Jakarta, 23 May 1966
590. Secret Immediate
Confrontation
With Malik and Razak likely to meet shortly,2 following are personal views on some of the factors and issues involved. Given my short time here I make them tentatively, especially since rumours, contradictions and deliberate double-talk are prevalent here.
Views of Malik and his colleagues
2. Malik has been consistent in saying privately that for military, economic and international reasons an early end to confrontation is essential. The evidence is that he has said the same things to his colleagues and to Sukarno and he has gone a long way in the same direction publicly.
3. We can be less sure of where his colleagues stand. The Sultan no doubt is on side. Malik has said on various occasions that the Army leaders accept his logic and are supporting his devices to induce Sukarno’s acquiescence. As against that both Suharto and Nasution in the last two days have made statements that, at a first reading, would commend considerable caution in any negotiations of a ‘settlement’ to which they were a party. Nasution is reported as saying on 21 May that although ways were now ahead for holding peace talks this did not lessen Indonesia’s principle to crush Malaysia. ‘Confrontation is to be continued and adapted to present conditions, physically, economically and diplomatically, since Indonesia sticks to her anti-Nekolim3 principle.’
4. However, Japanese Ambassador Saito claims that, in explaining to him what went on at Bogor on 15 May,4 Nasution boasted that he had devised the concept of confrontation being ‘adapted to present conditions’ as double-talk to get around Sukarno. Indonesia’s ‘present conditions’ were such that there could be no confrontation. (This is a variation of how Sukarno’s views were countered at Bogor, but only to the extent of making Nasution rather than Malik the leading debater against Sukarno.)5
Public opinion
5. The Press has carefully followed the mechanics of setting-up a meeting with Razak, but has said extraordinarily little about the substance of the solution that should be sought. There have been some references that only tactics were being changed, but nothing to indicate that the Press would not accept some pretty superficial ‘solution’.
6. Similarly the students recently have virtually ignored Malaysia. Last week’s outbreak of sign-writing was directed entirely to domestic issues such as the need to convene the MPRS and improve the economy.
7. Conversely Malik has worked hard to bring out the economic importance of recognising Singapore and more latterly the economic attractions of ending confrontation as a whole. (Antara has bolstered Malik’s case with speculative reports from various capitals, including Canberra, that countries are prepared to give substantial economic aid if confrontation is ended.) The Sultan has told Kami6 that a sick Indonesia can be cured only with ‘foreign medicine’.
8. So far as public opinion is concerned therefore Malik appears to face nothing substantially negative and to have considerable positive ammunition in arguing with the President that confrontation should end.
Timing and nature of settlement
9. Malik’s views, the alleged acquiescence of his colleagues, the state of public opinion and Indonesia’s general importance could be put together into an argument against offering concessions to achieve a quick solution. Moreover the Malaysians have to be able to live with {whatever} is conceded and we have to be able to live with an Indonesia which might claim that through use of force its right to meddle with its neighbours was acknowledged.
10. As against this however the Malaysians will need to have in mind that they are unlikely to get anyone more amenable to reason than Malik. He and his colleagues do not have unlimited time. There are increasing student demands for tangible evidence that the present regime is achieving something. While this has to be tempered by the consideration that the students may, to some extent, still be being manipulated by the Army leaders to force further changes from Sukarno,7 it is clear that some genuine demands are not too far distant, especially in the domestic economic field. Progress will not be easy and indeed the economy could easily deteriorate further. Ending confrontation would be a success for Malik and his colleagues in a situation where other successes are rare.
11. In addition to whether it is in our interest to assist the present regime to keep its position, there is also the fact that the present desirable momentum towards ending confrontation could easily be submerged by other imminent or possible problems such as constitutional wrangles, domestic political fighting, internal security and so on. Time would not necessarily bring an inevitable end to the formal state of confrontation.
12. As to the nature of the settlement, it will be realised that Malik’s chances of steering something past the President will depend on his having something that he can represent as a concession to the President’s views. And we need to accept the judgment of the present leaders in Indonesia that for the moment at least it is in their interest to work through the President rather than have a final showdown.
[NAA: A6364, JA1966/04]
1 Max Loveday, Ambassador to Indonesia, who had presented his credentials on 16 April. Shann’s term as ambassador had terminated on 1 April.
2 Razak had agreed to meet Malik following the latter’s request on 19 May for a meeting ‘at earliest possible moment’. The meeting took place in Bangkok on 30 May–1 June.
3 NEKOLIM—acronym referring to neo colonialism, colonialism and imperialism.
4 That is, Shizuo Saito. A KOGAM session to review confrontation and the recognition of Singapore had been held at Bogor on 15 May. It had been chaired by Sukarno and attended by Nasution, Suharto, Malik and other Deputy Prime Ministers and Force Commanders. It addition to a statement made following the session that Indonesia considered it appropriate to recognise Singapore ‘in the present stage of confrontation’, it was announced that: ‘Confrontation against Malaysia would be continued but the road to a peaceful solution based on the Manila Agreements was still open. Efforts towards a peaceful solution would be implemented directly without intermediaries and at the Foreign Minister level’.
5 On 16 May, Loveday had had a discussion with Malik on the Bogor Cabinet meeting, Malik had said the discussion on confrontation had been ‘pretty rough going’, but he had managed to turn Sukarno away from the idea of a meeting with the Tunku and convince him of the need for continued negotiation of a formula to end the dispute at lower than heads of government level.
6 See footnote 1, Document 354.
7 See Document 354.