Canberra, 27 June 1966
Top Secret
British Bases in Australia
The agreed Minute following the Cabinet consultations with Mr. Healey included the following:—
‘Military representatives of the countries at the present talks should meet together without commitment to examine what might be involved physically and in terms of costs and timing in any proposal to base British forces in Australia—that is to say to obtain an idea of the physical possibilities and limitations so that any further examination by Ministers may proceed on the basis of a better assessment of the practical possibilities.’
2. Subsequently the Prime Minister announced publicly that Australia was willing to plan against a contingency that Singapore might be untenable at some future point of time and that studies at the Service level of various possibilities and their feasibility would be undertaken.
3. An examination of the problems associated with the British requirement for base facilities in Australia was put in hand in the Australian Joint Service machinery. The Australian approach was that planning for the provision of base facilities in Australia is part of the price we must pay if we wish the British to hold on in Singapore longer than they would otherwise intend; and the actual existence of the facilities would enable British forces to remain in the area rather than go home when they eventually leave Singapore/Malaysia. Nevertheless it is unlikely that anybody would be prepared to provide full permanent facilities for the whole British force against what is only a contingency. Mr. Healey himself expressed his agreement with this view during the Ministerial discussions. For some elements of the Services it might be possible to rely on the establishment of an infrastructure in Australia with provision for rapid reinforcement. There would also be merit in locating the British forces as far as possible at existing bases or at some extension of these bases or at least where Australian bases would be required for the expected development of Australian forces.2
4. While in England in April Sir Edwin Hicks had discussions with the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Defence and Senior Advisers and also with the Chiefs of Staff Committee. At these meetings it was agreed that single Service planners at the level of Lieutenant Colonel and equivalent should visit Australia to examine and discuss British requirements on the spot with the Australian planning staff. These low level staff talks would be entirely without commitment on either side.
5. The British staff planners have just completed their visit. The level of British forces stated for planning purposes, which is at Annex, is about the same as that given by M. Healey in January. Three agreed single Service Reports were prepared recording the conclusions reached between the British and Australian planners. These conclusions are very broadly as follows:–
(a) NAVY—
- Cockburn Sound in Western Australia is the only area which can be regarded practically as an RN base;
- The RN requirements can be added as a self-contained phase to the RAN staff requirements for a base in Cockburn Sound. The facilities in the base would be integrated for use by both the RAN and the RN.
- There would be no physical difficulty in providing the necessary facilities for the RN by 1975. Limited facilities (those sought by the RAN) could be provided should RN forces be withdrawn from Singapore to the Cockburn Sound area in 1970 or at short notice.
- The design study for selection of sites and the establishment of orders and costs should be carried out by a firm of engineering consultants.
(b) ARMY—
- The amphibious force consisting of about 3 major units and totalling in all about 3,000 should be located close to the naval base in Western Australia.
- A force of about brigade strength consisting of the equivalent of 4 major units and totalling some 5,000 should be located in the Rockhampton area.
- The force headquarters and base units totalling some 5,000 should be in the Brisbane area.
- Construction for the above deployments could be achieved by about 1975. Earlier deployment would be acceptable but would probably necessitate a large proportion of the force being accommodated in temporary accommodation.
(c) AIR FORCE—
- The maritime forces should be located at a new airfield to be constructed in Western Australia near the naval base.
- RAAF Edinburgh with considerable development should house the RAF C 130 Squadron and Command Headquarters.
- RAF F111 aircraft could be located with RAAF F111s atAmberley with some further development.
- Army tactical support aircraft could be located at an airfield to be developed in the Rockhampton area.
- Air defence aircraft and Bloodhound missiles could be deployed to the Darwin area.
- Physical construction of the foregoing could be achieved by 1975. Emergency deployments in 1970 would be practicable but would impose very considerable limitations.
6. The Army and Air papers represent at this stage no more than low level staff studies. A great deal more work is required on them in both countries and the present tentative conclusions could be varied considerably. The case of the Navy is somewhat different as the RAN had recently completed a staff study for the construction in phases of an RAN base which provides a firmer point of departure for the discussions with the RN planners.
7. The visiting British planners were pleased with the discussions which were conducted in a friendly and forthright manner and they have taken back to London a great deal of factual information. No realistic estimates of cost could be made on the basis of the discussions as they have so far proceeded but it will be recalled that in January last the Defence Committee estimated that the total cost including married quarters could be in the vicinity of £A250—300 million while the Treasury believed that the costs could run as high as £A500 million. Even without detailed estimates of costs the investigations by British planners will have brought home to the British the magnitude of the task of locating in Australia forces of the strengths they have in mind. The British can now give further consideration to the practical realities and there may be further thought of possibilities, such as the rotational deployment or greater reliance on reinforcement in an emergency, for some elements of the forces, with lower strength levels permanently in Australia.
8. We would hope in due course to bring the Americans more fully into the contingency planning for base facilities in Australia. There may be some broad discussion during the quadripartite meeting on 30th June.
9. The results of the staff talks are now being put to further study in the Australian Joint Service machinery. At the Government level it is considered that the initiative lies essentially with the United Kingdom. However, it is felt that the Naval proposal to engage consulting engineers to investigate the possibility of Cockburn Sound being developed as a naval base should be incorporated in the general submission on Defence Programme costs which is currently being prepared for Cabinet consideration. Navy believe that such a survey to take account of both RAN and RN base requirements would cost something more than $A200,000 but this cannot be regarded as a firm figure as there has been no discussion with engineering consultants.
10. Another project which suggests itself for further early joint examination initially at the Service level, is the possibility of basing the RAF F111 aircraft from the outset at Amberley rather than in Malaysia/Singapore, although Fill aircraft of both the RAF and RAAF would be deployed forward in Singapore/Malaysia airfields for a considerable part of the time. In any event it is believed that the RAF contemplate drawing on Australia for their main support facilities in the operation of the F111 aircraft even if in fact they are actually deployed from Singapore.
ANNEX
The British Single Service Planners who visited Australia in June for low level planning discussions with their Australian counterparts tabled the following force levels as a basis for discussion:–
Royal Navy
1 Commando Ship
1 Landing Ship Assault
1 or 2 Cruisers
4 Guided Missile Destroyers Type 82
8 Other Destroyers/Frigates
4 Nuclear Propulsion Submarines (SSN)
2 Conventional Submarines
2 Escort Maintenance Ships
1 Submarine Depot Ship
11 Royal Fleet Auxiliaries
Not more than 50% of this force would be in the Australian base at any one time.
British Army
An amphibious force consisting of about three major units with logistic support totalling in all about 3000.
A force of about brigade strength consisting of the equivalent of four major units including two infantry battalions, plus supporting units, making a total of some 5000 all ranks.
A base force to provide the Headquarters and support for both the amphibious and the other brigade and for the maintenance or war reserves. This will be a static force and would amount to some 5000 all ranks, including a few U.K. based civilians.
Royal Air Force
Maritime Forces
1 Squadron Phantom
1 Squadron Buccaneers
1 Squadron Maritime Reconnaissance
Medium Range Transport
1 Squadron Hercules
Strike Forces
14 F111 aircraft (in the strike and reconnaissance role)
Tactical Forces
1 Squadron Short Range Transport
1 Squadron Helicopters
1 Squadron Pll27 (VTOL)
1 Squadron Jaguar
Air Defence Forces
1 Squadron Phantom
1 Squadron Bloodhound Missiles
1 This brief was one of a number of papers prepared for Holt’s visits to Washington and London in June and July 1966 respectively.
2 Reporting on a talk with Hicks in Canberra on 28 June 1966, the British Defence Liaison Staff in Australia commented: ‘Hicks said quite firmly that the Prime Minister of Australia was determined not to lay himself open to the charge of it being the Australians who had driven Britain out of the Far East but that this was to some extent balanced by the fact that they could see no sense in putting up at an early date a large range of facilities which would not be used while we were in Malaysia and Singapore (it may well be that this last point is a contributory factor to the Australian wariness about the Army but there are other points such as the embarrassment of accepting British troops in this country whilst there are Australians in Vietnam and some reluctance to any appearance of a garrison)’ (UKNA: DEFE 25/149, telegram to Ministry of Defence).
[NAA: A1945, 287/3/26]