London, 25 January 1962
Top Secret
Australia and New Zealand Defence Planning
As you know, the Prime Minister has undertaken to inform Mr. Menzies and Mr. Holyoake of the implications in the Far East of current British strategy. At our meeting on 23rd January, 1962 (COS (62) 7th Meeting, Minute 1), we agreed a report, a copy of which I attach, 1 which it is proposed should be used as the basis when the Ministry of Defence and Commonwealth Relations Office prepare a draft reply for the Prime Minister. Inevitably, the report refers to the need for a main base in Australia, and I am sure, too, that the First Sea Lord will be pressed hard on this question during his visit to Australia next month.
2. You will recall that I minuted you on 26th June, 1961 2 about the need to start exploratory discussions with a view to securing base facilities in Australia. In your reply on 6th July, 1961 you said that we should defer a decision on this issue until we were through with our other difficulties.
3. Since that time many of our difficulties have been to some extent resolved. Our new strategy for the sixties COS(62) 1, has been agreed and has confirmed our intention to maintain a military presence in the Far East for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, our talks with the Tunku have been more successful than had been expected and have prima facie increased our security of tenure in Singapore. On the other hand, there is general agreement that there are so many imponderables in the situation in the Far East—the Tunku’s prospects in the next election, the possibility of war in Dutch New Guinea 3 and the position of Lee Kuan Yew, to name but a few—that, no matter how secure our long term position in Singapore may now appear, there are many short term factors which could upset the present status quo and deny us effective use of Singapore at short notice. In the long term too it is recognised that we shall not enjoy the use of Singapore indefinitely. In these circumstances it would be prudent to plan the use of alternative main base facilities in Australia.
4. I realise of course that there are many attendant financial and political difficulties. No discussions with the Treasury have yet been initiated on this proposal; and if it were known that we were planning to use alternative facilities in Australia, it might well prejudice the continued use of facilities in Singapore because the Tunku would be less willing to take political risks on our behalf and Australia and New Zealand would be more reluctant to expend money in Malaya in the interim. Nevertheless our position in the Far East is now such that, should we lose Singapore either at short notice or in the long term, we have no alternative plans which would enable us to fulfil our commitments.
5 .I feel that it is necessary that the First Sea Lord should be in a position to make a clear statement on the eventual establishment of a main base in Australia during his forthcoming visit.4
1 See Document 11.
2 See Document 7.
3 See Document 18, note 2.
4 Watkinson minuted: This is very useful. It must be taken account of in drafting the reply to NZ and Australian PM’s.’
[UKNA: DEFE 7/2148]