London, 15 April 1961
Secret
I sent you as soon as possible after my return to London a general account of my talks in Washington.1 I think that you will like to have the following more detailed account about the question of the Six and the Seven.
2. I found that the attitude of the new administration on this question was different from that of their predecessors and that they were more ready to recognise the dangers of a further political division in Europe. They saw that if a close economic and political unity developed between the countries of the Six the inner core of Europe might drift away from the wider concept of an Atlantic community and might even constitute itself as a third force in world politics. There were indeed some signs of such a development already. Under French leadership the countries of the Six were not co-operating fully with the other leading countries of the West in the current problems of the Congo and Laos. This was probably an example of General De Gaulle’s well known reluctance to accept ‘Anglo–Saxon’ leadership; and more difficulties of this kind must be expected if the Six were left to develop separate political policies of their own under French leadership. From that point of view the position would be no better after General De Gaulle has gone; for it was likely that the leadership of the Six would then be assumed by Germany. For those reasons the United States administration now believed that it would be better if the United Kingdom were to join the political associations of the Six where they would provide an element of stability.
3. As you know these are thoughts which we have ourselves long had in mind. I was glad to feel that they were now shared by the United States Government.
4. We still have to find a basis for negotiating an association of the United Kingdom with the Six. In doing so we shall certainly not overlook the interests of other Commonwealth countries and I hope that the Six will recognise the need to make special provision in favour of Commonwealth trade. There is no doubt that some economic disadvantages for both the United Kingdom itself and for other Commonwealth countries would be unavoidable but I am sure you will agree with me that they would have to be weighed against the great political advantage of avoiding a further division of Europe. In any case on economic grounds alone we have to recognise that the real choice may well be between maintaining a system of Commonwealth preference with a United Kingdom of declining economic strength and surrendering some of the advantages of the preferential system in return for a stronger United Kingdom and a wider European market.
1 Macmillan’s Washington visit in April 1961 was his first encounter with President Kennedy.
[NAA: A1838, 727/4/2 PART 1]