Documents on Australian Foreign Policy :: Volume 22: Australia and Recognition of the People’s Republic of China, 1949

1. MESSAGE FROM ATTLEE TO MENZIES: 17 December 1949; ‘Canberra, 17 December 1949 SECRET China You will already have received a message to the effect that my Government reached a decision in principle on 15th December to accord de jure recognition to the Chinese Communist Government. As to the date when the Chinese Government should be notified of this...’
2. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 2 January 1950; ‘Canberra, undated1 Confidential Recognition of People’s Government of China 1. The Chinese Communist Armies are now in virtually complete control of the whole of the mainland of China. According to the latest reports two more Nationalist generals in southern China have defected to the Communists, together with their troops, and...’
3. SUBMISSION TO SPENDER: 20 December 1949; ‘Canberra, 20 December 1949 Recognition of Chinese Communist Government The following are the main arguments that have been advanced against early recognition of the People’s Government of China:— (1) There is no advantage to be gained from it. The Chinese communists are communists in the fullest sense, and it can...’
4. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 20 December 1949; ‘Canberra, 20 December 1949 220. Secret Immediate The Australian Government has received through your High Commissioner in Canberra2Mr. Attlee’s and your message3 indicating that you propose to recognise the Communist Government of China on 2nd January next. 2. After carefully considering all aspects of the matter we have decided that...’
5. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 23 December 1949; ‘Nanking, 23 December 1949 Unnumbered Top Secret Immediate From Clark.1 Your message 115 of 21st December.2 1. In the event of Australia not recognizing the Communist Government in China at the same time as other members of the Commonwealth, Australian representatives in China may be expected to receive even worse...’
6. CABLEGRAM TO JAKARTA: 5 January 1950; ‘Canberra, 5 January 1950 14. Secret For Spender from Wynes:1 Washington Embassy state they are embarrassed by frequent enquires by State Department officials as to our views on recognition of China. They have impression that the officials are disinclined to take them into confidence without reciprocation. What are your views...’
7. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 7 January 1950; ‘Jakarta, 7 January 1950 11. Secret Immediate Your telegram No. 14.1 From Spender. You may authorise Washington Embassy to inform the State Department: (i) That the Australian Government does not propose to recognise the Mao Tse–Tung2 administration immediately; (ii) That we shall keep them informed before altering our present decision....’
8. BRIEF BY MCINTYRE FOR SPENDER: 9 January 1950; ‘Colombo, 9 January 1950 Recognition of Chinese Communists 1. The attitude of the Australian Government on the question of recognition of the so called Central People’s Government of China is based on our attitude towards Communism everywhere. This attitude is one of no compromise towards Communism anywhere in any form....’
9. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 11 January 1950; ‘Colombo, 11 January 1950 18. Secret Immediate Following for the Prime Minister from Spender. 1. Yesterday’s session of the Conference was devoted mainly to the discussion of China. I opened the discussion with a statement of the Australian attitude towards recognition of the Communist Government, giving reasons why we considered...’
10. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 6 February 1950; ‘Canberra, 6 February 1950 513. Restricted Emergency 1. We are concerned at the continuing stalemate regarding Chinese representation on international bodies2 and at reports of Lie’s3 fear that this might result in U.S.S.R. leaving U.N. 2. Please consult immediately with C.R.O. (State Department) and advise whether they have any views...’
11. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 6 February 1950; ‘London, 6 February 1950 538. Confidential Immediate Your telegram 513.1 United Kingdom officials see no immediate way of removing the stalemate nor of disconnecting the issue from recognition policies. The findings of a body such as that suggested in your paragraph 3 would hardly influence governments which have decided to...’
12. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 6 February 1950; ‘Washington, 6 February 1950 99. Restricted Emergency Your 51.1 1. Your views conveyed today to Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations, Hickerson.2 2. Hickerson stated that he did not consider that Soviet intended to withdraw from the United Nations. He considered that the Chinese Communist Government’s action in relation...’
13. CABLEGRAM TO OTTAWA: 18 February 1950; ‘Canberra, 18 February 1950 13. Restricted Please convey following message from Minister to Pearson. Begins. Reference our conversations at Ceylon on recognition of China.1 I would greatly appreciate an indication of your present views and what might be your Government’s intentions, also any indication you might have of United States...’
14. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 27 February 1950; ‘Ottawa, 27 February 1950 16. Secret Your 13.1 Our 11.2 The Minister3 replied by letter classified Secret. Resume follows:— Begin— 1. Recognition is still before Cabinet. 2. For the Minister’s personal information the trend of discussion is that Canada will recognise and the matter is one of timing. 3. In...’
15. CABLEGRAM TO OTTAWA: 2 March 1950; ‘Canberra, 2 March 1950 5. Secret For Pearson from Spender.1 I agree that it would be most fortunate if both our Governments could act together. I agree also that United States policy is only one factor. I have informed the State Department that we would not alter our decision without...’
16. CABLEGRAM TO OTTAWA: 25 May 1950; ‘Canberra, 25 May 1950 18. Secret For Pearson from Spender. My 5 of 2nd March.1 I should be most grateful for latest information on Canadian Government’s attitude towards possible recognition of Chinese Communist regime. My own view is that so far as Australia is concerned, at present time, there are...’
17. LETTER FROM LAFLÈCHE TO SPENDER: 7 June 1950; ‘Canberra, 7 June 1950 Secret The High Commissioner for Canada presents his compliments to the Minister for External Affairs and, with reference to the Minister’s telegram No. 18 of May 25,2 has the honour to transmit below the text of a reply to the Minister from the Secretary of State...’
18. NOTES ON CABINET MEETING: 25 August 1950; ‘Canberra, 25 August 1950 In addition to Ministers the following were in attendance: Sir F. Shedden, Secretary Dept of Defence Mr A.S. Watt, Secretary Dept of External Affairs Admiral Collins2 Lieut Gen Rowell3 Chiefs of Staff Air Marshall Jones4 P.M. reported that he was disturbed by world events. Stalin is...’
19. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 8 September 1950; ‘London, 8 September 1950 4269. Top Secret 1. The following comments summarise my views on the subject matters indicated as a result of my discussions with Attlee, Bevin, Younger,2 Griffiths3 and others. 2. Formosa. The United Kingdom Government does not consider Formosa as of vital strategic importance. It regards itself...’
20. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 10 October 1950; ‘New York, 10 October 1950 646. Top Secret For the Prime Minister from Spender. Now that the Korean War appears to be approaching its end and the debate in the United Nations has been completed,1 it seems to me that the stage of bargaining for the entry of the Communist...’
21. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 21 October 1950; ‘Canberra, 21 October 1950 535. Top Secret Immediate For Spender only from Menzies. Further to my telegram 500.1 China I agree with your view that the stage of bargaining for the entry to the United Nations of Communist China by offers to stop the Korean war is now over. I...’
22. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 11 December 1950; ‘Canberra, 11 December 1950 734. Top Secret Immediate For Officer1 from Spender. We have now received from various sources reports regarding the Truman–Attlee talks.2 Our estimate of the significance of these talks is as follows:— (a) Points of Agreement (i) United Nations forces will not voluntarily evacuate Korea. (ii) It...’
23. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 13 December 1950; ‘Canberra, 13 December 1950 748. Secret Immediate Personal for Officer from A.S. Watt. … You will no doubt have seen from repeated references in speeches and telegrams that the Minister’s view is that negotiation and settlement of the Korean issue is an essential preliminary to negotiation and agreement (if practicable)...’
24. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 13 December 1950; ‘Washington, 13 December 1950 1115. Secret Immediate Korea As I had not been in touch with Rusk2 since last Friday I arranged to see Rusk today to discuss the situation in general. In the course of the conversation I was able to get some reaction to the two points raised...’
25. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 20 December 1950; ‘Canberra, 20 December 1950 761. Top Secret Immediate For Officer from Spender Korea Your telegram 1135.1 Now that Committee of Three has been appointed to determine whether it is possible to effect a cease fire and, if so, the basis on which it may be arranged, it is essential that...’
26. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 22 December 1950; ‘Washington, 22 December 1950 1163. Secret Immediate For Minister from the Ambassador. Korea Your 711.1 Bearing in mind your comments on (a), what might be done in the event of a cease–fire in Korea and the settlement of the Korean problem, and (b), what further steps might be taken should...’
27. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 30 December 1950; ‘Karachi, 30 December 1950 338. Top Secret Immediate Fadden1 for Self and Spender from Menzies.2 Following is summary of my talks in India on the subjects of Korea, China and Formosa. Nehru, who claims to have good source of information, is strongly of the opinion that: 1. The Chinese People’s...’
28. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 2 January 1951; ‘Canberra, 2 January 1951 4. Top Secret Immediate For Prime Minister from Spender. Your 338.1 The most convenient way to pass my comments on the views expressed is to follow the order of your own cable. Nehru no doubt has very good opportunities for information but if his source is...’
29. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 5 January 1951; ‘London, 5 January 1951 76. Top Secret Immediate For Fadden and Spender from Menzies. Korea When discussion opened this afternoon on United Kingdom paper1 text of which has been telegraphed to you, I pressed for immediate steps to defer further action on Korea at Lake Success.2 I said the matters...’
30. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 7 January 1951; ‘Canberra, 7 January 1951 116. Top Secret Immediate From Fadden to Prime Minister. 1. Spender and I have discussed your 761 and Watt’s 4.2 Our views conveyed in Spender’s 43 cover generally the field dealt with in the U.K.’s memorandum of policy and to these views we adhere. 2. Subject...’
31. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 19 February 1951; ‘Canberra, 19 February 1951 Top Secret Relationships Between Australia and China On several occasions I have said, inside and outside Parliament, that the relationships between Australia and China will be reconsidered from time to time in the light of developments in the international situation. Although the Government of Mao Tse–tung...’
32. NOTE FROM BUNTING TO MENZIES: 28 February 1951; ‘Canberra, 28 February 1951 Top Secret Submission 267—China2 My reactions are these—(from a bit of a distance, I admit):— (a) What advantage is there in derecognising Chiang and not recognising Mao? There may be an argument for not doing anything (on the grounds that this is not the time for...’
33. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 11 July 1951; ‘Canberra, 11 July 1951 790. Secret Immediate For Spender from Casey.1 My telegram Washington 789 London 4077.2 It is, of course, fundamental, and I mention it specifically because it was raised in Cabinet this morning, that there should be no, repeat no, discussion of Formosa or of Chinese representation in...’
34. AUSTRALIAN DOCUMENT FOR ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING: 6 August 1952; ‘Undated Secret Objectives of the Three Parties in Relation to China [ matter omitted ] It is safe to assume that, as with other Communist regimes in the Soviet orbit, goodwill cannot be bought by mere concessions. It seems at present unlikely that official recognition or admission to the United...’
35. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 2 February 1953; ‘Washington, 2 February 1953 96. Secret Immediate For Casey from Spender. Your 72.1 I saw Allison2 this afternoon and questioned him as to the likely effects of Eisenhower’s instructions to the 7th Fleet3 and future policies. In more detail I asked: (1) Whether the United States Government would exercise positive...’
36. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 10 February 1953; ‘Canberra, 10 February 1953 90. Secret Priority For Spender from Casey. Your 96.1 As you will have seen from our telegram 353 to London,2 repeated to you number 87 we are in broad agreement with many of your observations. 2. We have refrained from public criticism of either the substance...’
37. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 12 February 1953; ‘Washington, 12 February 1953 SAV28. Secret For Casey from Spender Thanks for your 90.1 There are obviously some parts of my telegram No. 962 which have been quite misunderstood, in particular my observations on advisability of aiming as a matter of policy at limited recognition of the Chinese Nationalist Government....’
38. PAPER BY DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 1953; ‘Canberra, undated1 Top Secret The Political Problems of a Korean Armistice Introduction The prospect of an armistice in Korea makes it urgently necessary to consider the Australian attitude on the scope and substance of the post armistice political conference to be held within 90 days of the signature of the...’
39. PAPER BY UNITED NATIONS SECTION: 29 April 1953; ‘Canberra, 29 April 1953 Top Secret [ matter omitted ]1 Basic Assumptions 2. The present paper carries the discussion further and attempts to examine matters which may arise at the ‘political conference’ not so much as problems on each of which we would be prepared to negotiate with the Communists...’
40. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 13 June 1953; ‘Canberra, 13 June 1953 470. Secret Immediate For Ambassador from Minister. Korea—Post Armistice Programme [ matter omitted ] 7. So far as discussion of matters other than Korea in Political Conference itself is concerned, I would hope that, in any event, we could avoid any commitment just now to discuss...’
41. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 14 August 1953; ‘Canberra, 14 August 1953 Secret Some Current Matters of International Affairs MEMORANDUM BY MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS [ matter omitted ] Communist China There are two separate but closely a1lied questions, the diplomatic recognition of the Communists as the Government of China; and the admission of Communist China to the...’
42. BRIEF FOR AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING 1953: 1953; ‘Canberra, undated Top Secret Recognition of Communist China and Representation in the United Nations Since the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War in 1950, the problem of whether or not the Peking Government should be recognised and seated in the United Nations as the proper representative of China has not...’
43. MINUTE FROM GRIFFTH TO BROWN: September 1953; ‘Canberra, September 19532 I find distinguished support for my thesis on the significance of Formosa in this article by Dr. Steiner,3 who is certainly in world class as a China expert. You will notice that he does not put much faith on [sic] a half–way position i.e. one that recognises...’
44. CABLEGRAM TO BONN: 12 February 1954; ‘Canberra, 12 February 1954 38. Top Secret Priority Your telegrams 10 to 14.1 1. We are grateful for the information you have been able to secure. Please thank Eden and others for keeping us in touch and for their assurances that Australian interests will not be overlooked. 2. We agree...’
45. BRIEF FOR AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE: 18 February 1954; ‘Canberra, undated Top Secret Guard [ matter omitted ] Arguments For and Against Australian Recognition of the C.P. G. FOR (1) As the C.P.G. is the effective ruler of the mainland of China, there seems little reason from the legal viewpoint why we should not recognise the Peking Government as...’
46. MINUTE FROM SHANN TO TANGE: 9 July 1954; ‘Canberra, 9 July 1954 Top Secret Recognition of Communist China and Seating in the United Nations Attached is a paper I prepared last August for the ANZUS Council meeting in September,3 which you attended. The wheel has turned full circle in that it was prepared at a time when the...’
47. MINUTE FROM PLIMSOLL TO TANGE: 15 October 1954; ‘Canberra, 15 October 1954 Australian Representation on Formosa The arguments submitted by Dr. Chen for Australian representation on Formosa have considerable validity.2 Representation there would allow us to get a lot of useful information not only on what was happening in Formosa and on possible Chinese Nationalist intentions towards the...’
48. LETTER FROM CASEY TO MENZIES: 10 December 1954; ‘Melbourne, 10 December 1954 Confidential Personal As I mentioned to you I had intended to make some veiled reference in this past week to the recognition of Communist China. However, it might have alienated two or three votes at the end of the debate on Dutch New Guinea1 (Nationalist China...’
49. LETTER FROM BROWN TO MENZIES: 28 December 1954; ‘Canberra, 28 December 1954 While I was in Melbourne Mr. Casey told me that he had been proposing to make a speech with a section in it referring to the need to ‘negotiate’ with Communist China. This was to be a lead to the United States. He had refrained from...’
50. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 14 February 1955; ‘London, 14 February 1955 395. Secret From Tange to Plimsoll.1 Formosa 1. The department should examine carefully the effect of the public position2 we have taken insisting that the future of the Offshore Islands be regarded as quite distinct from the future of Formosa upon— (a) The logic of our...’
51. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 21 February 1955; ‘Canberra, 21 February 1955 395. Secret For the Prime Minister from McBride.1 Formosa Telegram No. 3952 from London. 1. I have been giving some consideration to the logic of our position in continuing to recognize Chiang as the Government of China and to the best means of maintaining support for...’
52. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 17 March 1955; ‘Washington, 17 March 1955 311. Top Secret For Fadden and Casey from Menzies. During a two hour meeting in the State Department on 16th March, Dulles gave me frank outline of United States thinking along the lines already indicated in Spender’s 1571 and 283.2 Dulles emphasised that United States intentions...’
53. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 27 April 1955; ‘Canberra, 27 April 1955 332. Top Secret Immediate To Spender for Dulles from Menzies. We have been considering the briefly reported offer of Chou En–lai to negotiate.1 This may well be an opportunity to explore a settlement much wider than that of the Formosa–Off–Shore problem. It has occurred to me...’
54. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 3 May 1955; ‘Washington, 3 May 1955 504. Top Secret Formosa For Menzies. My 477.1 Dulles has communicated to me by informal note his written reply to your 332.2 It is as follows— Begins— Message for the Prime Minister of Australia ‘from the Secretary of State. I appreciate the interest which prompted you...’
55. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN TANGE, CRITCHLEY AND PETERSON: 5 May 1955; ‘Canberra, 5 May 1955 [ matter omitted ] 4. Turning to the main purpose of his visit, Mr. Peterson said his Ambassador3 had asked him to say that he (the Ambassador) had been ‘astonished’ and ‘disturbed’ that the Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs had put forward to Mr....’
56. PAPER BY CRITCHLEY: 5 May 1955; ‘Canberra, 5 May 1955 Possible Topics for a Far-Eastern Conference Possible subjects for a Far-Eastern Conference would include the following:— 1. Cease fire in the Formosan Straits. 2. Avoidance of the use of force. 3. The future of the offshore islands. 4. CommunistChina’s representation in the United Nations. 5. Supervisory...’
57. TELETYPE MESSAGE FROM CASEY TO TANGE: 23 May 1955; ‘Melbourne, 23 May 1955 Confidential Easily the most important international matter for Australia is our relationship with Asia—which is another way of saying our relationship with Communist China. This is the real reason why I want to spend a month in free Asia in October—rather than fiddle around at the...’
58. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 16 June 1955; ‘Canberra, 16 June 1955 Top Secret The Situation in East Asia—Formosa and the Recognition of Communist China Australia has a prime interest in the success of efforts to find a way of living at peace with Communist China. A great many issues are involved in bringing this about: renunciation of...’
59. LETTER FROM CASEY TO MENZIES: 16 August 1955; ‘Canberra, 16 August 1955 Secret Personal You will remember that, on 29th June, I put an information paper2 to Cabinet on East Asia and on our attitude towards the Peking Government. It was decided that no steps should be taken at present towards recognition of Peking. Since then, the Heads...’
60. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 25 September 1955; ‘Washington, 25 September 1955 1076. Top Secret And Guard M311 For the Prime Minister and Acting Minister2 from Casey. I talked privately with Dulles about recognition of Peking. He says there is no chance of the United States recognising them before the end of 1956. He does not say they...’
61. PAPER BY CRITCHLEY: 29 September 1955; ‘Canberra, 29 September 1955 Top Secret Australian Policy on Formosa and the Off-Shore Islands Differences of policy between the United Kingdom and the United States have made it difficult to define publicly Australia’s policy on Formosa and the off-shore islands. 2. However, at all times, and with Cabinet approval (*1),...’
62. CABINET DECISION NO. 118: 13 April 1956; ‘Canberra, 13 April 1956 Confidential Without memorandum—Invitation to visit China Cabinet decided that it was undesirable that any government official or officer of a government instrumentality should be a member of a group to visit communist China. It noted that invitations were currently being issued to various people including government...’
63. PAPER BY EAST ASIA SECTION FOR PLIMSOLL AND LOOMES: 18 July 1956; ‘Canberra, 18 July 1956 Secret Policy toward Communist China and Possible Trade Representations [ matter omitted ] E. Recognition of Communist China 7. The Chinese Communists have laid down the following basis for recognition ‘the C.P.R. may negotiate and establish diplomatic relations on the basis of equality, mutual benefit and...’
64. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 1956; ‘550. Confidential For Spender from Tange. Your 7201 —China 1. Peterson made some heavy–footed representations to Plimsoll on July 17th on the subject of press opinion,2 suggesting that, if Australian Ministers would not check drift in press opinion, Dulles might have to refer publicly to Australian press and indicate American...’
65. MINUTE FROM PLIMSOLL TO TANGE: 16 October 1956; ‘Canberra, 16 October 1956 Secret Trade with Communist China On the afternoon of 15th October, we had a meeting between the Departments of Trade and of External Affairs on the attached draft Cabinet Submission on ‘Trade with Communist China’ which was prepared by the Department of Trade.1 2. Waller,2 Loomes,...’
66. MINUTE FROM PLIMSOLL TO TANGE: 24 October 1956; ‘Canberra, 24 October 1956 Secret Trade with Communist China I spoke to Mr Phillips (Assistant Secretary, Department of Trade) along the lines set out in Mr Tange’s minute of 19th October, in which he said the following:— ‘Please pursue discussions with Trade Department in the light of the Minister’s reactions;...’
67. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 10 November 1956; ‘Washington, 10 November 1956 1242. Secret Austeo Priority For the Acting Minister1 and Secretary. Australian Mission to the United Nation’s 843 to you.2 I firmly believe we should agree to American request for Australia to speak in support of the United States on Chinese Representation. I believe it would be...’
68. RECORD OF CONVERSATION AT ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING: 17 November 1956; ‘Washington, 17 November 1956 Top Secret Guard [ matter omitted ] 7. Later in the discussion Robertson returned to the subject of Communist China. In a lengthy intervention, he declared that U.S. non–recognition was the main obstacle to Chinese Communist influence in Asia; that recognition would result in Asian countries...’
69. MINUTE FROM BIRCH TO TANGE: 30 April 1957; ‘Canberra, 30 April 1957 Secret Australian Representation in Formosa The Australian Government has not given diplomatic recognition to the Communist regime in China. Australia recognises the Chiang Kai–shek administration on Formosa as representing the Government of the Republic of China and has accepted a Chinese Ambassador to Australia. This submission...’
70. EXTRACT FROM RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MCCLINTOCK AND HAY: 20 May 1957; ‘Canberra, 20 May 1957 Confidential Formosa I told McClintock the Secretary’s plan2 as it is to be put to the Minister. He said that their thoughts had been turning much more to representation on the mainland since trade with the mainland is running at an annual rate of more than...’
71. SUBMISSION TO MENZIES: 27 February 1958; ‘Canberra, 27 February 1958 Secret Communist China (a) Recognition (b) Admission to United Nations. Notes for Talks with Mr Nash.1 We have heard that the Americans were very concerned at the possibility of recognition of Communist China by the New Zealand Socialist Government; so much so that Dulles asked Mr...’
72. PAPER BY BRENNAN: 12 August 1958; ‘Canberra, 12 August 1958 Secret Guard Seating of Communist China into the United Nations PART I 1. The purpose of this paper is not to traverse the arguments in favour and against the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. It has long been accepted that the seating of...’
73. NOTES FOR CABINET DISCUSSION: 12 August 1958; ‘Canberra, [12] August 1958 Secret Australian Representation in Formosa 1. Australia recognizes the Nationalist Government of China. That Government maintains an Embassy in Canberra. The question is whether we should restore reciprocation. Arguments in Favour: 2. (1) Our information about Formosa is poor. Occasional visitors are confined to limited paths....’
74. MINUTE FROM QUINN TO TANGE: 26 August 1958; ‘Canberra, 26 August 1958 Top Secret Guard The Off–shore Islands2 Australian Attitude Australia regards it as vital that Formosa and the Pescadores should not fall into communist hands. The off–shore islands are historically and juridically different and strategically and politically, less important. Whilst our position has been that the destiny...’
75. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 30 September 1958; ‘Canberra, 30 September 1958 Confidential Trade Policy Towards Mainland China General Position: Australia has no obligations or rights in respect of trade with Mainland China. In general, Mainland China is treated the same as any other non–dollar country. The principal distinction is that as with other Communist countries, strategic export...’
76. EXTRACT FROM BRIEF FOR TANGE: 1 March 1959; ‘Canberra, March 1959 Secret Notes on Policy Towards China, Formosa, and the Off–Shore Islands Australia is convinced that Communist China is here to stay. Frictions in leaderships, manifestations of social discontent or apathy, distortions in economic planning, unfulfilled targets, etc., may occur from time to time but will not shake...’
77. PAPER BY GRIFFITH: 1959; ‘Canberra, undated Secret Recognition of Communist China Introductory The context of this question has been considerably altered in recent months. Issues which were only clear to the official experts are now obvious to the public as the drama of Tibet unfolds.2 There is no longer the need to justify the...’
78. MINUTE FROM JOCKEL TO TANGE: 3 June 1959; ‘Canberra, 3 June 1959 The Acting Prime Minister’s Remarks on Communist China 1. Mr. McEwen, in his television interview,2 said he thought that, if the Communist regime remained in power, then ‘I think it will be recognized as a de facto Government of Mainland China in due course’. 2. These...’
79. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 10 June 1959; ‘Washington, 10 June 1959 1284. Secret Personal For Casey from Beale.1 Your telegram 739.2 1. The Prime Minister’s discussions in Washington3 were overshadowed by Dulles’ death and funeral and his talks with the President and Herter4 were very general. 2. In the interview with the President the question of the...’
80. BRIEF FOR AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING: 9 October 1959; ‘Canberra, 9 October 1959 Top Secret Guard Austeo [ matter omitted ] Australian Policy 8. Australia fully supports the main lines of Western policy towards preventing the spread of Communist China’s influence; Korea, Formosa, Japan, SEATO, Colombo Plan etc. 9. In August (in the face of some public criticism of...’
81. SAVINGRAM TO ALL POSTS: 25 July 1960; ‘Canberra, 25 July 1960 GUIDANCE 10 Confidential Chinese Representation in the United Nations There follows a summary of a paper prepared recently in the Department which examined some procedural aspects of the above question. Likely Voting on ‘Moratorium’ Proposal 2. Because possibly 15 newly independent African States will be admitted...’
82. MEMORANDUM FROM MCINTYRE TO TANGE: 8 August 1960; ‘Tokyo, 8 August 1960 Secret Guard Chinese Representation in the United Nations I have read your guidance savingram No. 10 to all posts1 and Washington Embassy telegram No. 2106 reporting a discussion with Miss Bacon of the State Department.2 2. I am sure there is a good case to be...’
83. MINUTE FROM TANGE TO MENZIES: 28 October 1960; ‘Canberra, 28 October 1960 Confidential China and Formosa I wish to draw your attention to a new element which has been introduced into Australian consideration of the future of Formosa by Sir Garfield Barwick’s1 statement in the United Nations General Assembly on Chinese representation.2 2. Sir Garfield Barwick’s statement is...’
84. PAPER BY PACIFIC & AMERICAS BRANCH: 10 January 1961; ‘Canberra, 10 January 1961 Secret Chinese Representation in the U.N. and the Future of Formosa (This working paper sets out: (i) Australian objectives (paras 1–5) (ii) Positions of major countries concerned (paras 6–18) (iii) A suggested procedure (paras 19–34) (iv) Other necessary action (para. 35)) Australia’s Objectives 1. An essential...’
85. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 16 January 1961; ‘Canberra, 16 January 1961 53. Secret For Beale from Menzies. I hope you will be able to see Dean Rusk as soon as possible after the inauguration.1 I realise of course that it may be difficult to get to him in the early days of the new Administration. 2. I...’
86. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MENZIES, GORTON, HEYDON, WALKER, HARRY AND MCNICOL: 20 January 1961; ‘Canberra, 20 January 1961 Secret Subject: China (Note: A Working Paper on China5 dated 19th January was circulated before the meeting) The Minister opened the discussion by saying that he hoped it would be in nature a general talk with people interposing ideas and comments as they occurred to them....’
87. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 29 January 1961; ‘Canberra, 29 January 1961 235. Secret China For Shann. Thank you for your telegram No. 282 of 19th January1 which was helpful and timely. 2. The following views and comments, which have been approved by the Minister, but should not be attributed to him, are indicative of our thinking and...’
88. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 14 February 1961; ‘London, 14 February 1961 680. Secret Priority From External. Your 2351 and 374.2 China MacDermot3 called me in this morning to give me the replies to the questions I put to Hoyer-Millar arising out of telegram 235. 2. Exchanges have been and are going on on this subject at Assistant...’
89. CABINET DECISION NO. 1245: 2 March 1961; ‘Melbourne, 2 March 1961 Confidential Without Memorandum—Wheat Sales on Terms to Mainland China 1. The Minister for Trade informed the Cabinet that the Wheat Board had received advice from the China Resources Committee1 that it wishes to buy up to an additional one million tons of wheat from Australia during...’
90. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 9 June 1961; ‘Canberra, 9 June 1961 959. Secret For Beale from Menzies China Thanks for your telegram 1354.1 While you should not of course press Rusk unduly I would like you to see him reasonably soon and pursue the matter. It becomes increasingly important both to stimulate and to know President’s and...’
91. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 17 June 1961; ‘Washington, 17 June 1961 1587. Secret For Menzies from Beale. China I went through the points in your telegram 9591 with Rusk on 17th June. After listening to these he said he had two points to pass to you, the first one in the greatest confidence. 2. The first point...’
92. SAVINGRAM TO POSTS: 26 June 1961; ‘Canberra, 26 June 1961 Secret Chinese Representation in the United Nations With reference to our All Posts Savingrams AP731 and AP742 the following summarises present departmental thinking on this issue. The voting on the moratorium at the Fifteenth Session3 was 42–34–22. If it were decided to attempt to prolong the...’
93. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 30 June 1961; ‘New York, 30 June 1961 UN 801. Secret Guard Chinese Representation Okazaki (Permanent Representative of Japan)1 told me that Ikeda (Prime Minister of Japan)2 had given him some account of his talks with President Kennedy on the question of Chinese representation. Rusk had also been present. 2. Kennedy had said...’
94. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 31 July 1961; ‘Washington, 31 July 1961 1915. Secret Priority Chinese Representation in United Nations [ matter omitted ] 2. Lutkins1 said that the United States position had already been decided, at least to the extent of what could not be done. Devices such as the ‘New State’ and ‘Successor State’ had been...’
95. CABINET DECISION NO. 1528: 3 August 1961; ‘Canberra, 3 August 1961 Confidential Submission No. 12931 —Wheat Sales to Mainland China 1. The Cabinet was of the opinion that the draft long-term agreement between the China Corporation and the Australian Wheat Board was most unsatisfactory. It displayed a vagueness which might well give rise to a dispute between...’
96. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 3 August 1961; ‘Canberra, 3 August 1961 2521. Top Secret The following is a personal message, dated 3rd August, which Mr. Menzies wants passed to Mr. Macmillan as soon as possible. MESSAGE BEGINS. ‘Thank you for your message of July 28.1 So far as China is concerned, we have unsuccessfully tried to find...’
97. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 10 August 1961; ‘Canberra, 10 August 1961 1248. Secret Chinese Representation-Washington’s 19151 We recognise that it is primarily for the United States to decide on a firm line of action in time to gather sufficient support for it, but we see disadvantages and even dangers in the current State Department proposal. Reliance on...’
98. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 12 August 1961; ‘Washington, 12 August 1961 2011. Secret Chinese Representation We have canvassed your 12481 with Buffum2 (Deputy Director United Nations Affairs) and several other officers dealing with the China question … Our contacts were anxious to assure us that the circular instruction (now approved and shortly to be sent to posts)...’
99. BRIEF FOR AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING: 9 May 1962; ‘Canberra, undated Secret [ matter omitted ] The Problem of Communist China: Pressures and Possible Counteraction China’s Objectives: The major foreign policy objectives of Communist China are: (a) to gain control of Formosa, (b) to reduce as far as possible the risk of attack on her territory, (c) to ring...’
100. MINUTE FROM LOVEDAY TO ACTING SECRETARY: 28 November 1962; ‘Canberra, 28 November 1962 Confidential Note Received from Communist Chinese Foreign Ministry On 26th November we received, by commercial post, the attached note addressed to ‘Department of External Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia’ from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Communist China. To it is attached a copy of...’
101. BRIEF FOR AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING 1963: 1963; ‘Canberra, undated Secret [matter omitted] 16. As to recognition, the emphasis should be put on the fact that China has herself to blame for not being recognised, by insisting that recognising countries acknowledge her rights to Taiwan. The question of China’s admission to the United Nations is complicated by her...’
102. SAVINGRAM TO POSTS: 27 August 1963; ‘Canberra, 27 August 1963 AP59. Confidential Action to Offset the Effect of a Nuclear Detonation by Communist China Estimate of China’s Nuclear Capabilities Intelligence estimates vary but the possibility is recognised that Communist China will be capable of achieving an initial nuclear detonation between 1963 and 1965. It is believed...’
103. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 16 October 1963; ‘New York, 16 October 1963 1388. Chinese Representation Following is text of Australian statement in plenary this morning on Chinese representation item 1 — Begins— ‘ The Australian Delegation has a clear and unequivocal attitude on the draft resolution now before this Assembly. Australia recognizes the Republic of China. The...’
104. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 20 January 1964; ‘Paris, 20 January 1964 123. Secret Priority China Manac’h1 called me in this morning to inform me officially that— (a) Decision had been taken to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China; (b) Timing of public announcement and of completion of exchange was not yet certain but announcement might come quite...’
105. MINUTE FROM SHAW TO BARWICK: 22 January 1964; ‘Canberra, 22 January 1964 Secret Effect on Australia of French Recognition of Communist China We now know officially of France’s intention to establish diplomatic relations with Peking at the Ambassadorial level, at an early date. This paper examines how this affects those considerations which principally have determined, until now, Australia’s...’
106. CABLEGRAM TO MANILA: 20 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 20 February 1964 126. Secret Immediate For Cutts1 Please pass following message to President Macapagal2 from the Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies. Begins: I have asked our Ambassador, Mr. Cutts, to deliver this letter to you as I am conscious of the many and varied developments in the South...’
107. MINUTE FROM BOOKER TO TANGE: 23 October 1964; ‘Canberra, 23 October 1964 Secret China in the United Nations Attached is a redraft of the submission to the Acting Minister2 on China in the United Nations. 2. You have expressed concern that Australia was committed by Sir Garfield Barwick to the position that Formosa was part of China.3 It...’
108. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 30 October 1964; ‘Brussels, 30 October 1964 248. CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY Record of talks held at Soviet Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 28th October 1964 Present Australia Minister for External Affairs: The Honourable Paul Hasluck M.P. First Assistant Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Mr. P. Shaw. Chargéd’ Affaires, Australian Embassy, Moscow: Mr. J.D. Petherbridge. First Secretary,...’
109. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 7 November 1964; ‘London, 7 November 1964 7580. Confidential Following are notes of conversation between Australian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Hasluck, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Couve de Murville1 on 4th November, 1964. Also present were the Australian Ambassador, Sir Ronald Walker, Mr. P. Shaw and M. Lucet.2 Record...’
110. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN HASLUCK AND CADIEUX: 27 November 1964; ‘Ottawa, 27 November 1964 The Canadian Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Martin, who was acting as Prime Minister in the absence of Mr. Pearson from Ottawa, was present for a few minutes at the beginning of the meeting, but then excused himself to attend to a parliamentary situation which precluded...’
111. MINUTE FROM HASLUCK TO PLIMSOLL: 10 June 1965; ‘Canberra, 10 June 1965 Confidential Cabinet considered without submission the proposals by the Australian Wheat Board to invite Chinese Communist representatives to Australia next October.1 In due course you will receive the recorded decision.2 No invitation is to be issued but it is considered desirable that the matter should be...’
112. MINUTE FROM HORNE TO BOOKER: 18 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 18 August 1965 Confidential Chinese Representation at the United Nations Replies have now been received from the five posts addressed in our telegram of 11th August2 about the possibility of re-introducing the moratorium procedure at this year’s General Assembly. 2. The replies indicate that— (a) The Chinese proposal has...’
113. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 17 November 1965; ‘New York, 17 November 1965 UN1837. Confidential Immediate Chinese Representation Voting on both the procedural and substantive resolutions1 was too close for comfort and demonstrated our wisdom in stimulating the prior tabling of our ‘important question’ resolution. The American delegation remained to the end too optimistic about voting as our...’
114. CABINET DECISION NO. 82: 15 March 1966; ‘Canberra, 15 March 1966 Confidential Submission No. 721 —Mainland China—Wheat Negotiations The Cabinet approved the proposal that the China National Cereals Corporation be permitted to send a delegation of four Chinese to Australia to enter into negotiations with the Wheat Board for a contract for purchase by the Corporation of...’
115. MINUTE FROM PLIMSOLL TO HASLUCK: 16 May 1966; ‘Canberra, 16 May 1966 Confidential Australian Representation in Taiwan The opening of an Australian Embassy in Taiwan would not be a change of substance in our attitude towards Nationalist China (though some might interpret it as such). Australia has continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government, which...’
116. CABINET DECISION NO. 251: 17 May 1966; ‘Canberra, 17 May 1966 Confidential Without Memorandum—Creation of Post of Ambassador to Taiwan On the recommendation of the Minister for External Affairs, the Cabinet agreed that Australia should establish an Embassy in Taipeh. It agreed that this decision might be announced by the Minister when he visited Taiwan early in...’
117. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 13 June 1966; ‘Seoul, 13 June 1966 159. Secret For the Prime Minister and Acting Minister1 from Hasluck. Visit to Taiwan Following are some general impressions of my visit to Taipei. 2. My strongest impression is that the Chinese Nationalist leaders are as insistent as ever on their objective of returning to the...’
118. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 13 June 1966; ‘Seoul, 13 June 1966 162. Secret Priority For Plimsoll from Minister. Our announcement on representation in Taiwan was well received by Chinese in Taipeh but today I received some indication that various interpretations may be placed on our move. For example Korean Foreign Minister1 passed on a view ascribed to...’
119. CABINET DECISION NO. 416 (HOC): 21 July 1966; ‘Canberra, 21 July 1966 Confidential Without Memorandum—Export of Steel to Communist China At a meeting in the Prime Minister’s room on 21st July—the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry, the Treasurer and the Minister for External Affairs2 being present—a discussion took place concerning applications...’
120. DISPATCH FROM COOPER TO HASLUCK: 24 April 1967; ‘Taipei, 24 April 1967 Secret Sino-Australian Relations Following the Prime Minister’s recent visit to Taiwan,2 I have the honour to review. the present state of Sino-Australian relations and to examine the basic considerations which will affect our future relations with the Republic of China. 2. As I have already reported...’
121. CABINET DECISION NO. 311: 2 May 1967; ‘Canberra, 2 May 1967 Confidential Without Memorandum—Exports to Mainland China and North Korea The Minister for External Affairs informed the Cabinet of two developments:— (a) In 1966, exports of steel to mainland China had mounted to about 20,800 tons but there had been a significant increase in these exports in...’
122. DISPATCH FROM COOPER TO HASLUCK: 14 November 1967; ‘Taipei, 14 November 1967 Secret Guard Relations with the Republic of China I have the honour to review the state of our relations with the Republic of China since the establishment of an Australian Embassy in Taipei in September, 1966. 2. The establishment of the Embassy probably gave rise to...’
123. MINUTE FROM INGRAM TO BOOKER: 21 December 1967; ‘Canberra, 21 December 1967 Confidential Relations with the Republic of China You said that we should ask Mr Cooper to substantiate some of the views expressed in his attached despatch on relations with the Republic of China. The attached memorandum has been prepared, but it was inadvertently typed for my...’
124. CABLEGRAM TO OTTAWA: 13 August 1968; ‘Canberra, 13 August 1968 474. Confidential For Bailey Your Telegram 502.1 Canadian Attitude to China In your discussion with Mr Sharp2 you may wish to draw on the following in regard to the question of recognition of Communist China. (a) Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution the communist regime...’
125. DISPATCH FROM COOPER TO HASLUCK: 19 November 1968; ‘Taipei, 19 November 1968 Australia and China After two years in the Republic of China, and at a time when many people in the United States and elsewhere are becoming disenchanted with American policy in Asia, I have the honour to offer some reflexions on Australia’s relations with Taiwan and...’
126. MEMORANDUM FROM LAURIE TO PLIMSOLL: 5 December 1968; ‘Hong Kong, 5 December 1968 Secret Visit to China of External Affairs Representative, Hong Kong Not surprisingly after several months in Hong Kong my interest in making a visit to China has been greatly aroused and my earlier belief in the utility of such visits enhanced. I have tried to...’
127. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 31 January 1969; ‘Taipei, 31 January 1969 40. Confidential From Cooper. Interview with President Chiang Yesterday at the President’s invitation I spent nearly two hours with him. Apart from Aides, the only other person present was Vice Minister James Shen.1 The discussion was wide ranging but seemingly without specific purpose other than the...’
128. SUBMISSION TO FREETH: 12 February 1969; ‘Canberra, 12 February 1969 Confidential Recognition of Communist China You may wish to have an account of moves in recent weeks towards recognition of communist China by Canada, Italy and Belgium. Canada 2. When the Trudeau Government came into office it undertook to seek an exchange of diplomatic relations with...’
129. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 12 February 1969; ‘Ottawa, 12 February 1969 115. Confidential For Plimsoll from Bailey Canada–Recognition of Peking1 You will have seen from my series of telegrams last week about the recognition of Peking2 how acute a dilemma Mitchell Sharp has posed in relation to the territorial claims of Peking and Taipei respectively. Pointing out...’
130. LETTER FROM COOPER TO MCINTYRE: 11 March 1969; ‘Taipei, 11 March 1969 Secret China I was most interested to read the record of your conversation with the Canadian High Commissioner on 4th February on the above subject.1 One passage in particular caught my attention, viz: ‘The future status of Taiwan had not been resolved in the post-war settlement;...’
131. LETTER FROM MCINTYRE TO COOPER: 12 June 1969; ‘Canberra, 12 June 1969 Secret Personal I am writing now to reply to your letter of 11th March, 1969,1 in which you raise a number of questions in relation to the indefinite maintenance of a ‘two Chinas’ policy. I have noted, too, that your despatch No. 3 of 19th November,...’
132. LETTER FROM COOPER TO MCINTYRE: 15 July 1969; ‘Taipei, 15 July 1969 Secret Thank you for your personal letter of 12th June in which you discuss various aspects of our China policy.1 I welcome what I assume may be taken as a summary of Departmental thinking on this question because I am sure you will agree that it...’
133. LETTER FROM COOPER TO FREETH: 21 July 1969; ‘Taipei, 21 July 1969 Secret Instead of the customary valedictory despatch, I think it would be more appropriate in this instance if I were to let you have my views on my assignment to Taiwan in the form of a personal letter. You will recall that the decision to establish...’
134. SUBMISSION TO FREETH: 1969; ‘Canberra, undated Secret Mr Cooper’s Letter About the State of Affairs in Taiwan and Australian Policy Towards China1 Mr Cooper wrote to you before he left Taipei giving his valedictory impressions of Taiwan and his views about Australian policy on the China question in general. 2. Since he is now...’
135. MEMORANDUM FROM DUNN TO PLIMSOLL: 12 February 1970; ‘Taipei, 12 February 1970 Secret Australian Interests in Taiwan Washington telegram 712 outlined some of the fields in which the U.S. may be looking for new ways to make gestures to and possibly come to some sort of terms with Peking.2 In any review of policy, the U.S. will no...’
136. SUBMISSION TO MCMAHON: 21 April 1970; ‘Canberra, 21 April 1970 Confidential Australian Contacts with Communist Chinese in Hong Kong The External Affairs Representative in the Australian Trade Commission, Hong Kong, Mr Burgess,2 has drawn to our attention indications that ‘Communist Chinese officials in Hong Kong have recently been authorised to have fairly extensive contact with foreign...’
137. MINUTE FROM ANDERSON TO WALLER: 2 October 1970; ‘Canberra, 2 October 1970 Confidential Chinese Representation and Australian Relations with Peking The Australian Government’s long-standing positions on recognition of Communist China and Chinese representation at the U.N. could be called in question in the near future by the following possible developments: (a) Canadian recognition of Peking; (b) following (a),...’
138. SUBMISSION TO MCMAHON: 9 October 1970; ‘Canberra, 9 October 1970 Restricted Trade with Communist China: Opposition Attack Some heat was generated in Parliament late last week by an attack mounted by Mr. Whitlam 1 against the Government over its allowing the export of iron, steel and zinc to Mainland China. The point of the attack was...’
139. MEMORANDUM FROM PLIMSOLL TO WALLER: 15 October 1970; ‘Washington, 15 October 1970 Secret United States and China Yesterday I received from Mr Marshall Green (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) the attached letter enclosing the text of his testimony on China, 1 which he had given on 6th October to the Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific...’
140. LETTER FROM RENOUF TO WALLER: 15 October 1970; ‘Paris, 15 October 1970 Confidential Personal I notice with interest that Canada has now recognized Communist China, 2 and this will before long, I expect, be followed with recognition by Italy, Belgium and possibly some other countries. While appreciating fully that this subject has really nothing to do with this...’
141. MEMORANDUM FROM DUNN TO WALLER: 23 October 1970; ‘Taipei, 23 October 1970 Secret The China/Taiwan Problem Canada’s recognition of Peking and the likelihood that the U.N. vote on Chinese representation this year will be more adverse to Taiwan than ever before have prompted the following observations. They may be relevant for the analysis of Australian policies towards mainland...’
142. LETTER FROM WALLER TO RENOUF: 23 October 1970; ‘Canberra, 23 October 1970 Confidential Personal Many thanks for your letter of 15th October1 which has just arrived. We have been giving a lot of thought to the China problem and have been trying out various ideas for size, including the approach you describe. The time before the Senate elections2...’
143. MINUTE FROM EASTMAN TO MCMAHON: 28 October 1970; ‘Canberra, 28 October 1970 Secret The China Issue—Australian Policy The Secretary recently instructed us to prepare for submission to you a comprehensive study of the abovementioned question, looking beyond this year’s vote in the United Nations and examining the options open to Australia to adjust itself to the growing balance...’
144. LETTER FROM DUNN TO ROBERTSON: 13 November 1970; ‘Taipei, 13 November 1970 Confidential Personal I should like to sketch out hastily a few thoughts consequent on our talks here, and in particular on the paper on ‘Means of retaining international support for the R.O.C.’ which you took with you, and which I should like to discuss with Oscar...’
145. SAVINGRAM TO CANBERRA: 1 December 1970; ‘New York, 1 December 1970 SAV. 42. Confidential Future Representation of China in the United Nations Now that the China representation item has been concluded in this year’s General Assembly, and particularly in the light of the outcome of it, the time will soon arrive, if it has not arrived...’
146. MINUTE FROM EASTMAN TO ROBERTSON: 3 December 1970; ‘Canberra, 3 December 1970 Australian Relations with Republic of China With reference to your minute of 2nd December I am not attracted to Dunn’s ‘advisory’ proposals.1 2. If ROC accepted and implemented them all (which is wildly unlikely) it might be held in slightly higher esteem by a few countries;...’
147. MINUTE FROM EASTMAN TO ROBERTSON: 3 December 1970; ‘Canberra, 3 December 1970 China Policy I refer to your minute of 3rd December.1 2. In view of the growing international trend in favour of Peking and the indication that the United States, in particular, is making a fundamental reappraisal of its policy, my own feeling is that the primary...’
148. MINUTE FROM ROBERTSON TO SHANN: 10 December 1970; ‘Canberra, 10 December 1970 Secret Australia’s Policy Towards China As you know, we think the Policy Planning Group has produced a very valuable draft paper,1 and we have no basic quarrel with the thrust of its argument and conclusion. We do, however, see some problems with the presentation of the...’
149. MINUTE FROM HOLDICH TO ANDERSON: 10 December 1970; ‘Canberra, 10 December 1970 Secret Australia’s Policy towards China Attached is one copy of a paper prepared by the Policy Planning Group on Australia’s policy towards China. 2. The paper attempts to re-examine our China policy in the light of our national interest. In preparing it we have attempted to...’
150. MINUTE FROM MCMAHON TO SHANN: 17 December 1970; ‘Canberra, 17 December 1970 You will see the notes I have made to the first draft. 1 Please discuss with me when you have read them. The changes to paragraphs 642 and 693 (pages 31 and 32) are of crucial political importance. I do not want the impression to be...’
151. LETTER FROM ROBERTSON TO DUNN: 18 December 1970; ‘Canberra, 18 December 1970 Secret I have, as you’ve no doubt noticed, been less than assiduous in maintaining my end of our spirited correspondence. This has been partly the result of competing demands (mainly on the South Pacific) and partly because I have been a bit doubtful about what to...’
152. MEMORANDUM FROM HANDMER TO WALLER: 28 December 1970; ‘Rangoon, 28 December 1970 Secret Australia’s Policy Towards China (Your file 62511 0/6) I have read the Policy Planning Group’s paper2 on Australia’s policy towards China with considerable interest. 2. Whatever happens in respect of Australia’s China policy, it is bound to be difficult and possibly painful. This is so...’
153. MEMORANDUM FROM PLIMSOLL TO WALLER: 29 December 1970; ‘Washington, 29 December 1970 Secret Australia’s Policy Towards China [ matter omitted ] Conclusion 28. In addition to foregoing comments related to particular paragraphs of the Planning Paper,2 the following general comments are made. 29. The longer the attempt to seek an accommodation is postponed, the less the chances of...’
154. MINUTE FROM EASTMAN TO HOLDICH: 8 January 1971; ‘Canberra, 8 January 1971 Secret PPG Paper1 on Australia’s Policy Towards China With reference to your minute of 7th December,2 I have noted in pencil on the attached copy of the draft3 a number of comments on particular passages. 2. Following are comments on more general points:— (a) The logic...’
155. MEMORANDUM FROM DUNN TO WALLER: 22 January 1971; ‘Taipei, 22 January 1971 Secret China Policy Memoranda from Washington and New Zealand’s interest in the ’successor states’ approach to the China question1 have prompted the following comments on the possible reaction here to this approach. Earlier references to it are in my memoranda 176 of 3 April 19702 and...’
156. LETTER FROM MCMAHON TO GORTON: 4 February 1971; ‘Canberra, [ 4 February 1971] 1 Confidential You will recall that a number of questions were asked in Parliament towards the end of the last session about our trade in steel and other such products of possible strategic significance with Communist China. The point of the Opposition attack was that...’
157. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 9 February 1971; ‘Canberra, 9 February 1971 Secret Australia’s Policy Towards China [ matter omitted ] III Australian Policy to Date 42. Australia extends de jure recognition to the Government of the Republic of China, resident in Taipei, as the government of China. It does not recognise the Government of the People’s Republic...’
158. MINUTE FROM BAILEY TO WALLER: 22 February 1971; ‘Canberra, 22 February 1971 China: Recognition of Peking by France and by Canada Respectively You asked, I think, for elaboration of the view I have expressed several times in and around the Department that, in recognising Peking, Canada found itself forced to concede more than the French had done. 2....’
159. NOTE FROM MUNR0 TO MCMAHON: 23 February 1971; ‘Canberra, 23 February 1971 Note on Cabinet Submission No. 6782 — Australia’s Policy Towards China This submission is a tightly drafted analysis of the international position and policies of Communist China. Sections I to VI are not essential to consideration of the implications for Australian policy if it is accepted...’
160. CABINET DECISION NO. 902: 23 February 1971; ‘Canberra, 23 February 1971 Secret Submission No. 678—Australia’s Policy Towards China1 The Cabinet took up a first consideration of the issues in the Submission and expressed its position as follows:— (a) It accepted:— (i) that for the reasons argued in the Submission, the People’s Republic of China is likely soon...’
161. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 4 March 1971; ‘Canberra, 4 March 1971 Secret Australia’s Policy Towards China In accordance with the decision on Submission No. 2401 I discussed the China problem on 26 February with Ambassador Winthrop C. Brown,2 the Leader of the United States Delegation to the meeting of ANZUS officials and Mr A.L. Jenkins, Director of...’
162. MINUTE FROM DAN TO PETHERBRIDGE AND ROBERTSON: 9 March 1971; ‘Canberra, 9 March 1971 Confidential China Policy: Representation in the United Nations Following are comments on the New Zealand arguments set out in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Mr Robertson’s record of 4th March, 1971.3 Broad Objectives 2. In seeking a new approach, Australia started from the following propositions: (a)...’
163. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 10 March 1971; ‘Taipei, 10 March 1971 170. Secret Priority China Policy Your 202 (Para 1).1 Winthrop Brown leaves on 10 March, one day earlier than planned. Discussions with Japanese will be on 11 and 12 March. Reason for shortening visit appears to be paucity of value in discussions with ROC. 2. On...’
164. MINUTE FROM HEWITTT TO GORTON: 12 March 1971; ‘Canberra, 12 March 1971 Confidential At his request Keeble2 of the United Kingdom Office, who takes charge in Johnston’s3 absence, called this morning. His purpose was to tell me of a conversation that took place in Peking on 3rd March between Wang Jun-Sheng,Director of West European and other Departments of...’
165. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 1 March 1971; ‘Canberra, March 19711 Confidential Communist China: Strategic Export Controls This submission reviews the range of restrictions currently imposed on Australia’s trade with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and envisages that these restrictions should be eased. In particular, it is suggested that Australia should consider removing the ‘China differential’ .2...’
166. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 17 March 1971; ‘Washington, 17 March 1971 1407. Secret China Policy On 17 March, Winthrop Brown called in the New Zealanders and ourselves to outline results of his discussions in Taipei and Tokyo. Feldman was also present. Brown’s summary did not differ in substance from reports already forwarded by our embassies in Taipei...’
167. MEMORANDUM FROM DUNN TO WALLER: 18 March 1971; ‘Taipei, 18 March 1971 Secret China Policy Further to my telegram 1871 of 18 March, the following is a record of my talk with Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs James Shen on 17 March. 2. Shen first wanted to talk about recent governmental changes in Australia.2 (He had early asked me...’
168. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 2 April 1971; ‘Washington, 2 April 1971 1746. Top Secret Eclipse< Chinese Representation I have obtained the following information in very great confidence and it is important that there should be no leakage and no repetition back to any Americans. 2. The National Security Council considered Chinese Representation a few days ago. President...’
169. LETTER FROM ROBERTSON TO LAVETT: 6 April 1971; ‘Canberra, 6 April 1971 Personal Secret The need to provide some comments in reply to points raised in your letter of 26 March2 provides me with the opportunity to say how much we have valued all your reporting on the progress of American thinking on China issues and how much...’
170. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 7 April 1971; ‘Canberra, 7 April 1971 1652. Top Secret For Plimsoll Chinese Representation in the United Nations The Prime Minister has read your telegram 17462 with great interest. He wishes to be sure that, at this critical stage in the Administration’s policy review, the President has the fullest possible picture of the...’
171. SUBMISSION TO SWARTZ: 21 April 1971; ‘Canberra, 21 April 1971 Secret China Policy—Recent Developments This submission supplements and brings up-to-date material in your Cabinet Submission of 15 April2 on China Policy. In addition to recent domestic developments, such as the Prime Minister’s statements on China policy to the National Press Club and in the House,3 and...’
172. CABINET DECISION N0.114: 22 April 1971; ‘Canberra, 22 April 1971 Secret Submission No. 51—Australia’s Policy Towards China1 Subject to a variation in wording now incorporated in sub-paragraphs 19 (iv)2 the Cabinet endorsed the recommendations of the Submission— (a) that in examining possible tactics in the UN, the Department of Foreign Affairs be authorised to pursue with...’
173. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 22 April 1971; ‘Hong Kong, 22 April 1971 560. Confidential China’s Australia Policy The events of this month suggest that Chinese policy makers could be on the point of assuming a more active and opportunistic policy towards Australia. 2. In recent years Chinese propaganda media have had very little to say about Australia...’
174. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 26 April 1971; ‘London, 26 April 1971 7838. Confidential priority From Bury. Following are main points from conversation of about an hour with Douglas-Home to-day. China 2. I raised the question of China and gave some account of our position and our concern about Taiwan. Home commented that the Important Question position was...’
175. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: April 1975; ‘Canberra, April 19711 Confidential Communist China: Strategic Export Controls In decision No. 90 of 20th April, 19712 Cabinet directed that an Interdepartmental Committee consisting of representatives from the Departments of Foreign Affairs (Chairman), Prime Minister and Cabinet, Trade and Industry, Primary Industry, Customs and Excise, Defence and the Treasury, should...’
176. CABINET DECISION N0.158: 5 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 5 May 1971 Confidential Without Submission—Communist China—Strategic Export Controls The Cabinet took up a discussion of the handling and presentation of its earlier Decision—Decision No. 148 of 4 May 1971.1 2. Generally the Cabinet was of the view that action to give effect to the relaxation of strategic export...’
177. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 8 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 8 May 1971 2168. Secret Eclipse Priority China Policy Paragraph 2 of Washington’s telegram 2445 1 has reinforced our growing doubts about US intentions on the UN representation issue. Hitherto, consistent State Department advice has supported the belief that, however laboriously, the US Administration has been working towards decisions...’
178. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 10 May 1971; ‘Washington, 10 May 1971 2508. Secret Eclipse Priority China Policy Your telegram 2168.1 United States policy towards Chinese recognition and seating in the United Nations is being considered by President Nixon personally and no one knows what decision he will take. Kissinger and his staff and also officers in the...’
179. CABINET DECISION NO. 165: 11 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 11 May 1971 Confidential Without Submission—Prime Minister’s speech on Thursday, 13 May—Reference to P.R.C. The Prime Minister informed the Cabinet of developments in the matter of the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations—as reported in cables received by the Department of Foreign Affairs in...’
180. SUBMISSION TO MCMAHON AND BURY: 12 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 12 May 1971 Secret China Policy I attach the following papers: A submission on China policy, to which is attached A ‘balance sheet’ of advantages and disadvantages of Australia’s moving towards recognition of the PRC. 1 A draft statement for possible inclusion in a public speech by the Prime...’
181. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 13 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 13 May 1971 2256. Secret Priority For Ambassador China Policy Please take earliest opportunity to transmit the following self-explanatory message from the Prime Minister to President Nixon: Begins:— Dear Mr President, In continuation of the valuable consultations we have had with your Administration about the problems we both face...’
182. MINUTE FROM DAN TO CUMES: 14 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 14 May 1971 Secret Chinese Representation in the United Nations In a minute of 19th April, 1971 I attached the texts of our two draft resolutions which, taken together, constitute a dual representation formulation.2 Only the operative parts of those resolutions had been considered previously, and accepted as a...’
183. LETTER FROM MCMAHON TO SATO: 19 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 19 May 1971 I am taking the opportunity of the visit to Japan of Ambassador Shizuo Saito to let you know the Australian Government’s thinking about the People’s Republic of China and especially its likely admission to the United Nations. We do value the exchanges we have had with...’
184. SUBMISSION TO BURY: 20 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 20 May 1971 Secret Initiation of Dialogue with People’s Republic of China Attached for your consideration is a draft telegram to the Australian Ambassador to France instructing him to approach the PRC Embassy in Paris with a view to initiating a dialogue. 1 In drafting this message we have...’
185. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 22 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 22 May 1971 2354. Secret Priority China Personal for Renouf from Minister The Government has decided and the Prime Minister has announced that we should attempt to open a dialogue with the Government of the People’s Republic of China. We wish you to make the initial move by approaching...’
186. MINUTE FROM ANDERSON TO MCMAHON: 24 May 1971; ‘Canberra, 24 May 1971 Secret China Policy You asked for our comment on the inscribed part of attached cable 365 from the Australian Embassy, Taipei.1 2. In the course of his reported conversation with our Ambassador in the ROC, Yang (the ROC Vice Foreign Minister) said that, if it came...’
187. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 27 May 1971; ‘Paris, 27 May 1971 2486. Secret Priority Dialogue No 31 I saw the P.R.C. Ambassador2 27th May. The only others present were the Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy, who, apart from listening intently, did no more than applaud his Ambassador, and an interpreter who the Ambassador had note everything I...’
188. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 28 May 1971; ‘Paris, 28 May 1971 2491. Secret Priority Dialogue No. 4 On reading this morning of Austria’s recognition of the P.R. C., 1 it strikes me that the formula there used is precisely the same as that specified to me by the P.R.C. Ambassador yesterday that the P.R.C. Government should be...’
189. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 1 June 1971; ‘Hong Kong, 1 June 1971 742. Secret China/ Austria/ Australia Our 7281 (underlined) (not to all). The formula used in the PRC/Austria communiqué whereby Austria recognized the PRC as ‘the sole legal government of China’ without any reference to Taiwan is the same as that used with Kuwait (our telegram...’
190. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 1 June 1971; ‘Paris, 1 June 1971 2538. Secret Priority Dialogue No.5 Your telegram 2490 paragraph 4 (dialogue No. 2.)1 The P.R.C. Ambassador spoke of Taiwan or Formosa and used no other terms. 2. It is hard to answer clearly your question B. From the substance of what was said to me and...’
191. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 2 June 1971; ‘Washington, 2 June 1971 2940. Secret Priority Chinese Representation Marshall Green (Assistant Secretary of State) this morning saw the New Zealand Ambassador (Corner)1 and me. Winthrop Brown (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State) and Feldman (UN Division of the State Department) were also present. 2. Green and Brown said that President...’
192. LETTER FROM SATO TO MCMAHON: 5 June 1971; ‘Tokyo, 5 June 1971 Confidential I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 19th May, 1971,1 which you have entrusted to Ambassador Shizuo Saito on his temporary return to Japan on the occasion of the visit to Japan of the Hon. J.D. Anthony, Deputy Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia....’
193. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 27 May 1971; ‘Paris, 27 May 1971 2486. Secret Priority Chinese Representation Your cable 2940.1 We note that the US draft resolution is similar to the part of our draft2 that dealt with the General Assembly seat. However, the US draft is less likely to win support, both because of the deletion of...’
194. LETTER FROM DUNN TO ROBERTSON: 7 June 1971; ‘Taipei, 7 June 1971 Secret Personal A note in reply to yours of 14th May. 1 I have quite understood how busy you must have been. It has certainly been very useful to get the P.I.R.’s, for which much thanks to Dick2 and yourself. I must confess to having been...’
195. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 8 June 1971; ‘Washington, 8 June 1971 3037. Secret Austeo Chinese Representation Our 2940.1 On 7 June, Holdridge (White House Staff) told Lavett that proposed course outlined to Ambassador by Marshall Green on 2 June represented a distinctively State Department line which had not repeat not been approved, even tentatively, by President Nixon....’
196. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 16 June 1971; ‘Paris, 16 June 1971 2792.Secret Dialogue No. 10 Your Telegram 2763—Dialogue 4.1 I personally have little doubt that if the dialogue is to continue, we will have to make the next move. I say this because I believe the Chinese take pleasure in making Westerners come to them. However, the...’
197. MINUTE FROM ANDERSON TO MCMAHON AND BURY: 17 June 1971; ‘Canberra, 17 June 1971 Confidential China Policy-Albanian Resolution You asked for comment on cables 211 and 212 from Rangoon, reporting an intimation by the PRC that the only concession it would be prepared to make on Chinese representation at the UN would be to drop the second half of the...’
198. SUBMISSION TO BURY: 21 June 1971; ‘Canberra, 21 June 1971 Secret Australian Policy: Chinese Representation in the United Nations This submission summarises recent developments on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations, explores possible alternative courses open to Australia and recommends the lines of the response which we might now make to the United...’
199. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 25 June 1971; ‘Washington, 25 June 1971 3393. Secret China Today I asked Alexis Johnson (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) whether there had been any development in the United States Government’s thinking about the China question. He replied that there had been sounds1 of a number of Governments and these had...’
200. TELETYPE MESSAGE FROM WALLER TO BURY: 25 June 1971; ‘Canberra, 25 June 1971 Confidential priority China Dialogue On 18 June you agreed that Mr Renouf should be instructed, as he had recommended, to contact the PRC Ambassador in Paris on 28 June to seek a second meeting.1 At that meeting he would ask the Ambassador whether he had had...’
201. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 1 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 1 July 1971 Secret Austeo Priority For Renouf. China–Dialogue 7 Following points summarize memorandum from Department of Trade on trade matters that might be discussed with PRC Ambassador on Friday. 2. We believe that trade with China could be considerably expanded. This applies to both sales and purchases. 3....’
202. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 2 July 1971; ‘Paris, 2 July 1971 3132. Secret Priority Dialogue No. 11 I saw the P.R.C. Ambassador as arranged on 2nd July. I reminded him that at our first meeting he had promised to report to his Government and asked him whether he now wished to say anything. 2. The Ambassador replied...’
203. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 5 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 5 July 1971 3219. Secret Chinese Representation in the United Nations We have received your telegrams 3393,13395 and 3400.2 2. Our position remains as spelt out by the Prime Minister to Winthrop Brown:3 (a) Our aim is to preserve the right of Taiwan to a seat in the United...’
204. MEMORANDUM BY DUNN FOR HEADS OF MISSIONS CONFERENCE: July 1971; ‘Taipei, undated Secret Agenda Item 5. Taiwan 1. Taiwan has long been the major factor preventing Australia from making progress towards normal relationships with the PRC. Unless there are compromises, one basic political question is likely to remain–whether to choose relations with the PRC or the ROC. The short term...’
205. LETTER FROM ROBERTSON TO DUNN: 12 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 12 July 1971 Secret Personal There have been several reasons for the unusually long delay in replying to your letter of 7 June. 1 In the first place it arrived just after I had gone on two weeks’ sick leave (for a minor nasal operation); secondly, it raised, particularly...’
206. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 12 July 1971; ‘Paris, 12 July 1971 3285. Secret Priority Dialogue No. 12 You will be considering what should be recommended to Ministers to say when Mr Whitlam returns from China. 2. In this connection, I would like to ‘flag’ two points. Firstly, there is the obvious point that it might be argued...’
207. LETTER FROM APPLING TO MCMAHON: 14 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 14 July 1971 Secret I have been instructed to deliver to you urgently the following message from President Nixon: ‘Dear Mr. Prime Minister: Thank you for your letter of May 13, 1971,2 concerning the China policies of our two governments, particularly as they relate to Chinese representation in the...’
208. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 15 July 1971; ‘Belgrade, 15 July 1971 879. Confidential Communist China On 14th July, Communist Chinese Ambassador (Tseng Tao) approached me at French National Day reception to ask about my departure and to wish me well. Soviet Counsellor who was present said that we had been talking about seating of China in United...’
209. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 15 July 1971; ‘Washington, 15 July 1971 3777. Emergency For Prime Minister Minister and Secretary of Foreign Affairs From Plimsoll Secretary of State, has just telephoned me from San Clemente to say that Kissinger was in Peking from July 9th to 11th and had talks with Chow En Lai. President Nixon will visit...’
210. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 16 July 1971; ‘Manila, 16 July 1971 960. Confidential Priority For Prime Minister from Bury.1 Chinese Representation Japanese Position The Japanese Delegation Leader (former Foreign Minister Aichi) called on me on 15th July to ask about Australian views on this question. He stressed that time was running out if any new approach were...’
211. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 16 July 1971; ‘Washington, 16 July 1971 3817. Confidential Eclipse President’s Proposed Visit to China Although Kissinger’s visit to China must have been very carefully prepared in advance, knowledge of it was very severely restricted. None of our usual State Department contacts, including senior officers working in the China field, had any inkling...’
212. LETTER FROM PLIMSOLL TO WALLER: 16 July 1971; ‘Washington, 16 July 1971 Personal I am seeing the Secretary of State on Monday. I had hoped to see him by myself to probe him on President Nixon’s speech but the New Zealand Ambassador has been asked to be present too. I have spoken quite sharply to Marshall Green this...’
213. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 18 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 18 July 1971 3456. Secret Priority For Plimsoll. Please pass following message urgently to President Nixon from Prime Minister:— Begins: Dear Mr President, Following your announcement of your intended visit1 to the People’s Republic of China I issued a public statement endorsing this initiative without reservation and pointing out...’
214. CABLEGRAM TO TOKYO: 18 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 18 July 1971 1730. Secret Priority For Freeth. Please pass the following message urgently to Prime Minister Sato from MrMcMahon. Begins. ‘I have been giving close and urgent consideration to President Nixon’s statement about relations with the P.R.C.1 The concept of normalising relations with the P.R.C. is of course...’
215. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 19 July 1971; ‘Washington, 19 July 1971 3849. Top Secret Immediate For Prime Minister from Plimsoll After the Secretary of State had talked to New Zealand Ambassador and me as I have reported in Telegram No. 38481 I remained behind to talk with him privately. He had read your letter to President Nixon.2...’
216. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 19 July 1971; ‘Tokyo, 19 July 1971 1370. Secret Immediate Prime Minister’s Message Your 1730.1 2. We have received from Foreign Ministry text of Mr. Sato’s reply to Mr. McMahon’s message. Foreign Ministry wish original to be delivered to Mr. McMahon by Ambassador Saito, but we understand that they may be having some...’
217. CABINET DECISION NO. 262: 20 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 20 July 1971 Secret Without Submission—President Nixon—Visit to China The Prime Minister informed the Cabinet of the background so far as was then known to the announcement by the United States President on 16 July that he proposed to visit Peking before May of next year. 2. It was...’
218. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 20 July 1971; ‘Paris, 20 July 1971 3422. Secret Austeo Priority Dialogue No. 17 Your telegram 3424.1 I believe the P.R.C. remains interested in establishing diplomatic relations with Australia. I also believe that our present policy will not lead to anything and requires urgent re–examination in the light of what the United States...’
219. POLICY PLANNING PAPER: 21 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 21 July 1971 QP 11/71. Secret Eclipse Developments in Sino–American Relations: Implications for Australia The announcement by President Nixon on 15 July, 1971, of the Kissinger–Chou En-lai meeting in Peking and of his own acceptance of an invitation to visit Peking before May, 1972, served as dramatic confirmation of...’
220. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO MCMAHON: 21 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 21 July 1971 Secret Foreign Policy Initiatives on China These can be of two kinds: (a) Secret (b) those which can be publicly announced. Your letters to Sato and Nixon1 are in the secret category but are nonetheless important for that. I believe that contact with Japan is particularly...’
221. CABLEGRAM TO BELGRADE: 22 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 22 July 1971 884. Secret Immediate China Dialogue No. 011 Thank you for your telegram 9091 and for the skill with which it has proved possible for you to re–open a dialogue which the rigidity of Huang Chen in Paris had seemed virtually to have suspended. 2. We appreciate...’
222. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 22 July 1971; ‘New York, 22 July 1971 UN547. Secret Eclipse Chinese Representation Your 729.1 In considering our tactics at the General Assembly, we think it important to bear in mind that for the majority of countries which have at no time played any real part in the private consultations between the co-sponsors...’
223. CABLEGRAM TO TOKYO: 29 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 29 July 1971 1832. Secret Priority For Ambassador China Policy Please deliver following message from Prime Minister to Mr Sato and also give Mr Sato text of Prime Minister’s July speech.1 Begins:– Dear Prime Minister Sato, Thank you for your message of 20 July,2 which Ambassador Saito conveyed to...’
224. CABLEGRAM TO TAIPEI: 30 July 1971; ‘Canberra, 30 July 1971 Secret Your Cables 573 and 568.1 China Particularly until Ministers have considered how to handle matters at UN, you should give no encouragement to any view McConaughy may hold that Australia might be prepared to play a vanguard role at the UN in advocacy of the...’
225. LETTER FROM APPLING TO WALLER: 2 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 2 August 1971 Secret I have been instructed to deliver a message from Secretary Rogers to the Foreign Minister. Since Mr. Bowen will just be entering on his new duties today,1 it seemed best to bring the message to your attention, requesting that you inform him of it. A...’
226. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 2 August 1971; ‘Washington, 2 August 1971 4153. Confidential Priority China Representation Our 41541 (A).2 After Secretary Rogers had made his statement, State Department this afternoon briefed a number of ambassadors of countries who either sponsored IQ resolution last year or might be asked to sponsor Non–Expulsion resolution this year. (Final decision on...’
227. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 2 August 1971; ‘New York, 2 August 1971 UN568. Secret Immediate China–Representation Reference our 567.1 Following are texts. Draft DR resolution. Begins. DRAFT DR RESOLUTION. The General Assembly, Having considered the item entitled ‘the representation of China in the United Nations,’ Noting that since the founding of the United Nations, fundamental changes have...’
228. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 2 August 1971; ‘New York, 2 August 1971 UN567. Secret Immediate Chinese Representation Your 761.1 I propose to go to Washington tomorrow, 3rd August, as planned. 2. Meanwhile United States Mission here is moving swiftly following release of Rogers’s statement at mid-day today. Bush2 has returned here this afternoon from meeting with Rogers...’
229. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO MCMAHON: August 1971; ‘Canberra, undated Secret People’s Republic of China—Recognition You asked that a balance sheet be struck of the advantages and disadvantages of Australian recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 2. In the light of the negative response which Fernandez has now received from the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, it...’
230. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 3 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 3 August 1971 Secret Chinese Representation in the United Nations In his message to you of 2nd August, 1971,1 the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, raised, inter alia, the possibility of ‘a meeting of like-minded Nations at our UN Mission in New York to seek agreement upon...’
231. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 3 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 3 August 1971 767. Secret Immediate Chinese Representation Your 5671 and our 765.2 In time available, we can give you no ministerial guidance and can offer only brief official comments on American drafts. 2. We agree with your comment that draft United States DR resolution is cluttered with clauses...’
232. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 3 August 1971; ‘Washington, 3 August 1971 4180. Secret Priority Chinese Representation Our 4181.1 We put to Americans view that draft United States DR resolution seemed over–cluttered. They explained that introductory clauses had been intended as ‘catch–all’ to attract as wide sympathy as possible. It might be possible to exclude one or more...’
233. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 6 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 6 August 1971 781. Secret Chinese Representation We should be glad of any elucidation you can give us on American thinking on the following: (i) What is basis for their belief that they can defeat Albanian resolution and carry their DR? Have they done any recent arithmetic on voting...’
234. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 7 August 1971; ‘New York, 7 August 1971 UN584. Secret China—Representation Your telegram 781.1 We went through your questions with United States Mission (Newlin)2 on 6 August. He made notes of all questions and is referring them to Washington for further examination. The following reflects his preliminary comments. 2. Your paragraph 1. (i)...’
235. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 11 August 1971; ‘New York, 11 August 1971 UN 592. Confidential China—Representation United States Ambassador called informal meeting this morning in his office. Present were Australia, Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand. Purpose of meeting was to have informal no–commitment exchange of ideas and information. It emerged at the end of meeting that...’
236. LETTER FROM PLIMSOLL TO WALLER: 11 August 1971; ‘Washington, 11 August 1971 Secret Marshall Green (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) spoke to me today about a telegram which had been received from the American Embassy in Canberra. He said that strictly speaking he should not be talking to me on it as the American Embassy...’
237. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 13 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 13 August 1971 Secret Chinese Representation in the United Nations In our submission of 3rd August, 1971,2 we made recommendations on possible tactics on Chinese representation that we might explore in the immediate future with the United States, Japan, and New Zealand. At that time, we awaited reports from...’
238. LETTER FROM DUNN TO ANDERSON: 16 August 1971; ‘Taipei, 16 August 1971 Secret Eclipse China Policy I assume that the dialogue with the PRC has continued in some form, and that we are addressing, or will soon address, ourselves to the problem of ultimate recognition and possible formulas to be used in that connection. The following comments are...’
239. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK, WASHINGTON, TOKYO, TAIPEI AND WELLINGTON: 16 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 16 August 1971 809, 3979, 1977, 662, 1248. Secret Priority Chinese Representation Minister has approved our general approach in the immediate future to the question of Chinese representation as given below. 2. This approval is within the context of our current policy objectives as follows: (a) We shall seek...’
240. MEMORANDUM FROM PLIMSOLL TO WALLER: 17 August 1971; ‘Washington, 17 August 1971 Secret Eclipse Policy Planning Paper: Implications for Australia of Kissinger/Chou En–lai Talks I refer to your memorandum No. 836 of 23 July forwarding a copy of Policy Planning Paper QPll/71 of 21 July, 1971,1 received here on 3 August. [ matter omitted ] 12. I am...’
241. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 18 August 1971; ‘New York, 18 August 1971 UN608. Secret Chinese Representation As forecast in my 605,1 I spoke yesterday, 17th August, with Scott (New Zealand)2 and canvassed the suggestions on draft resolutions and tactics in your 809.3 Scott gave me the essence of New Zealand views as conveyed to him by telegram...’
242. SUMMARY RECORD OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MCMAHON AND WALLER: 19 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 19 August 1971 Secret (The Prime Minister rang the secretary in connection with UN New York’s 608).1 The Prime Minister asked why we are not co–sponsoring the American resolutions. The Secretary said we have not yet been asked to do so. There were still no firm texts. We had...’
243. MINUTE FROM BRADY TO ANDERSON: 20 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 20 August 1971 Secret AUSTUNAT 608 The penultimate Cabinet decision* 1 on China said that we were not to take a vanguard role or be activist (April 1971 ).2 Nevertheless, the Department had got involved in a big way in a discussion of tactics by floating its own resolutions....’
244. MEMORANDUM FROM DUNN TO WALLER: 24 August 1971; ‘Taipei, 24 August 1971 Secret Chinese Representation in the United Nations From intra–departmental papers sent to me for background, it appears that some thought has been given to the possibility of voting for the Albanian resolution as a whole, after seeking by other means to preserve UN membership for the...’
245. LETTER FROM WALLER TO PLIMSOLL: 24 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 24 August 1971 Secret Personal I have been slow in answering your letter of 11th August 1971 about A.T. Griffith.1 I had to wait for a chance to talk personally to Bunting and as we have both been inordinately busy, the opportunity did not arise until last night. Bunting...’
246. LETTER FROM WALLER TO PLIMSOLL: 24 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 24 August 1971 Confidential Personal I am rather worried about the attached telegram from Visbord1 and its strongly anti–American tone. It has had a reasonably wide distribution here and this is important because recent American actions—the Kissinger visit, civil aviation2 and the financial crisis3—have created a strong reaction among...’
247. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 25 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 25 August 1971 845. Secret Chinese Representation Your UN 608.1 Perhaps we should re–emphasise essential elements in our thinking which are as follows: (1) Our approach is flexible and under constant review. We aim to concert our policy with our friends. (2) We accept that no tactics can succeed...’
248. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 25 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 25 August 1971 Secret Taiwan: Internal Situation This submission selects salient features of reports (copies attached)1 from our posts in Taipei, Tokyo (from Japanese Foreign Ministry) and Washington (from2 State Department) on the attitudes of Taiwanese and former Mainlanders to the three main long–term options facing the ROC: (i)...’
249. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 30 August 1971; ‘Canberra, 30 August 1971 865. Secret Priority Chinese Representation Your 623.1 Following is answer to your paragraph 4:— (a) We want to be able to support the Americans, and co–sponsor their two resolutions, if that is at all possible. (b) Over the past months, we have provided the Americans with...’
250. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 2 September 1971; ‘Canberra, 2 September 1971 881. Secret Priority Chinese Representation Our 865,1 paragraph 4 refers. If you think it might be useful, please discuss with the Americans following possible amendments to the AR. We do not want them however to be known as ‘Australian’ amendments. (a) In the second preambular paragraph...’
251. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 2 September 1971; ‘New York, 2 September 1971 UN647. Secret Chinese Representation Your 881.1 On 2 September we conveyed to the United States Mission (Thayer)2 your possible amendments to the AR, commenting that they had no status other than to suggest alternative ways in which our policy objectives could be achieved. Thayer passed...’
252. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 3 September 1971; ‘Washington, 3 September 1971 4856. Secret Chinese Representation Secretary of State (Rogers) spoke yesterday to the New Zealand Ambassador (Comer) and me about the Chinese representation item. He said he thought it should be possible to keep Taiwan in the United Nations. I remarked that there was still a feeling...’
253. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 7 September 1971; ‘Hong Kong, 7 September 1971 1182. Secret For Secretary. From Burgess. Kibel1 Your 1368.2 I made contact with Kibel today, 7th September. He has been in Japan and will be returning to Australia this evening. He plans to come back here on his way to the Canton Fair next month....’
254. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO BOWEN: 9 September 1971; ‘Canberra, 9 September 1971 Secret Ministerial Visit to China 1. I think a Ministerial visit has more arguments running in favour of it than against it. 2. It would be desirable if you could first see Kibel and find out: (a) Who is the China Resources Co. he spoke to?...’
255. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 9 September 1971; ‘Canberra, 9 September 1971 4460. Secret Chinese Representation Ministers have now decided that we should inform the Americans that we agree in principle to join them in co–sponsoring their two resolutions on Chinese representation, that is, their IQ variation and their dual representation resolution with a reference to the Security...’
256. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 14 September 1971; ‘Canberra, 14 September 1971 Secret Possible Visit by Minister for the Army Against 1. If the Minister for the Army were in China while Australian troops were still in Vietnam, this could have a bad effect on public opinion and Army morale.1 2. It is impossible for a Minister of...’
257. LETTER FROM ANDERSON TO DUNN: 16 September 1971; ‘Canberra, 16 September 1971 Secret Eclipse Thank you for your letter of 16 August concerning China policy.1 Your views on possible formulae and lines of argument that we could seek to use concerning recognition of the PRC are interesting and could be valuable to our thinking should[/when]2 we come to...’
258. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 18 September 1971; ‘Washington, 18 September 1971 5184. Secret Priority Chinese Representation Your telegram 4666.1 I informed Marshall Green (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) today. He hopes Australia will still co–sponsor as whole exercise could collapse if delay continues before resolutions are submitted. 2. I hope that your telegram 4666...’
259. LETTER FROM WALLER TO PLIMSOLL: 21 September 1971; ‘Canberra, 21 September 1971 Secret Your telegram No. 5184 of 18th September1 turned the scale on co–sponsorship of the US resolutions on Chinese representation. The decision to co–sponsor was in fact a modification of the Cabinet decision. As originally drafted, this authorised co–sponsorship if Australia was a member of a...’
260. MINUTE FROM BAILEY TO WALLER: 28 September 1971; ‘Canberra, 28 September 1971 Confidential Representation of China in the UN The issue of Chinese representation in the UN will obviously not be decided on legal grounds by the General Assembly. Nevertheless it occurs to me that, where legal difficulties have been urged as grounds for not supporting our draft...’
261. MINUTE FROM ANDERSON TO WALLER: 30 September 1971; ‘Canberra, 30 September 1971 Secret The Kibel Mission1 Although the Chinese have not set precise political conditions for acceptance of the projected Australian trade mission, they have made it clear in their talks with Kibel and Bareham that they would read definite political implications into an Australian decision to send...’
262. CABLEGRAM TO POSTS: 30 September 1971; ‘Canberra, 30 September 1971 Secret Chinese Representation Our assessment of voting on the two resolutions we are co–sponsoring indicates that the final result will be close. For your own information only, our count on the IQ resolution as at 30th September 1971 was 55 (in favour)–57 (against)–17 (abstentions) with Maldives...’
263. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 1 October 1971; ‘Paris, 1 October 1971 4532. Secret Priority China As instructed, I attended the Chinese National Day reception 30th September. To my surprise, the Ambassador literally received me with open arms in full view of a large group of pressmen. He then instructed an assistant to take me into a small...’
264. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 3 October 1971; ‘New York, 3 October 1971 758. Confidential Chinese Representation Your 10751 and 1077.2 We do not think at this particular stage it is feasible to make a voting assessment on the IQ resolution that is accurate in any meaningful way. In this we agree with the United States Mission, who...’
265. LETTER FROM DUNN TO ANDERSON: 4 October 1971; ‘Taipei, 4 October 1971 Secret Eclipse [ matter omitted ] Apart from these questions,1 I might perhaps make some pretty speculative comments. There is, as you know from our reporting, some interesting thinking on broadening the base of government going on here at present. One publication has even advocated a...’
266. CABLEGRAM TO HONG KONG: 4 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 4 October 1971 1537. Secret Immediate For Bareham 1. Set out below is list of names and details for submission to China Resources Company. Kibel will be able to fill in details of himself and other member of his family to be proposed. 2. Particulars are as follows, showing...’
267. CABLEGRAM TO HONG KONG: 4 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 4 October 1971 1536. Secret Immediate For Bareham. 1. In light of Chinese request in your 12801 and 12862 for names of participants in proposed mission before ‘finality’ can be reached, we have arranged for Kibel to return to Hong Kong from Hawaii so that he, with you, can...’
268. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 6 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 6 October 1971 4980. Secret Priority For Plimsoll. Please convey following message from Prime Minister to President Nixon: ‘Thank you for letting me have advance notice of Henry Kissinger’s second journey to Peking in preparation for your own visit to China. In the circumstances I thought you would like...’
269. NOTE FOR FILE BY BAILEY: 8 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 8 October 1971 Secret In order to make direct contact with Mr. Kibel, I spoke to him at his home in Melbourne at about 6 p.m. and referred to the call Sir John Bunting had had from Mr. Hamilton.2 2. Mr. Kibel said he was extremely tired, but was...’
270. LETTER FROM RENOUF TO WALLER: 8 October 1971; ‘Paris, 8 October 1971 Secret Personal Since returning, I have been giving some more thought to the question of the ‘dialogue’, particularly in view of the invitation to the 1 October party1 and in view of the friendly way I was then received. I conclude as follows. If Ministers wish...’
271. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN WALLER AND KIBEL: 13 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 13 October 1971 Secret Trade Mission to China At the request of the Prime Minister, the Secretary this morning saw Mr. Jim Kibel in the office of Mr. Frank Hamilton at Eric White Associates rather than the Department. Mr. Kibel had just returned from Hong Kong. The Secretary explained...’
272. CABLEGRAM TO POSTS: 14 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 14 October 1971 Secret Priority Chinese Representation Under the present circumstances we think we should plan for all eventualities. We could be faced with a straight vote on the AR. This situation would arise if the NE is not accorded priority or if the NE fails. As for the...’
273. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 14 October 1971; ‘Hong Kong, 14 October 1971 1364. Secret Immediate From Bareham. China—Visit of Trade Mission 1. Following my telephone conversation with you, October 12, I rang C.R.C. at 1630 LT. In absence of Wang1 and Mao I spoke with T.M. Chow. He said he was unable to see me that day....’
274. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 14 October 1971; ‘New York, 14 October 1971 UN846. Secret Chinese Representation Your 1183.1 United States Mission (Newlin) informed us on 14 October that it had consciously refrained from examining in depth the possibility of fall–back positions because of the fears expressed in your paragraph 7. It had been felt necessary to maintain...’
275. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 15 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 15 October 1971 Secret Chinese Representation in the United Nations On present indications, the prospects of success of our two resolutions are not encouraging. Although we are certainly not prepared to acknowledge defeat at this point, the indications are that we could be faced with a straight vote on...’
276. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 15 October 1971; ‘New York, 15 October 1971 848.Secret China Representation Your 11831 and our 8462. We spoke to Newlin again this morning about fall–back positions emphasising that we were determined not to relax in any way our efforts to have our resolution succeed but that we should be ready to meet any...’
277. CABLEGRAM TO SINGAPORE: 15 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 15 October 1971 4211. Secret Austeo Priority For Parkinson.1 Chinese Representation Please convey as soon as possible the following message from the Prime Minister to Mr Lee Kuan Yew.2 If in the light of your discussion this seems desirable, you could ask Lee whether he would like to discuss...’
278. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 19 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 19 October 1971 1207. Secret Priority Chinese Representation Your 870.1 Your representations of fall–back positions are appreciated. 2. Your paragraph 1, third sentence.2 Our position on this matter is that tactical fall–back plans are essential. We consider it extremely important for the four countries to reach early agreement on...’
279. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 21 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 21 October 1971 Secret Austeo China Policy: The Next Step Purpose of Submission As has been made clear in public statements, Government policy has been based in recent months on settling the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations before we look further at our bilateral relations with...’
280. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 26 October 1971; ‘New York, 26 October 1971 UN 914. IMMEDIATE Chinese Representation Upon conclusion of debate and after explanations of vote before the vote, a motion to adjourn voting until26 October was defeated by 53 (Australia)—56—19. 2. United States motion to give priority in voting for the NE over the AR was...’
281. MINUTE FROM SHANN TO BOWEN: 27 October 1971; ‘Canberra, 27 October 1971 Confidential China I have been agonising today about the sorts of things that we are pretty soon going to have to face in relation to China and wonder whether it would not be a good idea to set up a task force of experienced people here...’
282. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 27 October 1971; ‘Taipei, 27 October 1971 773. Secret Austeo Priority China Policy After having strongly backed the US and inter alia shown our support for the ROC in the UN, we may now feel free to seek more flexibility in developing China policies. It may also seem desirable to appear to adjust...’
283. MEMORANDUM FROM DUNN TO WALLER: 2 November 1971; ‘Taipei, 2 November 1971 Confidential Taiwan: Reaction to Expulsion from UN A most striking feature of the ROC’s reaction to its expulsion from the UN—an historic event in the story of this country—was that there was so little which could be reported in concrete terms immediately after the event. This...’
284. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 8 November 1971; ‘Hong Kong, 8 November 1971 1487. Secret Priority China/ Australia—Trade Mission The following are some reflections on the recent contacts here with the Chinese following their proposals through Kibel that a minister and/or trade mission visit China, and the recent Chinese decision to abort the visit of a trade mission...’
285. MINUTE FROM SHANN TO BOWEN: 11 November 1971; ‘Canberra, 11 November 1971 Secret China Attached, as you requested, is a note setting out the advantages and disadvantages of establishing relations with the PRC. Attachment ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH THE PRC Advantages (i) The People’s Republic represents China in the United Nations and will hold a...’
286. LETTER FROM DUNN TO ANDERSON: 11 November 1971; ‘Taipei, 11 November 1971 Secret Austeo I am not sure whether you will send me any background on the PM’s talks in Washington1 to chew over before I come down on leave and consultations. That would be useful, but I appreciate that you might think it preferable to talk in...’
287. CABLEGRAM TO POSTS: 12 November 1971; ‘Canberra, 12 November 1971 AP 150. Confidential Addressed all posts except Consulate–Generals and Consulates. From Acting Secretary. ROC/PRC Representation in International Bodies Our AP.144.1 Ministers have now agreed that Australian attitude to ROC/PRC representation on international bodies should be as follows:— (a) So far as subsidiary organs of UN are...’
288. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 13 November 1971; ‘London, 13 November 1971 20753. Secret For Foreign Affairs and Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Prime Minister’s Discussion with Sir Alec Douglas Home at Foreign Office on 12th November, 1971 The Prime Minister had an half–hour private discussion with Sir Alec Douglas Home. He was then joined by...’
289. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 29 November 1971; ‘Canberra, 29 November 1971 Secret Taiwan The Ambassador in Taipei, Mr Dunn, has reported a conversation he had with Vice-Foreign Minister, Yang, on 25 November (telegrams nos. 850 and 851 attached),1 in which Yang told him of views he had put to the American Ambassador the previous day. Yang had...’
290. MINUTE FROM ANDERSON TO BOWEN: 10 December 1971; ‘Canberra, 10 December 1971 Confidential China Policy Paragraph 5 of the attached savingram from London1 points to a possible future dilemma for Australia should the Government decide to reopen the dialogue with Peking for the purpose of establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. 2. If and when...’
291. MINUTE FROM GRIFFITH TO MCMAHON: 20 December 1971; ‘Canberra, 20 December 1971 Confidential As requested, I spoke to Sir Keith Waller about the attached note of 17 December relating to Mr Kibel.1 Sir Keith came to the same conclusion as you, i.e. that it would be best to respond to Mr Kibel at this stage by simply thanking...’
292. MEMORANDUM FROM SHANN TO ASIAN POSTS: 4 January 1972; ‘Canberra, 4 January 1972 Secret Austeo China Policy Since the UN General Assembly’s decision on Chinese representation, a succession of events has caused governments in Southeast Asia to give closer consideration to China policy. Five more countries (though none in Asia) have established relations with Peking, and two others have...’
293. MINUTE FROM BAILEY TO FLOOD: 6 January 1972; ‘Canberra, 6 January 1972 Confidential China—I.M.F. and I.B.R.D.: Draft Submission to Minister2 I greatly appreciate the opportunity to comment on your draft submission to the Minister on the position to be taken by the Australian Executive Director in the I.M.F. as to the representation of China in the Fund. 2....’
294. MINUTE FROM COOK TO BOWEN: 7 January 1972; ‘Canberra, 7 January 1972 Secret China Policy Attached, for your discussions with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary A1 on Monday 10 January, is a copy of a draft Cabinet submission on China Policy. 2. The draft sets out the various alternatives open to the Government, and the major implications of...’
295. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO ANDERSON: 11 January 1972; ‘Canberra, 11 January 1972 Confidential China The Minister had read and liked the draft Cabinet Submission.1 On a point of detail he said that GRC should be ROC throughout the document. He said that he had some difficulty in relating our present policy to reality and he had concluded that...’
296. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO BOWEN: 14 January 1972; ‘Canberra, 14 January 1972 Secret Australian Relations With China— Representations By The Kibels Two members of the Kibel family, through whom the Chinese authorities in September last made the suggestion that visits by an Australian Minister and a trade mission would be welcomed, have been in Hong Kong again this...’
297. MEMORANDUM BY NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS STAFF: 8 February 1972; ‘Canberra, 8 February 1972 Secret Austeo Subject: The Likely Outcome of President Nixon’s Visit to Peking [ matter omitted ] AIM To discuss what topics are likely to be discussed during President Nixon’s visit to Peking from February 21–28 (on which we have no reliable official intelligence) and to assess...’
298. MINUTE FROM COOK TO WALLER: 16 February 1972; ‘Canberra, 16 February 1972 Secret China Policy I pray leave to wonder whether it is in the Minister’s or the Department’s interests to retain the penultimate sentence in para 10 of the Minister’s Cabinet submission.1 From the Minister’s point of view, it could lead to questioning in Cabinet as to...’
299. MINUTE FROM ANDERSON TO WALLER: 16 February 1972; ‘Canberra, 16 February 1972 Secret China Policy I share Mr Cook’s misgivings about the wording of the penultimate sentence of the Minister’s paragraph 10.1 I am less sure about his proposal that it be simply excised. 2. The bald statement that ‘my Department has not made a firm recommendation to...’
300. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 17 February 1972; ‘Canberra, 17 February 1972 Secret China Policy It is necessary for the Government to give further consideration to its China policy in the light of recent developments. These include the entry of the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations and its agencies, the increase in the number of...’
301. NOTE FROM GRIFFITH TO MCMAHON: 21 February 1972; ‘Canberra, 21 February 1972 Secret Notes on Cabinet Submission No.5541 —China Policy The Minister recommends that we continue our present China policy unmodified, and that we proceed from this decision to an early statement (para 11 (iii)). 2. Whatever Cabinet decides, the timing of an early announcement is a matter...’
302. CABINET DECISION NO. 754: 21 February 1972; ‘Canberra, 21 February 1972 Secret Submission No.554—China Policy1 In view of the currently developing situation, the Cabinet decided to hold over its consideration of the Government’s future policy towards China. 2. In the meantime, the position will be that present policy continues, namely—see paragraph 11(i) of the Submission—of seeking to...’
303. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 24 February 1972; ‘Canberra, 24 February 1972 Secret The Kibels In the Secretary’s submission of 14 January 1972 (copy attached),1 he suggested that the activities of the Kibels—ostensibly on behalf of the Government—were fast becoming an embarrassment and should be brought to speedy end. But it was suggested also that this should be...’
304. MINUTE FROM SHANN TO ANDERSON: 29 February 1972; ‘Canberra, 29 February 1972 China The Minister agreed this morning that we should prepare for him an instruction to Renouf to seek to reopen matters with the Chinese with a view to probing them about the possibility of their according to us something similar to the arrangements they have announced...’
305. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 1 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 1 March 1972 934. Secret For Renouf China Dialogue Our AP022.1 You will have noted Prime Minister’s statement that we shall test out the Chinese on whether they are now prepared not to make Taiwan the stumbling–block in the way of normalizing relations with Australia. 2. We shall shortly...’
306. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 3 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 3 March 1972 Secret Renewal of Contact with the PRC As a follow–up to the Prime Minister’s press statement1 of 28 February on the Sino/American communique,2 we have prepared the attached draft telegram of instructions to Mr Renouf in Paris.3 The draft telegram is designed to test out the...’
307. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 6 March 1972; ‘Taipei, 6 March 1972 137. Confidential Taiwan: Reaction to Nixon and Green Visits The main ROC reaction was one of essential helplessness in the face of events happening or to happen elsewhere. Marshall Green’s assurances that US policy towards Taiwan (as distinct from the PRC) remains unchanged were accepted with...’
308. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 6 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 6 March 1972 158. Confidential For Mcintyre from Bowen. China James Kibel who last year conveyed an invitation to the Government for a trade mission to visit the P.R.C. is reported to have told the press that he has had talks in New York with the Chinese Mission to...’
309. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 6 March 1972; ‘New York, 6 March 1972 UN134. Confidential For Minister from Mcintyre Your 158.1 According to ABC representatives who have been in contact with him, Kibel left New York last week for Boston and Canada and proposes to return here on or about 16 March. He apparently hopes to have another...’
310. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 7 March 1972; ‘New York, 7 March 1972 UN143. Confidential Priority China For Minister from Mcintyre Your 1581 and 1632 .and your telephone call.3 Today 7 March Merrillees4 met Chou Nan, first secretary in the Chinese Mission, in the United Nations Building. 2. Merrillees said the Australian authorities had heard that the Chinese...’
311. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 8 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 8 March 1972 165. Secret Austeo Priority For Mcintyre China Your UN143.1 It was not our intention that Merillees should raise in any way with the Chinese Mission the question of pursuing the dialogue. It was desired only to ascertain whether the Chinese Mission had said anything to James...’
312. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 8 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 8 March 1972 1078. Secret Immediate Personal for Renouf. China Dialogue We are sending you separately a telegram approved some days ago instructing you to see the PRC Ambassador at the earliest opportunity. Despatch of that telegram was held up in order to ascertain direct from the Chinese themselves...’
313. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 8 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 8 March 1972 1079. Secret Immediate Personal for Renouf from Minister. China Dialogue Our 934.1 You will have seen the Prime Minister’s press statement of 28 February (tel. AP22)2 on the Nixon–Chou communique and the reference to testing out the Chinese on whether they are now prepared to move...’
314. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 8 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 8 March 1972 Secret China Dialogue We have despatched to Renouf the telegram of instructions approved earlier this week,1 and have also sent him the exchange of messages with New York.2 We have in addition sent him a covering telegram (copy attached).3 2. You will see from para. 4...’
315. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 8 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 8 March 1972 1090. Secret Immediate Personal for Renouf from Minister. China Dialogue Para 4 of our tel. 1078.1 On this matter you should at an appropriate stage in your discussions say that you have been instructed to say that the Prime Minister’s remarks, which were given in answers...’
316. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 10 March 1972; ‘Paris, 10 March 1972 1069.Secret My telegram 1053:1 China I am still unable to get an answer from the Chinese Ambassador so I guess he is awaiting instructions. I am continuing to press. Renouf. [NAA: A1838, 3107/38/18/2, i] 1 9 March. Renouf reported that he had asked for an appointment...’
317. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 13 March 1972; ‘Paris, 13 March 1972 1124.Secret China There is still no reply from the PRC Ambassador1 although he had today 13 March his first meeting with the American Ambassador. I am beginning to wonder whether in fact there will ever be a reply other than what may be this indirect negative....’
318. LETTER FROM MCINTYRE TO WALLER: 14 March 1972; ‘New York, 14 March 1972 Confidential Personal I am sorry if we are thought to have messed up our assignment with the Chinese Mission. I was not happy with the idea of referring specifically to Kibel and inviting the Chinese to tell us what they had said to him. I...’
319. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MCMAHON, GREEN AND HOLDRIDGE: 14 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 14 March 1972 Top Secret Mr Green first said he had been asked by the President to convey his warmest good wishes to myself and my wife. He had the most pleasant recollections, for many reasons, of our visit to Washington. 2. He informed me of the comment he...’
320. PAPER BY NORTH ASIA BRANCH: 16 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 16 March 1972 Secret President Nixon’s visit to China and the Joint Communique A. THE VISIT Public attention has naturally concentrated on the joint communique issued at the end of President Nixon’s visit to China from 21–28 February 1972. But in many ways the most significant and portentous development...’
321. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 17 March 1972; ‘Paris, 17 March 1972 1212. Secret China It is now ten days since I asked for an early appointment with the Chinese Ambassador. There has not been any reply although the Ambassador has been in Paris and at work. 2. As time goes by, it is becoming clearer that silence...’
322. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 23 March 1972; ‘Paris, 23 March 1972 1343. Secret Priority China I saw the PRC Ambassador 23 March as arranged. I gave him the piece of paper prepared in accordance with your instructions (copies by bag) and went through it with him paragraph by paragraph. 2. Huang then asked me whether I had...’
323. LETTER FROM RENOUF TO ANDERSON: 23 March 1972; ‘Paris, 23 March 1972 Secret China Reference my telegram 1343,1 attached are two copies of the piece of paper I handed to the PRC Ambassador on 23 March. Attachment The Australian Government genuinely wishes to normalize progressively relations with the People’s Republic of China, moving ahead in the first place...’
324. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 23 March 1972; ‘Paris, 23 March 1972 1350. Secret Priority My telegram 13431 —China You may possibly wonder why I chose not to rebut some of Huang’s points, notably that about ‘the fallacies’ and that about Vietnam. 2. I had three reasons for not doing so:— (a) Huang thought that his talk should...’
325. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 24 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 24 March 1972 Secret China Policy With reference to Mr Renouf’s telegram 13501 (attached), which we did not see until after the preparation of our other submission to you today on his talk with Mr Huang, we are of the view that there would be no point in going...’
326. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 24 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 24 March 1972 Secret China Policy Cabinet on 21 February considered your submission (No. 55411—copy attached) on China Policy and decided to hold over its consideration—principally, we understand, because of the then impending visits of President Nixon to China and of Mr Marshall Green to Australia. 2. Now that...’
327. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 27 March 1972; ‘Paris, 27 March 1972 1398. Secret Priority China My 1343.1 The document I handed to the Chinese Ambassador last Thursday had been returned in the mail this morning with the following cover. Begins— Mr Ambassador, because of the fact that the document, which you handed over on March 23 1972,...’
328. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 30 March 1972; ‘Canberra, 30 March 1972 Secret China Dialogue We are inclined to think that the PRC’s conditions for diplomatic relations,1 which the PRC Ambassador to France (Huang Chen) read to Mr Renouf on 23 March, represent an advance rejection of our renewed proposal for the progressive normalisation of relations. It is...’
329. SUBMISSION TO CABINET: 7 April 1972; ‘Canberra, 7 April 1972 Secret China Policy: Information Paper Two developments since 21 February; when Cabinet considered my submission (No. 5542 attached) on our China Policy, lead me to resubmit this matter. 2. The first development was President Nixon’s visit to China. The second was a renewed attempt by us...’
330. LETTER FROM WALLER TO PLIMSOLL: 10 April 1972; ‘Canberra, 10 April 1972 Confidential Personal I am worried about our relations with the United States. The problem seems to me to be at two levels. First, I sense a growing anti–Americanism among the general public. This is an inchoate thing but it is a marked change from the atmosphere...’
331. NOTE FROM GRIFFITH TO MCMAHON: 17 April 1972; ‘Canberra, 17 April 1972 Secret Notes on Cabinet Submission No. 6081 This note does not challenge the Minister’s recommendations on China policy. There are two courses of action for the Australian Government and these basically arise from the political philosophy of the Government. 2. They are: (i) Acceptance of Peking...’
332. CABINET DECISION NO. 909: 20 April 1972; ‘Canberra, 20 April 1972 Secret Submission Nos. 554 and 608—China Policy1 The Cabinet noted Submission No. 608. 2. It decided that Australia continue its present dialogue in order to normalise our bilateral relations with the P.R.C., moving at all times with caution and with a careful assessment of Australia’s interests,...’
333. LETTER FROM DUNN TO ANDERSON: 16 June 1972; ‘Taipei, 16 June 1972 Secret Personal [ matter omitted ] I shall continue by making some observations on what I have sought to do here, in the belief that this was in accordance with our overall policy objectives. You might wish to comment on this section also. I have worked...’
334. LETTER FROM DUNN TO WALLER: 30 June 1972; ‘Taipei, 30 June 1972 Secret Personal It may be of some use at this stage to sum up my own ideas on how our China policy could best develop. In other writings to the Department I have set out some arguments in favour of points made below. I would greatly...’
335. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 30 June 1972; ‘Canberra, 30 June 1972 Confidential China There are signs that two Asian countries—Japan and the Philippines—could be in diplomatic relations with Peking before too long—probably not this year but perhaps next. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that both countries will have publicly opened negotiations with Peking before the...’
336. LETTER FROM WALLER TO DUNN: 12 July 1972; ‘Canberra, 12 July 1972 Secret Personal I was glad to have your letter of 30 June on China policy,1 and interested in your analysis and suggestions. Your most radical suggestion is that your Embassy be converted into some form of Trade Office (your paras. 6–9): You argue persuasively; but I...’
337. LETTER FROM DUNN TO ANDERSON: 12 July 1972; ‘Taipei, 12 July 1972 Secret Personal Thanks for your letter 3109/38118 of 3rd July.1 It was most helpful to have your comments. This note does not call for a reply. I would however like to make one or two remarks deriving from the fourth paragraph on your page 22 and...’
338. MINUTE FROM COOK TO ANDERSON: 13 July 1972; ‘Canberra, 13 July 1972 Restricted China In an article written for the FER1 (and reprinted in The Bulletin of 1 July), Mr Whitlam stated ‘I choose Peking as the government of China, of which Taiwan is a province’ . 2. If this accurately reflects ALP policy and the position Labor...’
339. LETTER FROM DUNN TO ANDERSON: 18 July 1972; ‘Taipei, 18 July 1972 Secret Personal One last note—again requiring no answer—to complete my comments on recent letters about China policy. I appreciated the Secretary’s reply 1 very much, and also your own note about the possible duration of my posting.2 I’ .l wait—more or less patiently—and try to sort...’
340. MINUTE FROM ANDERSON TO WALLER AND SHANN: 20 July 1972; ‘Canberra, 20 July 1972 Confidential Chinese Table Tennis Team1 The attached note2 indicates that the two PRC Foreign Affairs officials travelling with the ping pong team in New Zealand replied affirmatively when asked in Wellington if they wanted to discuss political matters. They subsequently saw Sir Keith Holyoake but we...’
341. LETTER FROM ANDERSON TO DUNN: 28 July 1972; ‘Canberra, 28 July 1972 Confidential Personal Your note of 18 July.1 I think we are at cross purposes in talking about ’steady progress’ . My essential point is that the present Government is just not going to approach the PRC’s position, step by unilateral step, before the elections. To move...’
342. SUBMISSION TO BOWEN: 8 August 1972; ‘Canberra, 8 August 1972 Confidential The China Dialogue We have suggested points you could make in reply to a possible Parliamentary question on this matter (copy attached).1 But we are uneasy about the whole thing. 2. The fact is that the PRC has not responded to our stated desire for...’
343. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN BOWEN AND HUANG HUA: 29 September 1972; ‘New York, 29 September 1972 Confidential The Minister referred to the visit to Australia of the Chinese table tennis team.1 He spoke of the team’s sportsmanship, of how this was appreciated by Australians generally, and of the success of the visit. He referred also to the conjunction of the visit...’
344. MINUTE FROM BURGESS TO COOK: 10 November 1972; ‘Canberra, 10 November 1972 Jamaica1 I think an initial break with the ROC is one of the options that should be canvassed. It could have some appeal to the incoming government for these reasons— (1) a decisive and probably popular step which could be made immediately (2) like the Mexicans...’
345. LETTER FROM ANDERSON TO RENOUF: 4 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 4 December 1972 Secret Normalization of Relations with China Herewith is a copy of a Departmental paper on this subject which has been given to the Prime Minister–designate.1 We don’t know yet whether he will accept our recommendation that negotiations with the Chinese be taken up in Paris—as you...’
346. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 4 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 4 December 1972 5901. Secret Immediate For Renouf. Relations with PRC Please inform PRC Ambassador that you will be seeking an appointment with him tomorrow to propose the opening of negotiations for mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. (The Prime Minister–elect will probably be announcing this at...’
347. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 5 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 5 December 1972 5909. Secret Immediate For Renouf. Negotiations with PRC Your 5537.1 When you call on PRC Ambassador you should give him the message in our following telegram from Mr Whitlam to Premier Chou En–lai,2 together with the draft in our separate telegram of a joint communique of...’
348. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 5 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 5 December 1972 5910. Secret Immediate For Renouf. Negotiations with PRC Our 5909.1 Following is text of draft PRC/Australian joint communique. Begins: Joint communique of the Australian Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between Australia and China (underlined) The...’
349. CABLEGRAM TO TAIPEI: 5 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 5 December 1972 780. Secret Immediate Personal for Dunn. Relations with PRC Instructions are being sent to Renouf to inform his PRC colleague that we wish to open immediate negotiations for mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Prime Minister will probably announce this decision at a...’
350. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 5 December 1972; ‘Tokyo, 5 December 1972 3399. Confidential Japan/PRC/Taiwan Our 3384.1 2. We saw Ogura2 (Deputy Head, China Division, Foreign Ministry) on December 4 in order to discuss developments in Japan’s relations with China and Taiwan. 3. Ogura (who was a member of the recent Foreign Ministry administrative mission to China) said...’
351. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 5 December 1972; ‘Taipei, 5 December 1972 746. Secret Personal from Dunn. Relations with PRC: Your 7801 Foreign Minister Shen2 received me on 5 December. Godfrey–Smith and Chao (Australian and Pacific Affairs) were also present. Discussion was relaxed and almost cordial throughout. 2. I made the points in paragraph 3 of your 780....’
352. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 6 December 1972; ‘Paris, 6 December 1972 5628. Secret Immediate China I saw the PRC Ambassador at 1800 hours Paris time 6 December as arranged. The meeting lasted one hour and I was received in a most friendly fashion. 2. I gave the Ambassador the Prime Minister’s message to Premier Chou En–lai.1 The...’
353. MINUTE FROM SHANN TO WHITLAM: December 1972; ‘Canberra, undated Secret China Attached are copies of telegram 56281 from Paris and of the Australian draft communique,2 and a draft telegram in reply to Mr Renouf.3 2. The draft telegram is based on the judgement that the Chinese, as is only natural, have begun with an extreme position on...’
354. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 7 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 7 December 1972 5975. Secret Priority China Thank you for your telegram 5628.1 The Prime Minister personally is gratified by the skill and expedition you have shown in getting the negotiation under way. 2. Your meeting with Huang plainly went well on the whole, and we are pleased in...’
355. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 7 December 1972; ‘Taipei, 7 December 1972 758. Secret Priority Relations with PRC Casual meetings with some Cabinet Ministers on 6 December indicated general hope that unofficial contacts would prove possible. 2. Minister without portfolio Chow Shu–kai, a former Foreign Minister who still is involved in such matters, was very interested in the...’
356. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 8 December 1972; ‘Taipei, 8 December 1972 775. Secret Priority China Policies Being unable to see Chiang Ching–[k]uo, on 8th December I made a point of farewelling ministers without portfolio George Yeh and Yu Kuo–hwa. The former is an ex–Foreign Minister but is now ill and without much influence. The latter is very...’
357. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 9 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 9 December 1972 6025. Secret Priority China Your tel. 5663.1 All three examples are acceptable to us. 2. The first example is deliberately ambiguous in its wording, and was included in case the PRC was not prepared to accept wording which more plainly met our legal point. 3. The...’
358. CABLEGRAM TO TAIPEI: 11 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 11 December 1972 820. Secret Austeo Priority For Ambassador. Bank of China Before your departure this week you should inform the R.O.C. Government that we want it to arrange for the Bank of China to wind up its business and arrange its early withdrawal from Australia. We would like...’
359. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 11 December 1972; ‘Paris, 11 December 1972 5730. Secret Immediate Your 59751 —China Chinese Ambassador, accompanied by his Counsellor, called on me 1500 hours 11 December. Meeting lasted for nearly two hours. 2. He passed over a reply from Cho[u] En–lai to Mr Whitlam’s letter (my 5727).2 Before presenting a revised version of...’
360. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO WHITLAM: 11 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 11 December 1972 Secret China We are drafting for your consideration a reply to Renouf’s telegram 57301concerning his meeting yesterday with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris. 2. You may wish to mention at your press conference this afternoon that there has been a further meeting between Renouf and Huang...’
361. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO WHITLAM: 12 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 12 December 1972 Secret China Policy Telegram 57301 from Paris (attached) raises three principal matters for decision: the central paragraph on the Taiwan issue; the remainder of the communique; and the question of unofficial offices in Taiwan and Australia. Taiwan 2. We suggested in our original submission to you...’
362. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 12 December 1972; ‘Taipei, 12 December 1972 791. Secret Austeo Priority Bank of China—Your telegram 8201 I arranged to see Vice Foreign Minister Tsai2 early in the afternoon of 12 December and told him the subject I wanted to discuss. At that time he had not yet seen Ambassador Shen’s report of his...’
363. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 12 December 1972; ‘Taipei, 12 December 1972 792. Secret Immediate Relations with the ROC Your telegram 8211 arrived shortly before my appointment with Vice Foreign Minister Tsai on 12 December on the Bank of China question (my telegram 791).2 After we had discussed that question, Tsai said he wished to give me the...’
364. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 12 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 12 December 1972 6062. Secret Priority China Policy Your telegrams 57301 and 5731.2 You should speak to Huang as follows. 2. We are naturally disappointed that China has not accepted more of our draftcommunique. In particular, while pleased that China is now no longer insistingon its original Taiwan formula,...’
365. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 12 December 1972; ‘Paris, 12 December 1972 5746. Secret Immediate My Telegram 57471 Paragraph 4—China Following is the text of the draft communique:— Begins:— ‘Joint communique of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Australian Government on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Australia. The Government of the...’
366. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 12 December 1972; ‘Paris, 12 December 1972 5747. Secret Immediate China I saw Huang and his Counsellor at the Chinese Embassy 1600 hours 12 December. Meeting lasted almost two hours. 2. I began, as instructed, by pleading strongly and at length for the adoption of the Canadian formula. I concluded by pressing Huang...’
367. CABLEGRAM TO TAIPEI: 13 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 13 December 1972 834. Secret Immediate For Dunn and Godfrey–Smith only Relations with ROC Renouf has informed the Chinese Ambassador in Paris on instructions: (a) That we will not establish an office of the Australian Government in Taipei nor allow the Taiwan authorities to establish an office in Australia....’
368. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO WHITLAM: 13 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 13 December 1972 Secret China Attached is a draft telegram1 in response to telegram 57472 from Paris, also attached. 2. The draft telegram is based on the assumption that the legal nicety of when diplomatic relations are established (whether at the time of the communique or only when an...’
369. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 13 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 13 December 1972 6089. Secret Immediate China Your telegram 5747.1 We can accept ‘have as from today decided upon’ . and the minor amendments in your paragraph 18. If Huang is instructed likewise, and is also empowered to accept our Taiwan paragraph, the communique will presumably have been agreed...’
370. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 13 December 1972; ‘Paris, 13 December 1972 5767. Secret Priority China Recognition Assuming it proves possible to reach agreement on the text of the communique at the next meeting (which should be Thursday or Friday), what date would you wish the communique to bear? Or in other words when would you want signature...’
371. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 14 December 1972; ‘Taipei, 14 December 1972 811. Secret Immediate Relations with ROC Your telegram 8341 reached me while I was with, among others, Economic Affairs Minister Sun and Minister without portfolio Chow Shu–kai. As the Foreign Minister and Vice Minister could not be reached immediately, and as both had been involved in...’
372. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 14 December 1972; ‘Taipei, 14 December 1972 817. Secret Priority Relations with the ROC Premier Chiang asked me to call at short notice on 14 December. The atmosphere was cordial. Much of the conversation was personal. 2. I said I appreciated the chance to say farewell personally and to pass our good wishes...’
373. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 19 December 1972; ‘Paris, 19 December 1972 5870. Secret Immediate China The P.R.C. Ambassador came to see me 1600 hours 19 December (having earlier changed the time from 1130 hours). The meeting lasted for two hours but everything was cleaned up subject to approval by both Governments. 2. Huang began by asking whether...’
374. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 19 December 1972; ‘Paris, 19 December 1972 5871. Secret Immediate My telegram 58701 —China Following is text of the draft communique as agreed ad referendum (underlined two) 19 December: Begins:— ‘Joint communique of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Australian Government concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between China...’
375. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO WHITLAM: 20 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 20 December 1972 Secret China Attached is a draft telegram1 replying to telegram 58702 and 58713 from Paris (also attached). 2. We have two reasons for suggesting 1800 hours Canberra time on 22 December as the time for releasing the communique and your exchange of messages with Premier Chou....’
376. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 20 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 20 December 1972 62241. Secret Immediate China Your telegrams 5870 and 5871.2 We accept text of communique in your 5871. (We assume that Huang had agreed to Australia’s being mentioned first in the heading and in para. 1 of the communique to be published here, and China’s being mentioned...’
377. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 20 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 20 December 1972 6223. Secret Immediate China Your telegram 5870,1 para. 14. You should tell Huang that, while we can do nothing directly to hold up the sale of property sold before the signing of the communique, we have issued today the warning which we had earlier offered (our...’
378. CABLEGRAM TO PARIS: 20 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 20 December 1972 6225. Secret Immediate China You have discretion to raise with Huang after the actual signing of the communique the question of Francis James1 and the question of establishing an Australian Embassy in Peking. If you decide not to raise either of these matters at that time,...’
379. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 20 December 1972; ‘Paris, 20 December 1972 5888. Secret Priority China The texts are to be compared at 1100 hours 21 December. 2. I will then inform Huang as instructed in your telegram 62231 (the property question). 3. On this property question, Huang mentioned casually 19 December that presumably we will ‘look after’...’
380. CABLEGRAM TO TAIPEI: 21 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 21 December 1972 AP242. Secret Priority Addressed Taipei and Hong Kong (Repeated All Posts by Savingram). Closure of Post—Australia Interests Your 838.1 Consular Pending the possible transfer in time of certain residual consular responsibilities to another mission or the assignment of duties in other respects, it will be necessary...’
381. MINUTE FROM WALLER TO WHITLAM: 21 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 21 December 1972 Secret China Attached is a draft telegram1 to a number of posts instructing them to hand over in confidence, in advance of release here, the text of your press statement and the joint communique.2 2. The draft telegram also gives posts some talking points. These are...’
382. CABLEGRAM TO POSTS: 21 December 1972; ‘Canberra, 21 December 1972 Secret Immediate China Our separate telegram contains text of press release Prime Minister will be issuing at 1800 hours Canberra time today 22 December. Joint communique attached to press release was signed in Paris at 0700 hours Canberra time today but will not be released until...’
383. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 21 December 1972; ‘Paris, 21 December 1972 5913. Secret Immediate China On arrival at the P.R.C. Embassy at 1100 hours 21 December with Price 1 and the Lees,2 I was surprised to be met only by Tsao Kuei–sheng (the so–called Press Counsellor who is always with Huang). Asked where was Huang, Tsao Kuei–sheng...’
384. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 21 December 1972; ‘Paris, 21 December 1972 5917. Secret Immediate My 59161 —China At the meeting at 1430 hours 21 December Huang simply accepted without further ado the text of the communique contained in my telegram 58712 subject to inclusion at the end of the first paragraph of the date ‘December 21, 1972’...’
385. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 27 December 1972; ‘Hong Kong, 27 December 1972 1913. Restricted PRC/Australia and New Zealand Diplomatic Relations Our telegram 18591 NCNA reported on 22 December the full texts of the Australian and New Zealand communiques establishing diplomatic relations and carried as well a New Zealand Foreign Ministry statement saying that New Zealand’s diplomatic relations...’

Documents on Australian Foreign Policy

Volume 22: Australia and Recognition of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1972

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