Australian High Commission, London, 14 August 1965
7037. Secret Priority
Malaysia and Singapore
I would not at this particular stage expect innermost thoughts but Morgan’s 1 probably indiscreet mention of the possibility of peace feelers to Indonesia and of limiting tenure of Singapore is, I think, fair indication that idea of ‘taking to the boat’ is not being entirely overlooked in current British review.
To that extent line of thought suggested in para 8 of my 1969 2 appears already to have some currency.
2. So far, of course, Healey, Stewart and Bottomley have all been agreeably robust in resistance to confrontation.
It has not been easy for them, however, to prevail against the Brown-and-Callaghan economy drive and in any case I have never been sure that any of them was reconciled to an indefinite siege.
For Healey, in particular, the year 1970 appears to have had some magic.
Hartnell’s hunch and mine is that he and his ministry have been thinking of that year as the outside limit of their commitments against confrontation and, for that matter, of their present scale of involvement in Malaysian and General Area defence through present expensive bases in Malaysia and Singapore.
I am not thoroughly sure what their private thoughts are in the longer term but I am prepared to believe that Healey is quite sincere in his interest in follow-on base facilities in Australia provided that he can afford them from his austerity budget.
Question of whether British maintained such military presence because of solicitude for us, to keep on side with Americans, to watch over vestigial British interests in area, or whatever, would presumably not matter greatly to us so long as they did it.
3. Events of last weekend3 must have weakened to some extent the position (and perhaps the resolve) of the stalwarts.
It will be so much harder for them to persuade the Treasury bloc that continued full-scale resistance to confrontation is both necessary and also stands any reasonable prospect of success.
There will clearly be increased pressures to search for any easier, quicker and cheaper way out of confrontation and, while they are at it, for some reduction of their general obligations to the mess that is now Malaysia and some contraction of their general commitment to the area.
4. I would not myself become over-excited about these risks just yet.
If British officials are doing their work thoroughly they are no doubt examining a broad band of possible courses ranging all the way from the near-absurd to the unattainable, and we might hope that some of the sillier notions (e.g. peace overtures to Sukarno in present circumstances) would not survive initial examination by British ministers.
Some ‘looseness’ of thinking is, however, very likely to survive and we will therefore need to have both our arguments and our pressures well-marshalled for the proposed quadripartite talks.
If, as I assume, our policy is to maintain to the maximum the situation as we knew it before Sunday, we may well be the only interested party with the same clear and unwavering aim, and we may have to work very hard to sustain it.
1 J.C. Morgan, UK Deputy High Commissioner, Canberra.
2
The cablegram under reference is numbered 6919 and refers to the announcement of Singapore’s separation from Malaysia on 9 August 1965. Paragraph 8 reads:
‘I have little doubt that immediate British reaction will be “Business as usual and be damned to them” and that efforts will be made through Joint Defence Council and otherwise to maintain common Malaysian-Singapore front against totality of Indonesian confrontation.
It could eventually become difficult to continue to do so, however, if Indonesians played their cards cleverly, if Tunku and/or Lee for different reasons, ceased to see profit in the struggle and if Sabah and Sarawak became increasingly disenchanted.
Furthermore, although Healey and Stewart have been agreeably robust so far, Brown and Callaghan are always lurking in the background with their pressures for curtailment of defence commitments and expenditure.
For the British also “face” is involved but we must expect growing feeling here that prospects of broad long-term cooperation between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore are too uncertain, that the bottom has fallen out of the grand design and that the remnants are hardly worth the considerable strain which they entail.
In fact, on Sunday’s precedent, the British (and we) might not even be asked for our views if Kuala Lumpur decided that the game was not worth the candle.’
‘Sunday’s precedent’ in the final paragraph is a reference to the announcement of Singapore’s separation from Malaysia.
3 Again, a reference to Singapore’s separation from Malaysia.
[NAA: Al838, 3006/10/4/1 PART I]