time, it rejected a proposal by Hay to state that the Commonwealth would through legislation counter a claim by the defence that the Local Government Ordinance was ultra vires the PNG Act.24
_The Crown subsequently indicated that it would consent to an acquittal on the stealing and possession charges, but the magistrate, P.J. Quinlivan, reserved his judgment.25 He also rejected the ultra vires argument that the defendants had no charge to answer. On 11 October, he dismissed the stealing and unlawful possession charges, acquittals which, to the chagrin of the Administration, ‘were the subject of a lengthy judgment’ despite the earlier concession of the prosecution.26 However, it was Quinlivan’s final judgment that inflamed Government most. He dismissed the obstruction charges on the basis of extenuating circumstances, after which he proceeded inter alia to criticise Hay’s decision to ignore the council’s revocation of the MRC concept.27 Hay complained that
the magistrate fully espoused the approach of the Mataungan Association … The complete contrast with the commission of enquiry report is very clear. [The] range of facts from which the magistrate has drawn his conclusions appears limited but clearly Nwokolo succeeded in having the issue judged in political terms and a good deal will be made of this by Members of the House and others who wish to criticise the Administration28
_
The PNG Secretary for Law, L.J. Curtis, spoke with Ballard about the matter, telling him that ‘the possibility of Quinlivan being transferred is well in mind having regard to the fact that his area also covers Bougainville’.29 The ‘difficulty’ in the issue was ‘to get a more suitable magistrate who will go to Rabaul willingly’.
In the background, officials had also continued to study the land issue. Driven apparently by the conviction that the ‘basic problem is land shortage with racial overtones’,30 Territories shared with the Administration a desire to further accelerate the redistribution of land. The Department was eager to use the PNG Development Bank to value, buy and sell or lease land because Warwick Smith believed the ‘problem must be considered firstly as a commercial operation’.31 Hay advocated Government purchase—a view characterised by the Secretary as ‘tending to look at it as a political matter [but we c]annot solve [the] political problem by attempting to buy it out’. It was also felt that Hay’s strategy would ‘be contrary to present policy and cause a dangerous precedent for existing plantations to be purchased as going concerns and handed back to native people’.32 Barnes supported the commercial perspective, but expressed a need for ‘quick action … or there could be political trouble among the people’.33 In late October, Barnes authorised a plan to encourage the Development Bank to purchase Matanatar and Ravalien Plantations on the Gazelle (1,765 acres),34 in spite of earlier opposition by the PNG Land Development Board35 and an indication by the Bank that it was ‘not anxious to get into an exercise where the considerations were predominantly political’.36 The Department contended that an advantage of using the bank was that it was less susceptible to political pressures, a factor thought to have relevance to the Gazelle and possibly to other areas in future.37
On 13 November, Barnes announced that ‘In harmony with one of the recommendations of the [commission’s] Report, additional land was being made available to the Tolai people by purchase of plantations through the Development Bank or otherwise, or by sub-dividing Administration land for resettlement’.38
This announcement, and the findings of the commission, did not impress the Mataungan Association. Prior to the commission, the Association had made clear that it would reject the findings,39 and on 14 November a second major march was held at which the removal of Barnes, Hay and District Commissioner West was demanded.40
1 The report was presented to the House on 17 November after two further Committee meetings of that month. The Administration remarked that at the first of these meetings ‘Members expressed some concern that [the] Committee was making little apparent progress arid decided that its December meeting should be for one week in which constitutional issues would be studied in depth’ (telex 1, Hay to Canberra, NAA: A452, 1969/3605). Johnson informed the Department that apart from the matters outlined in the interim report, the Committee would in December range over ‘(1) Parliamentary organisation, unitary, federal, bicameral, unicameral and position of Judiciary (2) Relationship of executive to legislature and organisation of executive (3) Possible developments within limits of present Act (4) Party systems and their relation to executive (5) Official Members (6) A.E.C. and Ministerial System (7) Regional electorates, educational qualifications’. Arrangements were made for Johnson and Littler to make a second visit to Canberra prior to the Committee’s meeting (minute, Kerr to Warwick Smith, 21 November 1969, ibid.).
2 In mid-October, Hay wrote to Territories on the status of the political education program in PNG, outlining various activities and suggesting that it was ‘now appropriate for a booklet to be written on systems of government other than the Westminster system’ (memorandum, Administration (Hay) to DOET, 18 October 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2898). Ballard was averse to the idea, proposing a bibliography instead (minute, Ballard to Douglas, 7 January 1970, ibid.). For a summary of the Administration’s political education program in 1969, see press release of 20 November 1969, ibid.
1 For context, see editorial note ‘Gazelle Peninsula: aftermath of the September incident’.
2 Submission, Ballard to Barnes, 10 October 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4331.
3 Minute, Kerr to Warwick Smith, 14 October 1969, ibid.
4 On the second point, Kerr wrote: ‘Some truth in this. Some European members of Gazelle council {apparently} very much in command’.
5 Letter, Hay to Warwick Smith, 14 October 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4167.
6 Loc. cit.
7 Letter, Connolly to Hay, 20 October 1969, ibid.
8 Letter, Hay to Warwick Smith, 14 October 1969, ibid.
9 He also said he would rebuff Epstein’s request for a copy of the transcript of public evidence (minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 15 October 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4331).
10 Letter, Hay to Warwick Smith, 18 October 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4167.
11 Telex 8948, Hay to Warwick Smith, 16 October 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4331.
12 See minute, Kerr to Warwick Smith, 14 October 1969, ibid., and attachment to memorandum, DOET (Warwick Smith) to Prime Minister’s Department, 18 November 1969, ibid. As early as September, Tammur had called for a referendum. He had suggested a ‘physical’ count of voters as the ‘ballot papers could be rigged’ (telex DP183, unidentified officer (Secretary, CISC—in this context apparently Current Intelligence Sub-Committee) to Hayes, 11 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4001 ).
13 Attachment to letter, Hay to Warwick Smith, 18 October 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4167.
14 Memorandum, DOET (Warwick Smith) to Administration, 24 October 1969, ibid.
15 For a copy of the report, see NAA: A1838, 936/4/16 part 2.
16 Letter, Connolly to Warwick Smith, 5 November 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4167.
17 Attachment to memorandum, DOET (Warwick Smith) to Prime Minister’s Department, 18 November 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4331.
18 Hay interview, 1973–4, NLA: TRC 121/65,5:1/38–42.
19 ibid., 5:1/47.
20 Paper by Ellis, 5 November 1969, attached to letter, Hay to Warwick Smith, 6 November 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4912.
21 Anonymous DOET paper, 10 November 1969, ibid.
22 Telex 9539, DOET to Administration, 1 October 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4331.
23 loc. cit.
24 Submission, Ballard to Barnes, 1 October 1969, ibid.
25 Telex 8506, Clay to Ballard, 7 October 1969, ibid.
26 Telex 8846, Hay to DOET, 14 October 1969, ibid.
27 Telex 9848, Hay to Warwick Smith, 5 November 1969, ibid.
28 Telex 9973, Hay to Warwick Smith, 7 November 1969, ibid.
29 Minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 7 November 1969, ibid.
30 Anonymous DOET paper, 1 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/2889 (the paper was seemingly prepared for submission to the Defence Committee on 2 September (see Document 311)). The paper also asserted that the ‘ultimate solution will have to be an acceptance by landless Tolais of an urban life but they are unlikely to do this while they see European plantations on their traditional land’.
31 Minute, Lattin to Warwick Smith, 15 September 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4146.
32 Submission, Ballard to Barnes, 23 October 1969, ibid.
33 Minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 3 October 1969, ibid.
34 Submission, Ballard to Barnes, 23 October 1969, ibid.
35 Telex 8223, Hay to Warwick Smith, 29 September 1969, ibid. Hay had written that the considerations of the Board, consisting of senior Administration officials, ‘represents [the] best advice available here from persons with long and wise experience … the reasons are weighty and I hope that in the interests of early action the Minister will accept them’.
36 Minute, Ballard to Warwick Smith, 3 October 1969, ibid. At the time, Barnes had said that he ‘would not want to press the Development Bank against its will’.
37 See submission, Ballard to Barnes, 23 October 1969, ibid., and telex, 8675, Besley to Hay, 4 September 1969, ibid. In a paper entitled ‘Gazelle land—principles’, Ballard wrote:‘1. Public money is not to be used to buy off old grievances. 2. We are not compensating Tolais for the circumstances of the original purchase by the Germans or giving land back to the descendants of those from whom it was purchased. 3. This does not mean that land cannot be used to relieve native land shortage but allocation should be directed to relieve that shortage in the way which is economically the most effective and not by releasing the land to its previous owners. 4. The purpose of using the Development Bank is to prevent the public revenue being held to ransom and to provide machinery whereby Tolais are able to buy expatriate owned land (it then means that pressure must be on the landowners to sell, not on the Administrator to find money to meet the landowners’ price)’ (4 November 1969, ibid.).
38 Press statement by Barnes, 13 November 1969, NAA: A452, 1969/4331.
39 Submission, Ballard to Barnes, 1 October 1969, ibid.
40 Attachment to memorandum, DOET (Warwick Smith) to Prime Minister’s Department, 18 November 1969, ibid. The paper estimated that 5,000 people participated in the march. For an Administration assessment of the Association’s development since the first march (see Document 271 ), see record of special meeting of the TIC, 23 October 1969, in ibid. The Committee estimated that ‘of the total Tolai population of 63,000, a third are supporters of the M.A., a further sixth may be expected to give passive support. A total involvement of almost half the population of the Council area’. Among those identified as coming to prominence since the march was John Kaputin, the manager of the Gazelle Savings and Loan League. Kaputin was said to be ‘active behind the scenes and is definitely anti-European. It is believed that he will remain in the background until a cause arises which will unite all the Tolais and not one faction as at present. He will then attempt to lead this’. According to an earlier MIS, a group of Port Moresby Tolais including Kaputin (who, at that time, was an interpreter in the House) had tried to see Hay on 31 May, but in his absence was met by Johnson. It presented a petition opposing the MRC and claiming that the Administration ‘was ignoring the younger educated Tolai in favour of the outdated traditional leadership’. The group met Hay three weeks later, with Kaputin acting as spokesman. His attitude was described as ‘bitterly anti-European’ and he said the ‘younger men want[ed] to take over [the] Tolai leadership … there would be bloodshed if the elders were retained’ (MIS no. 6/69, 4 July 1969, NAA: A1838, 3034/10/1/4 part 8). Hay later remembered the meeting in vivid terms: ‘[Kaputin] spoke with extreme bitterness against Australia. He was really spitting his words out. It was an unpleasant meeting in many ways, in which they maintained the view that the election had really been a victory for the Mataungans, that the Administration wouldn’t let the Tolai people run their own show, that they distrusted the Australians and that they believed that the proclamation should be rescinded … there was no doubt about it, they were talking in extreme terms. They were saying, “If this doesn’t happen our way there’s going to be bloodshed”’ (Hay interview, 1973-4, NLA: TRC 121/65, 4:2/34)