Canberra, 27 January 1966
The British memorandum1 and paper on the defence review contains a thesis along the lines of the note I did yesterday. It is clear that the whole British objective is to avoid being in a situation of primary commitment in South East Asia and that she sees the best way of doing this is to remove the bases from inside the area. If we accept some of the argumentation of course, we must accept also that America and ourselves have no future in sustaining a Western presence in the area. It is therefore not merely a diminution of British commitment but a philosophy of argument against a Western position in South East Asia.
2. We are therefore entitled to read the papers as an attack on the whole philosophy of involvement in South East Asia. This gives us a very good political ground for striking a real difference with Britain.
3. Nevertheless, whatever verbal observations we may make it is clear from the style and presentation of the papers that they are not intended to be received with any effect. This means that Healey will probably proceed to a White Paper which allows full scope for the statement of his position in any talks which we may have with him after the White Paper has been published.
4. It should be our objective to examine the possibility of bringing on early quadripartite talks with the tactical end that we will bring into concert American, Australian and New Zealand disagreement with the British approach. In this way we will politically, I hope, be able to thwart what I detect as a Healey stratagem to get as much of this thinking into the White Paper. In short, I conclude that the quadripartite talks are not much use after Healey goes to print.
1 ‘Four–Power Defence Arrangements in the Indo-Pacific Area’, Foreign Office memorandum, 24 January 1966. The paper reiterated the UK preference for a neutralised and non-aligned solution to the problems of Southeast Asia, emphasised the UK’s difficulty in sustaining the financial commitment involved in maintaining UK forces in the region, argued that in any case it would not be possible to maintain Western bases in Malaysia and Singapore into the 1970s, and concluded, ‘If therefore a British defence contribution to the area is to be maintained, it will be necessary for alternative facilities to be provided elsewhere. Australia seems to be the only possible site’ (NAA: Al945, 287/3/21).
[NAA: Al209, 1965/6595 PART 5]