Documents on Australian Foreign Policy :: Volume 25: Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, 1961

1. SUBMISSION NO. 1304 FROM MENZIES TO CABINET: 11 August 1961; ‘Canberra, 11 August 1961 Secret Political and Economic Association of Singapore, the Federation of Malaya and the Borneo Territories Question To Be Considered The Malayan Prime Minister2 has put forward a proposal (known as the ‘Grand Design’ or ‘Greater Malaysia Plan’) for the eventual creation of a federation to include...’
2. CABINET DECISION NO. 1543 (HOC): 16 August 1961; ‘Canberra, 16 August 1961 Secret Submission No. 1304—Political and Economic Association of Singapore, the Federation of Malaya and the Borneo Territories 1. The Committee came to conclusions substantially in line with those reached in the submission and referred to in paragraph 31.2 But it indicated that its position was no...’
3. LETTER FROM MENZIES TO MACMILLAN: 18 October 1961; ‘Canberra, 18 October 1961 Secret Thank you for your message of 4th October telling me what you have said to the Tunku on the Greater Malaysia plan.1 I completely agree with your handling of the matter and am heartened that the Tunku will soon meet you in London. 2. I...’
4. MINUTE FROM BRENNAN TO EASTMAN: 23 March 1962; ‘Canberra, 23 March 1962 Top Secret Australian Involvement in Malayan External Defence I had a discussion with Blakers3 and Poyser4 to clarify the attitude of the Department of Defence to the question of Australian involvement in Malayan defence. I told them that the Secretary5 accepted that there was an agreement...’
5. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 10 May 1962; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 10 May 1962 197.Secret The Tunku did not state categorically in House3 that ‘deadline’ for Malaysia was August 1962 but nevertheless this is his hope. He said Singapore would have to decide on merger by August or he would consider closing causeway.4 He had said earlier (our telegram...’
6. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 29 May 1962; ‘London, 29 May 1962 2431. Secret Malaysia I carried my discussion with Golds2 further this morning with Wallace3 at the Colonial Office. He was able to be a little more precise about timing, and suggested that if all went well the Cobbold report would be published this week, the Tunku...’
7. MEMORANDUM FROM CRITCHLEY TO TANGE: 4 July 1962; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 4 July 1962 Secret Minister’s Talks with the Tunku and Tun Razak While in Kuala Lumpur on June 29th, the Minister, Sir Garfield Barwick, had friendly discussions with the Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman and the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak.1 2. The Minister’s discussions with Tun Razak...’
8. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 3 August 1962; ‘London, 3 August 1962 3759. Secret Malaysia Our telegram 3724.1 Golds, C.R.O., last night gave Canadians, New Zealanders and ourselves further information about outcome of negotiations. 2. Golds first discussed the Singapore citizenship issue. As a consequence of the disagreement between Lee Kwan Yew and the Tunku on the interpretation...’
9. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 4 September 1962; ‘Singapore, 4 September 1962 193. Confidential Singapore Referendum1 Although somewhat loaded, referendum questions and complete Government control of propaganda machinery leave some doubt whether the people of Singapore genuinely accepted that merger proposals represent the best arrangement for Singapore or were badgered into choosing least objectionable of three alternatives. Large...’
10. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 5 September 1962; ‘London, 5 September 1962 4337. Confidential Malaysia Golds (C.R.O.) was not in a position to give us much detail on the Lansdowne Mission’s work since, although Lansdowne and British members returned here last week-end, they have been meeting together at Lansdowne’s house and there has been little opportunity to obtain...’
11. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 11 December 1962; ‘Singapore, 11 December 1962 294. Secret Priority Brunei Revolt Political Assessment While the considerable degree of planning and organisation of the revolt is apparent, the causes remain uncertain. The Party Rakyat contains many factions but is the only popularly based party in Brunei that had wide support. The incompetence and...’
12. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 12 December 1962; ‘Jakarta, 12 December 1962 977. Secret Brunei While there is still no overt evidence that the revolt was inspired or materially assisted by Indonesia Sukarno has predicted that the rebellion will succeed and Abdulgani2 has suggested that the press should take the side of the rebels (see our telegram 972).3...’
13. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 13 December 1962; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 13 December 1962 441. Secret Immediate Brunei Revolt Tunku called meeting at short notice this afternoon of Senior Commonwealth Representatives to discuss Brunei situation. 2. High Commissioner was unable to attend (only Commonwealth representatives were Tory1 of United Kingdom and Bennett2 of New Zealand). We understand from New...’
14. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 17 December 1962; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 17 December 1962 450. Confidential Brunei Federation Relations with Indonesia Last night Tunku described Subandrio’s1 statement in Singapore (repeated in Djakarta) attacking him for his allegations that Indonesia was involved in the Brunei revolt2 as serious matter which would be discussed by Cabinet. He added that if any...’
15. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 27 December 1962; ‘Jakarta, 27 December 1962 1032. Secret Brunei I called on Subandrio this morning mainly to seek his views on the Brunei situation. He had just seen the Malayan Ambassador1 and subsequent checking with Kamaruddin revealed that he took the same line with both of us although he said a number...’
16. SUBMISSION FROM TANGE TO BARWICK: 17 January 1963; ‘Canberra, 17 January 1963 Secret British Proposal for Tripartite Talks in Washington on Indonesia On 16th January the British High Commission passed us the attached copy of instructions1 sent to the British Ambassador in Washington2. The British Ambassador saw Rusk3 on 11th January and was to see Harriman4 {yesterday}, 16th...’
17. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN KIMBER AND TANGE: 17 January 1963; ‘Canberra, 17 January 1963 Secret Main Subjects: (1) British Proposal for Tripartite talks on Indonesia (2) British–Philippines talks2 The Secretary told Mr. Kimber that as the Minister was on leave he had not yet seen the paper on Indonesia which the British High Commission had forwarded on 16th January.3...’
18. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 21 January 1963; ‘Jakarta, 21 January 1963 51. Unclassified On 21st January ‘Antara’1 reported Dr. Subandrio as having said on 20th January in Djogjakarta2 that Indonesia cannot but adopt a policy of confrontation against Malaya because at present they represent themselves as accomplices of Neo-Colonialists and Neo-Imperialists pursuing a hostile policy towards Indonesia....’
19. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CRITCHLEY AND SHANN: 25 January 1963; ‘Canberra, 25 January 1963 59. 98. Secret Piority And Personal Indonesia/Malaya Relations I am greatly concerned at the continuing deterioration in Indonesia/Malaya relations. At least some of the blame rests with the Tunku. Your continued personal representations urging moderation on the Tunku have been valuable. I want you to keep...’
20. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO BARWICK: 28 January 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 28 January 1963 63. Secret Indonesia/Malaya Relations I saw Tunku this morning and went over with him arguments for seeking reconciliation with Indonesia and avoiding statements that could hinder this. Tunku said that following our previous talks he had endeavoured to avoid provocative statements. At same time Malays...’
21. LETTER FROM BARWICK TO HOLYOAKE: 1 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 1 February 1963 I am writing about the forthcoming quadripartite talks in Washington on Indonesia’s intentions in South East Asia and what we should do about them. The British Government has asked for a stepping up of the timing of these talks on the grounds that there could be...’
22. SUBMISSION FROM TANGE TO BARWICK: 4 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 4 February 1963 Secret Indonesia—Quadripartite Talks in Washington Initial United Kingdom Approach In mid January, 1963, the United Kingdom approached the United States in Washington expressing concern about developments in Indonesia and asking for discussions with the Americans on the question of policy towards Indonesia. Australia was invited to...’
23. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 4 February 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 4 February 1963 90. Secret Malaysia—Relations with Philippines Manila’s 72 to you.1 I agree continued public restraint by Tunku is important. He promised Thanat Khoman2 during the latter’s recent visit that he would exercise this and so far he is living up to his word. On the other...’
24. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 5 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 5 February 1963 85. Secret Malaysia Thank you for assessment in your 90.1 Tunku has been more restrained although he has s of ar shown no public appreciation that Indonesia has a real interest in the security of the area and may have genuine doubts both about Malaya’s ability...’
25. SAVINGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 5 February 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 5 February 1963 3. Secret Indonesian Hostility to Malaysia I should be glad to have Department’s and Mr. Shann’s assessments of reasons behind Indonesian hostility to Malaysia. My own views on which I should welcome comments follow: 2. Main factor is incompatibility of prosperous Malaysia with Indonesia’s national...’
26. CABINET DECISION NO. 632: 5 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 5 February 1963 Secret Without Memorandum—Indonesia—Quadripartite Talks The Minister for External Affairs informed the Cabinet that the British High Commission on 15th January suggested that Australia join in talks with the British and American Governments in Washington at Ambassadorial level, to discuss the British assessment of Indonesia’s expansionist intentions,...’
27. EXTRACT FROM MINUTE OF DEFENCE COMMITTEE MEETING: 7 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 7 February 1963 No. 6/1963. Top Secret Retention of Australian Forces in Malaya Conclusions 23. It is concluded that— (a) The Malayan/Singapore bases make possible the continued deployment of substantial Commonwealth forces in support of the overall Allied military position in South-East Asia. (b) The deployment of our forces...’
28. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 8 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 8 February 1963 277. Secret Talks on Indonesia If we are to continue to argue that efforts must be made to reconcile Indonesia and the Philippines to Malaysia so as to avoid Malaysia being exposed to their hostility and intrigue, then we may have to put forward some practical...’
29. CABLEGRAM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 8 February 1963; ‘Jakarta, 8 February 1963 130. Secret Immediate I had an hour with Subandrio this morning, who was even more friendly than he has been in the past and whose professions of anxiety for close relations with Australia were unusually insistent. I think this may reflect some fears as to our...’
30. SAVINGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 12 February 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 12 February 1963 5. Secret Malaysia—Relations with Indonesia Notwithstanding Tunku’s arguments, I agree he and Malayans generally have been more outspoken towards Indonesia than is in their interests. I have long suspected that the Indonesians—in particular Subandrio—have been deliberately provocative with a view to encouraging a battle of...’
31. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 16 February 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 16 February 1963 121. Secret Immediate Malaysia–Indonesian Policy Reference Djakarta’s 158.1 I agree generally with what Shann has said in his first two paragraphs, but I question the prospect of discrediting the Tunku internationally, and dispute that Indonesians are able to discredit him domestically in the foreseeable future....’
32. POLICY PLANNING PAPERMINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE: 18 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 18 February 1963 Confidential [ matter omitted ] Malaysia The Minister remarked by way of introduction that what was happening now in respect of Malaysia could be looked at as an early baptism of what lay ahead of Australia. Australia would have to give still more thought in the...’
33. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CRITCHLEY: 18 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 18 February 1963 125. Secret Indonesia and Malaya Your Savingram 5.1 I think we must tell the Tunku in firm and unmistakable terms that we believe Malaya must exercise great restraint in official, or unofficial, comments which could provoke reactions in Indonesia or the Philippines. I fear that both...’
34. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY AND SHANN: 18 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 18 February 1963 126. 205. Secret Malaysia Your 1211 (Critchley). Your 1582 (Shann). We have studied your assessments carefully and the following are our conclusions: (a) Indonesian hostility to the formation of Malaysia and attempts to subvert it after its establishment are a fact of life. We must strive...’
35. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 19 February 1963; ‘London, 19 February 1963 814. Secret Washington Talks Oddly enough British do not appear particularly disappointed at course of talks.1 Peck2 yesterday seemed happy enough and secret summary reports from Embassy3 (which he let me read) show no resentment at lectures they received or at firm intimations that Malaysia was...’
36. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 20 February 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 20 February 1963 134. Secret Malaysia My Savingram 9.1 I am concerned about continued reports of proposed meeting of Malaya, Indonesia and Philippines to discuss Malaysia. Such a meeting could hardly fail to damage Federation’s position. (a) It could give respectability to Philippines and Indonesian opposition to Malaysia....’
37. CABLEGRAM TO EASTMAN: 20 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 20 February 1963 590. Secret Priority Malaysia and Indonesia Your 802.1 We agree that there is a pressing need for greater diplomatic effort by the British to ensure peaceful acceptance of Malaysia. The Brunei revolt 10 weeks ago demonstrated clearly the need for constitutional reform in Brunei (our 4584...’
38. CABLEGRAM TO EASTMAN: 21 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 21 February 1963 606. Priority Secret Malaysia British High Commission has sought our agreement to brief which Tory would use in Kuala Lumpur when informing the Tunku about the recent Washington talks (British Embassy Washington telegram 495 to London and British High Commission Kuala Lumpur telegram 275 to London...’
39. LETTER FROM WALLER TO SHANN: 21 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 21 February 1963 Secret Personal Yesterday we had a telegram from you saying in effect ‘Is Malaysia sacred?’2 I ask myself this question about once a day because whichever way you look at it, there are difficulties. However, I suppose the question should really be ‘Is our forward position...’
40. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN TANGE AND SULEIMAN: 21 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 21 February 1963 Restricted Malayan–Indonesian Relations The Secretary sent for the Malayan High Commissioner on 21st February and outlined to him our thinking on Indonesia. He drew his attention to the proposals which Narasimhan had brought to Kuala Lumpur from Subandrio.2 These proposed an ending of the war of...’
41. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO BARWICK: 23 February 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1963 144. Secret Indonesia and Malaya I saw Tunku this morning and reiterated points in your telegram 125.1 Tunku said he was now exercising restraint. However, in past Malaya had looked up to Indonesia and Indonesians were endeavouring to take advantage of this. To maintain Malaya...’
42. SUBMISSION NO. 576 FROM BARWICK TO CABINET: 26 February 1963; ‘Canberra, 26 February 1963 Secret Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia Ambassadorial discussions on Indonesia between the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Australia took place in Washington on 11th and 12th February, 1963. At these talks Australia was represented by Sir Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador to the United States of America...’
43. CABINET DECISION NO. 675: 5 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 5 March 1963 Top Secret Submission No. 552—Australia’s Strategic Position1 Submission No. 560—The Strategic Importance to Australia of New Guinea2 Submission No. 575—Portuguese Timor and the North Borneo Territories3 Submission No. 576—Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia4 The Cabinet, in accepting generally the views expressed in Submission No. 552 ‘Australia’s Strategic...’
44. SAVINGRAM TO JAKARTA: 5 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 5 March 1963 27. Secret Following is record of conversation which Critchley had with President Sukarno and Dr. Subandrio on 27th February. This report is for background information only and is not at this stage to be passed to the Government to which you are accredited. You may discuss...’
45. CABLEGRAM TO ALL POSTS: 6 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 6 March 1963 AP15. Confidential Malaysia You will have Ministerial Press Release 29 of 5th March which followed long and careful consideration by Cabinet.1 In discussions with colleagues or the Government to which you are accredited, you should take the following line: (a) Malaysia is an imaginative plan for...’
46. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO TANGE: 6 March 1963; ‘Jakarta, 6 March 1963 224. Top Secret Immediate I have suggested to Moodie1 that Critchley should extend his visit to Djakarta on his way back to Kuala Lumpur by a day or so [so] that I can arrange some function at which he can meet some of his old buddies....’
47. CABLEGRAM FROM CUTTS TO CANBERRA: 7 March 1963; ‘Manila, 7 March 1963 153. Confidential Malaysia After I had discussed arrangements for Minister’s visit with Foreign Under–Secretary Lopez (my telegram 152)2 he said that he supposed that the Minister’s decision to come to Manila at this time was influenced by the fact that there was so much going on...’
48. CABLEGRAM FROM CUTTS TO CANBERRA: 12 March 1963; ‘Manila, 12 March 1963 181. Confidential Malaysia The Minister was received this morning by President Macapagal with whom he talked for about 40 minutes. Minister told Macapagal that Cabinet had recently given serious thought to the future of Malaya and Borneo Territory and had come to the conclusion that from...’
49. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CANBERRA: 12 March 1963; ‘Manila, 12 March 1963 182. Confidential I had a long talk with Pelaez, Macapagal,1 and Subandrio (record will follow)2 and am alarmed at Tunku’s latest outburst.3 Have made clear that I do not regard Malaysia as negotiable, but personally see merit in the conference proposed by the Filipinos (our 174)4...’
50. CABLEGRAM TO BARWICK IN MANILA: 13 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 13 March 1963 165. Confidential Immediate Your 1821 discussed with Critchley.2 He believes Tunku will be wary of multilateral discussions but could be prevailed on to agree to them so long as there was a clear proviso that Malaysia was not negotiable. He believes Razak could best propound the...’
51. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO MENZIES AND TANGE: 13 March 1963; ‘Manila, 13 March 1963 188. Secret Immediate Please deliver the following message from Sir Garfield Barwick immediately to Tunku Abdul Rahman. 1. ‘I have been having talks in Manila with Pelaez, Macapagal and Subandrio. These (particularly those with Subandrio) have led me to believe that there is a real possibility...’
52. CABLEGRAM TO ALL POSTS: 14 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 14 March 1963 AP19. Confidential Malaysia In discussing recent developments in Manila you should make the following points:— (a) Australia has not sought and does not desire the role of mediator. She has, however, friendly relations with Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaya and the Minister has been actively seeking...’
53. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CRITCHLEY: 15 March 1963; ‘Manila, 15 March 1963 199. Secret You will now have seen my message to the Tunku. I regret any inconvenience which may have been caused by my decision that you should get back to Kuala Lumpur as soon as possible.1 While there would, no doubt, have been considerable value in...’
54. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 16 March 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 16 March 1963 192. Secret Tunku told me this morning (March 16th) that he appreciated directness of Minister’s recent message1 and that it was based on desire to help. He would ‘try to comply’ with it. In this spirit he had accepted Subandrio’s two conditions for peaceful settlement...’
55. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 18 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 18 March 1963 213. Secret Your 192.1 Minister is somewhat disturbed at statement in your paragraph 4 that Malaya is prepared to discuss agenda for Ministerial talks provided Malaysia is not included as a subject for discussion. He wants you to emphasise to Tunku that while we share his...’
56. SAVINGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 18 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 18 March 1963 73. Secret Following1 for your background information, is record of Minister’s conversation with Subandrio in Manila on 13th March.2 Begins:— ‘Following is a record of my discussions with Subandrio yesterday and today. At my encouragement Subandrio led off with a rehearsal of the Indonesian arguments against...’
57. LETTER FROM BARWICK TO MENZIES: 18 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 18 March 1963 Secret I would like briefly to report on my visit to Manila in so far as it affected Malaysia. I talked with Macapagal, Pelaez and Subandrio. I had in attendance Cutts with the Filipinos and Shann with the Indonesians. I should tell you that some time...’
58. BRIEFING NOTES FOR MINISTER: 21 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 21 March 1963 Australian Defence Commitments in regard to Malaya and the Borneo Territories (a) Position Prior to the Formation of Malaysia Australia’s commitments are the same as they have been for some years now and as they have been explained to Parliament in the past. In 1955 the...’
59. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 29 March 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 29 March 1963 217. Secret Malaysia Concern referred to in your telegram 2391 exists among some officials in Ministry of External Affairs but I have found no evidence of it at government level. 2. Tunku told me last night that he was not worried about Australia’s attitude on...’
60. LETTER FROM BUNTING1 TO TANGE: 29 March 1963; ‘Canberra, 29 March 1963 Top Secret Personal I refer to the Cabinet Submission by the Minister for Defence and the Minister for External Affairs on the subject of Australian Association with the Malaysia Defence Agreement.2 The Submission is No. 582. This paper was before the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs...’
61. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 1 April 1963; ‘Canberra, 1 April 1963 743. Secret Malaysia Your 324.1 In talks with State Department you should stress our conviction that Indonesian and Philippine hostility to Malaysia can be minimised if we and the United States keep talking to them quietly and firmly, through diplomatic channels. Just as Indonesia tried to...’
62. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO MENZIES: 5 April 1963; ‘London, 5 April 1963 1590. Confidential I have now had conversations with Macmillan (over lunch), Butler2 (briefly), Sandys3, Heath4, Lansdowne, Thomas, Fisher5, Caccia6 and Gamer.7 Malaysia I have stressed the need, not merely for continued British firmness and resolve to complete Malaysia by August 31, but for continued British military...’
63. CABLEGRAM TO BARWICK IN LONDON: 13 April 1963; ‘Canberra, 13 April 1963 1273. Secret Priority Talks in Kuala Lumpur1 We do not have specific suggestions for discussion other than what will be in your mind already and what Critchley may suggest. We have sent message to Kuala Lumpur on smuggling2 and on relations between the Singapore and Federation...’
64. LETTER FROM BARWICK TO TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN: 29 April 1963; ‘Canberra, 29 April 1963 May I formally thank you and your Government for great kindness during my recent visit to Kuala Lumpur and to the Cameron Highlands.1 May I say how very much I enjoyed our conversations and I am sure thereby obtained a clearer insight into your own experienced...’
65. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO LONDON: 2 May 1963; ‘Canberra, 2 May 1963 1534. Confidential Your 2004.1 I do not like Narasimhan’s proposal for a plebiscite after Malaysia is formed. We had ourselves considered at an earlier stage the desirability of a plebiscite. This would in effect mean that at a stated period after the creation of a federation...’
66. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 3 May 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 3 May 1963 278. Secret Malaysia Serious deadlock continues over terms for inclusion of Brunei and Singapore. Brunei is holding out on mineral rights and financial issues and Singapore refuses to meet Federation demands on apportionment of Federal Revenue in Singapore.1 2. Federation believes only prospect of settlement...’
67. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 6 May 1963; ‘Canberra, 6 May 1963 339. Secret Malaysia Your telegram No. 278.1 We are not clear whether Malayans’ proposal for proceeding with Malaysia without Singapore is mainly a tactical device to put pressure on Singapore for a settlement. If so, we should be interested in yours and Singapore’s comments whether Lee...’
68. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 8 May 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 8 May 1963 286. Secret Malaysia Your 339.1 Although Malayans would hope that Singapore would bow under pressure I am satisfied that at least majority of Ministers are prepared to proceed without Singapore or give up Malaysia rather than make financial concessions that they fear would enable Singapore...’
69. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 21 May 1963; ‘Canberra, 21 May 1963 364. Secret Malaysia Reference your telegram No. 286.1 We are reluctant to intervene at this stage along the lines you suggest. There are disadvantages in taking sides in the dispute between the two major elements in the new Federation. Our intervention might encourage the Malayans not...’
70. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN JOCKEL AND LARMOUR: 29 May 1963; ‘Canberra, 29 May 1963 Secret Malaysia: Defence Aspects Mr. Larmour called today to discuss Malaysia. He left telegrams with me describing the results of the recent talks between Razak and the British Government on Malaysia defence finance. He also left a telegram from the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Kuala...’
71. CABLEGRAM FROM CUTTS TO CANBERRA: 8 June 1963; ‘Manila, 8 June 1963 399. Confidential Priority Tripartite Talks1 The atmosphere at the outset of the Ministerial meeting is one of unrelieved optimism. From press statement by Razak and Subandrio and opening speeches of the three Ministers success of the talks seems assured. Originally scheduled for one week they have...’
72. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 11 June 1963; ‘Manila, 11 June 1963 402. Unclassified Tripartite Talks Ministerial meeting concluded today with final statements by three participants. Following are operative paragraphs (2 to 9) of communique. 2. The deliberations were held in a frank manner and in a most cordial atmosphere in keeping with the spirit of the accord...’
73. SUBMISSION FROM WALLER TO BARWICK: 11 June 1963; ‘Canberra, 11 June 1963 Top Secret Malaysia—Defence Agreement We shall shortly have to begin negotiations of some fresh agreement covering the presence of the Strategic Reserve in Malaysia after August 31st. You mentioned this matter to Mr. Jockel in Wellington1 and stressed the desirability of finding a form of words...’
74. BRIEF FROM NIMMO FOR MENZIES: 13 June 1963; ‘Canberra, 13 June 1963 Secret Defence and Malaysia In March this year our Cabinet decided to defer a decision as to Australia’s defence relationship with Malaysia until Malaysia comes into being or, in other words, until the issue comes up in a more concrete way.3 Bunting has told me that...’
75. CABLEGRAM FROM CUTTS TO CANBERRA: 13 June 1963; ‘Manila, 13 June 1963 403. Confidential Priority Tripartite Meeting I called on Subandrio today at his request. He said he was anxious that the Australian Government should be informed of meeting and Indonesia’s attitude thereto. As he would be in Djakarta very briefly tomorrow, he would probably be unable to...’
76. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 20 June 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 20 June 1963 366. Confidential Malaysia Federal Cabinet met yesterday 19th June to discuss failure to reach agreement with Brunei and Singapore on terms for their entry into Malaysia. On Tunku’s initiative it was decided that final terms would be submitted in writing to both Governments. Tunku has...’
77. CABLEGRAM FROM WOOLCOTT TO CANBERRA: 21 June 1963; ‘Singapore, 21 June 1963 343. Confidential Priority Malaysia Financial Talks Reference our memorandum 1308,2 and Savingram 19.3 2. Lee Kuan Yew has now returned to Singapore and Cabinet is discussing Federation’s latest set of ‘final’ terms this afternoon. These terms differ very little from those set out in paragraph 5...’
78. EXTRACT FROM THE 1963 ANZUS RECORD: 1 June 1963; ‘June 1963 Secret Agenda Item V Malaysia Sir Garfield Barwick introduced this item, saying that Australia had declared publicly and privately its support for Malaysia. Malaysia was the best solution for the territories concerned. Our statements had been made against a background of known Indonesian hostility to Malaysia. Australia’s strong...’
79. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 23 June 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 23 June 1963 CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY Malaysia Reference my telegram 370. 1 The Sultan of Brunei returned to Brunei on 21st June.2 Tunku’s letter referred to in my telegram 370 had not been given him then but was despatched subsequently to Brunei. The letter had been prepared on 20th...’
80. CABLEGRAM FROM WOOLCOTT TO CANBERRA: 26 June 1963; ‘Singapore, 26 June 1963 354. Secret Malaysia I had [a] brief talk with Prime Minister last night before he left for London.1 2. Lee said he really wanted Malaysia but it had to be on a sound footing as far as Singapore was concerned. Malaysia was still essential and logical...’
81. CABLEGRAM TO EASTMAN: 5 July 1963; ‘Canberra, 5 July 1963 2608. Confidential Immediate Malaysia Reference your telegram No. 3343.1 We have assumed throughout that the British would be uncompromising in the view that they could not entertain an agreement on Malaysia which excluded Singapore. Please advise urgently whether they are likely to make any departure from...’
82. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 11 July 1963; ‘Jakarta, 11 July 1963 622. Unclassified Malyasia On 11th July ‘Antara’ reported President Sukarno as saying at a meeting commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Catholic Party that the Indonesian Government had definite proof that Tunku Abdul Rahman had signed an agreement with the British on the formation of Malaysia....’
83. CABLEGRAM TO UPTON: 11 July 1963; ‘Canberra, 11 July 1963 754. Secret Immediate Malaysia Please see Subandrio as soon as possible explaining that on Minister’s instructions you are recalling that he gave a clear understanding that Indonesia could accept Malaysia in substance as a practical solution for the Borneo territories if as a result of discussions...’
84. PAPER BY JOCKEL: 11 July 1963; ‘Canberra, 11 July 1963 Secret Secret Future Australian Defence Arrangements with Malaysia While not taking a decision on the matter, Cabinet seemed dissatisfied with the recommendation that we should seek an association with the British–Malaysian Treaty which would be identical to the present association with the British–Malayan Treaty.2 2. The...’
85. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 16 July 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 16 July 1963 415. Secret 415. Secret Indonesia and Malaysia Your 477.1 Washington telegram 18072 has not yet been received. 2. Tunku is unlikely to be back in Kuala Lumpur until towards end of next week but I have spokn with Razak and Tunku Ngah.3 Malayans are aware...’
86. MEMORANDUM FROM CRITCHLEY TO JOCKEL: 17 July 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 17 July 1963 Top Secret Personal You sent me a copy of your letter to Mick Shann of the 2nd July asking for comments on the suggestion that we might try to link our defence association with Malaysia with the defence and preservation of peace in South East...’
87. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 18 July 1963; ‘Canberra, 18 July 1963 487. Confidential Priority Malaysia We have repeated to you, Washington telegram 1840.1 We think you might encourage the Malayans to give thought to the points in paragraph 8.2 It is desirable that the Summit should keep control and while using the resources of the Secretary-General, avoid...’
88. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 22 July 1963; ‘Canberra, 22 July 1963 497. Confidential Reference your telegram No. 424.1 We were pleased, of course, to hear of the position adopted by U Thant.2 However, we think that a simple policy of ‘leaving it to him’ at the summit might not work and that the Malayans should be thinking...’
89. LETTER FROM WOOLCOTT TO WALLER: 23 July 1963; ‘Singapore, 23 July 1963 Personal Confidential I feel obliged to report to you personally that Lee Kuan Yew is at present in an aggressive and angry mood about the role which he considers Australia has played behind the scenes in the Malaysia talks since last April. The effect of our...’
90. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 27 July 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 1963 445. Secret Immediate Malaysia Your telegrams 511 and 512.1 1. Baldwin saw Tunku today. Baldwin did not refer to invitation to both Malaysia celebrations. We both feel that it would have been far more damaging to have failed to send Indonesia an invitation when others...’
91. MEMORANDUM FROM CRITCHLEY TO WALLER: 28 July 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 28 July 1963 Top Secret Personal Top Secret Personal Many thanks for your letter of the 16th July on future Australian defence arrangements with Malaysia.1 As I am leaving for Borneo in the morning I shall not be able to give you considered opinions but the following are...’
92. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 29 July 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 29 July 1963 447. Confidential Malaysia Djatikasumo who returned from Djakarta on July 27th asked to see Tunku urgently. Tunku saw him yesterday morning but found he had nothing positive to say.1 Razak told me last night that Djatikasumo had implied that Sukarno would demonstrate at the Summit...’
93. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CUTTS: 29 July 1963; ‘Canberra, 29 July 1963 448. Confidential Immediate Please pass the following message to Dr. Subandrio from Barwick: ‘I was naturally glad to learn that the Manila Summit will take place as planned and profoundly hope the meeting will be successful. As you know, I have always been conscious of Indonesia’s...’
94. CABLEGRAM FROM CUTTS TO CANBERRA: 1 August 1963; ‘Manila, 1 August 1963 494. Confidential Immediate Yesterday’s communique (our 490)1 reflects the unexpected rapid agreement by the leaders regarding means of settling their differences. The way for this was possibly paved by a personal call upon Sukarno paid by the Tunku prior to the meeting, presumably to offer his...’
95. CABLEGRAM FROM CUTTS TO CANBERRA: 2 August 1963; ‘Manila, 2 August 1963 497. Confidential Foreign Ministers met until late last night and will continue this morning. Leaders are scheduled to meet later this morning. Lopez announced last night that the Foreign Ministers had completed for submission to leaders a draft of ‘declaration’ which is ‘a statement of principles...’
96. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 4 August 1963; ‘Canberra, 4 August 1963 3067. Secret Immediate Malaysia Your 3956.1 The important thing from Australia’s point of view is: (a) that Malaysia should be born without the unflinching hostility of its neighbours; (b) that the position of the Tunku should be preserved. If in fact the Tunku is sheltering behind...’
97. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 8 August 1963; ‘Singapore, 8 August 1963 421. Confidential Malaysia Minister for Finance, Dr. Goh, told me last night Singapore Ministers are very disturbed over outcome of Manila meeting. 2. Singapore Cabinet generally considers that harsh fact is Indonesia is not prepared to accept Malaysia and Tengku has damaged his prestige and Malaya’s...’
98. LETTER FROM MENZIES TO BARWICK: 8 August 1963; ‘Canberra, 8 August 1963 I have been giving some further consideration to the terms of the Manila Declaration and the Joint Statement. In the result my anxieties are increased. I feel that Sukarno has had a very marked success and that the United Kingdom has been put in a highly...’
99. MINUTE BY DEFENCE COMMITTEE: 9 August 1963; ‘Canberra, 9 August 1963 Secret No. 50/1963: Australian Association with the Malaysian Defence Agreement Without Agendum The Committee considered a draft paper which examines the following three methods which appear possible for entering into an agreement to maintain Australian forces within Malaysia:— (a) to negotiate a separate Australian–Malaysian Agreement; (b)...’
100. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CRITCHLEY: 15 August 1963; ‘Canberra, 15 August 1963 565. Secret I should like you to approach the Malayan authorities as soon as possible regarding our defence arrangements post Malaysia. You might begin by referring to my statement of 27th March, 1963, emphasising that the security of Malaysia is a matter of close concern to...’
101. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 20 August 1963; ‘Singapore, 20 August 1963 443. Confidential Priority Malaysia Lee Kuan Yew is leaving for North Borneo tomorrow. He will see Chief Minister (Ningkan) in Kuching on way although Governor1 does not favour visit to Sarawak. 2. Lee intends to declare Singapore independent on 31st of August and Selkirk doesn’t think...’
102. LETTER FROM MENZIES TO OLIVER: 22 August 1963; ‘Canberra, 22 August 1963 Secret I have the letter of today’s date signed by your Deputy High Commissioner.1 The Minister for External Affairs and I have had an opportunity of discussing this matter. The views of the Australian Government may be put in this way— (1) We think that the...’
103. CABLEGRAM TO JAKARTA: 23 August 1963; ‘Canberra, 23 August 1963 894. Secret Immediate Please convey following message from Barwick.1 Begins: 1. ‘I have been closely following the course of events since the Manila summit and I am greatly disappointed that its results are being brought into jeopardy by insistence on a number of observers. It appeared...’
104. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CRITCHLEY: 27 August 1963; ‘Canberra, 27 August 1963 601. Secret Emergency Reference Shann’s telegram 7621 which has just been repeated to you, please see Duncan Sandys2 immediately and tell him the substance of Shann’s telegram. 2. You should say that Sir Robert Menzies and I have considered Shann’s recommendation and support it. The Prime...’
105. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CRITCHLEY: 29 August 1963; ‘Canberra, 29 August 1963 608. Secret Emergency Reference your telegram No. 534.1 I want you to see Duncan Sandys again immediately and take up the very important issues which emerge from your report. You should know that I cannot share his satisfaction with the way the situation is working out....’
106. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO BARWICK: 29 August 1963; ‘Singapore, 29 August 1963 476. Secret Emergency Your telegram 608.1 Sandys with Selkirk, Moore and Warner2 saw Woolcott and me early this morning. I went carefully through the points of your message. 2. Sandys said he fully agreed with your objectives, in particularly with the need, if possible, to bring...’
107. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 3 September 1963; ‘Singapore, 3 September 1963 494. Confidential Immediate Malaysia Kuala Lumpur telegrams 4471 and 5602 refer. Sandys, Selkirk and Moore are in Kuala Lumpur today as a result of Federation Cabinet statement last evening which took British and Lee completely by surprise.3 Lee had insisted that some assertion of will towards...’
108. CABLEGRAM FROM WOOLCOTT TO CANBERRA: 6 September 1963; ‘Singapore, 6 September 1963 500. Secret Malaysia I saw Selkirk and Moore yesterday and Deputy Prime Minister (Dr. Toh)1 this morning. Following appears to be present position: 2. Singapore is threatening to declare full independence and invite selected pro-Asian countries such as the U.A.R. and Cambodia to recognise it on...’
109. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 11 September 1963; ‘Canberra, 11 September 1963 644. Secret Immediate Future Association with British–Malaysian Defence Treaty In answer to a question in the House yesterday, Prime Minister said a positive statement on this matter would be made before long. 2. Please commence preliminary discussions with Malayan authorities on the text which follows below....’
110. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 14 September 1963; ‘Canberra, 14 September 1963 663. Unclassified Immediate Please convey following message from the Prime Minister to the Tunku:— Begins:— I offer you the warmest greetings of myself and my colleagues on the occasion of the coming into existence of Malaysia.1 We in Australia have expressed a clear and continuing conviction...’
111. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO MENZIES: 14 September 1963; ‘Jakarta, 14 September 1963 825. Secret Immediate Saw Sukarno this morning, Shann and Subandrio in attendance.1 I thought him in noticeably declining health. I had already seen a summary of Michelmore’s findings (from British).2 Although uncertain, I doubt if the Indonesians had received the report or a summary. No one...’
112. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 16 September 1963; ‘Jakarta, 16 September 1963 828. Unclassified Immediate Subandrio announced today Indonesia would not consider proclamation of Malaysia tomorrow as legal because of flaws in United Nations’ Survey in the Borneo Territories. Subandrio made announcement after meeting of Ministers and Services Chiefs at Bogor Palace.1 Subandrio listed three flaws. First :...’
113. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO MENZIES: 16 September 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 16 September 1963 602. Secret Immediate Our 599.1 Terms of letter2 have been cleared by Critchley with Razak personally. Although Razak said arrangement including its publicity would be alright with his Government, as far as we know it has not gone to Cabinet. In any case letters have...’
114. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 19 September 1963; ‘Jakarta, 19 September 1963 840. Secret Malaysia – Indonesian Policy Despite the dramatic events of the last few days, notably the attack on the British and Malayan Embassies, and the withdrawal of the Malayan Embassy,1 the Indonesian Government’s ultimate objective remains unclear. Indeed it seems to me that the Government...’
115. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 19 September 1963; ‘Canberra, 19 September 1963 751. Confidential Priority Malaysia Your 1172,1 11742 We agree that if matter is raised further the correct approach should be firmness without unnecessary provocation and that Malaysians should, if possible, make the running, in response to Indonesian moves. 2. Obviously we would oppose firmly any challenge...’
116. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 21 September 1963; ‘Canberra, 21 September 1963 695. Confidential Malaysia and the United Nations Our immediately following telegram contains text of report from New York on 20th September. (UN 1193).1 2. Minister would like you to tell the Tunku that he himself has considered this matter closely on the basis of the New...’
117. CABINET DECISION NO. 1040: 24 September 1963; ‘Canberra, 24 September 1963 Secret Without Memorandum—Australia’s Defence Association with Malaysia The Cabinet discussed the substance and the form of the statement to be made to Parliament on the subject of Australia’s defence association with Malaysia. 2. It was agreed that the Government should use the occasion of the statement...’
118. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 25 September 1963; ‘Canberra, 25 September 1963 Confidential Lydman1 saw Waller this morning and in the course of a long discussion on Indonesia and Malaysia said that he hoped the Tunku would maintain a flexible position and not close the door to future negotiations. It would be dangerous just to sit back and...’
119. LETTER FROM TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN TO MENZIES: 26 September 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 26 September 1963 Confidential I was most heartened to receive an extract of the statement you made in Parliament on 25th September when in no uncertain manner you made the following remarks: ‘… that if, in the circumstances that now exist, there occurs, in relation to Malaysia or...’
120. CABLEGRAM TO ALL POSTS: 26 September 1963; ‘Canberra, 26 September 1963 AP71. Secret Indonesia Indonesian foreign and domestic policies, which prior to September 17th were often shrewdly calculated, at present appear to be based on emotional considerations likely neither to increase Indonesia’s economic strength or her international reputation. Until the direction of these new policies can be...’
121. EXTRACT FROM MINUTE BY THE ANZAM DEFENCE COMMITTEE: 3 October 1963; ‘Canberra, 3 October 1963 No. 6/1963. Top Secret Commonwealth Defence in South-East Asia in the Light of Indonesian Policy and Activity [ matter omitted ] Consideration 2. The Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East1 outlined the latest British intelligence assessments of the threat to Malaysia in the Borneo...’
122. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR, SINGAPORE, JAKARTA AND MANILA: 4 October 1963; ‘Canberra, 4 October 1963 721. 766. 1124. 567. Unclassified Minister in statement at UNGA1 after reiterating main aspects of establishment of Malaysia said: ‘When Indonesia and the Philippines early this year expressed their misgivings about the extension of the Federation, Australia encouraged a meeting of the three Governments as a...’
123. CABLEGRAM TO LOOMES: 4 October 1963; ‘Canberra, 4 October 1963 694. Secret Indonesia/Malaysia We have had a number of reports indicating Thai willingness to use its good offices to bring about a reconciliation between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. While we naturally welcome any step which is genuinely likely to bring a relaxation of tension, we...’
124. LETTER FROM WALLER TO CRITCHLEY: 4 October 1963; ‘Canberra, 4 October 1963 Secret I think you should have some personal background information about recent developments over Malaysian defence. You are probably wondering about the precise significance of the Prime Minister’s pledge to assist in the defence of Malaysia. His final sentence was very carefully chosen and scrutinised by...’
125. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA AND PARIS: 9 October 1963; ‘New York, 9 October 1963 UNI 342. 32. Secret Immediate Please pass following message from Minister1 to Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, who leaves Paris tomorrow 10th October by air for Vienna at 1250 p.m. your time. ‘I was sorry not to be able to see you again before you...’
126. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 9 October 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 9 October 1963 694. Secret Malaysia In considering the effects of Indonesian policies against Malaysia, I assume that the adoption of confrontation in its present extreme form and with all its dangers for Indonesia is based on a false analogy—the belief that policies that worked for West Irian...’
127. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 11 October 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 11 October 1963 702. Secret Guard Malaysia My 698.1 Baldwin spoke to me this morning (October 10) about his talk with the Tunku yesterday and confirmed that he was satisfied that the Tunku would not agree to Tripartite talks now. His account suggests a milder approach than the...’
128. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 14 October 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 14 October 1963 704. Secret Priority Malaysia Your telegram 7411 request for elaboration of paragraphs 6 and 7 of my telegram 694.2 Tunku has recovered from damage to his prestige resulting from Manila talks but he could not get away with another ‘humbling’ of himself. Much in Malaysian...’
129. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CANBERRA: 17 October 1963; ‘Washington, 17 October 1963 2785. Secret Priority Please pass following to Critchley in Kuala Lumpur. I should be glad if you would take an early opportunity to see the Tunku and convey to him the following message from me. 2. I feel that you will be interested to have my...’
130. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 30 October 1963; ‘Washington, 30 October 1963 2926. Secret Malaysia Further to our 2886 para. 4,1 Cuthell2 discussed with us at greater length today his recent visit to Malaysia.3 2. He concentrated on an interview the congressional group (our 2646)4 had in Kuala Lumpur on 12 October with the Tunku and Ghazali which,...’
131. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 31 October 1963; ‘Canberra, 31 October 1963 799. Secret Immediate Reference our telegram No. 796.2 As you know from his talks in Washington one of the factors in the Minister’s mind has been the risk that Lee would attempt to exploit a move by the Tunku for a conference. The Minister has no...’
132. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 4 November 1963; ‘Canberra, 4 November 1963 SECRET Malaysia Your 2926.1 We would like you to continue discussion with Cuthell on Tunku’s attitude to Indonesia. You should say in first place, that we believe that the Tunku on the whole has been moderate in his public behaviour considering the treatment which he received...’
133. DEPARTMENTAL BRIEF FOR TANGE: 11 November 1963; ‘Canberra, 11 November 1963 Secret Current Developments Affecting Malaysia Malayan Attitude The Tunku believes that Indonesian bad faith has been clearly demonstrated and that new tripartite talks will only result in further meaningless promises. The task facing Malaysia in his view, is one of national consolidation and he has accordingly...’
134. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 28 November 1963; ‘Jakarta, 28 November 1963 1143. Secret Immediate Malaysia When we had disposed of the border matter1 and the fuss over the Colombo Plan,2 1 asked Subandrio whether he yet saw any light on Malaysia. He said that he did not. The Tunku, encouraged by the British because of their policy...’
135. MINUTE FROM BUNTING TO MENZIES: 5 December 1963; ‘Canberra, 5 December 1963 Top Secret Australian Assistance to the Defence of Eastern Malaysia1 I attach a letter which I have received from the British High Commission, forecasting requests for assistance by Australian forces in Eastern Malaysia.2 The subject is about to be taken up by the Defence Committee,3 after...’
136. DEA PAPER: 10 December 1963; ‘Canberra, c. 10 December 19631 Secret British/Malaysian Request for the Use of Australian Forces The Prime Minister’s Pledge —25th September, 1963 ‘If … there occurs in relation to Malaysia or any of its constituent States, armed invasion or subversive activity—supported or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia—we shall to the...’
137. MINUTE FROM BLAKERS TO HICKS: 10 December 1963; ‘Canberra, 10 December 1963 Top Secret External Affairs has produced a paper on political aspects of Australian assistance in Malaysia2 which, I understand, takes a pretty cautious line. 2. We have no advice as yet of the United States attitude to the British requests. 3. The External Affairs paper will...’
138. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO HARRISON: 16 December 1963; ‘Canberra, 16 December 1963 5286. Secret Immediate Please convey the following message from me to Mr Duncan Sandys immediately. Message begins. I want you to know that our defence machinery is examining, as a matter of urgency, the list of ways in which you think Australia could come to the...’
139. REPORT BY THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE: 18 December 1963; ‘Canberra, 18 December 1963 Top Secret Military Implications for Australia of the Malaysian Situation Introduction Attached at Appendix A is an extract from a British paper listing the additional forces in eastern Malaysia which Britain considers would be the most useful Australian and New Zealand contributions if a request for...’
140. SUBMISSION FROM BUNTING TO MENZIES: 19 December 1963; ‘Canberra, 19 December 1963 Top Secret Malaysia What you said in Parliament in September was this:— ‘… if in the circumstances that now exist and which will continue for a long time, there occurs, in relation to Malaysia or any of its constituent states, armed invasion or subversive activity—supported or...’
141. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO CRITCHLEY: 27 December 1963; ‘Canberra, 27 December 1963 951. Secret Please pass following message to the Tunku and ensure that Razak is informed as soon as practicable. Begins: ‘My colleagues and I have considered further Australian military assistance to Malaysia. Your people will now have had an account from Critchley of the outcome of...’
142. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO SHANN: 30 December 1963; ‘Canberra, 30 December 1963 1477. Secret Immediate Please pass the following message to Subandrio from me and inform him at the same time that I have asked you to speak in the same sense to General Nasution. Begins: 1. I have watched with grave concern the continuation of Indonesia’s policy...’
143. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 30 December 1963; ‘Canberra, 30 December 1963 955. Confidential Malaysia and the United Nations Reference your telegram No. 930.1 The question of involving the United Nations directly in support of Malaysia has been under careful study. It is a course of action which on first view appears to have attractions and at some...’
144. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 31 December 1963; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 31 December 1963 939. Secret Immediate Malaysian Complaint to United Nations At short notice this morning Razak (in Tunku’s absence) called Wade, Bottomley1 (Acting British High Commissioner) and me to meeting with Dato Ismail, Tan Siew Sin, Donald Stephens, Tunku Ngah and himself to discuss Indonesian attack on...’
145. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 9 January 1964; ‘Canberra, 9 January 1964 31. Secret Priority Indonesian Attitudes The Malaysian Government may have seen recent public references in Djakarta to the personal message which the Minister sent to Subandrio last week.1 They will also have seen the specious commentary of the Indonesian ‘Herald’ referred to in our telegram No....’
146. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 21 January 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 21 January 1964 79. Secret Malaysia—Kennedy’s Visit1 Before lunch today, Kennedy gave Bottomley and me a half hour briefing on his talks so far including meeting with Tunku this morning (21st January). 2. At their meeting in Tokyo Sukarno had agreed to announce on Thursday the calling off...’
147. CABLEGRAM FROM BEALE TO MENZIES AND BARWICK: 22 January 1964; ‘Washington, 22 January 1964 177. Secret Guard You will have gathered from my messages that I have not been enthusiastic about Robert Kennedy’s intervention in the Malaysian matter. One reason for this was my feeling that those responsible for this trip had not been sufficiently aware of or had ignored...’
148. CABLEGRAM TO WASHINGTON: 23 January 1964; ‘Canberra, 23 January 1964 169. Secret Kennedy Mission We have not attempted to inject our views into the current discussions conducted by Robert Kennedy. While we should have preferred that the effort ‘to rescue’ the Indonesians from their present course should have been deferred for some time, we do not...’
149. SUBMISSION NO. 30 FROM HASLUCK AND BARWICK TO CABINET: 24 January 1964; ‘Canberra, 24 January 1964 Secret Defence Assistance for Malaysia Introduction 1. Over the last six months the Malaysian authorities have stated from time to time their intention to approach Australia (and New Zealand) for defence assistance (equipment, training etc.) once the extent of United Kingdom assistance has been established. 2....’
150. NOTE FROM BUNTING TO MENZIES: 24 January 1964; ‘Canberra, 24 January 1964 Top Secret Defence of Malaysia Mr Hasluck will wish to tell Cabinet on Tuesday1 that our Defence authorities have received the following message from the British Commander in Chief Far East2:— ‘I have received a request from the Federation of Malaysia for the Australian and New...’
151. CABINET DECISION NO. 39: 28 January 1964; ‘Melbourne, 28 January 1964 Secret Submission No. 30 – Defence Assistance for Malaysia2 The Cabinet agreed:— (a) that in order to strengthen Malaysia’s defence potential, defence assistance of the nature and scale sketched in the Submission should be given to Malaysia by Australia from a special fund of £3 million...’
152. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO LOOMES: 4 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 4 February 1964 91. Secret Immediate Please deliver this message from me to Dr. Subandrio immediately. It is important that he should receive it before the Tripartite meetings begin:1 Begins:— I have studied your letter of 6th January, 1964,2 with great care and I am grateful to you for...’
153. SAVINGRAM TO SELECTED POSTS: 4 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 4 February 1964. Secret Indonesia/Malaysia/Philippines Meeting Rogers2 left for Bangkok today to keep in touch with developments through discreet contact with the Malaysian Delegation. Appended is a Departmental Working Paper which contains material for him to talk over with the Malaysians if practicable. It has been sighted by the...’
154. CABLEGRAM TO SELECTED POSTS: 4 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 4 February 1964 Secret Immediate Indonesia—Recourse to the United Nations Until the present the Minister has taken the view that Indonesia’s actions in the border regions of Malaysia should be reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations but that political action through the Security Council or the General...’
155. NOTE FROM HASLUCK TO HICKS: 5 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 5 February 1964 I agree with the need for some caution in the way in which we express our reaction to paragraph 7.2 2. For the rest, I would like to see a stronger expression of an Australian view (i) that Malaysia cannot be expected to make any concessions;...’
156. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO BEALE: 5 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 5 February 1964 Secret Priority Please pass the following message urgently to Rusk: Begins: Thank you very much for your letter of 9th January.1 I am glad that there is such a degree of understanding between us on the policies we respectively follow towards Indonesia. Allow me to say...’
157. SAVINGRAM TO ALL POSTS: 6 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 6 February 1964 AP15. Secret The Problem of Indonesian Hostility towards Malaysia The following points on Australian general policy objectives in respect of Malaysia and Indonesia have been drawn from a slightly longer submission approved by the Prime Minister and Sir Garfield Barwick1:— (1) Our primary consideration is the...’
158. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 12 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 12 February 1964 164. Secret Priority Reference your telegram No. 199.1 You will have seen from our telegram No. 3712 to Washington that we think Malaysians did well in the difficult situation in which they were placed by the Kennedy Mission. Lopez in Bangkok was putting it about that...’
159. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 13 February 1964; ‘New York, 13 February 1964 UN 149. Confidential Malaysia and the United Nations This telegram outlines some of the considerations which will have to be taken into account in deciding whether and how Malaysia should approach the United Nations in the event of a resumption of hostilities. The main conclusions...’
160. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 17 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 17 February 1964 183. Secret Thank you for your useful telegrams Nos. 212, 213 and 214.1 2. As you know, we have strenuously argued the Malaysian case that the Indonesian infiltrators should be withdrawn and we shall continue to do so. At the same time, we think that Razak...’
161. CABLEGRAM TO SELECTED POSTS: 20 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 20 February 1964 Confidential Malaysia/Indonesia As you know we have endorsed the type of suggestion you made in your telegram UNI48,2 and previously made by the British Mission in New York, concerning the practical ways in which the Malaysians could substantially help their cause in the United Nations and...’
162. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 20 February 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 20 February 1964 231. Secret Immediate Ceasefire in Borneo My 227.1 I spoke to Razak briefly this morning before he left for Pahang and later to Ghazali. My immediately following telegram is the text of the letter which Razak gave Head this morning. As you will see it...’
163. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 27 February 1964; ‘Canberra, 27 February 1964 170. Secret Immediate Malaysia As you know another Ministerial Meeting is now to be held in Bangkok on 3rd March.1 The Malaysians in proposing it said they wanted it confined to the cease-fire and presence of Indonesian troops. 2. We know that the Indonesians and Filipinos...’
164. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 28 February 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 28 February 1964 290. Secret Immediate Your 231.1 Malaysians are understandably most anxious to avoid a summit unless the Indonesians agree in Bangkok to withdraw the forces under their control from Malaysia or (if Subandrio argues that he has no authority) agree to recommend the withdrawal publicly to...’
165. CABLEGRAM FROM LOOMES TO CANBERRA: 3 March 1964; ‘Bangkok, 3 March 1964 06. Secret Emergency Critchley, who arrived in Bangkok from Hua Hin1 this morning in transit to Kuala Lumpur, has asked me to send you the following message. Begins:— The Tunku has decided to consult with Razak in Bangkok on the Malaysia stand in the Ministerial talks....’
166. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO LOOMES: 4 March 1964; ‘Canberra, 4 March 1964 206. Secret Immediate Reference our telegram No. 202.1 I should like you to give the Tunku and Razak my views on the crucially important matter of the public explanation and presentation of the Malaysian case in the event of the talks breaking down. In that event...’
167. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 4 March 1964; ‘Washington, 4 March 1964 634. Confidential Priority Indonesia/Malaysia The Tunku’s reported announcement yesterday of his intention to have recourse to the U.N.1 leads us to suggest for consideration that Australia should perhaps seek the right to be heard by the Security Council if and when the Malaysian question comes up...’
168. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO UPTON AND LOOMES: 6 March 1964; ‘Canberra, 6 March 1964 284. 217. Secret Please pass following letter from me to Dr. Subandrio: Begins:— I am deeply disturbed that no progress was made at the Bangkok meeting which has just concluded.1 I must tell you that I believe the attitude of the Malaysian Government in declining to...’
169. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO BEALE: 6 March 1964; ‘Canberra, 6 March 1964 667. Secret Immediate Indonesia-Malaysia Your 635.1 Your message is most disturbing and reflects a point of view which you and your staff must contest at all appropriate levels and with great urgency in the White House and the State Department. 2. Please leave with Harriman and...’
170. CABLEGRAM FROM BEALE TO BARWICK: 6 March 1964; ‘Washington, 6 March 1964 665. Secret Guard Priority Indonesia/Malaysia Your 667.1 1. I delivered your message to Harriman on 6th March. To emphasize the seriousness of the occasion, I read the message out to him and gave copies to those also present (Hilsman, Forrestal, Cuthell and Ingraham).2 2. A rather...’
171. CABLEGRAM FROM BEALE TO BARWICK: 8 March 1964; ‘Washington, 8 March 1964 669. Secret Guard Priority Indonesia/Malaysia My telegram 665.1 1. In view of my talk with Harriman and his young men Friday and of Rusk’s reply of 5th March to your last two messages to him, I see little prospect at present of moving the Americans from...’
172. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO BEALE: 10 March 1964; ‘Canberra, 10 March 1964 691. Secret Priority Indonesia/Malaysia Reference your telegram No. 669.1 We are grateful for the spirit and skilful way in which you have defended our interests. I am glad you will be having a talk with Rusk. I suggest you give him a short message from me...’
173. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 10 March 1964; ‘Canberra, 10 March 1964 282. Secret Priority Malaysian Approach to United Nations Your 352.1 Our position on reference to the United Nations has not changed. We think that the time for the appeal to the Security Council is not appropriate now for three reasons: (a) despite the break-down of the...’
174. SAVINGRAM TO ALL POSTS: 12 March 1964; ‘Canberra, 12 March 1964 AP39. Restricted Indonesia/Malaysia In discussions with colleagues and the Government to which you are accredited, please take all available opportunities to stress the following points:— 1. Australia remains anxious to explore every avenue of possible agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia. 2. Malaysia is now an international...’
175. CABLEGRAM TO SELECTED POSTS: 13 March 1964; ‘Canberra, 13 March 1964 Secret Guard Priority Lim Yew Hock2 who is returning to Kuala Lumpur today for consultations had an hour with the Minister yesterday. 2. The Minister reaffirmed Australia’s military commitment and asked that Malaysia precede any formal request for Australian troops by close and regular consultations with...’
176. SUBMISSION FROM HICKS TO HASLUCK: 13 March 1964; ‘Canberra, 13 March 1964 Secret Deployment of Units of Australian Forces I refer to our discussion yesterday concerning the possibility of the deployment of some units of the armed forces to an area which would convince Indonesia that we were serious in our intentions to support Malaysia. 2. As I...’
177. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO MINISTER: 25 March 1964; ‘Jakarta, 25 March 1964 333. Secret Immediate Subandrio called me in this evening shortly before a meeting with Sukarno. He is leaving in a few hours for The Hague and Paris (returning on the 6th or 7th of April) and said that Sukarno would want to know where Australia stood...’
178. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 6 April 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 6 April 1964 440. Top Secret Priority Australian Forces Our 423.1 I received today (April 6) from Razak formal request for Australian Government’s permission to use Australian forces in Malaya to deal with Indonesian incursions on the mainland if need arises. New Zealanders received similar request. 2. Letter...’
179. CABINET DECISION NO. 138 (FAD): 9 April 1964; ‘Canberra, 9 April 1964 Top Secret Submission No. 126—Use of Australian Forces against Indonesian trained Infiltrators in Malaysia The Committee noted the request of the government of Malaysia that Australian forces in the Strategic Reserve should be made available as required to meet infiltration from Indonesia onto the mainland of...’
180. REPORT BY THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE: 13 April 1964; ‘Canberra, 13 April 1964 No. 18/1964. Top Secret Australian Forces for the Defence of Malaysia In our report of 19th March we recommended that assistance should be offered by Australia along the lines indicated to the informal requests by the Malaysian Department of Defence for assistance by Australian forces.1 [...’
181. CABINET DECISION NO. 147 (FAD): 14 April 1964; ‘Canberra, 14 April 1964 Top Secret Submission No. 136—Australian Forces for the Defence of Malaysia The Committee considered in the first place the message received during the week-end from the British Prime Minister seeking the approval of the Australian Government to the use in Borneo of the Australian battalion in...’
182. CABLEGRAM FROM BARWICK TO SHANN: 17 April 1964; ‘Canberra, 17 April 1964 453. Confidential Immediate Please pass the following message to Dr Subandrio from me. Begins: ‘Mr Shann tells me that he has already informed you of the statement by the Australian Minister of Defence in Parliament on 16th April announcing that we have agreed to provide further...’
183. SUBMISSION NO. 188 FROM PALTRIDGE TO CABINET: 8 May 1964; ‘Canberra, 8 May 1964 Top Secret Australian Forces for the Defence of Malaysia Introduction 1. On 14th April last, the Cabinet Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee considered the attached message dated 10th April from the British Prime Minister seeking approval to use in Borneo the Australian battalion in the Strategic...’
184. SUBMISSION FROM WALLER TO HASLUCK: 12 May 1964; ‘Canberra, 12 May 1964 Secret Malaysia-Indonesia-Philippines—Summit Meeting This submission outlines the background to the current discussions on the possibility of another Heads of Government meeting between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Critchley, in reporting the Malaysians’ present thinking (telegram No. 565, dated 10th May),2 has asked whether we have any...’
185. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 13 May 1964; ‘Canberra, 13 May 1964 497. Secret The Defence and Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee of Cabinet reviewed briefly last night the current discussions on the possibility of another meeting between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. We appreciate the need for Malaysia to appear before the world as peace-loving and reasonable but are...’
186. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 9 June 1964; ‘Jakarta, 9 June 1964 635. Confidential Malaysia-Indonesian Policy Present indications that the Indonesians are stepping up, rather than reducing, their activity in North Borneo,1 underline the impression I have that Indonesia neither expects nor wishes a satisfactory outcome from a possible Summit. They must know (and perhaps want this) that...’
187. CABLEGRAM FROM MCINTYRE TO CANBERRA: 17 June 1964; ‘Tokyo, 17 June 1964 478. Confidential Priority Malaysia My telegram 473.2 No ministerial meeting as yet, and it is doubtful whether any start can be made this evening. No word yet received that Thais are even in position ready to verify withdrawal.3 2. I talked last evening with Razak and...’
188. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO GORTON: 20 June 1964; ‘Singapore, 20 June 1964 446. Top Secret Immediate Malaysia 1. I have as yet no details of the progress of the Tokyo summit meeting but after extensive briefings at Phoenix Park2 and in Kuala Lumpur I am gravely concerned at the likely course of events. 2. Nothing I have heard...’
189. MINUTE FROM SHAW TO JOCKEL: 26 June 1964; ‘Canberra, 26 June 1964 Secret Malaysia and the United Nations I spoke to the Minister about the possible involvement of the United Nations over the Indonesian/Malaysian confrontation. I described the various considerations which had made it difficult to arrive at a firm conclusion about the extent to which we should...’
190. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 27 June 1964; ‘Canberra, 27 June 1964 639. Secret Malaysia and the United Nations Minister will be discussing matter with the Prime Minister and perhaps the Tunku in London. 2. In the meantime we should not volunteer views but, if required to express a view, it would be on the lines that we...’
191. CABLEGRAM FROM MCEWEN TO MENZIES: 3 July 1964; ‘Canberra, 3 July 1964 3245. Top Secret The Cabinet has considered Sir Alec Douglas-Home’ s message of 23rd June about the possible requirement of the Commonwealth Brigade as further reinforcements for Borneo.2 2. The Defence Committee reported that the military necessity to commit the Australian battalion of the Commonwealth Brigade...’
192. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MCNAMARA AND HASLUCK: 16 July 1964; ‘Washington, 16 July 1964 Secret [ matter omitted ] Malaysia 17. The Minister introduced this subject by saying that Australia felt herself to be under a deep obligation towards the United States not to ‘trigger off’ the ANZUS commitment of the United States without prior consultation with Washington. He therefore...’
193. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 27 July 1964; ‘Singapore, 27 July 1964 514. Secret Priority I had lengthy interviews separately with Goh J. Keng Swee and Lee Kuan Yew this morning. Lee was poised and fluent, but anxious primarily to make his case. Goh was more balanced and interested to explore issues. 2. Both believed that the riots...’
194. CABLEGRAM FROM LOVEDAY TO CANBERRA: 27 July 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 1964 824. Secret Immediate Your 707.2 Prior to receiving your telegram, I had had a discussion this morning with Head (and Wade) about a gloomy exchange between Head and Sandys over prospects in Singapore and the Borneo territories. Head had suggested to Sandys that on Tunku’...’
195. LETTER FROM MENZIES TO DOUGLAS-HOME: 31 July 1964; ‘Canberra, 31 July 1964 Secret Most Personal At this end, and with the assistance of our most experienced High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, we have been giving much thought to Malaysia and to the mind and attitude of the Tunku himself. Our estimate is that Soekarno is not likely to...’
196. PERSONAL NOTE FROM BUNTING TO MENZIES: 4 August 1964; ‘Canberra, 4 August 1964 Secret I attach some notes towards a speech to Parliament next week, on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting … [ matter omitted ] 4. You will find it very much a narrative with not much highlight and not much analysis. Therefore what I want to say...’
197. NOTE FROM MOODIE TO HASLUCK: 17 August 1964; ‘Canberra, 17 August 1964. Secret Indonesian Infiltrations into Malaya I attach a copy of telegram 868 from Kuala Lumpur which refers to news of landings early this morning near Pontian in western Johore and also to possible landings on the east coast of Johore.2 2. We have had indications for...’
198. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 3 September 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 3 September 1964 935. Secret Priority Indonesian Paratroop Landing Our telegram 930.1 Malaysians called an emergency meeting September 2nd to discuss the situation. Present were – Tunku, Razak, Ismail, Fenner,2 Tunku Osman,3 Ghazali, Nik Daud,4 Head, Wade and myself. 2. Fenner explained that the Indonesians had dropped 14...’
199. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 3 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 3 September 1964 827. Top Secret Immediate Indonesian Paratroop Landings in Malaysia Your 953.1 You should be aware by now that British Government has told the Malaysian Government that the Security Council should be summoned immediately in an emergency session at which the Malaysian representative should make a statement...’
200. CABINET DECISION NO. 445: 4 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 4 September 1964 Top Secret Without Memorandum—Indonesian Paratroop Landing in Malaysia (Johore) The Minister for External Affairs outlined for the information of Cabinet the known facts of the Indonesian paratroop landing in Johore. He informed the Cabinet that the Malaysian Government had decided to take the matter of the...’
201. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 5 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 5 September 1964 840. Secret Immediate Ministers have authorised you to convey assurance to Malaysian Government in following terms— Begins: The Australian Government agrees in principle that after the taking of the question of Indonesian attacks on Malayan territory to the Security Council, the defensive measures to be taken...’
202. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 6 September 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 6 September 1964 965. Secret Malaysia and the Security Council Before leaving Kuala Lumpur I am setting out below my preliminary thinking on the form that a resolution in the Security Council might take.1 I was not impressed by the possible draft resolution initially proposed by the British....’
203. SAVINGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 10 September 1964; ‘New York, 10 September 1964 78. Secret US Attitudes to Security Council Action on Malaysia Mr. F. Underhill,1 Deputy Under Secretary South West Pacific Affairs, who is with the United States delegation during the Security Council debate on Malaysia’s complaint against Indonesia, called on me on September 9th at his...’
204. CABLEGRAM TO ALL POSTS: 11 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 11 September 1964 AP102. Secret Malaysian Complaint in Security Council Following is a summary of Departmental thinking of present Security Council consideration of Malaysian complaint. The Malaysians requested an urgent meeting of the Council under Article 39, describing recent parachute drops as ‘a blatant and inexcusable aggression’.1 2. From...’
205. CABLEGRAM FROM MENZIES TO HARRISON: 11 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 11 September 1964 4396. Secret Immediate It is essential that Australian Government should have authoritative indications at Ministerial level of British Government thinking and intentions on their handling of relations with Indonesia. 2. You have Australia’s general objectives to be sought from Security Council discussions, our telegram 4324,1 and...’
206. CABLEGRAM FROM BUNTING TO HARRISON: 13 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 13 September 1964 4401. Top Secret The following is the text of a message handed to the British High Commissioner in reply to the British Government’s message of the 12th September concerning retaliatory action against Indonesia.1 Begins: The Australian Government is grateful for the message conveyed by the British...’
207. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 13 September 1964; ‘New York, 13 September 1964 UN896. Confidential Priority Malaysia Americans have suggested a resolution which after relatively minor modifications by Malaysians reads as follows— ‘Having considered the complaint of the Government of Malaysia as contained in document….1 Having heard the statements of the representatives of Malaysia and Indonesia:— 1. Deplores...’
208. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 17 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 17 September 1964 635. Secret Immediate Malaysia We assume active consideration is being given by members of the Council to the position which arises if the Norwegian resolution is vetoed.1 The discussion could lapse at that point and the Council simply remain formally seized of the matter. This might...’
209. CABLEGRAM FROM HAY TO CANBERRA: 17 September 1964; ‘New York, 17 September 1964 UN919. Secret Immediate Malaysia Your 635.1 In the light of today’s vote, Indonesians and Russians will find some difficulty in convincing representatives at the United Nations that Malaysians have ‘failed’ because of the Russian veto.2 It is true that Indonesians have not been placed under...’
210. CABLEGRAM FROM MENZIES TO HARRISON: 19 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 19 September 1964 4535. Top Secret Immediate Following is copy of a message to Home sent through British High Commission channels today. Begins:— Message to—Sir Alec Douglas-Home From—Sir Robert Menzies Thank you for your message of 18th September, in reply to my message of 13th September, 1964, on Indonesian...’
211. CABLEGRAM TO VAWDREY: 19 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 19 September 1964 887. Top Secret Immediate Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to the Malaysian Prime Minister: Begins: Please accept my warm congratulations on your resounding success in the Security Council despite Russian obstruction. It is clear that you selected just the right occasion for...’
212. SAVINGRAM TO SHANN: 21 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 21 September 1964 76. Top Secret Immediate SECRET PERSONAL Military Counter Measures Reference your telegram No. 941.2 In summary, for your information, in the period between the paratroop drop and the complaint to the Security Council the Malaysian Government sought and obtained assurances from Britain and Australia and New...’
213. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO HAY: 21 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 21 September 1964 645. Confidential Malaysia Thank you for your careful assessment of the Security Council proceedings.1 It is now under study. 2. In pursuit of our objective of ensuring that the United Nations (this is, the Security Council) remains effectively seized of the matter please make an early...’
214. CABLEGRAM FROM VAWDREY TO CANBERRA: 25 September 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 25 September 1964 1034. Top Secret Immediate Australian Forces Following is text of letter dated 25th September from Razak. ‘As you are aware, recent Indonesian landings in the peninsula have imposed a heavy strain on the Malaysian Forces. In an effort to relieve this burden arrangements are being...’
215. CABLEGRAM TO SELECTED POSTS: 26 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 26 September 1964 Confidential Non-Aligned Conference—Malaysia We are concerned that the Second Non-Aligned Conference to begin in Cairo on 5th October, and to be attended by President Sukarno, might lead to some weakening of the Afro-Asian support and understanding for Malaysia which has been built up at the Security...’
216. CABLEGRAM TO TOKYO: 30 September 1964; ‘Canberra, 30 September 1964 803. Confidential Priority Malaysia Your telegram 737.1 We are at present reviewing our attitude towards political negotiations between Indonesia and Malaysia, and hope to be able to provide general guidance shortly. 2. Since the Security Council Meeting, Tunku has received messages from Sukarno about an early...’
217. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 2 October 1964; ‘Canberra, 2 October 1964 950. Top Secret Immediate Use of Australian Forces Your telegram No. 1034.1 Chairman Chiefs of Staff is despatching following telegram to Admiral Begg. ‘Australia has agreed to the terms of the supplementary directive on employment of our forces on operations against Indonesian infiltrators into Malaya/Singapore as...’
218. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 6 October 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 6 October 1964 1077. Top Secret Guard Priority Head and I had a long talk with the Tunku and Ghazali this morning (October 6th). 2. Tunku said he saw clearly that Afro-Asian conciliation efforts were likely to lead to pressure on Malaysia to agree to a plebiscite in...’
219. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 9 October 1964; ‘Canberra, 9 October 1964 4874. Secret Malaysia: Afro-Asian Conciliation Please convey the following views in answer to the British request, conveyed through the High Commissioner’s Office here concerning the question of a plebiscite in the Borneo States as discussed in Kuala Lumpur on 6th October. Critchley’s telegram No. 1077 refers.2...’
220. LETTER FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 16 October 1964; ‘Canberra, 16 October 1964 Top Secret My purpose in writing to you is to provide you with a broad statement of government policy which I should wish you to follow in carrying out the important responsibilities which fall upon you in the course of your consultations with the Malaysian Government....’
221. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 29 October 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 29 October 1964 1185. Secret Immediate Indonesian Landing My 1177.1 Those present at meeting called by Tunku this afternoon were Ghazali, Bottomley, Wade and myself. 2. Tunku reported briefly on events this morning. He said the landing had been reported by the vigilantes and that Security Forces had...’
222. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 30 October 1964; ‘Canberra, 30 October 1964 1055. Secret Immediate Indonesian Landing: Security Council Action Your telegram No. 1185.1 Reference your paragraph 6, our view is that for the present an immediate message to the President of the Security Council would meet the case. We gather from your paragraph 4 that this is...’
223. CABLEGRAM TO NEW YORK: 3 November 1964; ‘Canberra, 3 November 1964 776. Confidential Priority Please transmit today following letter to President of the Security Council: Begins: I have the honour to refer to the letter addressed to you on 31st October by the Permanent Representative of Malaysia regarding further acts of aggression committed by Indonesia against Malaysia.1...’
224. CABLEGRAM FROM TANGE TO HASLUCK: 9 November 1964; ‘Canberra, 9 November 1964 5359. Top Secret Malaysia–Indonesia Following are Departmental comments. You will be aware that an important statement by Soekamo is foreshadowed for 10th November (Heroes’ Day) and that there is the possibility of further military action to mark the occasion. What follows is accordingly subject to whatever...’
225. LETTER FROM JOCKEL TO CRITCHLEY: 10 November 1964; ‘Canberra, 10 November 1964 Top Secret Further to my letter of 19th October, 1964,1 I am enclosing a copy of telegram No. 5359 sent to the Minister in London as background for his talks.2 We should be glad of any further impressions you may have formed of future Malaysian reaction...’
226. LETTER FROM CRITCHLEY TO JOCKEL: 13 November 1964; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 13 November 1964 Top Secret I refer to your letter of 10th November, reference 3006/4/9 and 687/9/2.1 As you can imagine I was very pleased to get the Minister’s standing instructions and I have been quietly doing what I can to influence the Tunku and other Ministers in...’
227. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CANBERRA: 25 November 1964; ‘Washington, 25 November 1964 3265. Confidential Harriman said today that Jones was much impressed by the development of the Chaerul Saleh–Adam Malik1 group as an anti-P.K.I. force.2 He believed they should be encouraged as a force which might check the P.K.I., which people such as Nasution might support and which...’
228. JIC (AUSTRALIA) WEEKLY REPORT: 15 December 1964; ‘Canberra, 15 December 1964 Secret Indonesia: Confrontation Activities During the past week the number of infiltrations by Indonesians into Malaya and Singapore has increased, but with small parties. Bases in the Riouw Islands have received some reinforcements; this is no doubt partly to replace troops who have been lost in...’
229. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN TANGE AND TUN LIM YEW HOCK: 30 December 1964; ‘Canberra, 30 December 1964 Secret In the course of a call by the Malaysian High Commissioner on another matter, the Secretary referred to reports which we had received about a build-up of Indonesian forces in Kalimantan. We did not expect any immediate trouble; it would take some time for the...’
230. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 6 January 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 6 January 1965 19. Unclassified My 18.1 Following is text of statement by Tunku Abdul Rahman after an emergency meeting of the Cabinet on January 4th: ‘The withdrawal from the United Nations by Indonesia follows a series of actions by that country in defiance of world opinion, rule...’
231. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 6 January 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 6 January 1965 23. Confidential Priority Reference my 18.1 My following telegram reports Tunku’s remarks to the press after Cabinet meeting this morning.2 2. Tunku told me this afternoon that he is preparing a draft submission to the United Nations which he would discuss with Bottomley, Wade and...’
232. PRIME MINISTER’S DEPARTMENT BRIEF: 7 January 1965; ‘Canberra, 7 January 1965 Top Secret Developments over Indonesian Confrontation of Malaysia On Christmas Eve the British High Commission circulated to the Australian Government copies of an appreciation by the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) outlining Indonesian moves to deploy regular forces in strength on the Borneo border and in...’
233. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 8 January 1965; ‘Canberra, 8 January 1965 28. Secret Immediate Malaysian Approach to United Nations Your telegram 23.1 1. In the short time available we can only give following brief comments which have been cleared with Minister. We assume that the Tunku intends to send his communication to the President of the Security...’
234. JIC (AUSTRALIA) REPORT: 13 January 1965; ‘Canberra, 13 January 1965 Secret The Military Situation in Malaysia Aim To assess the current military situation in Malaysia and the threat to the area over the next few months. This paper does not take into account the current or future political factors. The Military Situation The Borneo Territories 2....’
235. DEA PAPER: 15 January 1965; ‘Canberra, 15 January 1965 Secret Defence Aid for Malaysia The Malaysian proposals for expansion of the Malaysian defence forces have been examined by a Working Party of officials (Australia, Britain, New Zealand and Malaysia) in Kuala Lumpur and in Canberra by the Interdepartmental Committee.2 This examination, which has included a...’
236. DEFENCE COMMITTEE MINUTE: 17 January 1965; ‘Canberra, 17 January 1965 NO. 1/1965. Top Secret Current Malaysian Situation Following Indonesian Build-Up Introduction The Committee considered a message dated 15th January from the British Prime Minister to the Acting Prime Minister setting out the measures Britain proposes to take in response to the increasing Indonesian threat to Malaysia,...’
237. LETTER FROM MCEWEN TO WILSON: 19 January 1965; ‘Canberra, 19 January 1965 Top Secret With my Cabinet colleagues I have had the opportunity to consider your personal message of January 15th.3 We were impressed by the robustness with which your Government has approached the problem created by the continuing Indonesian aggression against Malaysia and we appreciated the frank...’
238. CABLEGRAM FROM PALTRIDGE TO MCEWEN: 21 January 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 21 January 1965 184. Top Secret Priority At our meeting this morning (21 January), Razak, after expressing his concern about the Indonesian build-up in Borneo and Sumatra, said he hoped Australia would be able to provide more troops. Razak was inclined to speak in general terms but emphasises...’
239. SUBMISSION NO. 599 FROM MCEWEN TO CABINET: 26 January 1965; ‘Canberra, 26 January 1965 Top Secret Possible Use of Australian Forces in the Defence of Malaysia At its meeting on 18th January, the Cabinet Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee considered Submission No. 588 by the Minister for Defence relating to a message from the United Kingdom Prime Minister dated 15th...’
240. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 27 January 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 27 January 1965 221. Secret Immediate Military Aid Following is text of letter from Tun Razak to High Commissioner under date 26th January:— ‘When your Minister of Defence, Senator Paltridge was here I spoke to him informally that, in view of the continued Indonesian military build-up along the...’
241. CABINET DECISION NO. 690 (FAD): 27 January 1965; ‘Canberra, 27 January 1965 Top Secret Submission No. 599—Possible Use of Australian Forces in the Defence of Malaysia1 The Committee noted— (a) the Malaysian requests as outlined in messages from the Minister for Defence on his discussions with Razak in Kuala Lumpur; (b) Razak’s agreement that these should be regarded...’
242. CABLEGRAM TO ALL POSTS: 3 February 1965; ‘Canberra, 3 February 1965 AP11. Confidential Further Australian Military Assistance to Malaysia We are cabling separately the text of the statement made today by the Acting Prime Minister on further measures to assist Malaysia.1 2. Please give a copy of the statement to Government to which you are accredited and...’
243. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 17 February 1965; ‘Jakarta, 17 February 1965 207. Secret Part 1.1 I had one and a quarter hours of friendly and light-hearted talk with Sukarno this morning, [ matter omitted ] 2. His references to Australia were not at any time in the least hostile.2 He said he thought that the Prime Minister...’
244. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO HASLUCK: 17 February 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 17 February 1965 417. Top Secret Austeo Central Government’s Relations with Singapore As you know, there has been a serious deterioration in Singapore’s relations with the Central Government since the P.A.P. contested elections in the Malayan Peninsula last year.1 For some time, it has been evident that events...’
245. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 17 February 1965; ‘Singapore, 17 February 1965 151. Confidential When Lendrum, New Zealand Deputy, saw Lee Kuan Yew yesterday to discuss his visit to New Zealand,1 Lee said that he hoped to go to Kuala Lumpur today to talk with the Tunku about a possible modus vivendi between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. He...’
246. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 18 February 1965; ‘Canberra, 18 February 1965 276. Top Secret Austeo Malaysia Your telegram No. 417 gives me a good deal of concern.1 I note your view that the Malaysians have to solve this problem for themselves but it is apparent that any major constitutional changes will be followed with the closest attention...’
247. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 20 February 1965; ‘Singapore, 20 February 1965 170. Top Secret Austeo Lee talked with me today about the proposal for constitutional revision. 2. He said that as far as he knew this was first mooted by Razak in an off-the-record talk with journalists in Kuala Lumpur on December 28. Some two or three...’
248. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 21 February 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 21 February 1965 446. Top Secret Malaysia Singapore’s 151.1 While I sympathise with many of the views in Singapore’s telegram, it is misleading to describe the conflict between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur as ‘the familiar conflict between modernisers and traditionalists’. Basically, it is a power struggle which because...’
249. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO HASLUCK: 21 February 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 21 February 1965 447. Top Secret Austeo Priority As Pritchett has pointed out, proposals have been modified and it is now intended that Singapore remain in the Federal Parliament speaking only on defence, foreign affairs and possibly internal security. The suggestion here is that the P.A.P. should be...’
250. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 23 February 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 1965 474. Secret Tunku called me to an urgent meeting this morning (February 23). Others present were Razak, Ismail, Tan Siew Sin, Ghazali and the British, New Zealand and Canadian High Commissioners. Canadian did not speak during the meeting.1 2. Tunku said he had very good...’
251. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY AND PRITCHETT: 24 February 1965; ‘Canberra, 24 February 1965 308. 202. Top Secret Exchanges between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. In addition to your reports we have had a British account of the sequence of the exchanges between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. We have also seen the instructions which have gone to Lord Head and I...’
252. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 25 February 1965; ‘Canberra, 25 February 1965 322. Secret Reference your telegrams Nos. 474,1 4752 and 481.3 The Department is examining the possible Indonesian motivation in suggesting a Ministerial meeting between Malaysia and Indonesia in Bangkok early next month. However, it seems apparent that it is a political manoeuvre and does not indicate...’
253. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO HASLUCK: 26 February 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 26 February 1965 510. Top Secret Priority My telegram 509.1 Pritchett and I are in general agreement about the proposals for a new relationship between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore although there are some differences of emphasis more particularly on what is practicable at this time. Our views are...’
254. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO HASLUCK: 27 February 1965; ‘Singapore, 27 February 1965 190. Top Secret Exchanges between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore After consultation with Critchley I spoke to Lee yesterday (Friday) afternoon in accordance with your cable 1651 (though without at this stage taking up the point in your paragraph 7 about internal security staying with the Central...’
255. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 1 March 1965; ‘Canberra, 1 March 1965 350. Secret Your telegram No. 523.1 We feel some misgivings at the possibility that the Tunku himself will go to Bangkok for direct talks with Sukarno. We think it probable that this new approach from Indonesia represents a calculated judgment that the Tunku is likely to...’
256. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO HASLUCK: 2 March 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 2 March 1965 554. Secret I went over the arguments in your 523 (322?)1 with the Tunku this morning. Razak was also present. Tunku appreciated the force of these arguments but said there was further background that you should know about 2. Recently there had been a number...’
257. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO HASLUCK: 3 March 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 3 March 1965 569. Top Secret Priority I spoke to the Tunku this morning along the lines of your 308.1 He quickly made it clear that the situation had changed and that there was no present prospect of a disengagement with Singapore. 2. Tunku said he had intended...’
258. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 3 March 1965; ‘Canberra, 3 March 1965 373. Secret Priority Talks in Bangkok Reference your telegram No. 554.1 This account provides useful insight into the Tunku’s thinking but does not alter our assessment of the Indonesian motivation behind the approaches they are making. 2. We accept the view that the Army in Indonesia...’
259. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO HASLUCK: 4 March 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 4 March 1965 581. Secret Priority Talks in Bangkok Your 373.1 All Malaysians I have talked to, including the Tunku would agree with the analysis in your paragraph 2. The Tunku believes that confrontation is being pushed by the Communists and is working to their advantage but he...’
260. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 8 March 1965; ‘Canberra, 8 March 1965 401. Secret Talks in Bangkok Reference your telegram No. 581.1 I am uncertain whether there is clear thinking behind the Malaysian argument that if all members of an Afro-Asian Commission accept in advance Malaysia’s sovereignty, then this in itself rules out an ascertainment. This line of...’
261. DEA MINISTERIAL BRIEF: 9 March 1965; ‘Canberra, 9 March 1965 Secret Relations between the Federal and Singapore Governments The present relations between the Federal Government and the Singapore Government in Malaysia are causing us a great deal of concern. There is no real working relationship between the two Governments. The two strongest political forces are U.M.N.O....’
262. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 11 March 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 11 March 1965 627. Secret Priority Malaysia/Indonesia Tunku showed me this morning a letter he had just received from Thanat Khoman with a message from Subandrio. 2. Subandrio said he and Sukarno had been on the point of fixing a date for a meeting with Malaysia but a...’
263. BRIEFING NOTES FOR VISIT OF LEE KUAN YEW: 15 March 1965; ‘Canberra, 15 March 1965 Secret Background 1. The Tunku told Critchley on 3rd March that Lee had over-played his hand and there was no present prospect of ‘disengagement’ with Singapore. 2. This is not surprising. Once they started to think about it carefully the leadership in Kuala Lumpur were scarcely...’
264. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN HASLUCK AND LEE KUAN YEW: 16 March 1965; ‘Canberra, 16 March 1965 Secret I opened a discussion of about one hour by asking for Mr. Lee’s views on confrontation and the Indonesian situation. Mr. Lee thought confrontation would continue at least so long as Sukarno lived: there was no advantage for Sukarno in changing course now, apart from...’
265. SAVINGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 14 April 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 14 April 1965 16 . Secret Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s Views Lee, who is making his first visit to Kuala Lumpur since his return from Australia, called on me today. He had not yet seen the Tunku but hoped to do so this evening. 2. Lee complained about...’
266. LETTER FROM LEE KUAN YEW TO MENZIES: 20 April 1965; ‘Singapore, 20 April 1965 Secret I write to thank you for the rare opportunity you afforded me of putting across the problems now bedevilling Malaysia to your Cabinet colleagues.1 I have waited for a fortnight after returning before composing my thoughts in writing, as you so kindly requested. I am...’
267. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO MCEWEN: 7 May 1965; ‘London, 7 May 1965 3613. Secret Malaysia In my talk with Bottomley3 yesterday, I indicated that I was less optimistic about Lee’s willingness to refrain from pressing for ‘disengagement’ than he had appeared to be during his visit to Canberra.4 I said I thought that a dangerous situation was developing...’
268. CABLEGRAM TO SINGAPORE: 17 May 1965; ‘Canberra, 17 May 1965 529. Secret Please pass to Mr Hasluck on arrival.1 From the Prime Minister. Jockel2 is carrying with him a copy of a recent letter to me from Lee Kuan Yew.3 I am sending reply by air tomorrow. I emphasise that the correspondence was at my suggestion...’
269. LETTER FROM MENZIES TO LEE KUAN YEW: 18 May 1965; ‘Canberra, 18 May 1965 Personal Confidential Thank you for your personal letter of April 20th, following up our valuable discussions during your recent visit.1 Perhaps I should make clear a few aspects of my own thinking. I was, and am, impressed by your political analysis, and your belief that it...’
270. DEA PAPER BY JOCKEL: 28 May 1965; ‘Canberra, c. 28 May 1965 Secret Notes on Visit to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore Accompanying the Minister, I was in Kuala Lumpur from Wednesday, 19th May t of riday, 21st May, and in Singapore on Saturday, 22nd May. 2. In Kuala Lumpur the Minister had a private talk with the...’
271. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 4 June 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 4 June 1965 1296. Secret Priority I am sending reports by bag on the parliamentary debate on the King’s speech,1 together with an assessment of the state of relations between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. 2. The main points that have emerged are:— (a) The PAP has issued a...’
272. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 5 June 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 5 June 1965 1301. Secret Priority Lee’s Views on the Political Situation. In our talk yesterday June 4th Lee continued to pursue the line in paragraph 4 of my telegram 1296.1 He singled Ismail out for special praise and said that he hoped to be able to keep...’
273. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 10 June 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 10 June 1965 1351 . Top Secret Immediate Indonesia Tunku called Head, Wade, Butler1 (new Canadian High Commissioner) and me to a meeting at the residence late last night. Others present were Ismail and Tan Siew Sin. 2. Tunku said his Ambassador in Bangkok2 had sent a message...’
274. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 10 June 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 10 June 1965 1352. Secret Singapore/Kuala Lumpur Relations Head, Wade and I have been discussing the problem of Singapore/Kuala Lumpur relations. We agree that the prospects of any improvement are dim unless Lee leaves the scene. At the same time, of course, we appreciate that his detention (or...’
275. SUBMISSION FROM JOCKEL TO HASLUCK: 11 June 1965; ‘Canberra, 11 June 1965 Secret Singapore/Kuala Lumpur Relations As you will see from Critchley’s latest telegram No. 1352,1 the Commonwealth High Commissions in Kuala Lumpur are not able to make any really useful suggestions about how to deal with the current situation. Head seems to have bungled his interviews with...’
276. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 11 June 1965; ‘Canberra, 11 June 1965 898 . Top Secret Immediate Reference your 1351.1 We are not in a position to have an opinion whether the plan is genuine or not. However, even if it is genuine, we see the following grave difficulties:— (a) The plan could well be at an embryonic...’
277. REPORT FROM PRITCHETT TO HASLUCK: 12 June 1965; ‘Singapore, 12 June 1965 Secret I spoke with Lee Kuan Yew yesterday. He was relaxed and balanced. The following are the main points. 2. I queried Lee closely about his political motivation over the last six weeks or so; in particular to what extent he was trying to stimulate a...’
278. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 25 June 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 25 June 1965 1465. Secret Immediate Review Of Recent Developments Your 960.2 Internal With the Tunku and others away, the internal political quarrel has continued at a more subdued level. Alliance ministers are now giving their main attention to emphasising development and the progress that the Central Government...’
279. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 26 June 1965; ‘Singapore, 26 June 1965 544 . Secret Immediate Canberra’s 679.1 As reported by the High Commissioner (his 6 to London)2 the political situation has been comparatively subdued over the last two weeks. The main development in Singapore/ Kuala Lumpur relations has been the Tunku’s statement that he was ready to...’
280. EXTRACT FROM RECORD OF DISCUSSIONS ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING: 28 June 1965; ‘Washington, 28 June 1965 Top Secret Malaysia–Indonesia 25. At Mr. Rusk’s suggestion, the meeting turned its attention to Malaysia/Indonesia. 26. Mr. Holyoake said that in New Zealand’s view Sukarno was losing his power of manoeuvre and that the PK1 were acquiring more influence with him. 27. Mr. Hasluck said it...’
281. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN LEE KUAN YEW AND TURNER, NIXON AND PRITCHETT: 1 July 1965; ‘Singapore, 1 July 1965 Confidential After a reference by Mr. Turner to publicity in Djakarta about Mr. Lee’s statements and comments in the press there to the effect that Malaysia was breaking up, the Prime Minister said it was not possible for him to take things slowly as many people...’
282. SAVINGRAM TO CANBERRA: 8 July 1965; ‘Jakarta, 8 July 1965 35 . Confidential [ matter omitted ] Malaysia 15. Hostility towards Malaysia will be a constant and continuing factor in Indonesian foreign policy in the months ahead. The Indonesians will continue to attack Malaysia in the familiar terms of it being a ‘Puppet regime’ created as...’
283. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO PLIMSOLL: 15 July 1965; ‘Jakarta, 15 July 1965 35. Secret Immediate The Prime Minister’s equation of our situation in Borneo in facing Indonesia with that in Vietnam as being ‘War’ has attracted very considerable attention here.2 It is widely reported in the vernacular press today, and there will certainly be a state3 of violently...’
284. MEMORANDUM FROM CRITCHLEY TO PLIMSOLL: 15 July 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 15 July 1965 1187. Secret The Challenge of Mr Lee Kuan Yew I refer to Singapore’s memorandum No. 847 of 3rd July.1 2. I read with concern the report of Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Mr Turner and Mr Nixon in Singapore on 1st July.2 It confirms...’
285. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN LEE KUAN YEW AND PRITCHETT: 21 July 1965; ‘Singapore, 21 July 1965 Confidential I said to Lee that I wanted to discuss with him the implication of remarks he had made to Messrs. Turner and Nixon about Australian troops in Malaysia.1 Lee gave me his full attention. Also, I said, some comments made to me by Alex Josey...’
286. SUBMISSION FROM PLIMSOLL TO HASLUCK: July 1965; ‘Canberra, undated Confidential Relations between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore The High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur and the Deputy High Commissioner in Singapore recently reported a disturbing hardening of attitudes between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. In the attached memorandum, dated 15th July,1 Mr. Critchley concluded that, unless a show-down between the...’
287. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 6 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 6 August 1965 1703 . Unclassified Prime Minister’s Return The Tunku returned to Malaysia yesterday.1 2. Speaking to the press in Singapore and in Kuala Lumpur, the Tunku made the following points: (i) That he would certainly be meeting Lee Kuan Yew soon for talks and attempt to...’
288. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 9 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 9 August 1965 1710. Secret Emergency Following meeting of Alliance Council this afternoon (8th August) Tunku told Head that the Alliance Government has decided and would announce tomorrow the separation of Singapore from Malaysia. Meeting was at Head’s initiative and it is uncertain if otherwise British would have...’
289. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 9 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 9 August 1965 1141 . Secret Your telegram No. 17101 does not indicate that you have been informed of Malaysian Government’s decision by that Government itself. Your information seems to be only from Lord Head. 2. It looks from your telegram to be too late for us to change...’
290. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO HASLUCK: 9 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 9 August 1965 1713. Secret Emergency My 1710.1 Tunku confirmed that Singapore separation would be ‘complete’ but said an agreement had been worked out and signed with Singapore covering defence, economic and other matters. He promised to let me have a copy of the agreement as soon as...’
291. LETTER FROM MENZIES TO TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN: 9 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 9 August 1965 Secret I am deeply disturbed to hear from Critchley that you intend to announce that Singapore is to be separated from Malaysia. I regret in view of our relations that you did not think it fit either to consult us or notify us what you were...’
292. LETTER FROM LEE KUAN YEW TO MENZIES: 9 August 1965; ‘Singapore, 9 August 1965 Confidential By the time you have decoded this message you will know that the Tunku has proclaimed, and I have agreed and simultaneously also proclaimed Singapore as a separate and sovereign nation. But for your staunch support for democratic practice, Malaysia, I and my Government would...’
293. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 9 August 1965; ‘Jakarta, 9 August 1965 935. Secret Immediate Singapore and Indonesia We have heard on Radio Australia that Singapore is no longer part of Malaysia. The British Ambassador earlier in the morning informed me of the immediate background in Kuala Lumpur to this announcement. Already there has been some lower level...’
294. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE: 9 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 9 August 1965 1148. 851. Confidential Immediate We are looking forward to your earliest possible assessment of the constitutional changes. Among the points we would like you to cover are: (a) To what extent was Lee Kuan Yew a willing participant in these decisions? (b) How genuine and effective...’
295. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 9 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 9 August 1965 1729 . Secret Immediate Separation of Singapore I shall report more fully as further information becomes available but the following are my first reactions to the questions raised in your telegram 1148.1 (a) Lee Kuan Yew was a willing participant but only it seems under...’
296. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 10 August 1965; ‘Singapore, 10 August 1965 669. Secret Priority Your 851.1 Some of the points you raise will have been partially covered by our 660, reporting Lee’s talk with Commonwealth representatives, and our 668, reporting Lee’s press conference today.2 In particular you will have noted that though Lee contemplates a resumption of...’
297. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 10 August 1965; ‘Singapore, 10 August 1965 678. Secret Priority Kuala Lumpur’s 1729.1 2. Position as reported by High Commissioner is not altogether as I understand it here. I do not believe that Goh and Barker threatened resignation: neither have sufficient following in the party or the constituencies for such a threat to...’
298. CABINET DECISION NO. 1121 (FAD): 10 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 10 August 1965 Secret Without Memorandum—Malaysia/Singapore Separation The Committee noted the separation arrangements announced on and given effect from 9th August. It noted, with regret, that the event of separation had occurred without prior discussion with or notice to Australia—or Britain or New Zealand—by Malaysia or Singapore, notwithstanding the...’
299. CABLEGRAM TO PRITCHETT: 10 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 10 August 1965 864. Secret Singapore and Malaysia Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of Singapore. Begins: My dear Lee, Thank you very much for your letter of yesterday. You and I have discussed in the past the many problems that were...’
300. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY: 11 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 11 August 1965 1158. Secret Immediate Singapore and Malaysia Please pass the following message from the Prime Minister to the Malaysian Prime Minister. Begins:— My dear Tunku, Critchley has told me of his talk with you.1 Much as I regret the fact that Singapore and Malaysia have separated, I...’
301. CABLEGRAM FROM BUNTING TO CUMMING AND EASTMAN: 11 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 11 August 1965 4149. Secret Immediate Singapore and Malaysia Following for your information is a copy of a message from the Prime Minister to MrWilson which has been handed to the British High Commission here tonight. Begins: We have each been shabbily treated over the way in which the...’
302. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 11 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 11 August 1965 1166. Secret Immediate Defence Arrangements for Singapore Reference your telegram No. 1737.1 You will have seen from Prime Minister’s statement and messages to Wilson,2 Tunku3 and Lee4 the stress which is placed by the Government on the continuation of existing arrangements for a unified system of...’
303. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 11 August 1965; ‘London, 11 August 1965 6919. Secret Malaysia—Separation of Singapore As considered British assessment will not be available before end of week I might in meantime, suggest some personal thoughts as to implications for confrontation. 2. Long-term outcome will of course depend on fresh stock-takings which will undoubtedly be made by...’
304. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 11 August 1965; ‘Jakarta, 11 August 1965 940. Secret Immediate Subandrio I saw Subandrio this morning. He was understandably enough in rip-roaring form and rubbed my nose in a number of things although he did it fairly pleasantly and was by no means offensive and cocky. He said that we must now understand...’
305. CABLEGRAM TO SHANN: 12 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 12 August 1965 810. Secret Immediate Your talk with Dr Subandrio (your 940).1 It would be better for you to avoid expressing views about Indonesia recognizing Singapore quickly. We noticed the context of your remarks, but there is the risk that Subandrio might read into your view more than...’
306. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 12 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 12 August 1965 1758. Secret Priority Malaysia: Singapore I was not surprised to learn from Singapore’s 678 that the reports in Singapore differ from what I have heard here.1 However, Pritchett’s account requires further comment. 2. Lee told Tunku and Ismail that Goh and Barker had threatened resignation....’
307. CABINET DECISION NO. 1123: 12 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 12 August 1965 Confidential Without Memorandum—Australian Relations with Singapore The Cabinet noted that Singapore, having separated from Malaysia and not being, as yet, a member of the Commonwealth in its own right, is strictly not eligible for treatment as a Commonwealth country and is outside the Sterling area and...’
308. LETTER FROM TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN TO MENZIES: 12 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 12 August 1965 I must apologize for not advising you beforehand that I would be taking this step to set up Singapore as an independent country. I was afraid then that if my intentions were to become known there would be trouble within the country and so I...’
309. CABLEGRAM TO LONDON: 13 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 13 August 1965 4190. Secret Malaysia and Singapore As stated in our telegram No. 1166 to Kuala Lumpur1 we do not wish at this stage to express considered official views about changes and modifications in the existing defence treaty arrangements. We are pleased at the progress at the meeting...’
310. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 13 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 13 August 1965 1773. Secret Malaysia/Singapore Further to my 1758,1 it is worth noting that had Singapore been anxious to avoid separation it would have been logical for Lee to have procrastinated and to have arranged quietly for the proposals to be leaked to the British. He would...’
311. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 14 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 14 August 1965 1188. Secret Singapore and Indonesia1 We are concerned that unless this matter is handled skillfully and with understanding by each of the position of the other, this subject could start to poison relations between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. 2. Our tentative assessment of the position is...’
312. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 16 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 1965 1790. Secret Priority Singapore and Indonesia I agree generally with the assessment in para 2 of your 1188,1 and particularly the importance Singapore must place on satisfying its own trading community. However, I would not think that Singapore has much doubt about reactions in Kuala...’
313. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 16 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 1965 1791. Secret Priority Malaysia/Singapore Outlook Now that a week has passed since the separation of Singapore, there appears to be three critical factors which will affect the short-term future of Malaysia. 2. Assuming as I think we should that both the Singapore and Kuala Lumpur...’
314. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 16 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 16 August 1965 SECRET Since sending our telegraph No. 1188,1 I have read the Tunku’s reply to the Prime Minister.2 This increases our apprehension. It contains no suggestion of a new beginning or of the need for mutual co-operation between Singapore and Malaysia. On the contrary its tone could...’
315. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 16 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 16 August 1965 1795. Confidential Priority Tunku, Razak, Ismail and Tan Siew Sin have now given me their account of the developments leading to Singapore’s separation. 2. The Tunku said he reached his decision in hospital on June 29th and shortly afterwards told Lim Kim San who was...’
316. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO PRITCHETT: 16 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 16 August 1965 920. Secret Priority Please see the telegram of instructions which I have just sent to Critchley.1 I understand you have a copy of the Tunku’s letter to the Prime Minister.2 The Department has also repeated to you and Critchley the reports from Eastman which suggest that...’
317. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO HASLUCK: 17 August 1965; ‘Singapore, 17 August 1965 726. Secret Priority I have just returned from interviews with Goh, Rajaratnam and Lee. Goh was the only one with whom I could have a sensible discussion. 2. I spoke to Goh along the lines of your 920.1 He was thoroughly receptive, though initially somewhat sceptical...’
318. SUBMISSION FROM BOOKER TO HASLUCK: 18 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 18 August 1965 Singapore and the United Nations In his message to the Prime Minister dated 12th August2 Tunku Abdul Rahman said: ‘I propose to sponsor Singapore’s admission to the United Nations and also as a member of the Commonwealth and I hope you would be willing to give...’
319. CABLEGRAM TO SINGAPORE: 23 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 23 August 1965 967. Secret Reference your telegram 745.1 As you will appreciate, all our emphasis in public statements and private messages has been on the establishment and maintenance of the closest integration in the field of defence between Singapore and Malaysia. As you say this assumes substantial trust....’
320. SUBMISSION FROM JOCKEL TO HASLUCK: 24 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 24 August 1965 Secret Malaysia Attached is a paper which sets out some initial thinking on the kinds of issues that now arise following the separation of Singapore from Malaysia. In compiling these notes we have had in mind the kind of reappraisal of the overall situation that is...’
321. SAVINGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 24 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 24 August 1965 40. Secret Separation of Singapore I refer to my telegram 1195 of the 16th August outlining the account given to me by Malaysian Ministers of the developments leading to Singapore’s separation.1 2. Mr Tan Siew Sin has checked up for me and tells me that...’
322. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 25 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 25 August 1965 1867. Secret Parkinson1 returned from Borneo today. Following is my assessment of the present situation. 2. The separation of Singapore appears to have created uncertainty and some tension among sections of nearly all the racial groups in Sabah and Sarawak. These arise out of— (a)...’
323. NOTES FOR CABINET: 26 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 26 August 1965 Secret Quadripartite Talks on Malaysia and Singapore There is no agenda for this meeting.1 But we are told from London that there are urgent matters to be decided and that time is slipping by. Our information from London suggests: (a) the British believe that a fluid...’
324. CABINET DECISION NO. 1173 (FAD): 26 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 26 August 1965 Secret Without Memorandum—Proposed Quadripartite Talks Arising from the Separation of Singapore from Malaysia The Committee discussed the invitation extended by the Prime Minister of Britain on 18th August to the Governments of New Zealand, United States and Australia to send senior officials to a meeting in...’
325. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 27 August 1965; ‘Canberra, 27 August 1965 1259. Secret Sabah and Sarawak Reference your telegram No. 1867.1 Thank you for this assessment. Although the situation is fluid, we need to be as clear in our minds as we can about trends and developments. Your assessment gives rise in our minds to a number...’
326. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 28 August 1965; ‘Jakarta, 28 August 1965 996. Secret Malaysia While this is of course a somewhat hazardous exercise it may be worthwhile to speculate a little on Indonesian behaviour at the moment in the light of the new situation and on possible developments in this behaviour. My thoughts are offered by way...’
327. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO HASLUCK: 31 August 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 31 August 1965 1906. Secret Priority Sabah and Sarawak Reference your telegram 1259.1 There are strong elements in Sabah and Sarawak that want more than a ‘spinning out of transitional arrangements’. They see Singapore’s separation as both a reason and an opportunity to press for Constitutional revision or...’
328. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO HASLUCK: 2 September 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 2 September 1965 1924. Secret Priority Sabah and Sarawak The following are some additional thoughts elaborating on the assessment in my 1906.1 2. My impression is that there is a good deal of sentiment in UPKO for secession. This is opposed generally by USNO although there seem to...’
329. EXTRACT FROM REVIEW OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: 3 September 1965; ‘Canberra, 3 September 1965 Secret Political Situation in the Borneo States 10. The lull in Sabah’s political affairs continues while ideas crystallise. The bad impression created by the Tunku’s visit has persisted1 and has given rise to a feeling that to remain in the Federation would be to accept a...’
330. MINUTE FROM ROGERS TO BORDER: 20 September 1965; ‘Canberra, 20 September 1965 Secret Indonesian Approaches to Lee Kuan Yew Reference telegram 866 dated 17th September from Singapore, reporting Pritchett’s conversation with Lee Kuan Yew, in the course of which Lee said that Indonesia had made seven approaches to Singapore since Singapore’s separation from Malaysia.2 2. Lee told Pritchett...’
331. CABLEGRAM TO SINGAPORE: 21 September 1965; ‘Canberra, 21 September 1965 1095. Confidential Your telegram 866.1 We think it important that Lee should keep the Tunku informed of Indonesian approaches and about his response to them. Indirect communication e.g. through Critchley is no substitute for the kind of close consultation between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur which is...’
332. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 21 September 1965; ‘Singapore, 21 September 1965 884. Secret Your 1095.1 Lee’s point about Pulau Sambu was that he wanted to get it across to the Indonesians that they should not think that any resumption of trade would give them access to Singapore or Malaysian territory—i.e. he was keeping them at arm’s length....’
333. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 23 September 1965; ‘Singapore, 23 September 1965 895. Secret During my talk with Goh on Tuesday (my 884)1 he expressed much impatience with Lee’s behaviour and said he had rebuked him severely for his Hokkien interview.2 This sort of thing had to stop. I reminded him of his earlier statements to me and...’
334. LETTER FROM WILSON TO MENZIES: 25 September 1965; ‘London, 25 September 1965 Top Secret By now you will have had reports on the talks about the consequences of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia which have recently been held between official representatives of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, the United States and Britain.1 We had earlier...’
335. SUBMISSION FROM RENOUF TO HASLUCK: 1 October 1965; ‘Canberra, 1 October 1965 Confidential Lord Head’s Views on the Situation in Borneo The British High Commissioner to Malaysia, Lord Head, recently visited Sarawak and Sabah. His views on the situation in those states are summarized below.2 2. Lord Head described the feeling in Borneo as one of ‘all-pervading uncertainty’...’
336. MEMORANDUM FROM BENTLEY TO CANBERRA: 15 October 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 15 October 1965 1798. Malaysian Reaction to the Indonesian Crisis For the first few days after the coup in Djakarta, there was little reaction of consequence from either the Malaysian Government or the press. The Tunku was quoted as saying that the Communists may have overplayed their hand;...’
337. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 18 October 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 18 October 1965 2228. Secret Priority Indonesia In case you have not already heard from the British High Commission, British here have given us the following account of a conversation between Peck and Ghazali last week. 2. Ghazali said that the Indonesian Army had been in touch with...’
338. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 25 October 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 25 October 1965 2258. Secret Immediate Barter Trade with Indonesia Our 2251.1 Head spoke to Razak on 22nd October suggesting that he should ask Singapore to raise the resumption of barter trade in the C.O.C.2 Razak declined, saying it would be wrong for him to take the initiative...’
339. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO CRITCHLEY: 28 October 1965; ‘Canberra, 28 October 1965 1533. Secret Indonesia We have seen Head’s report of a talk with Razak on 19th October.1 Head said that a certain amount of pressure, notably from Fenner, had been put on Razak to intensify operations in Borneo. Head reported that Razak shared his view that perhaps...’
340. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 10 November 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 10 November 1965 2382. Top Secret Immediate Barter Trade Head discussed with Wade and Parkinson this morning Singapore’s barter trading proposals and the effect of continuing disagreement between Malaysia and Singapore. 2. Head was gloomy. He had now reached the conclusion that Lee’s main political objective was to...’
341. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 11 November 1965; ‘Singapore, 11 November 1965 1093. Top Secret Immediate Barter TYade Kuala Lumpur’s 232.1 It might be worthwhile drawing together some of the main points from earlier reports on the situation as seen from Singapore. (i) Singapore has never been happy about the stopping of the barter trade. It has meant...’
342. CABLEGRAM TO CRITCHLEY AND PRITCHETT: 11 November 1965; ‘Canberra, 11 November 1965 1609. 1375. Secret Immediate Barter Trade Your telegram 2382.1 1. We share your feeling that Lord Head might be seeing things too starkly, despite the mutual animosity which embitters relations between the Malaysian and Singapore leaders and their apparent intention to make things as hard as...’
343. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 16 November 1965; ‘Singapore,1 16 November 1965 1109. Secret Indonesia Over the weekend the Tungku spoke to me about Ghazali’s talks with Sukendro and elaborated on what Ghazali had told me.2 2. Sukendro had emphasised that the Army were determined to crush the communists. For this it was essential to create a good...’
344. CABLEGRAM FROM CRITCHLEY TO CANBERRA: 18 November 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 18 November 1965 2446. Secret Priority Barter Trade Tunku saw me this morning (November 18) when he confirmed his discussion with Head as reported in our 2436.1 Tunku said he was not prepared to allow barter trading and would use the Malaysian Navy to attack Indonesian ships if...’
345. CABLEGRAM TO SINGAPORE: 18 November 1965; ‘Canberra, 18 November 1965 1410. Secret Barter Trade In earlier messages we raised with you the question of what grounds there were for the Singapore authorities really being confident that their proposed barter trade scheme would work. In his telegram No. 23491 Critchley made the point that he had doubts...’
346. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 18 November 1965; ‘Singapore, 18 November 1965 1115. Secret Barter Trade CINC(FE) this afternoon showed me Head’s cable reporting his talk with the Tungku referred to in Kuala Lumpur’s 2436.1 I note that Head opened the conversation by referring to reports that Singapore Ministers were intending to start barter trade on December 1...’
347. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 24 November 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 24 November 1965 2506. Secret Immediate Barter Trade Following is text of letter addressed to me1 from the Tunku and handed to us by Ministry official this afternoon. Comments in our immediately following cable.2 I wish to invite your attention to the question of the proposed resumption of...’
348. CABLEGRAM TO PARKINSON: 26 November 1965; ‘Canberra, 26 November 1965 1705. Secret Immediate The following reply has been approved by the Minister for you to communicate on his behalf to the Tunku. The British and New Zealanders are being given an opportunity to comment and have been asked to convey any views direct to you as...’
349. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO PRITCHETT: 26 November 1965; ‘Canberra, 26 November 1965 1455. Secret Immediate My immediately preceding telegram to Parkinson contains the Government’s reply to the Tunku’s letter. 1 You might discuss the problem with Singapore ministers informally as opportunity offers and make the following points:— (i) We are glad that the proposal has been examined carefully...’
350. CABLEGRAM FROM PARKINSON TO CANBERRA: 9 December 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 9 December 1965 2640. Secret Priority Barter Trading For ‘Toh’ in our cable No. 26341 please read ‘Bogaars’. 2. Wade, Bottomley and I met again this afternoon following Wade’s farewell meeting with Razak (Wade leaves tomorrow for six weeks’ leave in New Zealand.) Razak told Wade that he...’
351. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 16 December 1965; ‘Singapore, 16 December 1965 1252. Confidential Representatives of Malaysia and Singapore yesterday agreed to an alternative proposal for barter trade of stationing two two-hundred tons ships off Singapore (a scheme previously rejected by C.I.S.C. as less secure than Pulau Senang).1 The chances are that Pulau Senang will now drop out...’
352. RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN AND HASLUCK: 19 December 1965; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 19 December 1965 Confidential Relations with Singapore The Minister asked the Tunku about the present state of relations with Singapore. The Tunku referred to Lee Kuan Yew’s earlier public statements regarding his intention of establishing barter trade with the Indonesians from Pulau Senang. Following Lee’s public statements on...’
353. REPORT OF HASLUCK’S VISIT TO SINGAPORE: 22 December 1965; ‘Singapore, 22 December 1965 Confidential Accompanied by Sir James Plimsoll and Mr Pritchett, the Minister for External Affairs (Mr Hasluck) called on Mr Rajaratnam (the Foreign Minister of Singapore), Mr Lee Kuan Yew (Prime Minister), Dr Goh Keng Swee (Minister for the Interior and Defence), and Air Chief Marshal Sir...’
354. SAVINGRAM TO ALL POSTS: 30 March 1966; ‘Canberra, 30 March 1966 Secret Indonesia: Recent Events The sequence of recent events in Indonesia seems to be as follows. 2. In securing at least the nominal acceptance, by military and political leaders, of the Cabinet reshuffle on 21st February when Nasution was dropped, Sukarno apparently took little account of...’
355. CABLEGRAM FROM SHANN TO CANBERRA: 1 April 1966; ‘Jakarta, 1 April 1966 363. Secret Malaysia I have discussed Malaysia this morning with both Suharto and Malik with some conflicting results. Suharto maintained the usual Indonesian line that Malaysia constituted a danger to Indonesia and had been improperly set up. While it remained in its present form military confrontation...’
356. CABLEGRAM TO EASTMAN: 14 April 1966; ‘Canberra, 14 April 1966 646. Secret Please deliver the following message to the Tunku from the Prime Minister.1 Begins: My Dear Tunku, This is my first official message to you on a personal basis since I came to the Prime Ministership, and I begin it with a message of greeting...’
357. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 15 April 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 15 April 1966 1013. Secret Priority Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia I finally managed to see Tunku and hand over Prime Minister’s message1 just before dinner engagement. Tunku asked me to convey reply on following lines— Begins He thanked Prime Minister for message and reciprocated kind remarks. He agreed that it would...’
358. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 15 April 1966; ‘Jakarta, 15 April 1966 415. Confidential Confrontation From here, we are finding it difficult to sort out in any consistently logical way the events of the past week insofar as they bear on the policy of the new Indonesian leaders towards Malaysia, confrontation and recognition of Singapore. Our uncertainty has...’
359. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 19 April 1966; ‘Singapore, 19 April 1966 474. Confidential I discussed confrontation with Rajaratnam this morning in the light of Djakarta’s 4151 (incomplete version). 2. He said Singapore’s information through various channels was that Malik wanted to dismantle confrontation and get on with economic rehabilitation before the mob started after him and his...’
360. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 6 May 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 6 May 1966 1165. Secret Malaysia/Indonesia We have no further developments to report since yesterday’s telegram No. 11411 and No. 1156.2 It might, however, be of some use if I attempted some summary of the situation as seen here today. 2. It is, of course, impossible to pick...’
361. CABLEGRAM FROM PARKINSON TO CANBERRA: 7 May 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 7 May 1966 1173. Secret Priority Indonesia/Malaysia Ghazali sent for Wade and I (Eastman away meeting daughter) this morning to brief us on his discussions last weekend with Malik in Bangkok1 and his subsequent talks with Tunku. He had seen Walker2 earlier in the morning. Ghazali’s account differs...’
362. CABLEGRAM FROM LOVEDAY TO CANBERRA: 23 May 1966; ‘Jakarta, 23 May 1966 590. Secret Immediate Confrontation With Malik and Razak likely to meet shortly,2 following are personal views on some of the factors and issues involved. Given my short time here I make them tentatively, especially since rumours, contradictions and deliberate double-talk are prevalent here. Views of Malik...’
363. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 28 May 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 28 May 1966 1341. Confidential Malaysia–Indonesia Ghazali today briefed Wade, Walker and myself on yesterday’s visit of Indonesian officers.1 2. Ghazali said that a goodwill visit from the ‘enemy’ before formal peace talks had even started might seem odd to Western eyes but this was ‘the kampong way’....’
364. CABLEGRAM FROM PRITCHETT TO CANBERRA: 1 June 1966; ‘Singapore, 1 June 1966 685. Confidential Malaysia/Singapore/Britain: Defence Agreements Your 835.1 I spoke briefly yesterday to Bogaars and Goh Keng Swee about defence arrangements with Malaysia and Britain. 2. Bogaars said that at the last meeting of officials Ghazali had agreed ‘as a last minute concession’ that he would table...’
365. CABLEGRAM FROM LOOMES TO CANBERRA: 1 June 1966; ‘Bangkok, 1 June 1966 837. Secret Immediate Malaysia–Indonesia talks With British and New Zealand Ambassadors,1 I saw Razak this afternoon. Razak was jubilant at a very satisfactory outcome. 2. Agreement was reached today that there would be an exchange of notes (which will be exchanged at 6 p.m. this evening)...’
366. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 3 June 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 3 June 1966 1391. Secret Immediate Malaysian/Indonesian Talks Razak and party returned late yesterday afternoon. Ghazali gave briefing at noon today to Wade, Walker and myself. 2. Ghazali said that in their own ministerial talks Razak and Malik kept to civilities and generalities and left substance of negotiations...’
367. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 8 June 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 8 June 1966 1430. Secret Priority Disengagement My 14201 and your 967.2 Grandy proposed to Razak late yesterday that he should talk to Osman about programme for disengagement, saying that he had worked out various ideas which Osman might find useful. Razak agreed readily. Grandy then spoke again...’
368. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 9 June 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 9 June 1966 1434. Confidential Malaysia—Singapore Lee Kuan Yew and Lim Kim San were in Kuala Lumpur yesterday. They met the Tunku, Razak, Ismail, Tan Siew Sin and Sambanthan at the Residency. 2. The two Prime Ministers met the press after their meeting. Lee said discussions boiled down...’
369. CABLEGRAM FROM HASLUCK TO PLIMSOLL: 9 June 1966; ‘Manila, 9 June 1966 526. Top Secret Reference Committee Minute 33/1966.2 Copy No. 19 being returned by safe hand. I think we have to be exceptionally careful that discussions of disengagement and reciprocal rundown of forces after end of confrontation are kept completely separate from any question of withdrawal of...’
370. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 17 June 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 17 June 1966 1530. Secret Indonesia-Malaysia Our 1514.1 Ghazali gave briefing today to Wade, Bottomley and myself. 2. Ghazali said he went to Djakarta on personal invitation of Suharto and kept visit as secret as possible to avoid interrogation by Press.2 At their first meeting Suharto said that...’
371. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 20 June 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 20 June 1966 1539. Secret Disengagement of Forces If formula reported in para 4 my 15301 is accepted by Malaysians and settlement on that basis is ratified by both Governments we may expect that drive for economy will lead British to urge Malaysians to press ahead with disengagement...’
372. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 7 July 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 7 July 1966 1679. Secret End of Confrontation During Mr Fraser’s call,1 Razak told us that at meeting earlier today he had told Mr Denis Healey2 of Malaysian desire for Malaysian Divisional Commander (Brigadier Ibrahim promoted)3 to take over Borneo Operation Command from DOBOPS4 immediately on signature of...’
373. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 26 July 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 26 July 1966 1786. Secret Malaysia—Indonesia Colonel Moerdani1 returned to Kuala Lumpur from Djakarta last night. The following is the state of Malaysian/Indonesian relations following his return as told to McDonald2 and British and New Zealand first secretaries today by Zainal Abidin Sulong. 2. Ghazali when in Djakarta...’
374. CABLEGRAM TO CANBERRA: 5 August 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 5 August 1966 1833. Confidential Priority Confrontation You will have already heard from the British that the Tunku told Walker yesterday that, despite the fact that he had little faith in Indonesia while Sukarno was still alive, he had decided to take a risk in the interests of...’
375. CABLEGRAM FROM EASTMAN TO CANBERRA: 6 August 1966; ‘Kuala Lumpur, 6 August 1966 1843. Confidential Priority Confrontation Our 1833. Walker, Wade and I have since seen Ghazali. 2. Ghazali said that in proposed secret exchange (supplementary to ratification of Bangkok Accord) Malik would write to say— (a) that Indonesian understanding was that implementation of Article II would take...’
376. CABLEGRAM FROM LOVEDAY TO CANBERRA: 12 August 1966; ‘Jakarta, 12 August 1966 986. Confidential Priority Malaysia The large Malaysian party, and the relatively smaller group led by Malik, left this morning by Malaysian and Indonesian aircraft respectively for the two-day return visit to Kuala Lumpur.1 The bonhomie at the airport reflected the warm atmosphere which surrounded the functions...’
377. CABLEGRAM TO KUALA LUMPUR: 12 August 1966; ‘Canberra, 12 August 1966 1330. Restricted Immediate Please deliver following message from Mr Hasluck to the Tunku informing him that Mr Hasluck has in mind publishing text within the next day or so. Please advise when delivered. Begins— I am sure that you must be greatly heartened by the agreement...’

Documents on Australian Foreign Policy

Volume 25: Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, 1961–1966

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