Australian High Commission, London, 2 September 1965
7578. Top Secret Immediate
Quadripartite Talks
British memorandum entitled ‘The Repercussions in South East Asia of the Separation of Singapore’ was received at 14.30 hours 2nd September.
Five copies will be despatched in bag leaving London 6th September.
The following is the concluding section of the paper:
Begins—
V. The British Assessment of the Implications 1
26. In the twelve months before Singapore’s separation from Malaysia the British Government has been considering the long term future of the military bases in Malaysia.
It was apparent that sooner or later the time would come when, for a variety of reasons, including the economic burden of expenditure, there would be increasing pressure on Britain and her Commonwealth allies to withdraw militarily from Malaysia.
27. The situation described in parts II, III, and IV suggests to us that our military security in the area has already been significantly reduced and is likely to be further reduced, that the basis of our position in relation to confrontation has been seriously eroded and that we need therefore to find urgently, in consultation with our allies, some means of adjusting to the position.
28. We next consider therefore the possibilities of ending confrontation.
Because it has always seemed unlikely that confrontation could be ended through a military victory by either side, we have only envisaged three ways in which it might actually be terminated:
- through Indonesian inability to continue confrontation owing to civil war in Indonesia, a complete economic collapse or, most unlikely, the emergence of an anti-communist regime dependent on Western support to maintain itself;
- a negotiated compromise acceptable to both parties;
- Malaysian readiness to capitulate to Indonesian demands following the disintegration of the Federation or the emergence of a pro-Indonesian government in Kuala Lumpur.
29. In considering (a) it seems to us that major military reverses would not break the determination of the Indonesian government to continue confrontation, while the relatively primitive economy of Indonesia seems capable of withstanding for a long time the likely aggravation of the present economic chaos.
Nor do we foresee any effective political revolt against President Sukarno.
Therefore our hopes that Indonesia might be unable to continue confrontation thus depend on the early death or incapacity of the president.
This might be followed by a struggle for power between the army and the communists, but it is equally possible that both sides would maintain an uneasy cooperation in pursuit of the only objective on which they are agreed: confrontation.
If President Sukarno survives much longer and Indonesia’s energies continue to be devoted to confrontation, the greater will be the risk of his being succeeded by a regime even more sympathetic to communism and China.
30. The third possibility—Malaysian readiness to capitulate—may have been brought a little nearer by recent events but it can never be a desirable objective of British policy and we should seek to avoid it.
31. This leaves alternative (b): a negotiated compromise. We have a number of ideas on this alternative which we wish to discuss with our allies with a view to reaching agreement with them on the best course to be adopted.
32. By whatever means it may be contrived, we need an early end to confrontation.
This may have to be at some sacrifice, for example, of ‘prestige’, but there are certain minimum terms which we should regard as essential.
These are, firstly, that no constituent territory of what was Malaysia should be placed, against its will, in a position of compete helplessness in the face of future Indonesian or other aggression: and secondly, that we should not be forced to withdraw from Singapore before we are ready to do so in good order. (The tactics of achieving this aim may require particular consideration.)
33. The considerations set out in this memorandum also appear to lead to the conclusion that present and likely developments may shorten the prospect of our being able to stay in the Singapore base.
It is, however, our view that Britain should continue, although on a reduced scale, to make a military contribution to the defence of Australasia and South East Asia.
We shall not be in a position to discuss in detail the military questions involved in this concept, such as the level of forces which will be required and the site of the necessary facilities, until our defence system has reached a more advanced state.
Ends.
2. The remainder of this paper is being telegraphed.
1 When Singapore separated from Malaysia, Healey wrote to Wilson with an assessment of the implications from a British defence point of view. ‘The secession of Singapore has increased our freedom of action in several respects. I believe that we should decide our policy and initiate action to implement it before the dust settles, or we shall find our current freedom of action removed by the initiatives of others. The key issue is not whether or when we leave Singapore, but how to get out of Borneo: i.e. how to end our commitment under confrontation as soon as possible.’ According to Healey the worst feature of the UK’s East of Suez responsibilities was that they required an unqualified commitment by Britain towards governments ‘which retain excessive freedom of action in relation to British interests’. Britain’s withdrawal from Borneo need not mean a simultaneous withdrawal from Singapore, ‘although this may well be forced upon us before 1970 in any case’. On the contrary, to obtain US and Australian approval for the withdrawal from Borneo, it might be necessary in the current defence review to indicate a greater willingness to retain forces in Southeast Asia, whether in Singapore or Australia, ‘than we might otherwise have wished’. Conceivably the Americans might withdraw support from Sterling if they thought the UK was planning to withdraw from Singapore. The US wanted the UK to remain in Singapore as long as possible to prevent it becoming an ‘Asian “Cuba” under Chinese control’. In order therefore to withdraw from Borneo, the UK would have to make clear its intention ‘to retain a military capacity in Singapore for as long as we are politically permitted to do so, and to shift to Australia thereafter’ (UKNA: PREM 13/431, letter, Healey to Wilson, 13 August 1965, reproduced in ESAC , Part I, Document 98).
[NAA: A1209, 1965/6595 PART 1]