Canberra, 4 February 1964
Secret Immediate
Indonesia—Recourse to the United Nations
Until the present the Minister has taken the view that Indonesia’s actions in the border regions of Malaysia should be reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations but that political action through the Security Council or the General Assembly should be held in reserve. Our view has been that the situation was not serious enough, in terms of the gravity of the incidents and the numbers of Malaysian casualties, for us to be sure that the United Nations would be sufficiently aroused. In addition, while the evidence was sketchy, Indonesia might successfully use diversionary and blocking tactics by skilful use of points such as foreign bases and the presence of British forces in Borneo and so forth.
2. We understand that the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur2 has been authorised to consider with the Malaysians if an immediate approach to the United Nations should be made if negotiations break down. If President Sukarno resumes hostilities having admitted that Indonesians have been operating in Malaysia previously there might be advantages in using the United Nations forum at that moment.
3. The Minister has approved that urgent recourse to the United Nations in the event of a breakdown of negotiations should be actively and positively examined with our allies. The arguments in favour of such action include the following:
(i) If the negotiations break down the overall position could deteriorate rapidly. It might not simply revert to the uneasy stalemate previously existing. A quick transfer of the crisis to the United Nations might be the means of preserving a cessation of hostilities.
(ii) Illegal Indonesian involvement is now crystal clear. The Indonesian authorities have officially acknowledged, both in private and in public, that Indonesians detached from the Armed Forces are fighting on Malaysian soil. Previously they have, of course, admitted to training and reinfiltration of dissidents.3 These activities clearly violate the United Nations Charter. Thus the prospects of building up effective United Nations pressure on Indonesia are good. Moreover, the Indonesians cannot be allowed to think that they can openly flout the accepted standards of international conduct.
(iii) We doubt whether Malaysia can any longer afford not to take Indonesia to the United Nations. Malaysia has a strong case but unwillingness to present it to international opinion would have the effect of weakening it.
(iv) Malaysia has already made major concessions on ascertainment and the postponement date.4 She is now expected to enter into discussions with enemy forces on her territory. Issues of confidence and morale are likely to arise internally unless there is a positive alternative plan for safeguarding her interests.
(v) As countries which have a fundamental interest in orderly international conduct we should be ready to take action to uphold basic United Nations principles in the behaviour between States.
(vi) Intelligence reports suggest that Indonesia is sensitive to the international implications of its behaviour in the border regions and is nervous about United Nations involvement. The latest illustration is its unwillingness to have Thailand named as a truce observer by the Secretary-General.5 We must play upon these doubts.
4. We should like you to seek British, American and New Zealand agreement for an urgent study of all the issues involved in United Nations action including an examination of the kind of resolutions that might be sought and possible fall-back resolutions in the light of possible use by the U.S.S.R. of the veto. There should be expert discussions initiated on these matters. Possibly a joint group, including the Malaysians, in New York should be established.
For Critchley
5. Without disclosing to the Malaysians that we are seeking joint consultation on this matter, we should be glad of your views on the likely Malaysian attitudes and for any reports which you can obtain on discussions which the British and Malaysians may already have held.
[NAA: A1838, 3027/9/1 part 2]
1 Addressed London 515, Washington 282, New York 74, Kuala Lumpur 125, Wellington 53, Bangkok 92.
2 Viscount Antony Henry Flead had replaced Tory as British High Commissioner in Malaysia in October 1963.
3 For instance, in an interview with Shann on 7 January, Nasution had ‘frankly admitted’ training North Kalimantan cadres to conduct territorial warfare in the Borneo territories.
4 That is, the UN ascertainment process in the Borneo territories in August-September 1963 and the postponement of Malaysia from 31 August to 16 September 1963.
5 On 1 February, Shann advised that the Indonesians had asked Thailand to supervise implementation of the cease-fire. On 4 February, however, the Australian Mission to the UN advised that the Indonesians had only informed the Secretary-General of the appointment of observers, and that it was their intention to exclude him from the observation process. Sukarno’s message to the Secretary-General said that the problem was an Asian one to be solved by Asians but with the ‘Secretary-General’s blessing’.