London, 9 January 1962
Top Secret
UK Eyes Only
British Strategy in the Sixties
Introduction
1. The Prime Minister has re-defined the political assumptions on which our defence policy and strategy should be based and has directed that we should prepare, on the basis of these political assumptions, proposals for a revised strategy to secure the objectives of our defence policy in the next decade, making the best use of our limited resources.
General Assumptions
2. The Prime Minister’s general assumptions are as follows:–
(a) Force Levels. We shall continue to rely on all-regular forces, of a strength not exceeding 390,000-400,000.
(b) Expenditure. The level of defence expenditure will be taken as that set out in the Treasury report on public expenditure and resources; annual defence expenditure outside Germany should be reduced as soon as possible by £35 million below the level of 1961/62.
(c) The Deterrent. We shall continue, throughout the 1960s, to maintain our independent contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent of the West, at the level of expenditure now planned.
(d) Bases and Facilities. We shall not be able to rely on using military bases or facilities in independent countries for any purpose which is not in full accord with the policies and views of the Governments and peoples of those countries. Thus:–
(i) For the period up to 1970 we may count on having unrestricted use, for military purposes, of facilities in:-
Gibraltar
Malta
Aden
Addu Atoll
Seychelles
Bahrein
(ii) We must, however, expect to suffer restrictions on our freedom to use for military purposes, facilities in:-
Libya
Cyprus
Kenya
The prospective area of Greater Malaysia including Singapore. We may, however, be able to use these facilities in global war and, in some circumstances, on a once-for-all basis for limited war.
(e) Staging and Over-flying. Similarly, we must expect increasing difficulty in securing the exercise of staging or over-flying rights for purposes which the Governments concerned are not in sympathy.
Objectives of Defence Policy
3. The Prime Minister has given the following general objectives of our defence policy:–
(a) Europe. Our objective is to support the North Atlantic Alliance as a bulwark against Soviet encroachment. Future plans should be based on the assumptions:–
(i) that some detente will be secured, following some settlement of the Berlin question; and
(ii) that on this basis our contribution to the land forces of the North Atlantic Alliance will consist of four divisions, each of two brigade groups, of which two divisions will be stationed in Germany and two in the United Kingdom.
(b) The Commonwealth. We have an obligation to come to the assistance of any Commonwealth country, dependent or independent, which is the victim of external aggression. We should not, however, seek on this account to keep British troops in emergent Commonwealth countries. We should encourage dependent territories to take a greater share of responsibility for their internal security.
Other objectives which the Prime Minister has given and which apply to particular overseas theatres are set out in the sections of our paper which deal with those theatres.
Aim
4. To formulate, on the basis of the given political and financial assumptions, a strategy for the United Kingdom in circumstances short of global war to be adopted in the present decade and to continue to be applicable beyond 1970; and to recommend the size and shape of forces which would be required, taking into account the financial and manpower implications of the forces postulated for NATO.
The Scope of The Study
5. Against the background of the Prime Minister’s directive we first consider our military commitments and then certain major factors affecting their discharge. Next we assess the force requirements to meet these commitments in the’60s. We then go on to consider, in broad terms, the strategic trends of the’70s. Finally we show the financial consequences of the strategy which we recommend for the ‘60s. Accordingly, our study is divided into five parts:–
Part I –Commitments
Part II– Factors Affecting the Discharge of Commitments
Part III– Force Requirements
Part IV– After the Sixties
Part V– Financial Implications of the Proposed Strategy
[matter omitted]
The Far East
21. Our objectives in the Far East, as recently confirmed by the Prime Minister, are firstly to prevent Communist, particularly Chinese Communist, expansion throughout the area by support of SEATO and other means, and secondly to preserve our links with Australia and New Zealand and to contribute to their forward defence. We also have a continuing commitment to maintain forces in Hong Kong and a traditional naval obligation to keep the High Seas free of pirates. It has now become clear that a Government of Greater Malaysia is likely to come about, but there is likely to be a period of transition before it will be able to assume full responsibility for internal security throughout the territories of Greater Malaysia and especially on the Malay/Thai border. We must therefore expect for some time to come to contribute to the internal security of the Greater Malaysia territories.
22. Apart from our independent contribution to the nuclear deterrent against China, most of the military commitments which derive from these objectives are shaped by SEATO plans. These plans require us to provide naval and air forces, with a nuclear and amphibious capability, and the United Kingdom element of the Commonwealth Brigade Group, for certain operations on the mainland of South East Asia. In addition we shall remain responsible, with our ANZAM partners, for the external defence of the territories composing Greater Malaysia and, directly, for Hong Kong and the South West Pacific territories. We are also committed by public declaration in 1953 to join with the other fifteen nations who took part in the United Nations Command in Korea to resolve promptly and in unison any unprovoked breach by the Communists of the Korean Armistice.
[matter omitted]
Strategic Stance We Foresee For The Seventies
General Concept
119. Despite the development and spread of automatic weapon systems, particularly weapons of mass destruction, we believe that conventional forces will still be required to achieve military objectives in circumstances short of global war. We shall continue to need to be able to deploy land forces overseas when required, but more speedily than at present, and to provide them with sea and air support. Air operations will increasingly be affected by improved forms of propulsion, vertical lift and space development. At sea, although for physical reasons the speed of transit is likely to be much as at present, we shall see greater emphasis on underwater movement and concealment, and the use of missiles.
120. So long as we continue to have commitments in the Middle or Far East we shall still need facilities on land, and a commensurate military presence, east of the Barrier. Only Australia can provide the security of tenure and industrial backing that we require here. We therefore see our eventual strategy as supported by two main bases—the United Kingdom and Australia.
The Sixties as a Period of Transition
121. Meanwhile, we have been directed to assume the availability of facilities in the Arabian Peninsula and Singapore until 1970. For financial reasons we have not been able to recommend the provision during the Sixties of alternative facilities, including additional seaborne forces, strategic transport aircraft and bases in Australia. If for any reason political developments in either of these places compel us to withdraw before the middle-Seventies the lack of these alternative facilities will greatly complicate, and make for considerable delay in, the meeting of what are likely to be our residual commitments until they are provided. In particular, in view of the time it takes to build ships and to procure aircraft (particularly VC 10s) and the essential part played by Singapore in an interim strategy, the effect of the premature loss of the facilities there would be particularly crippling.
122. Insurance against premature withdrawal and provision for the future could be made to some extent by the adoption of the following measures:–
(a) A preliminary examination, in conjunction with the Australian Government, of the facilities likely to be needed in Australia in the long term.
(b) The negotiation of transit and operating facilities on a SEATO basis.
(c) The conversion of HMS Centaur to an aircraft support ship and the provision of an additional Commando ship and Assault ship in the course of the Sixties, as finance permits. Until required to support our forces East of Suez they could be based in the UK, providing a useful reinforcement in emergency and being available part-time West of Suez.
(d) The construction of an airfield in the Seychelles and the further development of the airfields in certain other islands such as Gan and Cocos.
(e) The equipping and training of the RAF DF/GA reinforcement squadrons in the UK for dual role of ashore and carrier based support.
[matter omitted]
[UKNA: DEFE 5/123]