Cablegram 306 LONDON, 18 August 1945, 12.30 a.m.
IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET
Your telegram 7th August, 217. [1] SIAM.
Please see my telegrams today D1483 and 1484 and 1485. [2]
We are glad to note that His Majesty’s Government in Australia are in general accord with our views and with our proposed conditions for acceptance by a new Siamese Government. It will however be seen that under the procedure now contemplated it is proposed that consultation with the United States Military authorities should be through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that it is not proposed to enter into consultation with the United States Government on political conditions.
2. The following remarks relate to detailed suggestions in paragraph 4 of your telegram under reply.
(i) We have added at the end of paragraph 10 of Military Conditions (formerly Condition C (7) [3], the words ‘or notable for affording active assistance to Japan’.
(ii) (Apprehension and punishment of Siamese who have committed war crimes or have harshly treated Allied prisoners). In our view this is sufficiently covered by paragraph 10 of Military Conditions as it stands and to attempt to make Siamese obligations more specific might result in limiting them.
(iii) (Security requirements in Old Condition E (1)). Your amendment has been incorporated in paragraph C (1) of Political Conditions.
(iv) (Amnesty for Siamese who have assisted the United Nations in propaganda and possible extension to cover political offences against the Pibul Regime [4]). We consider that any collaborating Government will not wish to persecute Siamese who have helped the United Nations and that provision for amnesty accordingly should not be made in the Conditions.
3. We note the views in your paragraph 5 as to a ‘Tutelage’ period for Siam but feel that this idea is unlikely to be practicable in the light of probable developments and the known attitude of the United States Government. Having regard to the United States attitude it is not at all clear that there will be any Control Organisation for Siam such as has been established in European enemy countries or is being considered for Japan. So far as military arrangements for Siam are concerned exchange of Military Liaison Missions between the Australian Commander-in-Chief and Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, will we hope ensure closest possible contact between our military authorities on the spot and yours. Further, if Australia could provide suitable personnel to fill a proportion of any establishment which may be created by Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia for dealing with Siamese affairs we are sure that Admiral Mountbatten would greatly welcome their help.
4. Siam-Indo-China Border. We have noted your view on this point and will bear it in mind, but this particular problem will presumably not arise until a later stage. [5]
_
1 Document 161.
2 See Document 204, and note 3 thereto.
3 ‘Former’ and ‘old’ conditions refer to Document 145.
4 See Document 144, note 3.
5 Addison’s cablegram D1589, dispatched 30 August (on file AA :
A1838/2, 453/10/1/2) advised that the French Provisional Govt sought Anglo-French co-operation in resolving the border dispute with Thailand, and were likely to demand restitution of the territory seized and to regard themselves as in a state of war with Thailand until this was guaranteed. But on the assumption that the French would conduct their own simultaneous negotiations with the Thai Govt, the U.K. Govt removed reference to the border dispute from the draft heads of agreement. See also Addison’s cablegram 345, dispatched 30 August, in AA : A3195, 1945, Folder, Top Secret, Inwards from Secretary of State, D1157-3/7/45 to D2033, 2/11/45-1.28132.
_
[AA : A1066, P45/49/1]