Canberra, 17 February 1964
183. Secret
Thank you for your useful telegrams Nos. 212, 213 and 214.1
2. As you know, we have strenuously argued the Malaysian case that the Indonesian infiltrators should be withdrawn and we shall continue to do so. At the same time, we think that Razak is wise in saying that he would agree to another Ministerial meeting even if Subandrio as seems probable has failed to get Sukarno’s agreement on the full cease-fire formula.2 We have seen a U.P.I.3 report of remarks by Ghazali that Indonesian troops must get out before Ministerial talks can be held. We assume his remarks can be discounted.4
3. We also hope that the Malaysians, at least until the matter is fully thrashed out at the further Ministerial meeting, will agree that the cease-fire is in force subject to their reservation about the inevitability of incidents and that they will work co-operatively with the Thais in the arrangements for preserving and supervising the cease-fire.
4. Our broad reasoning is that as things stand the Malaysians should appear reasonable in accepting the ‘Kennedy’ cease-fire for the sake of American goodwill. In addition, even an inadequate cease-fire seems to work to their advantage if an effective ‘standstill’ is gained, thus denying Indonesia the prospect of reinforcement. Although the present groups may be scattered and disorganised, all intelligence assessments have suggested an increased Indonesian capacity to send in better organised parties.
5. It was from this point of view that we have seen some merit in the Malaysians trying to turn the cease-fire to further practical advantages. While we appreciate the force of the points in your telegram 212, we still feel there may be scope for Malaysian initiatives to build on the cease-fire. We agree the Indonesians are talking about ‘pockets of resistance’ and in other high-sounding terms. Might it not be good for Malaysians’ morale if their pretensions were exposed through detailed identification? Moreover, if the Malaysians intend to ‘mop up’ the infiltrated groups as an ‘internal security problem’ do they not run the risk of being accused of violating the cease-fire?5
6. The Malaysians should maintain their current moral and political advantages. Our New York Mission has suggested that more vigorous efforts be made by the Malaysians to promote their cause in the United Nations. They suggest, for example, that the Malaysians could have circulated as a United Nations document the Bangkok communique,6 together with any memorandum of explanation they thought necessary. We wonder also whether the Tunku would agree to Lee Kuan Yew and some other members of the present mission in Africa extending their trip to New York ostensibly to make contact with African delegates there.7 The Mission could make a good effect in press and television interviews and in Washington. If the Tunku demurs at using Lee Kuan Yew the point could be made to him that much of the American uncertainty over Malaysia stems from the Chinese element in the population and that the appearance of a good Malaysian-Chinese could be valuable in the United States.8
[NAA: A1838, 3006/4/7 part 21]
1 14 February. These responded to Canberra’s request for Critchley’s views on whether the Malaysians could take the initiative and suggest that ‘the Indonesians should designate the positions of [their] groups on the ground?’ Canberra thought that ‘if the Indonesians refuse they are not co-operating in making the cease-fire work’, and if they agreed, ‘the groups could be encircled and denied mobility and hence food and other supplies’. Critchley could ‘see no merit’ in these tactics and suggested that they would ‘more likely’ work to Indonesia’s advantage. In his view, (a) the presence of Indonesian groups in Malaysian territory could not become a subject for negotiation; (b) allowing designated positions would give these ‘few scattered and disorganised’ groups ‘undeserved prestige and importance’; and (c) an official request for the groups’ locations (which the Malaysians already knew) could leave the Malaysians facing an awkward Indonesian request to send in its own personnel to make contact. The cablegrams also reported the Malaysians’ approach to the operation of the cease-fire, including their arrangements with the Thai supervisory team and the Indonesians. They were particularly concerned not to have Indonesian officials in Malaysian territory, nor to agree to Malaysian and Indonesian local commanders making contact in order to assist in the maintenance of the cease-fire. Both situations could aid Indonesia’s claims of neo-colonialism, given the numbers of British forces in the states and that most senior commanders were British.
2 On 13 February, Sukarno told US Ambassador, Howard Jones, that Subandrio had never delivered a message to him (see editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks ), and that he would not order the withdrawal of Indonesian forces until a political settlement had been reached with Malaysia.
3 United Press International.
4 Critchley did not respond to this statement.
5 Critchley believed that ‘Malaysian insistence on Indonesian withdrawal [was] primarily a matter of principle’. The Indonesian groups still in Malaysia were scattered and disorganised, the Malaysians knew where they were located, and were in a position to bring them under control.
6 That is, the communique issued at the end of the tripartite meeting in Bangkok, 5–10 February (see editorial note, 1964 Tripartite Talks ).
7 Lee Kuan Yew was then leading the mission to explain Malaysia to the African states (see footnote 3, Document 144). The 12-member delegation included the Chief Ministers of Sarawak and Sabah and other MPs from the territories, Malaya and Singapore. 18 African capitals were visited over 35 days.
8 On Lee’s return to Malaysia on 26 February, the Tunku did ask him to go to New York, but he subsequently rescinded the request with the PAP’s decision to contest the Malaysian general election.