Canberra, 3 December 1970
Australian Relations with Republic of China
With reference to your minute of 2nd December I am not attracted to Dunn’s ‘advisory’ proposals.1
2. If ROC accepted and implemented them all (which is wildly unlikely) it might be held in slightly higher esteem by a few countries; but this would have no effect whatever on the pro-Peking tide and I do not think that, at best, it would have more than a very marginal influence on the prospects for any ‘protect Taiwan’ formula. Any resulting advantage to Australian interests would be minute.
3. In points (a), (b) and (h) Dunn proposes the softening of Taipei’s posture towards Peking. This would of course serve some ultimate good but I do not believe that it would have any measurable effect on international support; as against that, all three suggestions would be anathema to Chiang and I should think it likely that Shen would regard them as impertinent however low Dunn kept his profile.
4. Points (c), (d) and (e) relate to the democratization of the Government. If implemented they would, of course, be beneficial to internal relations in Taiwan, but the suggestions come very close to the bone and I doubt that such steps would have much effect on international opinion.
5. The suggestions in (f) and (g) are constructive ones which carry no risk of embarrassment, but these two in themselves would provide little meat for a special session with Shen.
6. If we were eventually to reach agreement with the United States and others to mount a special confrontation with ROC to persuade it to lower its sights so as to facilitate a protective formula limited to Taiwan, points (c), (d) and (e) might be reconsidered; but they would probably only complicate an operation which would be difficult enough at best.
7. With regard to the draft proposal for a possible public re-formulation of our attitude on the China question, I have no objection to PPG taking. it into consideration as it stands, but what we choose to say, and when, must depend on the substantive conclusions to which the study leads.
[NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18, i]
1 In connection with the ideas contained in Document 144, Robertson had recommended to Eastman that Dunn be authorised to float these with the US Embassy on a personal basis. Robertson also proposed endorsement—subject to a positive US response and further consideration in Canberra—of Dunn’s suggestion that he pursue his ideas with James C.H. Shen, ROC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Finally, Robertson had recommended that Eastman ask the Policy Planning Group to consider incorporating in its paper (see Document 149) a draft statement that he and Dunn had constructed with a view to the ‘intermediate’ China policy toward which the Department was moving.