Documents on Australian Foreign Policy :: Volume 6: July 1942

1. EVATT TO STIRLING: 2 July 1942; ‘Cablegram 226 CANBERRA, 2 July 1942 SECRET Please have the following message transmitted to the British Ambassador, Kuibyshev. [1] Begins:- Would be glad if you would communicate personally following message to M. Molotov [2] from me:- While in London in May you will recall I discussed with you and your...’
2. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 6 July 1942; ‘Cablegram 497 LONDON, 6 July 1942, 11.35 p.m. IMMEDIATE In order that British-Japanese exchange can take place at Lourenco Marques on 20th August 1942, as agreed, we have to embark Japanese personnel on 13th July. But this depends on the conclusion of negotiations with the Japanese. Only outstanding points are...’
3. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 8 July 1942; ‘Cablegram 360 CANBERRA, 8 July 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET Your telegrams 497 [1] and 498. [2] 1. In view of fact that we received cablegrams from Bowden up to February 10th, and advice that he stated on the day before the actual capitulation took place he proposed to remain, we...’
4. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 11 July 1942; ‘Cablegram Winch 25 LONDON, [11 July 1942] [1] PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET I am very glad that the 9th Australian Division is now in action in the Western Desert, and I am most thankful to you for making it available for this vital key point of the war. 2. The...’
5. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH CRIPPS: 13 July 1942; ‘[LONDON], 13 July 1942 I had nearly an hour with Cripps this morning. I told him that I had come to see him because of the state of complete frustration into which I was getting. Cripps interjected at once that I was not the only person suffering from such a...’
6. DIXON TO EGGLESTON: 13 July 1942; ‘Letter WASHINGTON, 13 July 1942 Many thanks for your letter of 10th June [1] enclosing your letter to Sir Earle Page. [2] I have never had enough information to form any reasoned judgment about the causes of the disasters in Singapore and Burmah and my instinctive forebodings springing from such...’
7. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 16 July 1942; ‘Cablegram Johcu 37 (extracts) CANBERRA, 16 July 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET 1. You will recall from cablegram No. 245 of 14th April [1] that the Government expressed the view that all Australian troops abroad should be returned to Australia, but it was prepared to agree to the postponement of...’
8. NOTE BY BRUCE: 20 July 1942; ‘[LONDON], 20 July 1942 SECOND FRONT IN EUROPE As a result of the Hopkins-Marshall visit to London in April our primary strategic objective was agreed as the creation of a second front. To achieve this objective the maximum land and air forces are being concentrated in the United Kingdom as...’
9. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 25 July 1942; ‘Cablegram 111 [A] LONDON, 25 July 1942, 2.25 p.m. IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET PERSONAL HIMSELF My telegram 107 of 20th July. [1] The discussions on very high level referred to were with Hopkins, Marshall and King who arrived in this country on Friday of last week. Their...’
10. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 24 July 1942; ‘Cablegram 532 [1] LONDON, 24 July 1942, 10.12 p.m. MOST SECRET Your JOHCU No. 37. [2] I send you a minute which has been prepared by the Chiefs of Staff. Begins. It had always been our intention to build up a considerable force in the Levant-Caspian area this summer in...’
11. EGGLESTON TO EVATT: 29 July 1942; ‘Letter CHUNGKING, 29 July 1942 PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL I want to write you a letter somewhat more informal than the private and Confidential letters you have had from me. I want to place before you some of the unsatisfactory Conditions which exist in our relations with the External Affairs Department...’
12. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 30 July 1942; ‘Cablegram Johcu 38 CANBERRA, 30 July 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET With reference to Dominions Office cablegram No. 532 [1], the Government is appreciative of your own personal acknowledgement in Part 2 of the difficulties which confront it in this matter. 2. It is frankly disappointed that the review of...’
13. NOTE BY BRUCE: 30 July 1942; ‘[LONDON], 30 July 1942 PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT FOR THE WAR AT SEA [1] The Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee W.P. (42) 302 appears to me to be a most unsatisfactory and illogical document. It has all the appearance of a compromise between sharply divergent points of view. [2]...’
14. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 2 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 121[A] LONDON, 2 August 1942, 7.50 p.m. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY My telegram S.34 of 4th June. [1] There have been developments during the past week of which it is desirable that I should inform you. After the Cabinet Meeting on Monday last,...’
15. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 2 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 122[A] LONDON, 2 August 1942, 11 p.m. IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY Following is note referred to in my immediately preceding telegram 121[A] [1]:- ‘In the course of a short conversation with the Prime Minister this evening, after dealing with matters upon which...’
16. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 2 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 123[A] LONDON, 2 August 1942, 10.30 p.m. IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY Following is copy of the draft telegram referred to in my note to the Prime Minister (my telegram 122[A] [1]):- ‘In my conversations with Evatt, prior to his departure from London...’
17. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 7 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 7268 CANBERRA, 7 August 1942 MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL 1. Your cables 121[A] 122[A] and 123[A] [1] give two instances of the difficulties on the working out of Australian representation in the War Cabinet viz. (i) Churchill’s remark on the desire of the United Kingdom Government to sit alone...’
18. ATTLEE TO CURTIN: 6 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 548 LONDON, 6 August 1942, 9 p.m. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Your Johcu No. 38. [1] The Prime Minister has asked me to send you the following message:- I much appreciate your decision to provide additional drafts for your 9th Division. I am informing the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. 2....’
19. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 8 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 130[A] LONDON, 8 August 1942, 3.10 p.m. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Your telegram 7268 [1], paragraph 1, subsection 2. I regret that I did not make this point quite as clear as I should. When the Agreement between the Chiefs of Staff and Marshall and King came before War...’
20. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 8 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 131[A] LONDON, 8 August 1942, 3.10 p.m. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Your telegram 7267 of 7th August. [1] The Prime Minister had under consideration a draft telegram to the Dominions with regard to the Marshall-King visit and the agreement arrived at with the Chiefs of...’
21. NOTE BY BRUCE: 12 August 1942; ‘[LONDON], 12 August 1942 WAR CABINET The Chiefs of Staff paper with regard to the provision of aircraft for the war at sea, W.P. (42) 302 [1], and my paper W.P. (42) 326 [2], were considered by the War Cabinet. Attlee first asked the Chiefs of Staff for any comments...’
22. MCDOUGALL TO BRUCE: 13 August 1942; ‘Letter WASHINGTON, 13 August [1942] PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL I wrote to you on Monday Aug 10th [1] following my first talk with Sumner Welles. Since then I have been seeing people all day and each evening. On Wednesday I had 1 1/2 hours with Mr Wallace. For the first time...’
23. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 13 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 135[A] LONDON, 13 August 1942, 8.20 p.m. IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Your telegram 7359. [1] In the absence of the Prime Minister [2] and in view of his request (my telegram of the 25th July [3]), I do not feel at liberty to send...’
24. EVATT TO KING: 14 August 1942; ‘Cablegram SW80 CANBERRA, 14 August 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET TO BE DECIPHERED BY WATT Personal for Admiral King to be given to himself alone from Dr. Evatt. 1. Despite losses almost inevitable in so daring an operation [1], your Solomon attack has captured the imagination of all our people...’
25. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH POUND: 16 August 1942; ‘[LONDON], 16 August 1942 Pound came and dined with me-we had about 2 hours talk after dinner. I told him at the start of our talk that I wanted to go over the question of the Air against the Sea because I was anything but happy at the way in...’
26. REPORT BY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL RELATIONS: 20 August 1942; ‘Paper B20 CANBERRA, 20 August 1942 SECRET [The Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations was formed to coordinate executive action on matters of external economic policy affecting more than one department. It met for the first time on 5 June 1942 and included representatives of the Departments of Commerce, External Affairs,...’
27. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 25 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 407 [1] CANBERRA, 25 August 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL It will be evident from the Coral Sea, Midway and Solomon Islands naval engagements that operations in the Pacific Ocean are leading to a naval clash which may well decide the course of the conflict in this...’
28. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 25 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 408 [1] CANBERRA, 25 August 1942 IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL When Dr. Evatt was in London he made representations regarding the allocation of aircraft for the 71 squadron programme for the R.A.A.F. in Australia. The programme, as you know, excludes the Sunderland flying boat squadron in the United...’
29. MCDOUGALL TO BRUCE LETTER WASHINGTON, 26 AUGUST 1942: 26 August 1942; ‘On August 24th, I dined at the White House at Mrs. Roosevelt’s request and had the great pleasure of sitting next to the President at a ‘family’ dinner. Harry Hopkins and his new wife and several young people associated with Mrs. Roosevelt’s activities made up the party. The President was...’
30. NOTE BY BRUCE: 28 August 1942; ‘[LONDON], 28 August 1942 WAR CABINET-PAPER BY AIR MARSHAL SIR ARTHUR HARRIS There was to-day included in the War Cabinet distribution a Note by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Commander in Chief, Bomber Command, which he had prepared at the request of the Prime Minister. The Note is a dreadful...’
31. PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT TO DIXON: 31 August 1942; ‘Cablegram 132 CANBERRA, 31 August 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET The Prime Minister desires you to seek an interview with the President at the earliest possible opportunity and to convey to him the following personal message:- Dear Mr. President, 1. I desire to submit for your urgent consideration my views...’
32. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO WATT: 31 August 1942; ‘Cablegram SW91 CANBERRA, 31 August 1942 For Watt. Please convey following personal message to Hopkins from Evatt. BEGINS. Curtin extremely concerned growing menace approaching enemy thrust. Authentic reports that main Japanese fleet has left home waters suggest necessity of considerable concentration of aircraft on Solomons area and also in South-West...’
33. DIXON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 31 August 1942; ‘Cablegram S123 WASHINGTON, 31 August 1942, 7.25 p.m. IMMEDIATE I had a lengthy interview this morning with General Marshall at which the allocation of aircraft to the R.A.A.F. was discussed as well as the Pacific situation. I impressed upon him the concern of the Government at the relatively small number...’
34. EVATT TO BRUCE CABLEGRAM SL55: 1 September 1942; ‘CANBERRA, 1 September 1942 TO BE DECIPHERED BY OLDHAM MOST CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL Please take up with Palace authorities immediately question of exchange of Ministers with Russia. [1] It is desired King’s informal approval be obtained for Honourable William Slater M.L.A., Speaker of Legislative Assembly, Victoria, [to be] nominated as...’
35. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 1 September 1942; ‘Cablegram Johcu 41 CANBERRA, 1 September 1942 MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL I have read with interest the changes you have recently made in Commands in the Middle East and I hope that the greatest possible success will be achieved by the new Commanders. [1] 2. As a considerable body of...’
36. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 1 September 1942; ‘Cablegram 145[A] LONDON, 1 September 1942, 11.35 p.m. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY Before replying to your telegrams 407 and 408 [1] the Prime Minister referred them to the Chiefs of Staff for their appreciation. Your message to the President (Johcu No. 40) [2] has now been similarly...’
37. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 2 September 1942; ‘Cablegram 588 [1] LONDON, 2 September 1942, 12.45 a.m. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Your No. 408 of 26th August. [3] I fully share your view of importance of providing sufficient air forces for the defence of Australia and, as I assured you in my message of 6th August [4], our...’
38. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 2 September 1942; ‘Cablegram 146[A] LONDON, 2 September 1942, 8.25 p.m. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF Dominions Office telegram 588. [1] This telegram came as a complete surprise to me and to Ismay with whom I have been working in closest touch ever since your telegrams 407 and 408 [2] were received...’
39. DIXON TO HULL: 3 September 1942; ‘Letter WASHINGTON, 3 September 1942 As contracting parties to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942 [1], the Governments of the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Australia pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military and economic, against those nations with which they are at war....’
40. MCDOUGALL TO BRUCE: 6 September 1942; ‘Letter WASHINGTON, 6 September 1942 In this letter I shall both report progress and attempt to give you an account of some aspects of the Washington attitude in so far as I have been able to ascertain it. On the morning of September 2nd I had 1 1/2 hours with...’
41. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 8 September 1942; ‘Cablegram 594 [1] LONDON, 8 September 1942, 6.43 p.m. MOST SECRET Your telegram of 26th August, No. 407. [2] I have consulted the Chiefs of Staff and the following are their views:- 2. Since the despatch of the Dominions Office cablegram No. 362 of the 6th April to which you...’
42. BRUCE TO CRIPPS: 9 September 1942; ‘Letter [LONDON], 9 September 1942 My McDougall has been in Washington for the past month and has been putting in some quite useful work. The question I sent him to Washington on was Wheat [1] and this was the official reason for his presence there. He has, however, been unofficially...’
43. PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT TO DIXON: 11 September 1942; ‘Cablegram 138 [1] CANBERRA, 11 September 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL The Prime Minister desires you to convey the following personal message to the President as soon as possible:- Dear Mr. President, 1. In my previous message I submitted for your urgent consideration my views on ‘the situation...’
44. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 11 September 1942; ‘Cablegram 420 [1] CANBERRA, 11 September 1942 IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Reference your No. 594 [2], it is learnt with considerable surprise that there has been a change in the views notified in No. 362 of 6th April [3], which contemplated a strategic offensive action in the Pacific by the transfer...’
45. PAGE TO BRUCE: 14 September 1942; ‘Cablegram unnumbered CANBERRA, 14 September 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Have now been back in Australia four weeks [1] and am giving you my impressions as a background for your work. I find the morale in Australia not nearly as high as in Britain. This is due to...’
46. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH PORTAL: 14 September 1942; ‘[LONDON], 14 September 1942 I sat next to Portal at a Canadian dinner last night, and had a considerable talk with him. I started off by saying that it was a great pity in my view that we were getting into an atmosphere where the Air Ministry regarded my attitude...’
47. NOTE OF SECRAPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MACARTHUR AND CURTIN: 17 September 1942; ‘CANBERRA, 17 September 1942 MOST SECRET General MacArthur said he was disturbed at the situation in New Guinea and his view as to the real reason for the present unsatisfactory position is the lack of efficiency of the Australian troops in that theatre. 2. He feels quite convinced that we...’
48. DIXON TO CURTIN: 16 September 1942; ‘Cablegram S140 WASHINGTON, 16 September 1942, 2.49 p.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET I have received this morning the following reply dated yesterday to your communications to the President. [1] Begins. My dear Mr. Curtin. I have given very careful consideration to the situation in the South-West Pacific Area as presented...’
49. DIXON TO CURTIN: 17 September 1942; ‘Cablegram S143 WASHINGTON, 17 September 1942, 12.25 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Further to my S.140. [1] My impression is that the President’s answer is the outcome of a very full consideration by the United States Joint Staff of your messages over the weekend [2] and that it represents a...’
50. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 18 September 1942; ‘Cablegram 154[A] LONDON, 18 September 1942, 12.15 a.m. PERSONAL MOST SECRET Your telegrams 407 and 408 [1], and two messages to the President. [2] I have learned tonight unofficially that the President probably replied to you today. [3] If my information is correct as to its contents it is a...’
51. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH CHURCHILL: 21 September 1942; ‘[LONDON], 21 September 1942 After the Cabinet I had about 3/4 hour’s talk with the Prime Minister. He was quite cordial and friendly when we started and neither he nor I made any reference at that stage to the somewhat crisp correspondence we had been indulging in. [1] I told...’
52. BRUCE TO CHURCHILL: 25 September 1942; ‘Letter LONDON, 25 September 1942 I am hopeful that in our conversation on Monday night [1] I convinced you that my one desire is to render you all the assistance in my power. That I believe I can best do by the most complete frankness. In that belief I am...’
53. APPRECIATION BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA: 30 September 1942; ‘Extracts 30 September 1942, MOST SECRET REVIEW OF PRESENT POSITION In our report of 1st June 1942 [1], we stated two main propositions:- (1) Naval policy and shipping resources must dictate the moment for commencing an offensive in the Pacific as until Japanese sea supremacy has been successfully challenged, combined...’
54. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 1 October 1942; ‘Circular Cablegram [D]615 LONDON, 1 October 1942, 10.14 p.m. SECRET IMMEDIATE My telegram No. 604 of 19th September. [1] Post War Economic Talks. In determining the personnel and scope of your representation at the proposed forthcoming conversations it may be useful for your Government to receive a clear[er] indication of...’
55. NOTE BY BRUCE: 6 October 1942; ‘[LONDON], 6 October 1942 I learnt to-day of the Prime Minister’s reactions to my letter of the 25th September and my two Memoranda. [1] Apparently he became somewhat violent on the subject and dictated, and in fact signed, a letter to me in which I gather he suggested that I...’
56. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 8 October 1942; ‘Cablegram 161A LONDON, 8 October 1942, 5.30 p.m. MOST SECRET D.O. telegrams 396 and 397 of October 2nd [1]-in my telegram S.92 of August 28th [2], I indicated that in my view we would be well advised to determine our own policy with a view to taking advantage of opportunity...’
57. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 13 October 1942; ‘Cablegram 165[A] LONDON, 13 October 1942, 3.49 p.m. MOST IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY [Following the Allied raids on Dieppe on 19 August and on Sark on 4 October the German Govt alleged that Germans captured during the raids had had their hands tied to prevent them...’
58. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH ATTLEE: 14 October 1942; ‘[LONDON], 14 October 1942 I went to see Attlee this morning. I asked him if he had suggested to the Prime Minister that I should be present at the meeting on Monday night. [1] He said that he had, but that the Prime Minister felt the meeting should be confined...’
59. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 15 October 1942; ‘Cablegram 167[A] LONDON, 15 October 1942, 12.17 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET At War Cabinet meeting this evening, the Prime Minister made a statement re prisoners of war. [1] It contained nothing new and he finished by deprecating any discussions at the moment and suggesting that any further action could...’
60. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 15 October 1942; ‘Cablegram 168[A] LONDON, 15 October 1942, 12.17 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL HIMSELF MOST IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY My telegram 165[A]. [1] In dealing with the prisoners of war question at War Cabinet meeting (my telegram 167[A])...’
61. MCDOUGALL TO BRUCE: 16 October 1942; ‘Letter WASHINGTON, 16 October 1942 Yesterday I got your telegram [1] again telling me to postpone my departure if this is necessary owing to the delay in Orr’s [2] arrival. There is no news about Orr save the telegram I had from Alfred Stirling saying that the U.S. Embassy London...’
62. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 17 October 1942; ‘Cablegram 461 [1] CANBERRA, 17 October 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET 1. The Government and the Advisory War Council have given the most earnest and careful consideration to the replies of President Roosevelt and yourself in the recent series of cablegrams on:- (a) the concentration of superior naval strength in...’
63. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 20 October 1942; ‘Cablegram 171[A] LONDON, 20 October 1942, 12 noon MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Your telegram No. 9551. [1] Our manpower problem fully recognised and the necessity for the return of the 9th Division appreciated. The Chiefs of Staff are now examining the problem with a view to return at the earliest...’
64. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 22 October 1942; ‘22 October 1942 Cablegram 9684, MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Your cablegram 171[A] of 20th October, 9th Division. [1] It is desired to point out that:- (a) owing to the reasons previously stated, no further reinforcements for the 9th Division are being despatched from Australia; (b) the Government is not agreeable...’
65. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 24 October 1942; ‘Cablegram 467 [1] CANBERRA, 24 October 1942 SECRET IMMEDIATE Your telegrams Circular D.418, 419, 420 and 428. [2] As already indicated, His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth of Australia is in agreement with the relinquishment of extra- territorial rights in China and proposes to negotiate a separate agreement on the...’
66. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 29 October 1942; ‘Cablegram Johcu 43 [1] CANBERRA, 29 October 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Thank you for the information contained in Winch 26. [2] We are glad to be associated with the forces of the Empire and the United Nations in what it is hoped will be a decisive blow to the...’
67. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 31 October 1942; ‘Cablegram 10002 CANBERRA, 31 October 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET My cablegram No. 9941 of 29th October-9th Division. [1] The G.O.C. A.I.F. in the Middle East was informed of the Government’s decision on 24th October, in order to ensure that fulfilment of decision and all its implications was safeguarded. The...’
68. ROOSEVELT TO CURTIN: 28 October 1942; ‘Dispatch [310740] [1] WASHINGTON, [28 October 1942, 7.30 p.m.] MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL MOST IMMEDIATE I have carefully reviewed your letter regarding the Strength of armed forces in Australia which was presented to me through the Department of State on 18th October, 1942. [2] I appreciate the anxiety of your...’
69. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 1 November 1942; ‘Cablegram 179[A] LONDON, 1 November 1942, 8.36 p.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST CONFIDENTIAL My telegram 178[A]. [1] No further information yet obtained as to why telegram from Chief of the Imperial General Staff to the Commander-in-Chief referred to in my telegram No. 173[A] [2] had apparently not reached the Commander-in-Chief when...’
70. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 4 November 1942; ‘Cablegram 10111 CANBERRA, 4 November 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Reference your No. 179 [1] I agree with your interpretation of our attitude, in view of the situation with which we are now confronted, but it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the necessary reinforcements cannot be despatched from Australia...’
71. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO EGGLESTON: 5 November 1942; ‘Cablegram SC21 CANBERRA, 5 November 1942 MOST SECRET Your S.132. Extraterritorial treaty. [1] 1. Minister desires you to negotiate treaty at Chungking and he wishes you to know you have his complete confidence in respect of this matter. He desires a short treaty dealing with abrogation of extraterritorial rights, avoiding...’
72. STIRLING TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 7 November 1942; ‘Cablegram 386 LONDON, 7 November 1942, 2.45 p.m. IMMEDIATE SECRET Your telegram No. 359 Nov. 4th. [1] Message passed to Wilson [2] and the following is his reply. From Wilson for the Treasury. Begins. Your telegram Nov. 4th. Please inform Dr. Evatt that the Dominions including self have been hunting...’
73. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH CRIPPS: 11 November 1942; ‘[LONDON], 11 November 1942 I went to see Cripps to ask him about the Sub-Committee of the Cabinet to deal with the question of security of our communications which has been brought into the forefront by the recent heavy sinkings. What I learned from Cripps was not nearly as satisfactory...’
74. MCDOUGALL TO BURTON: 12 November 1942; ‘Letter (extract) LONDON, 12 November 1942 PERSONAL You refer to my visit to America [1] and I presume you mean in 1941. Well 1942 was still more interesting. After the Wheat Council was over and I had attended a meeting of the Economic and Financial Committees of the League at...’
75. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH SMUTS: 14 November 1942; ‘[LONDON], 14 November 1942 I went to see Smuts on Friday night. I told him that I had come to see him with regard to his statement, when receiving the Freedom of Plymouth, as to the necessity for a concentration upon the problem of the U-Boat menace and the danger...’
76. EVATT TO DIXON: 16 November 1942; ‘Cablegram 159 CANBERRA, 16 November 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Please convey the following message urgently to the President from the Prime Minister:- Dear President Roosevelt, I have carefully considered the suggestion in your message of 1st November [1] for the retention of the 9th A.I.F. Division in the Middle...’
77. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH SMUTS: 19 November 1942; ‘[LONDON], 19 November 1942 I went and saw Smuts this morning and raised with him the question of forward thinking with regard to the political settlement we would desire to see achieved after the war. I told him that with regard to economic and social questions there was a considerable...’
78. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 22 November 1942; ‘Letter [LONDON], 22 November 1942 You will recollect that in July last you cabled to me suggesting that Mr. F. L. McDougall should go to Washington to attend the first meeting of the International Wheat Council. [1] I greatly welcomed this suggestion as apart from the fact that McDougall has...’
79. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 24 November 1942; ‘Cablegram Winch 28 LONDON, 24 November 1942, 10.35 a.m. PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET Your Johcu 45 [1] and President Roosevelt’s telegram 1st November. [2] We recognise of course that the withdrawal of the 9th Australian Division from the Mediterranean theatre rests with the Commonwealth Government. However the United States forces...’
80. EGGLESTON TO EVATT: 25 November 1942; ‘Letter CHUNGKING, 25 November 1942 PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL I have telegraphed this week my draft of the treaty for abrogation of extraterritoriality and rendition of the Concession [1] together with a telegram on the problems of policy involved [2] and another on the drafting. [3] You will realise that I...’
81. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH EDEN: 25 November 1942; ‘[LONDON], 25 November 1942 I went and had half an hour with Eden. He was looking very tired and worried and I am rather doubtful whether he will be able to stand the strain of his dual position of Leader of the House of Commons and Foreign Minister. The main...’
82. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 25 November 1942; ‘Cablegram 196[A] LONDON, 25 November 1942, 2.40 p.m. MOST IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY MOST SECRT MOST IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY MOST SECRET My telegram 193[A] [1] and Winch 28. [2] At War Cabinet meeting on Monday evening the question of the return...’
83. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 30 November 1942; ‘Cablegram Johcu 47 [1] CANBERRA, 30 November 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET I appreciate the motive that prompted you to send this cablegram [2] but frankly I am disappointed with the views you express. I had hoped, particularly in view of the part played by the 9th Division in the...’
84. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 2 December 1942; ‘Cablegram Winch 30 LONDON, 2 December 1942, 3.45 a.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Received 2 December 1942 Your Johcu 47. [1] 1. I and my professional advisers are very sorry that you Continue to press for the move of the 9th Australian Division which we do not consider is...’
85. LEGATION IN WASHINGTON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 3 December 1942; ‘Cablegram S186 WASHINGTON, 3 December 1942, 1.55 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Prime Minister’s 159 [1] and our S.183. [2] Following message for Prime Minister has been received from President Roosevelt: Begins: From the President to Mr. John Curtin. Careful consideration has been given to your despatch with reference to...’
86. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 3 December 1942; ‘Cablegram 205[A] LONDON, 3 December 1942, 7.39 p.m. IMMEDIATE MOST CONFIDENTIAL Post War Problems-my telegram 199. [1] Things have moved much more rapidly on the political side than I had dared to hope and there is a prospect that you may be approached on the matter by the United Kingdom...’
87. EVATT TO DIXON: 8 December 1942; ‘Cablegram 166 [1] CANBERRA, 8 December 1942 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Please convey the following message urgently to the President from the Prime Minister- ‘Dear President Roosevelt, I have received your communication of 2nd December regarding the return of the 9th Division to Australia [2], and I am grateful for...’
88. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY TO LEGATION IN WASHINGTON: 10 December 1942; ‘Cablegram 1499 CANBERRA, 10 December 1942 SECRET PART I 1. Reciprocal Lend-Lease Agreement. You will recollect that the limitation of our financial liability under paragraph 3 to ‘Australia or its territories and in such other cases as may be determined by common agreement in the light of the development of...’
89. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 10 December 1942; ‘Cablegram Winch 33 LONDON, 10 December 1942, 1.50 p.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET & PERSONAL Thank you very much for the very full explanation of your difficulties which you have been kind enough to send me. [1] The fact that the New Zealand Division is to remain in the Middle East...’
90. ATTLEE TO CURTIN: 11 December 1942; ‘Circular cablegram D538 LONDON, 11 December 1942, 10.20 p.m. MOST SECRET We have for some time past had under consideration the question how to deal with the considerable volume of criticism which is heard from time to time regarding British Colonial Policy. Recent events in America-for example, Mr. Luce’s article...’
91. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 12 December 1942; ‘Cablegram 209[A] LONDON, 12 December 1942, 3.10 p.m. MOST SECRET IMMEDIATE Dominions Office Circular D.538. [1] While, as you will appreciate from my previous telegrams [2], I share the views expressed as to the necessity vis-a-vis the United States of facing this question I would put the case even more...’
92. LEGATION IN WASHINGTON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 22 December 1942; ‘Cablegram 1704 WASHINGTON, 22 December 1942, 1.56 p.m. SECRET Following are general observations by Hasluck on I.P.R. Conference. [1] (1) Consensus of opinion reached on the following principles- (a) Third party judgment on post-war colonial rule in South East Asia, exercised through an International Pacific Council, the main purposes being...’
93. DIXON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 24 December 1942; ‘Cablegram S197 WASHINGTON, 24 December 1942, 11.26 p.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Reference your S.W.113. Prime Minister’s message to the President [1] was conveyed to Sumner Welles for urgent transmission to the President early in the afternoon of December 23rd, Washington time. At 4.30 p.m. today I received direct from...’
94. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 2 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 2 [1] CANBERRA, 2 January 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Your telegram D. 538. [2] We have given consideration to the contents of your telegram and to your and Hull’s views on question of colonies. At the moment we do not propose to offer any exhaustive comment, but we...’
95. ATTLEE TO CURTIN: 8 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 4 LONDON, 8 January 1943, 8.10 p.m. MOST SECRET Your telegram 2nd January No. 2. [1] We are grateful for this very full expression of your views which we have read with great interest. We were particularly glad to have text of statement made by Evatt in House of...’
96. ATTLEE TO CURTIN: 8 January 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D14 LONDON, 8 January 1943, 9.35 p.m. MOST SECRET IMPORTANT My immediately preceding telegram. [1] Following is revised text. Begins- The immediate object of the United Nations is to defeat the present aggression and to render future aggression impossible. This requires for its successful achievement the establishment of...’
97. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 11 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 14 [1] CANBERRA, 11 January 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET Your telegram[s] No. 4 and D.14. [2] Colonies. 1. We have noted the terms of revised draft text in your D.14. Although text is in form of a draft declaration we assume that it is not intended that Halifax should...’
98. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH KEYNES: 12 January 1943; ‘[LONDON], 12 January 1943 I asked Keynes to come and see me this morning and we had a quite interesting three quarters of an hour’s conversation. I told him that I felt some concern that we were not really getting on to his side of the post-war policy, namely, International...’
99. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND CUSTOMS TO MCCARTHY (IN WASHINGTON): 13 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 56/Smart 8 (extract) CANBERRA, 13 January 1943 SECRET PART I Our telegram No. 25 of 6th January Trade Negotiations. [1] In our summing up of the position reached in these discussions we are concerned at the Stiffening attitude shown by American officials in their efforts to remove as many...’
100. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH ATTLEE: 13 January 1943; ‘[LONDON], 13 January 1943 I saw Attlee this morning and he had in front of him my letter to the Prime Minister indicating that I wanted to see him. [1]Attlee asked me whether there was anything he could do and I replied somewhat brusquely I feared that there was not....’
101. BRUCE TO CHURCHILL: 13 January 1943; ‘Letter [LONDON], 13 January 1943 PERSONAL I enclose herewith a Note which I had proposed to discuss with you personally when I heard of your departure. [1] I would ask you to devote two minutes to read the enclosure marked ‘A’. The one marked ‘B’ [2] merely summarises the arguments...’
102. DIXON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 13 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 56 WASHINGTON, 13 January 1943, 10 p.m. Your 41 and 42 [1] and Prime Minister’s Department No.5. [2] I informed Halifax fully of your views and discussed the matter with him. I think that in a great measure he is personally in sympathy with your approach particularly with the...’
103. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 14 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 9 LONDON, 14 January 1943, 11.35 p.m. SECRET 1. Swiss Government have been asked by Vichy Government to safeguard latter’s interests in Australia. Have expressed readiness to accept providing His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth of Australia have no object[ion]s and have asked that Commonwealth Government’s views be ascertained....’
104. DR ROLAND WILSON TO CURTIN: 18 January 1943; ‘Letter (extracts) CANBERRA, 18 January 1943 SECRET POST-WAR ECONOMIC TALKS, LONDON, OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1942 I have the honour to submit the following report on my mission to Great Britain to attend a series of Post-War Economic Talks between representatives of the British Dominions and Indian Governments. I left Brisbane for London...’
105. CURTIN TO DIXON: 19 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 10 CANBERRA, 19 January 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Please hand immediately to the President and Mr. Churchill the following messages from the Prime Minister [1]:- Dear Mr. President:- Dear Mr. Churchill:- Having learnt that the President/Mr. Churchill and yourself are meeting in Washington [2], I presume that discussions...’
106. EGGLESTON TO EVATT: 20 January 1943; ‘Dispatch 63 CHUNGKING, 20 January 1943 I have the honour to report that this morning I presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a draft treaty for the abolition of extra-territoriality between His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and the Republic of China. On receipt of your telegram...’
107. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 21 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 20 [1] CANBERRA, 21 January 1943 SECRET Your No. 9 of 14th January. [2] Vichy Government interests in Australia. The position here is that on withdrawal of his exequatur the French Consul [3] on 7th December, 1942, asked his Government for instructions as to whom he should hand over...’
108. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 21 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 15[A] LONDON, 21 January 1943, 8.15 p.m. IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY [Churchill and Roosevelt met at Casablanca between 14 and 24 January to plan global strategy for 1943 and 1944. They decided that the Mediterranean should continue to be the main theatre of operations in...’
109. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND CUSTOMS TO MACGREGOR: 23 January 1943; ‘Cablegram 836 [1] CANBERRA, 23 January 1943 SECRET Your V.738 has been examined. [2] The action now being taken by War Production Board and Office of Lend Lease Administration with respect to these non munitions controlled materials opens up matters of vital importance to Australia and may well compel us...’
110. EGGLESTON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: January 1943; ‘Cablegram S15 CHUNGKING, n.d. IMMEDIATE My telegram S.14. [1] (1) I have now studied the text of the Chinese counter proposals. Preamble and Articles one to four are almost identical with my proposals and I therefore recommend that they should be accepted. I am telegraphing the text in order to...’
111. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO EGGLESTON: 2 February 1943; ‘Cablegram SC3 CANBERRA, 2 February 1943 IMMEDIATE Your S.15 [1] and S.16. [2] Extraterritoriality. 1. Minister considers that attitude of Chinese as evidenced by their counter-draft demonstrates need for utmost caution in this matter and feels now that even on basis of your draft the Treaty would be liable to...’
112. EGGLESTON TO EVATT: 2 February 1943; ‘Dispatch 66 CHUNGKING, 2 February 1943 During the period in which I have had the honour to act in China as His Majesty’s Minister for the Commonwealth of Australia, I have had an opportunity of studying the situation in the Eastern theatre of war and the policies of various Pacific...’
113. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 1 February 1943; ‘Cablegram 21 LONDON, 1 February 1943, 11.30 p.m. MOST SECRET Many thanks for your telegram No. 14 of 11th January concerning Colonial Policy. [1] We have noted your views as to return to status quo as in paragraph 2(a) of your telegram. As regards paragraph 2(b), we have again carefully...’
114. EGGLESTON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 3 February 1943; ‘Cablegram S19 CHUNGKING, 3 February 1943, 1.30 p.m. PRIORITY MOST IMMEDIATE Your telegram S.C.3. [1] While I appreciate the strength of your argument I feel that having submitted the proposals to the Chinese Government for the Treaty [2] it is most desirable that we should first inform the Chinese that...’
115. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 5 February 1943; ‘Cablegram 36 [1] CANBERRA, 5 February 1943 MOST SECRET Your telegram Nos. D.54 [2] and 21 [3] Colonial Policy. We have noted terms of revised draft declaration which is to serve as basis for discussion between Lord Halifax and Mr. Hull. In this connection the Commonwealth Government would wish it...’
116. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO EGGLESTON: 6 February 1943; ‘Cablegram SC4 CANBERRA, 6 February 1943 IMMEDIATE Your S.19. [1] Minister is prepared accept your view that attempt might be made to obtain agreement on basis of your draft articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8 (ratification). He notes however that Preamble is not appropriate to abrogation of extraterritoriality only,...’
117. CURTIN TO MACARTHUR: 8 February 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 8 February 1943 MOST SECRET CASABLANCA CONFERENCE [1] 1. I have received a message from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom summarising the conclusions of the Casablanca Conference [2] and I am quoting for your most secret and personal information the substance of the advice communicated to...’
118. EGGLESTON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: February 1943; ‘Cablegram S24 CHUNGKING, n.d. IMMEDIATE Your telegram S.C.4. [1] 1. I saw the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday and spoke as instructed. [2] I stressed the fact that while you were anxious to abrogate extra-territoriality, H.M. Government in the Commonwealth of Australia was not prepared to go beyond this...’
119. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 12 February 1943; ‘Cablegram Winch 1 LONDON, 12 February 1943, 11 p.m. You will remember that last August when, through our High Commissioner, I expressed the hope that it would be possible for you to pay a visit to this country, you said that you felt that it was not then practicable for...’
120. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 17 February 1943; ‘Cablegram Johcu 3 [1] CANBERRA, 17 February 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET I am very grateful for your renewed invitation to visit the United Kingdom. [2] The position at the moment is that Parliament is faced with a rather lengthy session on an important list of bills. 2. In the...’
121. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 16 February 1943; ‘Cablegram 37[A] LONDON, 16 February 1943, 8.10 p.m. MOST CONFIDENTIAL In my telegram 199 of 30th November [1], and my telegram 305 of 3rd December [2], and my telegram No. 18 of 21st January [3], I have touched on Post War Policy and given you some indications as to the...’
122. FRASER TO CURTIN: 20 February 1943; ‘Cablegram 48 WELLINGTON, 20 February 1943, 8.40 p.m. My colleagues and I have decided that I should again raise with you the question of exchange of representatives which was discussed generally on the occasion of my last visit to Australia. [1] We remain as firmly convinced as we believe you...’
123. SLATER TO EVATT: 20 February 1943; ‘Dispatch KU4/43 KUYBYSHEV, 20 February 1943 SECRET I have had the honour to report in my despatch No. 5 [1] that (accompanied by Mr. Crawford) I left Kuibyshev on the morning of February 8th for Moscow in order to see MR. MOLOTOV [2] and put before him the desire of...’
124. CURTIN TO FRASER: 23 February 1943; ‘Cablegram 47 CANBERRA, 23 February 1943 Your telegrams No. 48 [1] and 49 [2] received. The Commonwealth Government would be glad to receive Mr. Berendsen as High Commissioner for New Zealand in Australia [3] and arrangements would be made for Government Departments to co-operate with him in every possible way....’
125. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO EGGLESTON: 24 February 1943; ‘Cablegram SC6 CANBERRA, 24 February 1943 MOST SECRET My S.C.5, extraterritoriality in China. [1] (1) Mackenzie King has now advised that Chinese Minister in Ottawa [2] did not indicate any objection to Canadian draft when submitted to him. Canadian Government has twice requested reply from Chinese Government but has not...’
126. CURTIN TO DIXON CABLEGRAM PW14 IMMEDIATE SECRET: 24 February 1943; ‘CANBERRA, 24 February 1943 Please convey following personal message from me to President:- BEGINS: In the conviction that personal collaboration is best form of consultation for the prosecution of our common war effort, I announced in Parliament to-day that Dr. Evatt would shortly proceed abroad to visit the United States...’
127. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 23 February 1943; ‘Cablegram 34 LONDON, 23 February 1943, 7 p.m. SECRET Your telegram No. 20, 21st January, 1943. [1] Representation of Vichy interests in Australia. 1. As regards possibility that Swiss would refuse to look after Vichy interests in Australia on informal basis as proposed in last paragraph of my telegram No....’
128. EVATT TO CURTIN: 24 February 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 24 February 1943 You will have seen from Dominions Office telegram D.78 [1] that the United Kingdom Government has set up under the Foreign Office a committee to examine certain major political and strategic questions connected with the peace settlement. These questions include armistice terms on the cessation...’
129. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 24 February 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D109 LONDON, 24 February 1943, 4.25 p.m. SECRET My telegram D. No. 383, 26/8/42 [1] and connected telegrams. [2] Following on exploratory discussions here with Dominion experts last autumn, revised version of Clearing Union plan in form communicated to Dominion Delegates before their departure was given informally by...’
130. EVATT TO BRUCE: 26 February 1943; ‘Cablegram SL4 [1] CANBERRA, 26 February 1943 IMPORTANT MOST SECRET Your telegram S.36 20th February. Portuguese Timor. [2] In view of facts of present situation we are entirely at a loss to understand the attitude of the Portuguese Government. Evacuees from Portuguese Timor now in Australia total 535, comprising 105...’
131. EGGLESTON TO EVATT: 3 March 1943; ‘Letter CHUNGKING, 3 March 1943 PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL I received your Telegram No. SC.6 [1] but I am afraid there has been some misunderstanding which must have occurred through the inadequacy of our telegrams in explaining the matter to you. In the circumstances, I considered it proper to send you...’
132. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 5 March 1943; ‘Letter LONDON, 5 March 1943 Now that some 9 months have passed since I became the Accredited Representative of the Australian Government to the United Kingdom War Cabinet I feel I should send you a report of the developments over that period. My starting point must be to examine what...’
133. EVATT TO ATTLEE: 10 March 1943; ‘Cablegram 57 [1] CANBERRA, 10 March 1943 SECRET Your 46. [2] Chinese extra-territoriality. We had expected to have completed negotiations before this to enable us to agree to issue of Order in Council. Difficulties, however, have arisen in that whereas we desire simple treaty dealing with abrogation only, Chinese have...’
134. PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT TO BRUCE: 11 March 1943; ‘Cablegram 33 [1] CANBERRA, 11 March 1943 SECRET Reference your telegram 45. [2] Clearing Union. (1) The Government has considered the Clearing Union proposals generally but because of pressure of Parliamentary matters has not been able to give them detailed attention. However, we assume that the proposed discussions will be...’
135. DIXON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 9 March 1943; ‘Cablegram 261 WASHINGTON, 9 March 1943, 12.02 a.m. Your telegrams 206 [1] and 219 Monetary Policy. [2] At his request I saw Berle today at the State Department. He referred to two documents the British C.U. and the American S.F. and said that in preparing the United States plan and...’
136. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 13 March 1943; ‘Cablegram 50 LONDON, 13 March 1943, 5.55 p.m. SECRET Commonwealth Government telegram No. 57 of 10th March. [1] Chinese Extra-Territoriality. As Canadian Government may already have informed you they have concurred in issue and terms of draft Order in Council. [2] New Zealand and South Africa have also concurred. 2....’
137. HODGSON TO EGGLESTON: 16 March 1943; ‘Cablegram PC4 CANBERRA, 16 March 1943 PERSONAL SECRET Your S.40. [1] I fully appreciate your position and have endeavoured to expedite. Minister however has been very pressed over political crisis here [2] and arrangements impending visit abroad. Difficulty here over articles (a) and (g) of proposed exchange of notes. In...’
138. MACARTHUR TO CURTIN: 17 March 1943; ‘Teleprinter message BXC270 [1] BRISBANE, 17 March 1943 SECRET The failure of the Prime Minister to receive any reply to his message of January 19th [2] is an astonishing development if it can be assumed that his cablegram was duly received. I have heard nothing yet from the military group...’
139. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 18 March 1943; ‘Cablegram Johcu 60 [1] CANBERRA, 18 March 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET On 19th January I addressed to Washington, for transmission to President Roosevelt and yourself, a cablegram urging, in view of the lessons of the use of airpower in the New Guinea campaign, that 1,500 additional operational and Soo...’
140. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 18 March 1943; ‘Cablegram 41 [1] CANBERRA, 18 March 1943 SECRET Please see reply dated 9th March from Prime Minister, Canada [2], to Dominions Office telegrams D.109 [3] and D.121. [4] This deprecates possibility of United Kingdom and United States draft plans [5] coming into competition with each other and suggests that in...’
141. CURTIN TO ATTLEE: 18 March 1943; ‘Cablegram 67 CANBERRA, 18 March 1943 1. The Australian Government regards the subjects raised in your telegrams [D]149 to 152 [1] as of outstanding importance and welcomes proposals for international consideration of post-war plans for improving living standards and promoting efficient production and distribution of foodstuffs and other primary products....’
142. EVATT TO DIXON: 23 March 1943; ‘Cablegram PW23 CANBERRA, 23 March 1943 SECRET Arising out of last paragraph your S.45 [1] proposed relief organisation, glad if you would convey following personal message to Hull from myself:- Begins: We are very concerned at possible exclusion of Australia from one of primary positions in connection with food relief...’
143. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 23 March 1943; ‘Cablegram [64A] [1] LONDON, 23 March 1943, 9.30 p.m. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL-HIMSELF ONLY MOST SECRET Your telegrams Nos. 38, 39 and 40 of 18th March. [3] Your recent message to the Prime Minister [4] as well as your message of 19th January to the President and the Prime...’
144. DIXON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 25 March 1943; ‘Cablegram S55 WASHINGTON, 25 March 1943, 3 p.m. Your P.W.21 paragraph 3. [1] I saw Cordell Hull to-day and informed him that the Australian Government had seen the draft declaration as to Colonies which Lord Halifax had left with him [2] and that while so far as it went, the...’
145. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 27 March 1943; ‘Cablegram Winch 6 LONDON, 27 March 1943, 9.25 p.m. MOST SECRET Your telegram Johcu No. 60. [1] I am sorry you have not had a reply to your telegram of 19th January [2], which I remember the President showing me at Casablanca. I propose to discuss with Dr. Evatt, when...’
146. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 29 March 1943; ‘Cablegram 47 CANBERRA, 29 March 1943 IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Your cablegram 164. [1] I appreciate the report of the action being taken by you to support our case on the lines requested in cablegram No. 38 [2] and the outline of the counter-arguments with which you are being confronted. 2....’
147. DIXON TO CURTIN AND EVATT: 29 March 1943; ‘Cablegram S61 WASHINGTON, 29 March 1943, 3.13 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Reference Prime Minister’s Department telegram 49. [1] Following reply to the Prime Minister’s message has just been received from the White House:- Begins: Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have your message regarding additional aircraft for the South West...’
148. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 30 March 1943; ‘Cablegram Johcu 62 (extracts) CANBERRA, [30 March 1943] [1] IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET With reference to Winch No. 6 [2], I was about to cable you that Dr. Evatt will be leaving for Washington and London by air on 5th April and that he will be able to support our case...’
149. EVATT TO DIXON: 31 March 1943; ‘Cablegram 308 CANBERRA, 31 March 1943 Your S.55. [1] Colonial Policy. Your interview with Hull noted with interest. Apart from our specific colonial interests, the course of the war in this theatre has demonstrated that the control or supervision of control over neighbouring Territories will be vital to the future...’
150. EGGLESTON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: April 1943; ‘Cablegram S43 CHUNGKING, n.d. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET I called on the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday [1] and spoke as instructed in your telegram S.C.6 [2] and telegram 50. [3] He appeared to accept our explanation as to why we now considered the exchange of notes would be adequate...’
151. CURTIN TO EVATT: 1 April 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 1 April 1943 MOST SECRET MISSION TO UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM With further reference to my letter of 29th March [1] and Section 2 of the statement prepared for you [2], I desire to inform you that I am in receipt of most secret advice from General...’
152. DIXON TO CURTIN: 6 April 1943; ‘Cablegram S71 WASHINGTON, 6 April 1943, 6.33 p.m. MOST SECRET I have to-day received the following message from the President for transmission to you. BEGINS: Dear Mr. Curtin, Your message informing me of Dr. Evatt’s visit to Washington is received [1] and I shall be very glad to see him...’
153. DRAFT MEMORANDUM BY FORSYTH: 7 April 1943; ‘[CANBERRA], 7 April 1943 PROPOSED DECLARATION ON COLONIAL POLICY: THE HULL DRAFT [1] 1. THE HULL DRAFT 1. The principle of United Nations supervision of administration in some non-selfgoverning territories (Part II of Hull Draft) should be extended to cover all such territories. 2. It should be made clear where...’
154. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 7 April 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D206 LONDON, 7 April 1943, 2.15 p.m. MOST SECRET We have now for some time past had under examination the question of post-war Civil Aviation. It seems to us that the time has now come when it would be desirable for us to take the lead in approaching...’
155. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 7 April 1943; ‘Cablegram 74[A] LONDON, 7 April 1943, 9.30 p.m. PERSONAL SECRET International Clearing Union and Stabilization Fund. I send you the following thoughts for what they are worth. These two plans show great imagination and thought, and the expert consideration that has gone to their construction should afford a basis for...’
156. EVATT TO HODGSON: 13 April 1943; ‘Cablegram E6 WASHINGTON, 13 April 1943, 12.07 a.m. MOST SECRET Many thanks for your personal wire P.W.35. [1] Please convey the following message to the Prime Minister: Begins. Had conference today with the President and urged strongly the need for rapid deliveries of aeroplanes and carrying out of promises without...’
157. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN CIRCULAR CABLEGRAM D219 [1]: 15 April 1943; ‘LONDON, 15 April 1943, 2.50 p.m. SECRET AND PERSONAL Received 16 April 1943 The time has now come when we must devote serious thought to the planning of the future world organisation both in the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities and also for the long term settlement. The...’
158. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 20 April 1943; ‘Cablegram 100 [1] CANBERRA, 20 April 1943 SECRET AND PERSONAL I am in full agreement with the objectives you have in mind. [2] The Commonwealth Government has welcomed the initiative taken by the United Kingdom and United States Governments to formulate and exchange views on various aspects of a post-war...’
159. EVATT TO HODGSON: 19 April 1943; ‘Cablegram E11 WASHINGTON, 19 April 1943, 4.30 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET & PERSONAL TO HODGSON FOR CURTIN, As instructed I am concentrating on the objective of additional squadrons for the R.A.A.F. [1] The opposition to this has come and will come from several quarters but I am pursuing the...’
160. CURTIN TO EVATT: 20 April 1943; ‘Cablegram SW11 CANBERRA, 20 April 1943, 9 p.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Reference your E.11 [1] the following information was in course of preparation for communication to you in regard to the last paragraph of Dixon’s S.69. [2] It is also being communicated to General MacArthur with a request that he...’
161. EVATT TO CHURCHILL: 22 April 1943; ‘Cablegram unnumbered [1] WASHINGTON, 22 April 1943 MOST SECRET FOR MR CHURCHILL ALONE Curtin has sent me your telegram as to proposed Conference of Dominion Prime Ministers [2] and his reply. [3] I sincerely hope that if the Conference is to be held at all and you are willing to...’
162. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH ATTLEE: 22 April 1943; ‘[LONDON], 22 April 1943 I saw Attlee and had about half an hour with him. My object in going to see him was to suggest that Orr should be included in the United Kingdom Delegation to the Food Conference. [1] With this view Attlee expressed his sympathy but pointed out...’
163. EVATT TO HODGSON: 22 April 1943; ‘Cablegram E21 WASHINGTON, 22 April 1943, 3 a.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET HODGSON FOR SIR KEITH MURDOCH [1] ALONE 1. I am somewhat concerned at reported Melbourne Sun leading article endorsing the view of Elmer Davis regarding Australia’s peril and paper’s comment thereon. [2] I have never referred to Australia’s peril...’
164. EVATT TO ROOSEVELT: 22 April 1943; ‘Letter WASHINGTON, 22 April 1943 1. Mr. Curtin expresses thanks for your message of April 6th referring to certain increases in aeroplanes for United States forces in the South-West Pacific Area, but also indicating that, in accordance with a prior arrangement, you would be pleased to consider what I had...’
165. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 22 April 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D234 LONDON, 22 April 1943, 10.30 p.m. SECRET As you know, it is expected that the Food Conference in the United States of America [1] will form part of a general programme of separate but inter-related discussions covering, in pursuance of Article 7 of the Mutual Aid Agreement,...’
166. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 22 April 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D235 LONDON, 22 April 1943, 10.30 p.m. SECRET My immediately preceding telegram. [1] Following is text of draft aide memoire, begins- As has been stated on many occasions His Majesty’s Government favours a commercial policy designed to promote general economic expansion and joint action directed towards the removal...’
167. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 29 April 1943; ‘Cablegram 64 [1] CANBERRA, 29 April 1943 SECRET Dominions Office telegrams D.234, D.235 and D.236. [2] We appreciate great importance of matters proposed for discussion at informal conference on official and expert level and are now considering our reply. Before replying we would be glad of your advice on the...’
168. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 28 April 1943; ‘Cablegram S76 LONDON, 28 April 1943, 5.30 p.m. MOST SECRET [The Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with Poland on 25 April. The dispute had its origin in the question of Poland’s eastern frontier: Poland insisted on the border established in 1921 by the Treaty of Riga after the Polish-Soviet war...’
169. EVATT TO HODGSON: 30 April 1943; ‘Cablegram E34 WASHINGTON, 30 April 1943, 1.56 a.m. IMMEDIATE SECRET TO HODGSON FOR CURTIN AND HIMSELF Regarding the circular telegram from the Dominions Office [1] I would suggest that there is the danger of political repercussions in now commencing conversations in regard to the post-war commercial policy, including the very...’
170. HODGSON TO EVATT (IN WASHINGTON): 1 May 1943; ‘Cablegram PW68 CANBERRA, 1 May 1943 PERSONAL SECRET Your E34 [1], 35 [2] and 36. [3] I fully appreciate your view. In fact we had a severe struggle with Treasury to get agreement on cable actually sent. [4] Indeed, Treasury bolted, and got Chifley to approve of telegram agreeing, in...’
171. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 1 May 1943; ‘Cablegram 86A LONDON, 1 May 1943 SECRET Your telegram No. 64 of the 29th April [1]-I can best reply by giving you in broad outline the background to the position which has now been reached. While it has always been recognised that economic questions and all the points raised in...’
172. EVATT TO CURTIN: 4 May 1943; ‘Cablegram E47 Washington, 4 May 1943, 9.59 p.m. Anglo Dominion talks on post-war commercial policy. I have seen Bruce’s message [1] and adhere to the view previously expressed in my telegram E.34 [2] with which Coombs strongly agrees. I add that as a Government we will invite political trouble if...’
173. ROOSEVELT TO EVATT: 5 May 1943; ‘Letter [Washington ], 5 May 1943 SECRET In respect to the allocation of additional aircraft to the R.A.A.F., which you requested in your letter of April 22nd [1], I have caused the Joint Chief of Staffs to present me their views. I am informed that an increase in present allocations...’
174. HODGSON TO EVATT (IN WASHINGTON): 6 May 1943; ‘Cablegram PW74 CANBERRA, 6 May 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE PERSONAL SECRET London Economic talks. Inter-departmental Committee [1] met yesterday afternoon and resulted practically in deadlock. Professor Melville and myself in a minority strongly advocating line of policy indicated by you in personal telegrams to Prime Minister and myself. [2] McFarlane and...’
175. CHIFLEY TO EVATT (IN WASHINGTON): 6 May 1943; ‘Cablegram SW19 CANBERRA, 6 May 1943 SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE Fully appreciate your views regarding proposed London talks. [1] I feel, however, we cannot ignore fact that Canada has accepted and if other Dominions do likewise it would be useless for us to seek to shelve talks indefinitely. 2. Pending advice...’
176. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 6 May 1943; ‘Cablegram 67 CANBERRA, 6 May 1943 SECRET Your 86. [1] We are now considering proposal of United Kingdom in light of your advices but are still somewhat uneasy on two points. 2. Firstly, having regard to leakage of information relating to Clearing Union [2] we feel there is danger of...’
177. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 6 May 1943; ‘Cablegram S83 [1] LONDON, 6 May 1943, 12.22 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF My telegrams S.81 and 82. [2] Now recognized here most undesirable that either the United Kingdom or the United States should undertake the protection of Polish interests in the U.S.S.R. Clark...’
178. EVATT TO CHURCHILL: 6 May 1943; ‘Cablegram unnumbered [1] WASHINGTON, 6 May 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE FOR MR CHURCHILL ALONE MOST SECRET I thank you most sincerely for your message of welcome. [2] I am concerned as to my movements. In order to see as much as possible of your good self I had proposed to leave...’
179. CURTIN TO EVATT: 7 May 1943; ‘Cablegram S[W] [1] 20 CANBERRA, 7 May 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET I am firmly convinced that it is vital to the success of the war that British-Russian relations be maintained at the highest level. The Polish difficulty must not be allowed to intrude elements of controversy leading to strains. Therefore...’
180. EVATT TO HODGSON: 6 May 1943; ‘Cablegram E35 WASHINGTON, 6 May 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Your telegram S.W.18. [1] If the United Kingdom asks us directly we can give an answer. Until then proposal would be regarded as gratuitous intermeddling in a situation of extraordinary difficulties. Slater’s sudden departure [2] has undoubtedly given rise to...’
181. BEASLEY AND KEANE TO EVATT (IN WASHINGTON): 7 May 1943; ‘Cablegram PW77 CANBERRA, 7 May 1943 SECRET We have been studying the procurement and stock position of raw materials which are required from United States and Canada. The following appears to be the position. (1) Whereas stock position of large number of commodities was considered satisfactory twelve months or more...’
182. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH ATTLEE: 8 May 1943; ‘[LONDON], 8 May 1943 After the High Commissioners Meeting I spoke to Attlee and told him I knew there had been a meeting of the Cabinet that morning to consider the Egyptian situation [1], that I could think of no matter which more directly concerned us, but I was sick...’
183. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 8 May 1943; ‘Cablegram S88 LONDON, 8 May 1943 MOST SECRET PERSONAL POLISH RUSSIAN SITUATION. My recent telegrams [1] will have made clear to you my anxieties, which have steadily increased, as to the developments that may flow from the present incident. It would perhaps be desirable however if I were to briefly...’
184. CURTIN TO EVATT: 10 May 1943; ‘Cablegram SW22 CANBERRA, 10 May 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE STRICTLY PERSONAL For your guidance in thinking about the European problem in the highest consultations which the presence of certain leaders in Washington [1] makes possible, I give you a summary of my views: Begins. 1. The vital immediate policy must be...’
185. EVATT TO CURTIN: 10 May 1943; ‘Cablegram E66 WASHINGTON, 10 May 1943, 12.12 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET My telegram E.47. [1] Additional reason for the postponement of the proposed London talks is that the opening of general discussions concerning commercial policy arising out of Article 7 might interfere [with] or delay the conclusion of agreements now...’
186. OFFICER TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 11 May 1943; ‘Cablegram 83 KUYBYSHEV, 11 May 1943, 5.15 p.m. IMPORTANT SECRET British Embassy has advised me of the proposal that Australia should assume the protection of Polish subjects and interests in the U.S.S.R. during the suspension of their diplomatic relations. (2) You may have already come to a decision and no...’
187. WAR CABINET MINUTE 2813: 12 May 1943; ‘Extract MELBOURNE, 12 May 1943 DISCUSSION WITH SIR OWEN DIXON The Prime Minister invited Sir Owen Dixon to make a statement to War Cabinet on his activities and impressions in the light of his service as Australian Minister to the United States and Accredited Representative of the Government on the...’
188. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 12 May 1943; ‘Cablegram 116 [1] CANBERRA, 12 May 1943 IMMEDIATE Your D.206. [2] Post-war aviation. Commonwealth Government has carefully considered questions raised by you and agrees that it is desirable for an approach to be made to United States Government on this matter. We assume that if response is favourable early approach...’
189. MACARTHUR TO CURTIN: 13 May 1943; ‘Teleprinter message BXM343 BRISBANE, 13 May 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET Received 13 May 1943, 12.10 p.m. [In the light of both the successful Allied offensive in the Mediterranean and of the lack of progress in the war against Japan Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to meet in Washington to discuss future...’
190. CURTIN TO EVATT: 13 May 1943; ‘Cablegram PW96 CANBERRA, 13 May 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Reference Mr Churchill’s mission to United States of America. I contemplated submitting to Churchill and Roosevelt a new appreciation of our position for consideration in conjunction with the deliberations taking place. However, after consulting MacArthur who has pointed out that...’
191. EVATT TO CURTIN: 13 May 1943; ‘Cablegram E81 WASHINGTON, 13 May 1943, 1.23 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET PERSONAL I had a long conversation with the Prime Minister this evening at the White House. First of all he was greatly impressed with the general approach to the Russian-Polish situation contained in your telegram [1] which contains...’
192. VAN AERSSEN TO CURTIN: 14 May 1943; ‘Aide-memoire [14 May 1943] [1] Having taken note of Dr. Evatt’s speeches [2], the Government of the Netherlands wants to point out that, although they fully recognize the desirability of establishing, after the war, the security in [sic] the West and South-West Pacific areas by the common efforts of friendly...’
193. CURTIN TO VAN AERSSEN: 14 May 1943; ‘Letter MELBOURNE, 14 May 1943 With reference to our conversation this morning, and the ‘aide- memoire’ [1] which you kindly left with me regarding recent speeches by Dr. Evatt, you will appreciate that I am not in possession of the complete text of his statements [2] and am relying on...’
194. EVATT TO CURTIN: 14 May 1943; ‘Cablegram E86 WASHINGTON, 14 May 1943, 6.19 p.m. MOST SECRET FOR HODGSON FOR THE PRIME MINISTER The Prime Minister has now intimated to me his gratitude for our willingness to take over representation of Poland in Moscow. [1] The President has also stated that he is entirely agreeable to the...’
195. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 15 May 1943; ‘Cablegram 119 CANBERRA, 15 May 1943 SECRET IMMEDIATE Your telegrams 234 [1] and 280 [2] Post-War Commercial Policy. The Commonwealth Government appreciates the opportunity for an exchange of views before the United Kingdom Government’s preliminary approach is made to the United States Government and is glad to learn that it...’
196. EVATT TO HODGSON: 18 May 1943; ‘Cablegram E95 WASHINGTON, 18 May 1943, 12.30 a.m. URGENT PERSONAL TO HODGSON ALONE SECRET Reference Bruce’s telegram S.57 repeated to Washington. [1] I think Bruce’s contact with the Polish Ambassador quite unnecessary. Bruce was informed by me of the matter and the procedure to be adopted; namely a clear indication...’
197. EVATT TO CURTIN: 22 May 1943; ‘Cablegram E104 (extracts) WASHINGTON, 22 May 1943, 8.45 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET HODGSON PERSONAL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER Reference to your PW.109. [1] Your telegram PW.106 [2] asking for some account of discussions crossed my E.101 promising further telegram this week-end. 1. What follows is derived from statements made...’
198. SHEDDEN TO CURTIN: 26 May 1943; ‘Minute 26 May 1943, MOST SECRET RETENTION OF NEW ZEALAND DIVISION IN THE MIDDLE EAST As stated verbally, I entirely agree with your note of comments to the High Commissioner for New Zealand on 17th May, relative to the considerations which make it highly desirable that the New Zealand division...’
199. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH BRIDGES: 26 May 1943; ‘[LONDON], 26 May 1943 I had about half an hour’s conversation with Bridges following on my talk with Attlee. [1] I told Bridges of the latter conversation and said that all I wanted to do was to put into his mind what I had said to Attlee, so that if...’
200. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 26 May 1943; ‘Cablegram 95A LONDON, 26 May 1943 Post War Relief Recent developments in the progress of the war and the appointment by the United States of Governor Lehman have under-lined the necessity of working out now some broad principles upon which provision should be made to meet the needs of the...’
201. EVATT TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 26 May 1943; ‘Cablegram E117 WASHINGTON, 26 May 1943, 4 p.m. IMMEDIATE SECRET Your telegrams 521 of 18th May and 346 of 10th April. [1] I understand that substantial agreement regarding objectives of monetary plans exists between United States and United Kingdom experts and that there is little probability of competition between the...’
202. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 28 May 1943; ‘Cablegram 128 [1] CANBERRA, 28 May 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET 1. Your telegram No.100. [2] Priority. If system of priorities were adopted we would desire inclusion in high priority of persons who would be of use in war effort, especially men with experienced knowledge of Japanese language of whom we...’
203. OFFICER TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 27 May 1943; ‘Cablegram 94 [1] KUYBYSHEV, 27 May 1943, 6.15 p.m. IMMEDIATE SECRET Your telegram No. 58, paragraph 2. [2] I am afraid that the third paragraph of my telegram No. 83 [3] could not have been clear. Question is not of ‘full representation’ but as to whom the Soviet Government recognises...’
204. CURTIN TO CHIFLEY: 1 June 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 1 June 1943 You will have seen telegram No. 95 from Mr. Bruce regarding postwar relief. [1] The value of the United Nations relief organisation in affording a practical approach to many post-war problems has been recognized by the Commonwealth Government for some time, and last December we...’
205. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 1 June 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 1 June 1943 PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY I am grateful for your letter of 5th March [1] in which you reviewed developments during the period of nine months since you assumed the office of Accredited Representative of the Australian Government in the United Kingdom War Cabinet-a period I should...’
206. CURTIN TO FRASER: 1 June 1943; ‘Cablegram 100 CANBERRA, 1 June 1943 MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Your High Commissioner has acquainted me with the decision of your Parliament regarding the retention of your Division in the Middle East. [1] As this represents the will of the New Zealand people, I do not presume to offer any...’
207. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH SOMERVILLE: 1 June 1943; ‘Extract [LONDON], 1 June 1943 Somerville came to see me on his return from America where he has been for the Staff talks. He opened the conversation by saying that he had met Dr. Evatt in Washington and that as he had had something of a brawl with him he...’
208. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 3 June 1943; ‘Cablegram [Johcu] 67 CANBERRA, 3 June 1943 IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET I would like to convey to you on behalf of the Australian people our appreciation of the deep significance of your public assurance that the war in the Pacific will be prosecuted with the same vigour as the war in...’
209. EGGLESTON TO EVATT (IN WASHINGTON): 3 June 1943; ‘Cablegram 21 [1] CHUNGKING, 3 June 1943 MOST SECRET PERSONAL My telegram addressed to Washington 18 [2] was drafted while I was in the country. My observations, since my return, have strengthened my belief that the situation here has deteriorated seriously. I now learn that the British Ambassador expressed similar...’
210. EVATT TO ROOSEVELT: 3 June 1943; ‘Letter WASHINGTON, 3 June 1943 On behalf of the Australian Government I thank you most sincerely for your continued assistance in connection with Mr. Curtin’s proposal for equipping and developing the Royal Australian Air Force. Australia will be most grateful. Mr. Churchill’s signal from abroad too was most satisfactory indeed....’
211. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 4 June 1943; ‘Cablegram 127 LONDON, 4 June 1943, 2.55 p.m. IMMEDIATE SECRET Your telegram of 28th May, No. 128. [1] 1. Your paragraph 1. Priority. Please see my immediately following telegram. [2] 2. Your paragraphs 2 to 10. His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom note views of His Majesty’s Government in...’
212. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 4 June 1943; ‘Cablegram S118 LONDON, 4 June 1943, 8.40 p.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET PERSONAL EXCHANGE WITH JAPAN Dominions Office telegram 127 of 4th June. [1] I think that it is desirable that I should let you know that a great deal of feeling is being engendered here in regard to this question....’
213. ATTLEE TO CROSS: 5 June 1943; ‘Circular cablegram Z65 LONDON, 5 June 1943, 3.30 a.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL The following summary of main conclusions approved by the Prime Minister and the President in their discussions with Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington is for the most secret and personal information of the Prime Minister:-...’
214. EVATT TO HODGSON: 5 June 1943; ‘Cablegram E138 WASHINGTON, 5 June 1943, 10.10 p.m. SECRET Reference your 629. [1] I am in general agreement with the views expressed which appear very sound. There was danger of embarrassment in undertaking representation but Australian Prime Minister’s views appealed to both Churchill and Roosevelt. The essence of the situation...’
215. COOMBS TO CHIFLEY: 7 June 1943; ‘Letter (extracts) [WASHINGTON], 7 June 1943 Food Conference. The Food Conference is now over and the general feeling appears to be that it has been a very real success. [1] You have received by this time a summary of the recommendations which Dr. Evatt forwarded. [2] Four copies of the...’
216. EVATT TO HODGSON: 7 June 1943; ‘Cablegram E146 WASHINGTON, 7 June 1943, 4.02 p.m. MOST SECRET PERSONAL 1. Eggleston’s wire No.21 [1] synchronises similar Chinese argument presented here at highest level. There is no occasion for further action by us because he can take it that reasonable reinforcement of United States air force has been decided...’
217. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 9 June 1943; ‘Cablegram 86 CANBERRA, 9 June 1943 STRICTLY PERSONAL Your telegrams S.88 [1], S.89 [2] and S.122. [3] I have read these telegrams with great interest and appreciate the importance of the issues raised. As I see it essential Australian interests in this matter are:- (a) Assurance of continued Soviet participation...’
218. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH CHURCHILL: 10 June 1943; ‘[LONDON], 10 June 1943 I had about three quarters of an hour with the Prime Minister. I told him the reason I had wanted to see him was mainly personal but that it had wider repercussions which justified my taking up his time. I then told him that my time...’
219. CHIFLEY TO EVATT (IN WASHINGTON): 11 June 1943; ‘Cablegram 670 CANBERRA, 11 June 1943 MOST SECRET IMMEDIATE Your E.117 [1] and 147. [2] (1) I am very pleased to learn of the arrangements which have been made to bring together United Kingdom and United States experts in order to consolidate the two plans together with any other suggestions...’
220. EVATT TO CURTIN: 12 June 1943; ‘Cablegram E152 WASHINGTON, 12 June 1943, 5.09 a.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET The following is an appreciation of the probable position in the South West Pacific. It was given to me in order to indicate the strength of the case against any further expansion of the R.A.A.F. The figures therefore do...’
221. ROBINSON TO CURTIN: 12 June 1943; ‘Cablegram E155 WASHINGTON, 12 June 1943, 6.18 a.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET On the eve of our departure for London I feel I should report to you on the progress made towards satisfying the major responsibilities entrusted by you to Dr Evatt’s care. Those of paramount importance to Australia were, firstly,...’
222. EVATT TO CURTIN: 12 June 1943; ‘Cablegram E157 WASHINGTON, 12 June 1943, 6.30 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE PERSONAL MOST SECRET (1) I cannot tell you how relieved and proud I am to inform you that I have discharged the sole mission entrusted to me by you in relation to aircraft as stated in your instructions dated 1st...’
223. EVATT TO HODGSON: 12 June 1943; ‘Cablegram E159 WASHINGTON, 12 June 1943, 5.03 a.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET 1. Please read the personal wire E.157 that has gone to the Prime Minister from myself. [1] I think it is of vital importance to the Government, the Prime Minister, and myself, that the Prime Minister should issue an...’
224. EGGLESTON TO EVATT: 14 June 1943; ‘Cablegram 23 [1] CHUNGKING, 14 June 1943 MOST SECRET PERSONAL Following are the answers to your questions [2]:- (a) In my view the recent Japanese offensive in Hopei was not an all out attack on Chungking although it is too early to say whether this is contemplated. Recent concentrations were...’
225. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH EVATT: 16 June 1943; ‘[LONDON], 16 June 1943 Evatt rang me up at about 10. o’clock this morning on the telephone [1] and was insultingly rude to me with regard to my having asked Dr. Coombs to come and see me at 10.15 before the meeting with regard to Post-War Commercial Policy. What he...’
226. EVATT TO HODGSON: 19 June 1943; ‘Cablegram EC5 LONDON, 19 June 1943, 2 p.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET 1. Please give personal message to Mr. Curtin as follows:- In the course of a remarkably intimate letter from President Roosevelt [1] he said- ‘I am delighted over the result which, by constant pressure, came out of the War...’
227. ATTLEE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 19 June 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D365 LONDON, 19 June 1943, 11 p.m. MOST SECRET My immediately preceding telegram. [1] Following is the text of the principles. (a) The terms to be imposed on any European member of the Axis should be presented as one comprehensive document covering all the United Nations at war...’
228. MCDOUGALL TO BRUCE: 23 June 1943; ‘Letter (extract) WASHINGTON, 23 June 1943 I wrote to you at some length on June 20th [1] but having no copy I may repeat some of the points I then made. McCarthy’s secretary is on leave and the typing staff of the Legation are very fully employed. I heard today...’
229. DIXON TO CURTIN: 24 June 1943; ‘Cablegram S90 WASHINGTON, 24 June 1943, 9.45 p.m. MOST SECRET FOR THE PRIME MINISTER ALONE I had lunch with the President yesterday and during the conversation he made a number of observations of interest. No one else was present. He said that he regarded operations through Burma as too difficult...’
230. EVATT TO HODGSON: 26 June 1943; ‘Cablegram EC15 LONDON, 26 June 1943, 6.30 p.m. IMMEDIATE PERSONAL SECRET Your L.36 Japanese exchange. [1] Following is correspondence with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. 1. Letter from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to me 18 June:- ‘I understand that your Government have asked you to...’
231. EGGLESTON TO DIXON: 29 June 1943; ‘Letter CHUNGKING, 29 June 1943 Thank you for your letter of 5th March [1] which reached me when I was on a trip to Chengtu. I hope you benefited by your trip [2] and I should be glad to hear from you when you return. It is profitless to discuss...’
232. KEANE TO CURTIN: 30 June 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 30 June 1943 A number of reports which have appeared in the press recently have suggested that the reciprocal aid being granted by Australia to the United States Forces is now outstripping the Lend-Lease aid granted to Australia by the United States Government. The first suggestions of this...’
233. EVATT TO CURTIN: 1 July 1943; ‘Cablegram EC27 LONDON, 1 July 1943, 12.44 a.m. MOST SECRET FOR HODGSON PERSONAL 1. In my immediately following telegram I am sending you text of aide-memoire setting out the present position as regards very important conversations between United Kingdom, United States and Portuguese Governments directed to invoking Anglo-Portuguese alliance and...’
234. CURTIN TO EVATT: 3 July 1943; ‘Cablegram L53 [1] CANBERRA, 3 July 1943 MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Your telegram EC.28. [2] I have given close consideration to this question and agree generally with the reply which you have returned to the United Kingdom Government associating Australia with the general assurance that Portuguese colonial sovereignty will be...’
235. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO DIXON: 5 July 1943; ‘Cablegram 781 CANBERRA, 5 July 1943 SECRET 1. In transmitting draft agreement for Relief and Rehabilitation the United States Government suggested that before proceeding to definitive action any questions or suggestions from Commonwealth Government might be discussed through diplomatic channels in Washington. [1] Accordingly you are asked to approach the...’
236. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH ROBINSON: 6 July 1943; ‘[LONDON], 6 July 1943 Robinson came to see me-a farewell visit before his departure. He opened the conversation by a few graceful references to the invaluable work I was doing and how greatly it was appreciated. This attitude on his part makes it difficult not to be a little cynical...’
237. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH EVATT: 6 July 1943; ‘[LONDON], 6 July 1943 Evatt asked me to dine privately with him in view of his departure tomorrow. [1] We dined alone in the main room of the flat with a large dinner party raging in the next room. Evatt was amazingly cordial and proceeded to tell me that it...’
238. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 7 July 1943; ‘Cablegram 101 CANBERRA, 7 July 1943 SECRET (1) Please see Dominions Office despatch No. 90 of 30th November, 1942 [1], referring to Article V of the Mutual Aid Agreement. (2) We have noted the steps the United Kingdom Government is taking to enable them to fulfil the undertaking given in...’
239. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 7 July 1943; ‘Cablegram S127 LONDON, 7 July 1943 PERSONAL Greek Ambassador [1] called to see me recently to ask whether Commonwealth Government’s attitude towards exchange of diplomatic representatives had changed since his predecessor [2] had raised the matter (Menzies’ telegram to me No. 4241 of 6th August 1941 and my No. 636...’
240. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 9 July 1943; ‘Cablegram 102 CANBERRA, 9 July 1943 IMMEDIATE SECRET Australian Air Staff have raised question of supply and replenishment of Spitfire aircraft for squadrons operating in Darwin and New Guinea. 2. As you know wastage replacement at the rate of fifteen aircraft per month, plus spare engines and maintenance spares in...’
241. EVATT TO CURTIN: 8 July 1943; ‘Cablegram E4 LONDON, 8 July 1943, 11 p.m. SECRET Post War commercial policy discussions. [1] These talks have now concluded. No attempt has been made to secure a common Empire basis for an approach to the United States. Discussions revealed fairly wide differences of opinion between the Dominions participating. The...’
242. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 10 July 1943; ‘Cablegram 174 [1], CANBERRA, 10 July 1943 SECRET Your D.364 and D.365. [2] The Commonwealth Government agrees that the principles laid down in paragraphs (a) to (j) of telegram D.365 offer a useful basis for an informal approach to the United States and Soviet Union regarding the problems connected with...’
243. EVATT TO CURTIN: 12 July 1943; ‘Cablegram E173 WASHINGTON, 12 July 1943, 7.27 p.m. MOST SECRET Your telegram L.68 [1] is of course the first intimation I have had that an additional Spitfire squadron was raised from reserves and despatched to New Guinea. Your telegram says that the action was concurred in by the Air Ministry...’
244. EVATT TO ROOSEVELT: 13 July 1943; ‘Letter WASHINGTON, 13 July 1943 Following our discussion of this morning I desire to send you this personal and unofficial note. Your recent decision to give to Australia-in addition to all other previous commitments-organisation equipment for the purpose of developing the Royal Australian Air Force [1] has already had a...’
245. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 17 July 1943; ‘Cablegram 177 [1] LONDON, 17 July 1943, 3.50 p.m. SECRET THE MINISTER Reports have been received here which suggest that various matters in connection with past conduct of the war are being raised in controversy in the present election campaign in Australia. I am concerned at the possibility that these...’
246. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 19 July 1943; ‘Cablegram 181 [1] CANBERRA, 19 July 1943 IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Reference your 177 [2], I would be glad if you could advise me more definitely of the various matters on which you have received reports, as it would help me to send a more precise answer. It would...’
247. ATTLEE TO CURTIN: 19 July 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D439 LONDON, 19 July 1943, 2.30 p.m. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Our efforts to damage the German war effort by promoting resistance and sabotage inside Austria have hitherto been hampered by the absence of a declared policy as regards future of the latter country. 2. With the changed...’
248. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 21 July 1943; ‘Cablegram 185 CANBERRA, 21 July 1943 Your telegram D.432. [1] We note that if and when recognition is accorded to French Committee of Liberation on behalf of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom you propose to convey it through Resident Minister at Algiers. 2. Delegate in Australia of French...’
249. ARNOLD TO EVATT: 22 July 1943; ‘Letter WASHINGTON, 22 July 1943 CONFIDENTIAL I deeply regret that I was unable to return to Washington prior to your departure. It is unfortunate that you were obliged to leave Washington without complete satisfaction with our allocations of airplanes for the Royal Australian Air Force during the next 18 months....’
250. EVATT TO ARNOLD: 25 July 1943; ‘Letter SAN FRANCISCO, 25 July 1943 I have received your unofficial and confidential letter dated July 22nd [1] on the eve of my departure from this country. First of all, let me say this. Owing to your unavoidable absence from Washington, I spoke to General Stratemeyer not in relation to...’
251. DIXON TO EVATT: 31 July 1943; ‘Cablegram S95 WASHINGTON, 31 July 1943 IMMEDIATE PERSONAL The following message has been received for you from the President. Message begins: ‘Dear Doctor Evatt: I have your note of 13th July [1] and thank you for your expression of warm appreciation of our efforts to provide aircraft for the Royal...’
252. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 4 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 199 CANBERRA, 4 August 1943 SECRET Your D.467. [1] 1. We warmly welcome proposal to approach United States Government with view to obtaining broad U.S.-U.K. agreement on orderly agenda for the discussion of Article VII. 2. We have always regarded formulation of considered programme for Article VII discussions as...’
253. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 4 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 201 [1] CANBERRA, 4 August 1943 MOST SECRET Your telegram D.439, Austria. [2] Commonwealth Government much appreciates advice of proposals for a clarification of policy regarding Austria. We are glad to learn that increased opportunity now exists for the active encouragement of resistance inside Austria provided the Austrians can...’
254. BRUCE TO CURTIN AND EVATT: 6 August 1943; ‘Cablegram S147 [1] LONDON, 6 August 1943, 8.20 p.m. MOST SECRET Meeting of the Pacific War Council on 4th August, first held in London for many months, was stage-managed to enable- (a) The Prime Minister to outline his views regarding the war in the Pacific. (b) The Chinese Minister for...’
255. CURTIN TO CRANBORNE: 13 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 208 CANBERRA, 13 August 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL For immediate repetition to Mr. Churchill. [1] With reference to my cablegram No. 190 of 24th July and your 188 in reply [2], and to previous messages which passed between us on this subject [3], the Leader of...’
256. CURTIN TO CRANBORNE: 13 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 209 CANBERRA, 13 August 1943 My immediately preceding telegram. [1] ‘I charge Mr. Fadden with a gross breach of faith in revealing proceedings of the Advisory War Council at a time when he was Prime Minister. This is a violation of his oath as a member of the Council,...’
257. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 16 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 219 [1] LONDON, 16 August 1943, 11.02 a.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Your numbers 208 and 209. [2] I cannot give my sanction to the partial publication of most secret and personal telegrams interchanged with Dominion Governments about the conduct of the war. Such a practice would...’
258. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 16 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 124[A] LONDON, 16 August 1943, 7.28 p.m. IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY MOST SECRET Developments are taking place both here and in America in connection with what is known as the Tube Alloys scheme [1] which apart from their significance in relation to the war will...’
259. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 20 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 131[A] LONDON, 20 August 1943, 7.38 p.m. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY SECRET My telegram 130A. [1] Following is text of note sent to Prime Minister. Begins. (1) It is of transcending importance that during the forthcoming meeting between the Prime Minister and the President, agreement on...’
260. EVATT TO GLASGOW: 24 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 143 CANBERRA, 24 August 1943 SECRET I notice that Dr. Soong [1] appears to be conferring with Roosevelt and Churchill and it is most important that you should appear in the picture as representing Australia, and that you should understand that it is most embarrassing for Canada and China...’
261. GLASGOW TO EVATT: 24 August 1943; ‘Cablegram unnumbered QUEBEC, 24 August 1943 SECRET I saw Churchill again this afternoon and showed him your telegram. [1] He said that the main discussions were between Roosevelt and himself only in consultation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Canada was not included but advantage had been taken of the...’
262. EVATT TO MACKENZIE KING: 25 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 146 [1] CANBERRA, 25 August 1943 PERSONAL SECRET Your telegram No. 8 to Australia. [2] War Crimes Commission. Australia agrees with your insistence that Soviet Government must be made to understand constitutional and international position of Dominions. I therefore suggest that in any representations in Moscow, Canadian Minister should...’
263. EVATT TO OFFICER: 25 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 124 CANBERRA, 25 August 1943 SECRET War Crimes Commission. In March last United Kingdom Government communicated to the United States, Soviet and Chinese Governments a proposal to call a conference of all Allied Governments to make formal arrangements for carrying into effect the agreement of the four Governments to...’
264. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 25 August 1943; ‘Cablegram Winch 14 LONDON, 25 August 1943, 2.07 a.m. IMPORTANT SECRET AND PERSONAL Received 26 August 1943 Having agreed upon the setting up of the combined South East Asia Command [1] I have arranged with General Marshall and Admiral King, with the approval of the President, that I can have...’
265. CHURCHILL TO EVATT: 26 August 1943; ‘Cablegram 235 [1] LONDON, 26 August 1943, 7.50 p.m. IMPORTANT MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Many thanks to you and W.S. [2] for your most kind messages which I have conveyed to all addressees. [3] 2. I asked Mr Curtin to show you my telegram to him about my liaison with...’
266. NOTE BY BRUCE OF CONVERSATION WITH ATTLEE: 31 August 1943; ‘[LONDON], 31 August 1943 I went and had another bout with Attlee on the subject of my position. I asked him whether Stalin’s communication had been circulated to the members of the War Cabinet. [1] On this he rather hedged, and suggested he did not think it had been. To...’
267. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 1 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 146A LONDON, 1 September 1943 My telegram No. 144A. [1] In view of the importance of food both during the war and post-war period the organisation dealing with it is of first moment. In considering the two proposals now under consideration, namely (a) an all-powerful body in Washington, or...’
268. WAR CABINET SUBMISSION BY CHIFLEY: 4 September 1943; ‘Agendum 380/1943 CANBERRA, 4 September 1943 SECRET CANADIAN MUTUAL AID Introduction 1. In May, 1943, Canada passed a Mutual Aid Act providing for a gift of 1,000 million dollars of war supplies to be allocated to the United Nations. Australia has been invited to participate [1] and decisions of the...’
269. EVATT TO OFFICER: 4 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 128 [1] CANBERRA, 4 September 1943 IMMEDIATE SECRET Your telegrams No. 165 and 173. [2] The Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs advised on 24th August that a reply incorporating suggestions from the Canadian Government would be sent to the Soviet Government as soon as possible. [3] This reply...’
270. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 3 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 148[A] LONDON, 3 September 1943, 8.40 p.m. MOST SECRET PERSONAL During the past few days I have had two long conversations with Keynes who leaves for America tomorrow as part of the delegation for private talks with regard to Article 7 (see Dominions Office telegram D.No. 614, August 31st...’
271. DIXON TO CURTIN AND EVATT: 4 September 1943; ‘Cablegram S101 (extract) WASHINGTON, 4 September 1943, 5.30 p.m. MOST SECRET FOR HODGSON FOR THE PRIME MINISTER AND DR EVATT ONLY IMMEDIATE I saw Churchill this morning at the White House and gave him the message concerning the Spitfire squadrons (No. 155 to Ottawa [1]) and that concerning Mrs. Roosevelt’s...’
272. PRESS STATEMENT BY CURTIN: 6 September 1943; ‘CANBERRA, 6 September 1943 EMPIRE GOVERNMENT Gratifying and encouraging interest has been shown, particularly in Britain, in the proposal I put forward on August 14, 1943, for a new approach to Empire government after the war. [1] Machinery to give effect to what I am sure will be recognised as...’
273. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 7 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 230 [1] CANBERRA, 7 September 1943 Your telegrams D.579 [2], D.614 [3] and 244. [4] 1. We are pleased to learn that the United States Government await with pleasure the arrival at Washington of the British representatives. We have been able now to give more consideration to your telegram...’
274. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO ATTLEE: 7 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 231 CANBERRA, 7 September 1943 My telegram 185. [1] Paragraph 2. Recognition of French Committee of National Liberation. We now think that it will be more suitable if recognition of Committee by His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth of Australia is conveyed by Resident Minister at Algiers. We should,...’
275. ATTLEE TO CURTIN: 8 September 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D633 LONDON, 8 September 1943, 11.05 a.m. SECRET AND PERSONAL The Prime Minister has asked me to recall to you his message in telegram D. No. 219 of 15th April. [1] Now that the Australian and South African elections are over and that the New Zealand election has...’
276. OFFICER TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 10 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 186 Moscow, 10 September 1943, 3.30 p.m. My telegram No. 183. [1] Canadian Minister and I saw Mr. Molotov [2] last night. The former made his representations in the terms communicated to you in my telegrams 178, 179 and 180. [3] I made a communication in the terms of...’
277. CURTIN TO ATTLEE CABLEGRAM 240 [1]: 14 September 1943; ‘CANBERRA, 14 September 1943 SECRET AND PERSONAL 1. Reference your Circular D.633. [2] A meeting in November from my own point of view is too early for the following reasons: (I) The new Parliament assembles on 23rd September. (II) It is proposed to have a session of a few weeks...’
278. ATTLEE TO CURTIN: 13 September 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D650 LONDON, 13 September 1943, 4.40 p.m. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL Received 14 September 1943 President Roosevelt recently communicated to Prime Minister informally text of a suggested Four Power declaration by the United States, United Kingdom, Russia and China in the terms set out in my immediately following...’
279. ATTLEE TO CURTIN: 13 September 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D651 LONDON, 13 September 1943, 4.40 p.m. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL My immediately preceding telegram. [1] Following is text- ‘The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, united in their determination, in accordance with the declaration by the United Nations of 1st January,...’
280. CURTIN TO ATTLEE: 16 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 244 CANBERRA, 16 September 1943 SECRET Your D.650 and D.651. [1] It appears to us [2] that the positive value of a declaration of the nature proposed lies in the fact that the three main Military powers, viz., British Commonwealth, United States and Soviet Russia, would definitely commit themselves...’
281. EVATT TO STIRLING: 18 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 224 CANBERRA, 18 September 1943 Please deliver following personal message from Minister to Eden alone. Begins. I would refer you to D.650 and D.651 [1] and our reply No. 244 of 16th September. [2] You are well aware of my views on the topic of the Dominions, and I...’
282. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 25 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 168[A] LONDON, 25 September 1943, 8.40 p.m. SECRET Your telegram 244 of 16th September [1] is of paramount importance in that it raises the great issue of the international status of the Dominions and the reconciliation of that status with the Dominions’ membership of the Commonwealth of British Nations....’
283. MEMORANDUM BY COOMBS: 27 September 1943; ‘[CANBERRA], 27 September 1943 STABILISATION FUND AND CLEARING UNION REPORT OF DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON AND LONDON 1. While in Washington and London I took part in talks with United States and United Kingdom Treasury officials on international monetary plans. The following comments set out the main issues involved and the...’
284. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO DIXON: 28 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 1179 [1] CANBERRA, 28 September 1943 SECRET 1. Stabilisation Fund-The Commonwealth Government has not yet considered the international currency proposals. Pending this consideration the following departmental views on the Stabilisation Fund are forwarded for your guidance and transmission to the appropriate United Kingdom and United States officials. 2. Unless...’
285. EDEN TO EVATT: 27 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 225 [1] LONDON, 27 September 1943 IMMEDIATE PERSONAL Your telegram No. 224. [2] Thank you for your message. Question raised in paragraph 6 of your Government’s telegram No. 244 of 16th September [3] is to come before Cabinet shortly, and Dominions Secretary will telegraph to you our conclusions. We...’
286. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 27 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 173[A] LONDON, 27 September 1943 PERSONAL SECRET Dominions Office telegrams 664 and 665. [1] The fact that a decision should have been taken by the United Kingdom Government approving the text of a draft Declaration in favour of Austrian independence and that this Declaration should have been communicated to...’
287. ATTLEE TO CURTIN: 28 September 1943; ‘Circular Cablegram D705 LONDON, 28 September 1943, 12.30 a.m. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL My telegram of 20th September, D.674. [1] FOUR-POWER DECLARATION We are glad to note that the principle of such a declaration is welcomed by other British Commonwealth Governments and we have considered fully their comments on the...’
288. CRANBORNE TO CURTIN: 29 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 281 LONDON, 29 September 1943, 10.55 a.m. MOST SECRET My telegram No. 664 of 16th September. [1] On re-reading your telegram No. 201 of 4th August [2], we think that we may have misread your wishes. We had understood you to mean that you had no objection to preliminary...’
289. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT TO DIXON: 30 September 1943; ‘Cablegram 1190 CANBERRA, 30 September 1943 IMMEDIATE SECRET We have been considering the position of our proposed Trade Agreement with the United States of America, and the possible developments arising out of the present Washington conversations between United Kingdom and United States of America. The advices in your telegram 1094...’
290. CRANBORNE TO CURTIN CIRCULAR CABLEGRAM D723: 1 October 1943; ‘LONDON, 1 October 1943, 11.30 a.m. MOST SECRET Received 3 October 1943 You will have seen from my telegram D.710 [1] that the United States Government have included in their draft agenda for Moscow Conference ‘suggestion that United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union and China enter into Four Nations Arrangement...’
291. DIXON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 6 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 1150 WASHINGTON, 6 October 1943, 8.22 p.m. Further to my 1040 [1] and 1122. [2] Dean Acheson to-day handed me an Aide-Memoire as follows:-Begins. ‘The United States Government and the people of the United States deeply appreciate the aid which Australia has rendered to the United States Forces in...’
292. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 8 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 146 CANBERRA, 8 October 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET Our 144. [1] 1. The Commonwealth Government understands that the proposed talks in London on civil aviation will be an informal and exploratory exchange of views between members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. 2. We hope for eventual discussion between...’
293. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 8 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 267 [1] CANBERRA, 8 October 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL PART I-GENERAL 1. The Commonwealth Government has recently undertaken a comprehensive review of the nature, extent and balance of the Australian war effort. [2] This has been rendered necessary by certain strains and stresses which have manifested...’
294. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 8 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 180A LONDON, 8 October 1943 From Dominions Office telegram No. 282 of 29th September [1] you will have seen that Japanese are not prepared to proceed further with the contemplated exchange unless the 331 Japanese merchant seamen detained in Australia are included. This position was today the subject of...’
295. EVATT TO CURTIN: 11 October 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 11 October 1943 I have received a note from the American Legation at Canberra informing me that preparations have been made for the signing on 9th November of the Relief and Rehabilitation Agreement, and for the calling of the Council which the agreement brings into being. [1] You...’
296. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT TO BRUCE: 12 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 9583 CANBERRA, 12 October 1943 Your 180. [1] You should inform United Kingdom Committee at once that exclusion of these so-called merchant seamen is entirely due to security considerations which all competent military authorities here regarded as vital. 2. A close check has been made by the Intelligence Services...’
297. BURTON TO HODGSON: 13 October 1943; ‘Memorandum [CANBERRA], 13 October 1943 AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND RELATIONS The Minister has indicated on a number of occasions that he believes a more effective tie-up between Australia and New Zealand might place us in a better position from a point of view of political and economic discussions with the United Kingdom...’
298. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 13 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 186[A] LONDON, 13 October 1943, 7.30 p.m. SECRET Post War Civil Aviation. As indicated in my telegram 159A of September 10th [1] the intention was that the Empire discussions [2] should have been followed by a joint Anglo-American-Soviet meeting, the time and place of which was to be agreed...’
299. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 13 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 187[A] LONDON, 13 October 1943, 8.19 p.m. SECRET Your telegram No. 146 8th October, Post-war Civil Aviation. [1] The talks which have been of an entirely informal and exploratory character have been carried on almost continuously over the past three days. The broad lines of them have been- 1....’
300. DRAKEFORD TO CURTIN: 19 October 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 19 October 1943 Following on Mr. Bruce’s cablegram No. 187, dated 13th October [1], in which is set out a summary of the talks at the recent conference in London on post-war civil aviation, I have just received from Air Marshal Williams a signal containing certain other important...’
301. MEMORANDUM BY PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT: 19 October 1943; ‘CANBERRA, 19 October 1943 On 13th September, 1943, the Archbishop of Melbourne [1] forwarded to the Prime Minister a report [2] prepared for him by Reverend Father H. Modotti, S.J., pointing out that many Italian internees after working in labour camps have been found medically unfit for work and have...’
302. BRUCE TO CHURCHILL: 19 October 1943; ‘Letter LONDON, 19 October 1943 PERSONAL HIMSELF In view of the importance of the meetings that are just starting in Moscow [1] I would ask that I should be kept informed as to developments. I would also ask that I should be invited to attend meetings of the War Cabinet...’
303. DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO DIXON: 21 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 1283 [1] CANBERRA, 21 October 1943 SECRET Your 1150 Reciprocal Aid. [2] Please convey the following reply to United States authorities and also inform United Kingdom officials. 1. Commonwealth Government has given careful consideration to the request of the United States Government for the extension of Reciprocal Lend-Lease to...’
304. EVATT TO DIXON: 21 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 1278/81 CANBERRA, 21 October 1943 1. Your 1175. [1] I have informed the American Legation of our intention to accept Relief Agreement. You will sign on behalf of the Australian Government and represent us at first meeting of Council. [2] 2. Committee work on rules and regulations and general...’
305. EVATT TO BERENDSEN: 21 October 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 21 October 1943 I have the honour to refer to various matters relating to the future of the Southern Pacific region which appear to be the common concern of Australia and New Zealand, and to suggest an early exchange of views between Ministerial representatives of our two Governments,...’
306. CHURCHILL TO BRUCE: 21 October 1943; ‘Letter LONDON, 21 October 1943 Thank you very much for your letter of October 19. [1] I can give you an assurance that you and other Dominions representatives will be kept in touch by the Secretary of State with the developments of the Moscow Conference as closely as possible. [2]...’
307. CHURCHILL TO CURTIN: 21 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 313 [1] LONDON, 21 October 1943, 11.55 a.m. SECRET AND PERSONAL IMMEDIATE Your telegram No. 240, 14th September. [2] Since Attlee’s telegram of 8th September D.633 [3] as to projected meeting of Prime Ministers in November, I have as you know had to arrange for the meeting with Roosevelt...’
308. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 21 October 1943; ‘Cablegram [199A] [1] LONDON, 21 October 1943, 7.50 p.m. SECRET Portugal The Portuguese Ambassador [2] called to see me somewhat urgently last night as he is leaving on a short visit to Lisbon to-day. He told me that his Government had received reports that in certain sections of the Australian...’
309. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 22 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 202A LONDON, 22 October 1943 SECRET My telegram No. 193A. of the 18th October-Japanese Exchange. [1] I have now received the views of the United Kingdom Government. They are as follows-begins- The observations of your Government regarding inclusion of certain Japanese merchant seamen in proposed repatriation exchange with Japan...’
310. CURTIN TO CHURCHILL: 23 October 1943; ‘Cablegram Johcu 73 CANBERRA, 23 October 1943 MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL I have received your telegram of the 21st October with regard to a meeting of Prime Ministers in December. [1] I am aware of all the advantages which will flow from our meeting and my personal wishes would be...’
311. BRUCE TO CHURCHILL: 24 October 1943; ‘Letter LONDON, 24 October 1943 PERSONAL Many thanks for your letter of the 21st October. [1] I fully appreciate ‘the difficulties inherent in the situation’ and my one desire is to help in every way to overcome them. I can not, however, leave the matter there in view of the...’
312. DIXON TO CURTIN, CHIFLEY AND EVATT: 24 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 1226 WASHINGTON, 24 October 1943, 1.45 p.m. IMMEDIATE SECRET Your 1283. [1] The Congressional Sub-committee of the Truman Committee [2] considering Lease Lend is expected to end its hearings within a fortnight. It has already asked about raw materials and been told that requests for Reciprocal Aid have been...’
313. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 25 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 153 [1] CANBERRA, 25 October 1943 SECRET Your 186, 187 and 188. [2] Results of conference cannot be regarded as satisfactory to Australia. We would appreciate full account of proceedings and particularly some indication of attitude of various participants on points raised and reaction to views expressed by us...’
314. CRANBORNE TO CURTIN: 26 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 316 LONDON, 26 October 1943, 9.15 p.m. MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL The Prime Minister has shown me your JOHCU 73 [1] and has asked me to explain in greater detail the position as we see it regarding the proposed meeting of Prime Ministers. While we fully understand the strong...’
315. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 26 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 207[A] LONDON, 26 October 1943, 9.15 p.m. FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY While I fully appreciate the importance of the questions which you feel preclude your leaving Australia before April next [1], it is desirable that I should let you know how I see the position as...’
316. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 27 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 209[A] LONDON, 27 October 1943, 6.56 p.m. SECRET Your telegram 153 of 25th October. [1] I am afraid my telegrams 186 and 187 [2] did not give you as clear a picture of what happened at the Aviation Conference as they should have. While a full report of the...’
317. EVATT TO DIXON: 28 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 1314 CANBERRA, 28 October 1943 SECRET Reference your No. 1220. [1] Time is pressing. Instructions were given after most careful consideration that the matter must be pressed forward in Washington without any further delay. Your telegram seems to suggest that our attitude is necessarily linked up with a further...’
318. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO CRANBORNE: 28 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 281 [1] CANBERRA, 28 October 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET The Australian Government is much perturbed at the position of the Trade Agreement discussions in Washington because of the time now available for completion of the negotiations. It is apparent that further delay will make impossible the negotiation of an...’
319. PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT TO BRUCE: 29 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 156 CANBERRA, 29 October 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE Your 185 [1] and 202. [2] Japanese exchange. Australian Government has now reconsidered question, but regrets that it must adhere to its previous decision not to include the 331 merchant seamen in the exchange, for security reasons. 2. The Security and Naval...’
320. CRANBORNE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 28 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 322 LONDON, 28 October 1943, 9.05 p.m. MOST SECRET IMMEDIATE Your telegram No. 277. [1] We are very sorry to learn that the Commonwealth Government have felt unable to agree to an extension of Reciprocal Aid on the lines desired by the United States Government. As regards the main...’
321. EVATT TO DIXON: 29 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 1325 CANBERRA, 29 October 1943 IMMEDIATE Your 1226. [1] Reciprocal Aid. 1. The Government’s decision was only made after careful consideration of all relevant factors including considerations raised in your telegram and also the following- (a) Magnitude of our contribution in relation to capacity. (b) Certainty of Australia being...’
322. MINUTE BY HASLUCK: 29 October 1943; ‘CANBERRA, 29 October 1943 1. On Monday, 18th October, telegrams 186, 187 and 188 from Mr. Bruce [1] were considered in detail in conjunction with copies of telegrams 188, 194 and 195 from the Minister for External Affairs, Wellington, to the New Zealand High Commissioner, Canberra, conveying the text of...’
323. CURTIN TO CRANBORNE: 30 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 283 [1] CANBERRA, 30 October 1943 MOST SECRET & PERSONAL I have carefully considered your No. 316 [2], but, after fully weighing the reasons you advance, I am quite convinced that the accomplishment of the programme that I have mapped out for myself in Australia in the next few...’
324. DIXON TO HODGSON: 31 October 1943; ‘Cablegram 1252 WASHINGTON, 31 October 1943, 5.35 p.m. FOR EVATT IMMEDIATE SECRET Your 1314. [1] Everything possible has been done to press forward the Trade Agreement negotiations in accordance with the decision conveyed by your 1190 of 30th September [2], but Hull’s personal decision on the question [of] what United...’
325. EVATT TO DIXON: 4 November 1943; ‘Cablegram 1345 CANBERRA, 4 November 1943 Relief 1. The following will indicate the point of view the Australian Delegation should adopt on several aspects of the Relief Organisation. It is desirable that some suitable arrangements be made so that reports and instructions can be sent between Atlantic City [1] and...’
326. PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT TO BRUCE: 8 November 1943; ‘Cablegram 166 [1] CANBERRA, 8 November 1943 SECRET Your telegram 210. [2] Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Aviation commenced meetings in Melbourne last week and sittings are continuing. This Committee was appointed by the War Cabinet following a general discussion on observations by the Prime Minister on certain broad aspects of...’
327. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 15 November 1943; ‘Letter LONDON, 15 November 1943 PERSONAL I attach hereto copies of an exchange of letters which I have recently had with the Prime Minister. [1] These letters speak for themselves. It is necessary, however, that I should give you something of the background to them. At the end of a...’
328. CRANBORNE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 16 November 1943; ‘Cablegram 347 LONDON, 16 November 1943, 7.15 p.m. IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET Your telegram No. 281. [1] As you know, we have been most reluctant to envisage reopening of bilateral negotiations at the present time since, in our view, much more comprehensive approach to the problem of Trade Barriers will be...’
329. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 17 November 1943; ‘Cablegram 220[A] LONDON, 17 November 1943, 9.18 p.m. MOST SECRET Your 164 of [6]th November. [1] The staff conversations have now taken place and in my immediately following telegram [2] I send you text of a report which I have received from Williams and Wrigley. The position as I understand...’
330. EVATT TO BRUCE: 20 November 1943; ‘Cablegram N2 CANBERRA, 20 November 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET Your N.36. [1] Please strongly discourage notion of sending Netherlands Indies Governor to this country. In the present situation appointment would be most embarrassing. I regard it as an essential that van Kleffens should attend Pacific Conference referred to in my...’
331. CRANBORNE TO COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT: 20 November 1943; ‘Cablegram 354 LONDON, 20 November 1943, 3.10 p.m. SECRET IMPORTANT Mr. Bruce has communicated to us message contained in your telegram to him No. 156 [1] relating to inclusion of Japanese pearl divers in the proposed exchange. 2. We accept your decision not to agree to the return of these...’
332. MCDOUGALL TO BRUCE: 21 November 1943; ‘Letter (extract) ATLANTIC CITY, 21 November 1943 The delegations all came down here in a special train on Nov 10th and since then we have been hard at it. [1] The U.S. team is headed by Acheson who has done well especially in speaking in a large committee, a good...’
333. CURTIN TO MACARTHUR: 22 November 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 22 November 1943 MOST SECRET The splendid progress of your operations has been the subject of some thought on my part and discussion by the Government in relation to your future plans and the area of employment of the Australian Forces which have been assigned to you. 2....’
334. EVATT TO BRUCE: 23 November 1943; ‘Cablegram N3 CANBERRA, 23 November 1943 My telegram N.2. [1] You may possibly think it more advisable to postpone discussions with van Kleffens [2] until time comes when he will again visit Australia. My personal feeling is that defence of both Dutch Timor and Dutch New Guinea will be again...’
335. EGGLESTON TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 24 November 1943; ‘Cablegram S98 CHUNGKING, 24 November 1943 SECRET Received 25 November 1943 The Canadian Minister [1] has shown me copy of a telegram from Ottawa, the contents of which have been on the basis communicated to you [2], indicating that the Canadian Government is now considering signature of a treaty on...’
336. EVATT TO VACCARI: 26 November 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 26 November 1943 Following upon certain representations made to the effect that your standing in and knowledge of the Italian community in Australia should, from a humanitarian point of view, be availed of in matters pertaining to the welfare of that community [1], you have been authorized by...’
337. HODGSON TO DAVIS: 27 November 1943; ‘Letter CANBERRA, 27 November 1943 In regard to your letter of November 23rd to the Minister for External Affairs regarding the Extraterritoriality Treaty with China [1], I am directed by the Minister to ask if you would be good enough to send to your Prime Minister a telegram along the...’
338. EVATT TO GLASGOW: 1 December 1943; ‘Cablegram 235 CANBERRA, 1 December 1943 MOST SECRET Your 204 paragraph 2. [1] Canadian Mutual Aid. 1. Circumstances in which United Kingdom-United States of America Mutual Aid Agreement was signed are very different from those prevailing to-day. 2. Inclusion in Canadian agreement of proposed article which suggests tariff commitment would...’
339. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TO CRANBORNE: 1 December 1943; ‘Cablegram 305 CANBERRA, 1 December 1943 SECRET IMPORTANT Your 354. [1] Japanese Exchange. We greatly appreciate your understanding of our position and also your decision to give express support to our note. 2. With regard to amendments suggested in your paragraph 3, we agree to (1) but would suggest a...’
340. CRANBORNE TO CURTIN: 1 December 1943; ‘Circular cablegram D1046 LONDON, 1 December 1943, 1.10 p.m. MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL My immediately preceding telegram. [1] Draft public communique:- ‘President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek [2], Prime Minister Churchill together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers have completed a conference in North Africa. [3] The following...’
341. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 1 December 1943; ‘Cablegram 227[A] LONDON, 1 December 1943, 1.05 p.m. MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY Dominions Office telegraphing you urgently text of declaration [1] by the Prime Minister, President and Chiang Kai-shek [2] with regard to the Pacific which is being issued at midnight to-night. The facts with regard to this...’
342. DIXON TO EVATT: 3 December 1943; ‘Cablegram 1386 WASHINGTON, 3 December 1943, 12.13 a.m. IMMEDIATE SECRET Your 1424. [1] My 1363 Trade Treaty. [2] Hull saw me and McCarthy this afternoon, December 2nd. He had Hawkins present. After I had presented the Australian Government’s strong desire to proceed with negotiations, he verified the fact that wool...’
343. MACKENZIE KING TO DAVIS CABLEGRAM 226: 3 December 1943; ‘OTTAWA, 3 December 1943 1. Your telegram of November 27, 1943, No. 287, Chinese Extraterritoriality. [1] Please reply to Dr. Evatt along the following lines. 2. When we communicated with Australia on this subject in February 1943 [2] we were not aware that the Chinese interpretation of the simple act...’
344. BRUCE TO DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 3 December 1943; ‘Cablegram N39 LONDON, 3 December 1943, 6.46 p.m. SECRET CONFIDENTIAL Your telegrams N.2 and N.3. [1] Two definite and separate issues are involved: (1) an arrangement with the Dutch for post-war defence and economic co-operation in respect to the islands north of Australia; and, (2) van Mook’s contemplated migration to...’
345. GLASGOW TO EVATT: 6 December 1943; ‘Cablegram 230 OTTAWA, 6 December 1943, 6.14 p.m. MOST SECRET Your 235. [1] Canadian Mutual Aid. I saw Prime Minister yesterday and indicated position to him along lines of your telegram. I have now received a reply making the following points. 1. Ministers concerned regard it as essential to have...’
346. HODGSON TO SHEDDEN: 9 December 1943; ‘Memorandum CANBERRA, 9 December 1943 The proposed Conference with New Zealand has now been postponed until January as it has proved impossible to arrange mutually convenient dates in December. [1] 2. It is appreciated that there are difficulties in formulating precise views on defence matters in advance of political decisions...’
347. EVATT TO BRUCE: 9 December 1943; ‘Cablegram N5 CANBERRA, 9 December 1943 MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET Your N.39, reference van Mook. [1] You, of course, appreciate that while it is entirely within the competence of the Netherlands Government to make this appointment without any reference to Australia, the active occupancy of such a post in Australia does...’
348. BRUCE TO EVATT: 10 December 1943; ‘Cablegram N40 LONDON, 10 December 1943, 4.10 p.m. IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL MOST SECRET Your telegram N.5. [1] This matter is distinctly difficult. The position as I understand it is that the Netherlands Government have been giving careful consideration to the problems involved in regard to the Dutch re- occupation and resumption...’
349. EVATT TO BRUCE: 13 December 1943; ‘Cablegram [N]6 [1] CANBERRA, 13 December 1943 SECRET Your N.40. [2] Please inform van Kleffens [3] whatever may be the position later in 1944 the present time is quite inopportune to establish the formal organisation or set-up which would inevitably be associated with presence of gubernatorial regime in Australia itself....’
350. SHAW TO HODGSON: 15 December 1943; ‘Memorandum 6/43 WELLINGTON, 15 December 1943 With further reference to the forthcoming talks between Australia and New Zealand [1], the following points which emerged during a conversation with Mr. A. D. McIntosh, the Secretary for External Affairs, may be of interest. While the officially announced members of the New Zealand...’
351. BRUCE TO EVATT: 15 December 1943; ‘Cablegram N41 LONDON, 15 December 1943, 5 p.m. IMMEDIATE Your N.6 of 14th December. [1] I suggest that before I convey the message to van Kleffens [2] contained in paragraph 2 of your telegram it would be desirable that you should inform the United Kingdom Government either direct or through...’
352. WAR CABINET SUBMISSION BY CHIFLEY AND EVATT: 17 December 1943; ‘Agendum 496/1943 CANBERRA, 17 December 1943 SECRET CANADIAN MUTUAL AID PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES The Problem 1. Canada desires to conclude with Australia, and other prospective participants in Mutual Aid, an agreement on the general principles relating to the supply of goods by Canada under the Mutual Aid plan....’
353. BRUCE TO EVATT: 18 December 1943; ‘Cablegram N42 LONDON, 18 December 1943, 5.45 p.m. MOST SECRET Owing to van Kleffens [1] being down with flu it has been impossible for me to have a personal talk with him. To-day the matter has further developed in that the Netherlands Ambassador [2], who is acting for van Kleffens,...’
354. CURTIN TO BRUCE: 20 December 1943; ‘Cablegram 182 CANBERRA, 20 December 1943 MOST SECRET Your 220 [1] and 221 [2] of 17th and 18th November. PART I After full consideration of the views put forward by the Air Ministry concerning the proposed transfer to Australia of R.A.A.F. squadrons and R.A.A.F. personnel with R.A.F. squadrons [3], the...’
355. EVATT TO DIXON: 24 December 1943; ‘Cablegram PW140 CANBERRA, 24 December 1943 SECRET Your 1386 of 3rd December. [1] There is no option but to accept decision of Hull. At same time we felt impelled to place on record our views and understandings on the whole question of Australian- United States trade negotiations. This has been...’
356. BRUCE TO CURTIN: 24 December 1943; ‘Cablegram 246A LONDON, 24 December 1943 FOR THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY MOST SECRET At the second Cairo Conference between the Prime Minister and the President [1], held after their return from the meeting with Stalin at Teheran [2], the war against Japan was exhaustively considered and the broad...’

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Volume 6: July 1942 – December 1943

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