Canberra, 30 January 1966
Top Secret
Without Memorandum—British Defence Review
The Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee had for consideration a further report by the Defence Committee prepared in light of:–
- two papers from the British Government, viz. * United Kingdom Defence Review—Aide Memoire by Her Majesty’s Government1 * United Kingdom Memorandum—Four Power Defence Arrangements for the Indo-Pacific Area2
and,
- discussions which the Defence Committee had had with an advance group from Mr. Healey’s party.
It noted that officials adhered generally to the conclusion reached in their earlier report dated 20th January3 and that later information had only served to strengthen their impression that Britain had in mind withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia after 1970.
The Committee addressed itself to the issues arising for discussion with Mr. Healey. It agreed that a key issue, which might be a starting point with Mr. Healey, was that discussed at paragraphs 35–39 of the report—the issue of a strategic concept for the area as a whole. Britain appeared to hope for an eventual solution where countries on the Asian mainland would be neutral and non-aligned and where non-Asian powers would withdraw to off-shore bases, e.g. in the Philippines and Australia. On its understanding of the nature of the threat from Communist China, the Committee was of the view that such a strategy was wholly unrealistic, whether viewed in terms of the region or globally. It would, by abandoning the present Western association with Asian resistance to communism, weaken the resolve of countries in the area and, by depriving the West of the means of offering a measured response to covert communist aggression, may launch it on a frightening course of diplomacy where the alternatives could be either to allow Chinese domination of the area or to resort to nuclear war against China herself. The Committee saw this issue as one of supreme concern for Australia on which the Government’s views should be put squarely to the British.
The Committee recognised that other possibilities of conflict in the area could not be ruled out, e.g. as between Singapore and Malaysia, or Cambodia and Thailand, and if such conflicts occurred, Australia would be concerned, in concert with the United States and the United Kingdom, in terms of the general security of the region. It took the view that these possibilities involved dangers of a lesser order. In any event, a continued presence in the area would better equip the Western Allies to deal with any such developments.
The vital thing for Australia was to have the United States remain in the area and everything else must be measured against this. Any prospect that the British would abandon their presence in South East Asia must tend to embarrass and undermine present United States policy. The greatest importance, therefore, attached to dissuading Britain from pursuing proposals for withdrawal. The Committee saw the response of the United States, in the discussion taking place with Mr. Healey in Washington, as holding the best hope of influencing the British to remain.4
Having regard to its position on the security of South East Asia, including the retention of bases, the Committee accepted that, at an appropriate stage, Australia would need to register a willingness to involve herself further in commitments toward the security of the region. However, it wished to see a context of Ministerial quadripartite discussion which would take account of political as well as military objectives for the area and due recognition of Australia’s commitments for national development which were, in themselves, a contribution to defence in the area. If additional commitments were to be undertaken with the British and Americans, the Committee indicated its desire that these might be placed contractually within new permanent treaty arrangements.
The Committee referred to the question of British bases in Australia, recognising that Mr. Healey’s visit was directed towards this and that he would be seeking to obtain some commitment on Australia’s part. It agreed that it should try to avoid being drawn into detailed discussion on this point, adhering to its position that the Singapore and Malaysian bases should be retained indefinitely and any detailed contingency studies should arise out of quadripartite discussions which it understood the British wanted, and in which it believed the Americans would be prepared to join given a suitable occasion. The Committee observed that the provisional British conclusions about future bases in Australia did not envisage the same role for these bases as that discharged by existing bases in Singapore and Malaysia and therefore their value for Australia’s purposes was something which would call for military appreciation. While it would resist suggestions by Mr. Healey for detailed discussions, the Committee attached the utmost importance to avoiding any impression that the Government was refusing to have British bases in Australia, since, if, in the contingency, the British were to be forced out of Singapore and Malaysia, the Government would unhesitatingly want to have British bases here.
1The aide-memoire, dated January 1966, is published in ESAC, Part I, Document 10; copy at NAA: A1945, 287/3/21.
2See Document 50, note 1.
3See Document 47, which is dated ‘January 1966’ in the original.
4Healey and Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, discussed Britain’s defence review with Rusk, McNamara and Ball in Washington in late January 1966. In the UK record of the discussions, Healey commented, on the issue of alternative facilities in Australia, that he hoped to be able during his forthcoming Canberra visit to arrange staff talks to start soon. ‘We did not envisage setting up any new formal organisation and were not in a desperate hurry, but we did need American help to persuade the Australians to co-operate.‘ Rusk responded that the US regarded Australia ‘not merely as a friendly country to be defended, but as part of the whole free world defence system in the region’. ‘Mr. Rusk thought that if we were to leave Singapore the Australians would regard this as a sign that we were disengaging ourselves from the problems of the region. Mr. McNamara agreed and said it was not clear from the British Memorandum how the quadripartite group would participate in protecting the area, especially in South-East Asia.’ Healey argued that what was needed was a joint (i.e. quadripartite) capability to deal with a range of possibilities in the region. To which Rusk said, ‘the first question in everybody’s mind would be whether our proposals represented an increase or reduction of our commitments’ (UKNA: FO 317/190785, record of meeting at State Department, 27 January 1966, published in ESAC, Part I, Document 11). Reporting on the discussions, Sir P. Dean, Britain’s Ambassador in Washington, commented: ‘Rightly or wrongly, the Americans believe that our physical withdrawal from the South–East Asian mainland would have profound psychological repercussions on Asian and indeed American opinion and create a climate which would fatally undermine their position in Viet Nam. They are therefore not prepared to express views about an alternative base in North West Australia’ (UKNA: FO 371, 190785, telegram 416 to Foreign Office, 2 February 1966, published in ESAC , Part I, Document 13).
[NAA: A5839 VOLUME I]