Canberra, 10 February 1953
90. Secret Priority
For Spender from Casey. Your 96.1
As you will have seen from our telegram 353 to London,2 repeated to you number 87 we are in broad agreement with many of your observations.
2. We have refrained from public criticism of either the substance or method of Eisenhower’s statement, while conveying to the United States our concern at the possible implications of the decision and the need for prior consultation. We also have in mind an approach to the United States to discuss in advance of United States action related problems such as use of Chinese forces in Korea. We have informed the United Kingdom that we would welcome their views on this. Meanwhile, as you know from our telegram number 32 and the letter sent to you subsequently3 we are in consultation with Defence here as to the position we should take.
3. I also agree with the need to anticipate American policy trends and for the development of agreement between the United States and United Kingdom on a common policy for the Far East generally. Our efforts are constantly directed to that end, and I shall be glad to have any specific suggestions you may have from time to time as to how this can be furthered.
4. Your proposal that an approach should be made to the United States to withdraw recognition from the Chinese Nationalist Government except as the Government of Formosa (with the corollary of recognition of the Chinese People’s Republic for the mainland and admission to United Nations) is, I think, hardly a practicable line so long as the Communists continue operations against the United Nations in Korea. It is most unlikely that such a declaration would be accepted by the Chinese Communists or welcomed by Chiang Kai–Shek. I should have thought it most unlikely too that the United States would accept such a proposition. If we recognised a Government of Formosa in addition to a Government of China attacks by Formosa on China might have to be regarded as aggression. From the United States point of view it would mean abandonment of any hope of counter–revolution led by a purified K.M.T. From the United Kingdom point of view it would mean abandonment of the attempt to wean Communist China from the U.S.S.R. by diplomatic means. I would, however, be glad if you could let me have a dispatch assessing the possible United States attitude in the light of Eisenhower’s declaration on wartime agreements.
[NAA: AS461, 3/12, ii]
1 Document 35.
2 5 February. Menzies informed the High Commissioner in London, Sir Thomas White, of suggestions in the Australian press that the Australian Government welcomed Eisenhower’s announcement (see footnote 3,Document 35). The press further alleged that the Australian Government had criticised the United Kingdom’s opposition to the US decision and that Australia’s assessment was that the withdrawal of the ban on Nationalist Chinese operations would cause the Communist Chinese to redispose their forces. Menzies explained, inter alia, that Australia would not have been able to influence the US decision; that the decision would not in itself lead to immediate major operations; and that public controversy could damage mutual confidence.
3 Not published.