London, 26 April 1961
Secret
[…]
The Prime Minister said that the time had not yet come to take a final decision on the question whether the United Kingdom should accede to the Treaty of Rome. Many important aspects of this problem would have to be further considered in detail, and full consultations would have to be held with our partners in the Commonwealth and in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The question to which the Cabinet should address themselves at this stage was whether it was to our advantage to work towards a solution by which the United Kingdom (preferably with some of her partners in EFTA) would join with the countries of the Common Market in forming a wider political and economic association in Europe. The question for discussion now was whether, on a balance of advantage, it was in our interests to try to bring this about.
The following is a summary of the main points made in the Cabinet’s discussion:
(a) The countries of the Common Market, if left to develop alone under French leadership, would grow into a separate political force in Europe. Initially this would tend to have a disruptive effect within the Western Alliance. Eventually it might mean that the Six would come to exercise greater influence than the United Kingdom, both with the United States and possibly with some of the independent countries of the Commonwealth. This development was therefore a threat to the political position of the United Kingdom as a world Power. It would be consistent with our traditional policy to seek to prevent the concentration of undue strength in a single political unit on the continent of Europe. Politically, our interests would be better served by working for a wider European association in which we could play a prominent part.
(b) The Common Market also represented a serious economic threat to the United Kingdom. The countries of the Six, with a population of 160 million, would together constitute a market comparable in size to the United States; and, under modern conditions of industrial production, this must lead to a great increase in the efficiency and productivity of industries within the area. The larger industrial units which were already being formed in the countries of the Six would be in a stronger position—by reason, not only of their size, but of the degree of standardisation which could be developed within the area—to compete successfully with British industry in the export markets of the world; and this would be even more damaging to our interests than our exclusion from the European market itself. Moreover, as the economic strength of the Common Market grew, other European countries would be attracted to it and, against its attractions, we should find it difficult to hold EFTA together. If, therefore, we stood aloof from the Six, we should find ourselves in a position of growing economic weakness.
(c) Hitherto we had been thinking in terms of an economic settlement between the Six and the Seven. It was now apparent that this alone would be neither practicable nor sufficient. A solution was needed which would prevent political, as well as economic, division in Europe. Moreover, the United States Government would not lend their support to a purely economic settlement: their main concern was to prevent the Six from developing as a separate political force in Europe. In these circumstances a political initiative was required. Our economic objectives could not be attained unless we could find a means by which we, together with some of our EFTA partners, could join the political institutions of the Treaty of Rome.
(d) Public opinion in this country had in the past been preoccupied with the difficulties and dangers of a closer association with Europe. Recently its advantages had been more clearly seen. Many of the leaders of British industry were in favour of our joining the Six: indeed, there was some risk that the difficulties would be under-estimated. In political circles also informed opinion was moving in the same direction. On the other hand it must be remembered that a great weight of sentiment could easily be aroused against any policy which could be presented as a threat to the Commonwealth and to British agriculture. In the Conservative Party, in particular, this could evoke strong emotional reactions comparable to those which had recently arisen over Colonial policy.
(e) In respect of our relations with other Commonwealth countries a number of difficult questions would need to be considered. Thus, if we acceded to the Treaty of Rome, could we secure acceptable derogations in respect of Commonwealth preference and free entry? Would it be possible to assess, before entering into detailed negotiations, the nature of the derogations which we were likely to secure on these and other matters? Should we have to forgo our right to make trade arrangements with other Commonwealth countries? Would they have to forgo their right of free access to the London money market? If we joined the Six, would European interests come eventually to weigh more with us than Commonwealth interests in formulating our general political and economic policies? Finally, we were under obligation to consult fully with other Commonwealth Governments on this question, and the timing and the method of such consultation would need careful thought.
(f) The Home Secretary1 recalled that, at their meeting on 13th July, 1960, the Cabinet had agreed that there were insuperable difficulties in the way of our accepting membership of the Six under the existing provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The Cabinet had then particularly in mind the difficulties in respect of the Commonwealth. But there were other difficulties too. In the Cabinet’s last discussion on 20th April reference had been made to the surrender of national sovereignty which would be involved; and this point would certainly require careful thought in the light of reports by officials which were coming forward for consideration by Ministers.
[ matter omitted ]
(j) The Lord Privy Seal said that the French Government had indicated that they were willing to discuss with us how we could join the Common Market, or enter into a special association with it, so long as we were ready to make some concessions on Commonwealth trade and British agriculture. They had made it plain that, while it was open to us to consider either course, they would greatly prefer membership to association. Hitherto, we had not been able to tell the French how far we were prepared to go, either on Commonwealth trade or on agriculture. If we could disclose to the French the sort of conditions which the Cabinet were now considering it was possible that further progress could be made in negotiation. Even so, it was doubtful whether it would be expedient for us to declare at the outset that we were prepared to accede to the Treaty of Rome before we had negotiated the necessary derogations. Such a declaration would involve us in political difficulties in this country: it would also leave us less room for manoeuvre in negotiation. It would be preferable to make further progress with the detailed negotiation of the necessary derogations before taking any final decision. The obligations which we had undertaken to consult with our partners in the Commonwealth and in the EFTA were a further reason for preferring that course. It was evident that we could not accede to the Treaty of Rome without some economic damage, at least in the short-term both to this country and to other countries of the Commonwealth; and, before a final decision was taken, the Cabinet should have before them a statement showing the balance of advantage and disadvantage in the course ultimately proposed.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that this question must be viewed in the wider context of the East-West struggle. In this the Communist bloc were gaining ground and the Western countries were in some disarray. It was an article of Communist faith that capitalism would in the end destroy itself; and, given competing currencies and conflicting trade interests, there was a real risk of a growing economic weakness in the Western world unless its countries could find means of drawing more closely together. For some time after the war, in her years of political and economic weakness, Europe had been dependent on American aid and content to accept Anglo-Saxon leadership. Europe had now regained her strength and a new situation had arisen. Different means must now be found for binding Europe within the wider Atlantic Community. The United Kingdom, as the bridge between Europe and North America, had the opportunity to take an initiative in this. We could of course decline that responsibility. It would be easy for us to put forward, as excuses, the need for preserving our special relations with other Commonwealth countries and protecting the interests of British agriculture. But, if we decided to stand aloof from inner Europe at this time, might we not find that the eventual damage to our interests would be even greater in terms of the secular struggle between East and West? We should not forget that in this struggle half of our Commonwealth partners and half of our partners in the EFTA were neutral. Moreover, as the economic strength of the Six increased, other members of EFTA would certainly be under strong temptation to join it; and, to the extent that this happened, the economic position of the United Kingdom would be progressively undermined. The older members of the Commonwealth, though they would stand with us now, might then be obliged to turn increasingly towards the United States; and new world groupings would arise, as a result of which the United Kingdom would lose much of her influence in world affairs. These considerations suggested that, on a balance of advantage, it was in our interest to join the political and economic association of the Six if we could gain admission on terms which would be tolerable to us. A political initiative would be necessary, and France was certainly the key to the situation. Hitherto, General de Gaulle had not wished us to join the Six—presumably because he wanted France to retain the leadership of inner Europe. But his attitude might be changed if he could be brought to see that the West as a whole could not prevail against the Communists unless its leading countries worked together towards a wider unity in the free world as a whole.
The Prime Minister said that at the present time France was, in more respects than one, a main obstacle in the way of creating a closer unity in the West. This had been a main theme in his recent discussions in Washington. He believed that he had persuaded President Kennedy that, if the free world was to present a united front to the Communists, General de Gaulle must be brought to see that France must co-operate more fully and effectively with her Western partners. First, she must take her full share of responsibility within the North Atlantic Alliance and accept its principle of interdependence. Secondly, if she was determined to continue with her nuclear programme, she must aim, not so much to create an independent national force, as to make a contribution to the strength of the Western deterrent as a whole, which should increasingly be regarded as held in trust on behalf of the free world as a whole. Thirdly, she must make it possible for the United Kingdom and some of the other members of the EFTA to join with the Six in creating a wider political and economic association in Europe. If, in all these matters she were willing to work for Western unity, she could take her rightful place with the United States and the United Kingdom as one of the pillars of the Western Alliance and thus earn the right to participate in the system of tripartite consultation which General de Gaulle demanded.
The Prime Minister said that he hoped that President Kennedy would speak to General de Gaulle along these general lines in the course of his forthcoming visit to Paris. If so, we should be able to judge, in the light of the General’s response, whether there was a basis for seeking wider political and economic association in Europe. If General de Gaulle was willing to consider this problem in the wider framework of the world situation, it should be possible to find a solution of the special economic difficulties which the United Kingdom Government would find in acceding to the Treaty of Rome as it now stood.
The conclusion reached by the Cabinet, in the light of this discussion and the earlier discussion on 20th April, was that the right policy for the Government to follow at this stage was to work for a solution by which the United Kingdom (preferably with some of her partners in EFTA) would join with the countries of the Six in forming a wider political and economic association in Europe. It would be necessary, in negotiations with those countries, to secure special arrangements to preserve the main trading interests of the Commonwealth; a satisfactory relation with other members of EFTA and special provisions for British agriculture to enable it to be brought into harmony with the general agricultural policy of the Six on a basis adequate to support the interests dependent on it. If, however, these points could be covered satisfactorily, either in a protocol to the Treaty or otherwise, there seemed to be no reason of principle why the United Kingdom should not accede to the Treaty of Rome, including its political institutions.
The Cabinet–
(1) Took note that, in the course of his visit to Paris, President Kennedy might be able to ascertain whether the French Government were willing to co-operate more fully with their Western Allies on the general lines indicated by the Prime Minister in summing up the Cabinet’s discussion.
(2) Agreed that, if President Kennedy’s approach elicited a favourable response from General de Gaulle, the United Kingdom should be ready to enter into further negotiations with a view to finding means by which the United Kingdom, together with some of her partners in EFTA, could join with the countries of the Common Market in forming a wider political and economic association in Europe.
1 Rab Butler.
[UKNA: CAB 128/35 PART 1]